Katz v. United States(1967)
Relevant Case Facts:
FBI agents suspected Charles Katz of engaging in illegal bookmaking activities. Specifically, they thought he was transmitting bets and wagering information over the phone. To gather evidence they placed listening devices outside the telephone booth Katz used to make his calls. They used the evidence to gather an eight-count indictment.
Legal Question: Is a person protected by the Fourth Amendment when he seeks to preserve his privacy even in an area accessible to the public?
Holding: Yes. By a vote of 7-1 the Court ruled in favor of Katz.
Reasoning:
1.We refuse to adopt the legal questions as phrased by petitioner. First, the Fourth Amendment problem is not necessarily promoted by using the phrase “constitutionally protected area.” Second, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional “right to privacy.”
2.The government argues that the phone booth here was made partly of glass, so Katz was visible. However, “what he sought to exclude was not the intruding eye, but the uninvited ear.”
3.The government then argues that because its agents did not penetrate the booth, the Fourth Amendment should not apply here. At one time this argument would foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry (Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. United States), but we now depart from a narrow reading. Indeed, the trespass doctrine has been eroded, and the protection extends to the recording of statements, overheard without any technical trespass under local property law. In short, electronically listening to the petitioner constituted a “search and seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. That it did not penetrate the booth has no constitutional significance. It is the person that is protected, not simply “areas.” Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn on the presence or absence of physical penetration.
4.Here, we admit the officers showed restraint, but such restraint was imposed by themselves and not by a judicial officer. We reiterate again that such searches, without judicial oversight, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Concurrences (Harlan):
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from previous cases is that first, a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” The critical point is not that the booth is “accessible to the public” at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.
Dissenting (Black):
It is not the proper role of the Court to rewrite the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to reach a result that people believe is desirable. The Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping. If the framers wanted to cover this, they would have done so. However, they did not. There is no general right created by the amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything that affects privacy.
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
Relevant Case Facts:
The police came to Hardwick’s home to serve him with an arrest warrant for failure to keep a court date. When a housemate let the police in the house, the officer saw Hardwick engaged in sodomy with another man. Hardwick was arrested for violation of a Georgia law which prohibited oral or anal sex. Although the district attorney did not pursue the case, Hardwick challenged the law, asserting that it violated his fundamental right to privacy, protected by Griswold.
Legal Question: Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy?
Holding: No. By a vote of 5-4 the Court ruled in favor of Bowers.
Court (White):
1. Fundamental rights are those that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” or those that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Neither of these formulations would extend protection to the right to engage in sodomy.
3. Nor are we willing to take a more expansive view, discovering new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. There should be great resistance to expand the substantive reach of this clause, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.
4. Reliance on Stanley v. Georgia is insufficient. Stanley is firmly grounded in the First Amendment. The right expressed here has no such support in the constitution and does not qualify for protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Victimless crimes do not escape protection when committed in the privacy of the home.
Dissent (Blackmun, with Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens):
1. This case is no more about a fundamental right to commit sodomy, than Stanley was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies. Rather, this case is about the most comprehensive of rights and the right most value by civilized man – to be let alone.
- A fair reading of the statute reveals that the majority has distorted the question this case presents. First, the majority’s obsessive focus on homosexual activity is hard to justify in light of the broad language Georgia used. Second, we disagree with the Court’s refusal to consider whether the law runs afoul of the Ninth Amendment.
- Hardwick has a credible claim that the Georgia law infringes on his right to privacy. The majority has simply refused to recognize the right individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations.
- I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s scrutiny. This case involves no real interference with the rights of others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one’s value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Docket: 496
Citation: 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Appellant: Griswold
Apellee: Connecticut
Argument: March 29-30, 1965
Decision: Monday, June 7, 1965
Issues: Privacy, Miscellaneous
Categories: contraception, criminal, ninth amendment, privacy
Advocates: Joseph B. Clark (Argued the cause for the appellee)
Thomas I. Emerson (Argued the cause for the appellants)
Facts of the Case
Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counseling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception.
Question
Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?
Conclusion
Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.
Roe v. Wade
Docket: 70-18
Citation: 410U.S.113 (1973)
Appellant: Roe
Apellee: Wade
Argument: Monday, December 13, 1971
Reargument: Wednesday, October 11, 1972
Decision: Monday, January 22, 1973
Issues: Privacy, Abortion, Including Contraceptives
Categories: abortion, criminal, justiciability, privacy, states
Advocates: Jay Floyd (Argued the cause for the appellee)
Robert C. Flowers (Argued the cause for the appellee)
Sarah Weddington (Argued the cause for the appellants)
Facts of the Case
Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall.
Question
Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion?
Conclusion
The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), is the only Supreme Court of the United States decision to directly address the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Miller is a controversial decision in the ongoing American gun politics debate, as both sides claim that it supports their position.
Background
United States v. Miller involved a criminal prosecution under the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA). Passed in response to public outcry over the St. Valentine's Day Massacre, the NFA requires certain types of firearms (including but not limited to fully automatic firearms and short-barreled rifles and shotguns) to be registered with the Miscellaneous Tax Unit (later to be folded into what eventually became the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or ATF) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (ancestor of today's Internal Revenue Service), with a $200 tax paid at the time of registration and again if the firearm is ever sold. This was widely interpreted as a prohibitive measure, as the $200 tax was levied upon items which at the time were relatively common and typically cost less than ten dollars. The United States Department of the Treasury nonetheless claimed that it was a revenue-collecting measure.
The trial court
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were suspected bank robbers and moon shiners being watched by agents of the Department of the Treasury. On April 18, 1938 Miller and Layton were arrested for transporting an unlicensed sawed-off shotgun (defined as "having a barrel less than eighteen inches in length") across state lines while engaged in interstate commerce, in violation of the NFA. This was after the fact that the Treasury had "staked out" Mr. Miller and Mr. Layton's property in suspicion of moonshining. The Treasury, after a day-long stake, found that the distillery was not functional and had in fact been shut down for some time and had the boiler removed. The Treasury then found the sub-eighteen inch shot gun in Mr. Miller's truck on the seat. It is said that the Treasury, in fear of embarrassment for the distillery mishap, took the two men in on charges for not paying their taxes on the shortened shotgun.
This was a federal case and was therefore heard by the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. On January 3, 1939, U.S. District Court Judge Heartsill Ragon agreed with the defense's claim that the NFA was intended to restrict the individual ownership and possession of arms, in conflict with the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The defendant's argument at the trial court was reported (in the text of the Supreme Court opinion) to be as follows:
The National Firearms Act is not a revenue measure but an attempt to usurp police power reserved to the States, and is therefore unconstitutional. Also, it offends the inhibition of the Second Amendment to the Constitution, U.S.C.A.-'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.'
The trial court agreed, ruling that Section 11 of the National Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment. The trial court threw out the indictment. The United States Attorney, Clinton R. Barry, appealed to the Supreme Court.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)
Relevant Case Facts:
The state of Pennsylvania amended its abortion law in the following ways: it instituted an informed consent/twenty-four-hour waiting period; it required doctors to provide a list of adoption agencies to the woman seeking an abortion; it said spouses must be notified of the woman’s decision; it required women under eighteen to obtain the informed consent of one parent prior to obtaining an abortion; and it required all abortion facilities to file reports about the procedure.
Legal Question: Do the new provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute violate the constitutional right to privacy?
Holding: The Court announced a judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Some of the provisions were upheld, and others were struck down.
Reasoning:
- We initially conclude that the essential holding in Roe v. Wade must be reaffirmed. This contains three parts. First is the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the state. Second is the confirmation of the state’s power to restrict abortions after viability if the law has exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman’s life or health. Third is the principle that the state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
- Next, we note that given the personal nature of this decision, the state should not be able to insist upon, without more, its own vision of a woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.
- The sum of our precedential inquiry is that Roe’s underpinnings are unweakened in any way affecting the central holding. Although it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. We also note that overruling Roe’s central holding would be unjustifiable, and would also seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to function as the Supreme Court of a nation dedicated to the rule of law. Given that our power lies in the legitimacy of our institution, overruling our own precedents too frequently would overtax the country’s belief in the Court’s good faith. Additionally, to overrule a case when we are under fire in the absence of a compelling reason would subvert our legitimacy. Thus, it is imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision and we do so today.
- We do, however, abandon the trimester scheme set out in Roe as a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life. Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the state reach into the heart of the liberty protected in the Due Process Clause. In other words, an undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose of effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. This does not, however, disturb the central holding in Roe that a state may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate pregnancy prior to viability.
- Because the informed consent requirement furthers the wise exercise of the right protected in Roe, it cannot be classified as an interference with that holding.
- The spousal notification requirement would prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. Thus, it is a substantial obstacle to this right.
- A state may require a minor to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian provided there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure.
- All of the record keeping procedures are permissible except for any reporting that relates to spousal notification.
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part (Stevens):
It is not a contradiction to say that a state has a legitimate interest in preserving potential life, and at the same conclude that the interest does not justify the regulation of abortion prior to viability. The twenty-four-hour waiting period is only meant to wear down a woman, and there is no evidence that the delay benefits the woman. The correct application of the undue burden standard is that it can either be a burden that is too severe or one that lacks a legitimate rational justification. The waiting period is simply too burdensome as it fails both parts of this test.
Concurring in Part, and in the Judgment, and Dissenting in Part (Blackmun):
Roe’s requirement of strict scrutiny as implemented through a trimester scheme should not be disturbed. No other approach has gained a majority, and no other is more protective of the woman’s fundamental right.
Concurring in the Judgment and Dissenting in Part (Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas):
The undue burden standard was created out of whole cloth, and does not command a majority of the Court. The correct analysis here was set forth in Webster. There, a woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty, but states may regulate these procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.