Ockham on what makes propositions true
Handout for 12.01.2010 lecture
I
According to O the apparatus of signification and supposition (and more generally the theory of terms and propositions) is supposed to enable us to say what makes propositions true (or false), and indeed is sufficient for this purpose. Before seeing how O proceeds, let’s look at a (perhaps) more familiar example of the kind of approach he uses.
Takethe propositions
(1)“Scott is the author of Waverley”
(2)“Scott is tall”
Both propositions have the form
“a is b”
And so both seem like “elementary” propositions. But (Russell’s) analysis shows that (1) (but not (2))is actually complex, for (1) is really equivalent to three propositions:
(i)At least one person wrote Waverley
(ii)At most one person wrote Waverley
(iii)There is nobody who both wrote Waverley and is not identical with Scott
What Russell famously shows is that the apparent form of certain propositions is not a reliable guide to their “real”, logical structure. That’s what Ockham believes as well. O agrees that
(3)Socrates is human
(4)Socrates is white
are identical as regards their surface form, but he holds that they differ from the point of view of their logical structure. Of course, to know what these propositions really mean, and hence to determine what makes them true or false, we need to know what the proper, logical structure of the proposition is. For Russell, the key to knowing whether a given proposition’s apparent form is the same as its real form is whether or not that proposition contains descriptions (masquerading) as names. (“The author of Waverley”, for instance, is not a name, though it looks like one; it is a description, and descriptions behave differently from names). Once we know what the real form of the proposition is, it is an easy matter to know what would make the proposition true or false. Now for O, the question is not: does the proposition contain descriptions, but rather: does the proposition contain any connotative terms. If the proposition contains no connotative terms, then chances are its apparent form will be its true, logical form. So we first need to know what O means by connotative and absolute terms.
[look at III, 4]
Let’s return to the difference between “surface” vs “deep” form in O
As A. Freddoso puts it:
Ockham holds that a proposition like (3) or (4) is not exponible. That is, it is not such that it can be expounded in terms of other propositions which reveal more perspicuously its underlying logical form. One reason for this is such a proposition contains only absolute terms. Propositions containing connotative terms, on the other hand, are exponible and thus equivalent to hypothetical propositions. For example, according to Ockham the term ‘white’ is a connotative term which secondarily signifies individual whiteness. (…)
Hence, propositions which, like (3) and (4), contain no connotative terms and no syncategorematic elements other than the copula, are not exponible. They wear their logical form on their sleeve, as it were, and cannot be rendered more perspicuous by paraphrase. (A. J. Freddoso, Ockham’s theory of propositions, p. 12-13).
Now one of the main reasons O finds it necessary to appeal to the logical analysis of propositions and terms is that some authors, perhaps because they were misled by the “surface” form of sentences, had provided explanations of what makes propositions true that O finds completely mistaken and unnecessary. These authors are of course the Realists of different stripes (Burley, possiblyScotus). So the question is: can we account for what makes a proposition true without appealing to real universals or common natures? (In a sense, there is a parallel with Russell: Russell thought his theory of descriptions provided a better, simpler and more realistic analysis of propositions than that of, e.g.,Meinong who thought that [because] “we can make true propositions of which [“the golden mountain,” “the round square”] are subjects; hence they must have some kind of logical being, since otherwise the propositions in which they occur would be meaningless.” [Rosenberg & Travis, 168])
II
Ockham’s theory of predication
“From what has been said so far it is also clear that Ockham’s account of predication stands in marked contrast to at least two alternative accounts. According to the first of these alternatives a common term like ‘man’ in ‘Socrates is a man’ supposits for or demotes a universal. On this account an affirmative S-proposition is true just in case its subject term supposits for something which stands in the relation of exemplification (perhaps signified by the copula) to the universal for which the predicate term supposits. By contrast, according to Ockham it is required for the truth of such a proposition that both its subject and predicate supposit for the same thing.
According to the second alternative account, the subject of such a proposition supposits for something which—if the proposition is true—satisfies a function of the form ‘… is F’. Hence, the proponent of this alternative account denies that the subject and predicate S-proposition both have the role of suppositing for something.” Ockham’s theory of propositions, p. 11.