BBL Lab Pmcs Neg

BBL Lab PMCs Neg

1/36

Neg-PMCs

Iran Prolif DA (Links)

A2: We’re pulling out now

PMC ≠ Military Presence

PMC ≠ Its

Generic T Extensions

Hegemony DA (Links)

Hegemony DA (Links)

Hegemony DA (Link Extensions)

NATO CP

CMR DA (Link)

CMR DA (Links)

CMR DA (Links)

Instability Frontline

Hegemony Frontline

International Law Frontline

Solvency Frontline

Human Rights Frontline

Iran Prolif DA (Links)

In order to prevent Iranian proliferation, the US needs to stay in the region.

Russel and Moran, 09.

(James Russel and Daniel Moran. Gulf Research Center Members. October 4-5, 2009. EXTENDED DETERRENCE, SECURITY GUARANTEES, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE GULF REGION.

Some participants expressed the belief that the only acceptable goal for U.S. policy must be to prevent Iran’s nuclear program from succeeding, if necessary by means of direct military attack, the consequences of which for the political stability of the rest of the region they regarded as manageable. It was argued that firmer declaratory policies, including, for instance, a categorical guarantee that the Strait of Hormuz would remain open under all circumstances, are necessary to sustain the credibility of the strategic partnership between the United States and the Gulf states and, absent such an unambiguous stance by the U.S., the natural course for the Arab world would ultimately be to obtain its own nuclear capability. It can also be taken for granted that, to the extent that the American public comes to believe that America’s strategic commitment in the Gulf will expose the United States to nuclear attack, the credibility of America’s extended deterrence will be undermined. The central challenge for U.S. foreign policy is to retain and strengthen the trust of its allies. For this purpose, a number of mechanisms were suggested, including improved and strengthened defense cooperation across the board and a continued, sustained American military presence. As in Cold War Europe, such forces are the ultimate guarantee that U.S. interests would be at stake in any major conflict in the region. Some participants felt that a clearer declaratory policy, including defining specific actions that would trigger explicit responses, would strengthen American credibility. At present, U.S. allies in the Gulf have been left to infer the extent of American resolve from the scale of its capabilities, an imperfect process, at best, and an insufficient basis for such a critical strategic relationship.

Iran Prolif DA (Links)

The US must stay in the Middle East for many reasons

Hajjar, ’02.

(Sami, U.S. Army War College as Professor and Director of Middle East Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy. He is currently on assignment with the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. March 2002. US Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. Strategic studies Institute.

Cross-border conflict is a threat in Southwest Asia since .Iraq continues to pose a threat to its neighbors and to the free flow of oil from the region.. The second challenge identified by the Cohen report is internal conflict. The short-term prospects of such conflict erupting in the Gulf region in the form of civil disturbance, armed uprising, or civil wars are limited due to a combination of factors including the authoritarian nature of the region.s governments, the enhanced and modernized capabilities of their intelligence and security services, and the ability of most regimes to use their power of the purse to secure the loyalties of their citizens.82 Another challenge is the proliferation of dangerous military technologies. In the Gulf, the proliferation of modern military technologies and the attempt to develop WMD capabilities and the means to deliver them are certainly trends of concern in a region with the financial resources to allocate for these purposes as well as the existence of states.principally Iraq and Iran.with motives and justifications to proliferate.83 The fourth security challenge is transnational threats.a broad category that includes drug trafficking, organized crime, piracy, and terrorism. Acts of violence against U.S. personnel and assets have been and continue to be the major security challenge for the United States in a region with the common perception that U.S. policies are biased, anti-Arab, and anti-Muslim. Lastly, the report identifies humanitarian threats in the form of failed states, famines, uncontrolled migration, and other natural and man-made disasters as security challenges that could affect U.S. interests. They require the unique capabilities of U.S. military forces to provide stability and assistance. While the chances of humanitarian threats occurring in the region are low, the possibility of some kind of an accident involving oil spills, a nuclear reactor breach, or a natural disaster such as an earthquake cannot be dismissed. Terrorism is today the most critical security concern for the United States. U.S. military presence in the region provides a tempting target for determined radical groups opposed to U.S. policies and interests, as the attacks on Khobar Towers and the USS Cole demonstrated. None of the other security challenges in the Gulf are as directly related to U.S. presence. During the Gulf War, Saudi financier Osama bin Laden and his al Qaida [the Base] organization sought to remove U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. Failing this, they came to regard the United States as the enemy of Islam to be fought wherever possible. hence the attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa and recent reports of foiled attempts by individuals with ties to bin Laden to target the U.S. embassy and personnel in India and Yemen.84 And while bin Laden and his fanatical supporters pose a credible threat to Americans and their interests, there are other sources of threats that cannot be ignored.85 Of the seven states that the United States has given the designation of .state sponsors of terrorism,. two are major Gulf states.Iran and Iraq.three others are Arab countries.Syria, Libya, and Sudan.and the remaining two are Cuba and North Korea, with the latter often suspected as being a seller of weapons to terrorist groups.86 Iran, with its manifest hostility to Israel and the United States, poses the most serious threat to U.S. interests. According to the State Department, this is because .Its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continue to be involved in the planning and the execution of terrorist acts and continue to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals..87 The most well-known group with close ties to Iran and which receives funding, weapons, training, and safe-haven is Lebanon.s Hizballah. Other groups supported by Iran include the Palestinian group HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. All are rejectionist groups that oppose the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace process. In addition, because Iran maintains embassies in all of the Gulf states, it is safe

Iran Prolif DA (Links)

Must show that the US has military strength in the Middle East for sanctions to succeed

Robb and Wald, former senator and former general, 7/11

(Charles and Charles. Delaware online“Sanctions for Iran must be backed by a military threat”

If we remained neutral in such a conflict, it would only invigorate Tehran, antagonize our regional allies and lead to greater conflict. On the other extreme, the United States could be dragged into a major confrontation at a time not of its choosing. With sanctions unlikely to be sufficient and an Israeli strike extremely risky, we support a triple-track strategy that involves the simultaneous pursuit of diplomacy; sanctions; and visible, credible military readiness activity. This strategy is consistent with Obama's 2009 pledge at Camp Lejeune, N.C., "to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon." We cannot afford to wait indefinitely to determine the effectiveness of diplomacy and sanctions. Sanctions can be effective only if coupled with open preparation for the military option as a last resort. Indeed, publicly playing down potential military options has weakened our leverage with Tehran, making a peaceful resolution less likely. Instead, the administration needs to expand its approach and make clear to the Iranian regime and the American people: If diplomatic and economic pressures do not compel Iran to terminate its nuclear program, the U.S. military has the capability and is prepared to launch an effective, targeted strike on Tehran's nuclear and supporting military facilities. Many who condemned the Bush administration's lack of transparency before the invasion of Iraq today discourage public discussion of military options concerning Iran. But we cannot afford to shirk this debate or dismiss it as warmongering; it is precisely a public recognition of a viable military option that could preclude its need.

To ensure success of its policies against Iran prolif, the US must maintain a continued and sustained American military presence in the Persian Gulf

Russel and Moran, Center for Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 09
James, Daniel: Conference held at the Gulf Research Center Dubai “EXTENDED DETERRENCE, SECURITY GUARANTEES, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE GULF REGION”

Some participants expressed the belief that the only acceptable goal for U.S. policy must be to prevent Iran’s nuclear program from succeeding, if necessary by means of direct military attack, the consequences of which for the political stability of the rest of the region they regarded as manageable. It was argued that firmer declaratory policies, including, for instance, a categorical guarantee that the Strait of Hormuz would remain open under all circumstances, are necessary to sustain the credibility of the strategic partnership between the United States and the Gulf states and, absent such an unambiguous stance by the U.S., the natural course for the Arab world would ultimately be to obtain its own nuclear capability. It can also be taken for granted that, to the extent that the American public comes to believe that America’s strategic commitment in the Gulf will expose the United States to nuclear attack, the credibility of America’s extended deterrence will be undermined.

The central challenge for U.S. foreign policy is to retain and strengthen the trust of its allies. For this purpose, a number of mechanisms were suggested, including improved and strengthened defense cooperation across the board and a continued, sustained American military presence. As in Cold War Europe, such forces are the ultimate guarantee that U.S. interests would be at stake in any major conflict in the region. Some participants felt that a clearer declaratory policy, including defining specific actions that would trigger explicit responses, would strengthen American credibility. At present, U.S. allies in the Gulf have been left to infer the extent of American resolve from the scale of its capabilities, an imperfect process, at best, and an insufficient basis for such a critical strategic relationship.

Iran Prolif DA (Links)

US military is the only thing preventing Iranian expansion and prolif

Pynn, ’10. (Kyle, experienced writer on military issues and political science major. Should US troops withdraw from Iraq if wider regional conflict and ethnic cleansing results? Helium.

It will allow for the continued expansion of Iranian Islamic ambitions. Even among Muslims there is a fear from Sunni Muslim of an Iranian expansion of Shia Islam to the West. If Iranian expansion is allowed and not kept to Iraq the more moderate, by some definitions, Sunni nations will be forced to take actions that may further undermine stability in the region. The US presence in Iraq offers these nation a sense, even if it is a false sense, of security that Iranian expansion efforts are at least being curtailed. In addition to Iranian desires of expanding Shia Islam our presence in Iraq continues to force Iran to cautiously approach its efforts towards its nuclear enrichment program. This does however present a dilemma for the US. While we stay in Iraq we limit our ability to take military action against Iran because of the fear of what greater action Iran may take against us in Iraq. On the other it does make Iran fearful or cautious in how they approach the nuclear question due to the proximity of US forces to its borders with Iraq and let us not forget Afghanistan. Expansion of Iranian Islam is not the only threat to the wider region if the US withdraws from Iraq. There is the case of Turkey and the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Presently, Turkey has conducted artillery attacks on PKK in Norther Iraq and have threatened repeatedly to enter Iraq as a means of ridding PKK forces who have conducted attacks in Southern Turkey. As an ally with the US, although strained at the present time due to US liberal statements on past Turkish genocide carried out against Armenians, our withdrawal would eliminate one barrier to Turkey carrying out operations in Northern Iraq. As long as the US remains in Iraq Turkey is taking every precaution to not escalate the Turkish - Kurd conflict in Northern Iraq.

A2: We’re pulling out now

The US military is pulling out just to be replaced with PMCs

Scahill, Investigative Journalist, 7/22, Jeremy, “Iraq Withdrawal? Obama and Clinton Expanding US Paramilitary Force in Iraq”, The Nation, 7/22/10, date accessed 7/23/10, blog

The State Department is asking Congress to approve funds to more than double the number of private security contractors in Iraq with a State Department official testifying in June at a hearing of the Wartime Contracting Commission that the Department wants "between 6,000 and 7,000 security contractors." The Department also has asked the Pentagon for 24 Blackhawk helicopters, 50 Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles and other military equipment. "After the departure of U.S. Forces [from Iraq], we will continue to have a critical need for logistical and life support of a magnitude and scale of complexity that is unprecedented in the history of the Department of State," wrote Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, in an April letter to the Pentagon. "And to keep our people secure, Diplomatic Security requires certain items of equipment that are only available from the military." What is unfolding is the face of President Obama's scaled-down, rebranded mini-occupation of Iraq. Under the terms of the Status of Forces agreement, all US forces are supposed to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Using private forces is a backdoor way of continuing a substantial US presence under the cover of "diplomatic security." The kind of paramilitary force that Obama and Clinton are trying to build in Iraq is, in large part, a bi-product of the monstrous colonial fortress the US calls its embassy in Baghdad and other facilities the US will maintain throughout Iraq after the "withdrawal." The State Department plans to operate five "Enduring Presence Posts" at current U.S. military bases in Basrah, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Ninewa. The State Department has indicated that more sites may be created in the future, which would increase the demand for private forces. The US embassy in Baghdad is the size of Vatican City, comprised of 21 buildings on a 104-acres of land on the Tigris River. In making their case to Congress and the Defense Department for the expansion of a private paramilitary force in Iraq, State Department officials have developed what they call a "lost functionality" list of 14 security-related tasks that the military currently perform in Iraq that would become the responsibility of the State Department as US forces draw down. Among these are: Recovering killed and wounded personnel, downed aircraft or damaged vehicles, convoy security and threat intelligence. The Department also foresees a need to run a tactical operations center that would dispatch of armed response teams. Ambassador Kennedy said that without military equipment and an expansion of personnel, "the security of [State] personnel in Iraq will be degraded significantly and we can expect increased casualties." For years, companies operating in the private security/defense logistics industry have predicted an increased reliance on contractors in Iraq that would accompany a draw-down of official US forces. What is clear from the current State Department plan for Iraq is that the US is going to have armed forces in the country for the foreseeable future. The only question is: how many will be there as uniformed soldiers and how many will be private paramilitaries?

PMC ≠ Military Presence

A. Interpretation – Military is distinct from civilian contractors

“Military” means pertaining to soldiers and troops

WORDS AND PHRASES, Vol. 26C, 2003, 527.

Military means of or pertaining to soldiers, arms, or warfare, soldierly, warlike, martial, done supported or carried on by force of arms; assigned to or occupied by troops. Powell v. U.S., 60 F.Supp. 433.

And,

Stuart Flexner, (Editor-in-chief), RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED, 2nd Ed., 1987, 1220.