Gordon Review 5 (1959) 2-13.
Copyright © 1959 by Gordon College. Cited with permission.
IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO
ORGANIC EVOLUTION?*
JAMES O. BUSWELL, III
I
For over one hundred years there has been a continuous controversy,
between evolutionists and anti-evolutionists over the body of data and
theory of the origin, antiquity, and development of life and of man.
While the controversy has been continuous, it has by no means been
uniform. For a long time each dogmatically defended positions of
some truth mixed with considerable error, in violent and fruitless de-
bate, whose brilliance was in many cases mostly oratorical or literary.
As the factual and scientific aspects of the evolutionary position increased
and became more widely accepted, however, the bases for the anti-evo-
lutionary or creationist1 opposition remained comparatively constant,
with the result that, while the anti-evolutionists continued to actively
oppose the evolutionist position, their attacks were less and less fre-
quently reciprocated. Finally the evolutionist's entanglements with anti-
evolutionists dwindled to an occasional defense or debate, the last of
which of any consequence in this country was the famous Scopes trial of
1925. Interaction still persists in the British Commonwealth, however,
chiefly due to the seemingly tireless efforts of the Evolution Protest
Movement with active branches in London, Australia, and New Zealand.
Quite another pattern also emerges from a general review of this
question. It is quite evident that in the view each has taken, and still
takes of the other, whether in opposition or reaction, there is a tre-
mendous degree of ignorance as to progress made in the past hundred
years. The creationist exhibits in almost all of his anti-evolutionary
literature an antiquated, "moth-ball" variety of "ever onward, ever up-
ward" conception of evolutionism reminiscent of the latter nineteenth
century, while the evolutionist on his part tends to identify all crea-
tionists with an immutability of species - deluge geology -- Ussher
chronology type of position, sometimes referred to as "hyperorthodox",
or "hyper-traditionalist."2
* This article constitutes part of Mr. Buswell's chapter in the forthcoming book, One Hundred Years After Darwin, scheduled for publication by Eerdmans in the late spring.
1. For present purposes other "anti-" evolutionary views like neo-Darwinian, or
neo-Lamarckian, or other variations within scientific circles are ignored.
2. The term "hyperorthodox" has been recently brought into prominence by Dr.
Bernard Ramm (1954: 27-31 et passim). Because of its relationship to the
terms "fundamentalist" and "orthodox" and because of rather consistent objection
[2]
3 Buswell: Organic Evolution?
The complicating factor in all this is that while the anti-evolutionist
is wrong in his usual appraisal of evolution today, the creationist
position is still widely represented by the hyper-traditionalist point of
view, from which has split a Creationist group which seeks to keep itself
up-to-date scientifically while adopting a non-evolutionary rather than
to its use, it should be clearly defined and its usage clarified. The term "funda-
mentalist" is today the most widely known label for the Bible-believing creationist
in scientific circles. It is important, however, to understand the crucial distinc-
tion between at least two meanings of this widely misused term:
Fundamentalism originally referred to the belief that there are certain great truths in
Christianity, which, if changed, would dissolve Christianity. Each Christian is allowed
personal conviction in respect to a great number of doctrines and interpretations but that
personal liberty is hedged about by key infallible and eternal doctrines. This is the
term in its historic and good sense. The movement included such stalwarts as James Orr,
J. Gresham Machen, Benjamin Warfield, W. H. Green and the numerous contributors to
the famous Fundamentals papers.
In more recent years another movement has given the word an odious
connotation. Alen with much zeal, enthusiasm and conviction, yet lacking frequently in
education or cultural breadth, and many times individualistic, took to the stump to defend
the faith. Many times they were dogmatic beyond evidence, or were intractable of
disposition, or were obnoxiously anti-cultural, anti-scientific and anti-educational. Hence
the term came to mean one who was bigoted, an obscurantist, a fideist, a fighter and an
anti-intellectual [Ramm 1955: 131.
The creationist position which this paper attempts to advance is to be identified with the first, and
not the second meaning of "fundamentalist" as defined above. It is fully recognized, however,
that all creationists who do not agree with this position are not automatically considered in the second category.
It is abundantly clear from his discussion of the matter (1954) that Ramm is employing
the term "hyperorthodox" to refer to this second brand of fundamentalist so as not to perpetuate
the "odious connotation" with the term. Ramm's reason for this is that
we can sin to the right as well as to the left. Patriotism can degenerate into jingoism and
enthusiasm into fanaticism and virtue into prudishness. It is possible not only to have
slack theological views, but have views far more rigid and dogmatic than Scripture itself.
Hyperorthodoxy in trying to be loyal to the Bible has developed an exaggerated sense of
what loyalty to the Bible means [1954: 291.
He evidently got the term from J. W. Dawson, who, he points out (1954: 28), referred to
"pedantic hyperorthodoxy" in evangelical apologetics in 1877.
Certain objections to my use of the term have been raised, however, chiefly upon the
basis of a possible mss-identification of this position with sound, theological orthodoxy. Thus the
alternatives "distorted orthodoxy" and "blind orthodoxy" have been suggested. Even more
significant, perhaps, is the objection to the form of the term itself. Thus the Rev. John Buswell,
my brother, wrote me, "Can anyone be hyperorthodox? Is not orthodoxy an ultimate-in one
sphere anyway? In other words, many would regard 'hyper-orthodox' as they would 'hyper-
straight' or 'hyper-sterilized.' "
Since these objections, and others, seem to have some value, I have chosen to use instead
the term "hyper-traditionalist" suggested by my colleague, Professor Joseph Free. Although a bit
more cumbersome, this term carries none of the theological associations invariably attached to
"orthodoxy" and "fundamentalism", and seems in addition to refer a bit more precisely to those
who being bound by tradition, prefer to retain the peripheral, relative, and changeable interpretations with the fundamental truths, without being able to distinguish the difference.
[3]
Gordon Review 1959 4
an anti-evolutionary position. It is this position which the modern
evolutionist has tended to overlook, and which constitutes the alterna-
tive to organic evolution that I wish to set forth here.
The hyper-traditionalist position, however, is the most often heard,
though seldom listened-to, expression of creationism. Thus it is not
without reason that G. G. Simpson could dispense with a consideration
of creationism in a public lecture in Philadelphia in 1950 with words
to the effect that "creationists are found today only in non- or anti-
scientific circles."
One of the chief drawbacks to the anti-evolutionists, from Darwin's
early critics to the present day, familiar as some of their leaders are with
the data, is that their activities and literature have been almost com-
pletely wrapped up in arguments over petty fragments of the record,
assuming that to attack evolution as a total philosophy one must show
the data upon which the assumptions are based to be untrue. Instead of
offering a positive, non-evolutionary interpretation of the data them-
selves, they have been guilty of treating them with scorn and sarcasm
for no other reason than that the evolutionist has done something with
them first.
What results is that both parties claim to have truth on their side
and at the same time charge the other with falsity and ignorance. The
creationist attacks the evolutionist's total philosophy from the stand-
point of revelation, while the evolutionist answers with scientific data.
Since the evolutionist is seldom caught up in an argument over revelation,
the creationist is inevitably drawn to argue on the evolutionist's own
ground in terms of genetic processes or paleontological remains, where
he is generally over his depth. This anti-evolutionary position has been
characteristically negative and unscientific in spite of its strong adherence
to the scriptural fundamentals of the historic Christian faith.
II
Now to a consideration of the non-evolutionary creationist position.
There are three major areas to consider, each with its relevant body of
evidences and various interpretations. They are:
a. The origin of life.
b. The origin and age of man.
c. The processes of development since their origin.
The consideration of these areas is not simply a question of whether
evolution" or "creation" is the exclusive explanation. Organic evolu-
tion is so inclusive and so complex a system that it must be broken down
into its constituent elements. This may be attempted on various levels
of abstraction. One of the most obvious and important steps which can
[4]
5 Buswell: Organic Evolution?
be taken is a separation of the consideration of origins from the con-
sideration of process. I have the impression that British evolutionists are
perhaps oftener involved in considerations of origins than are American
evolutionists. The American, at least in anthropological circles, tends to
leave questions of the origin of the earth and of life to the astronomers.
physicists, and biologists on the one hand, or to the philosophers on the
other. William Howells has stated the position thus:
We are totally bewildered, of course, about the beginnings of life and
the reasons for our existence, and these are questions which have been
grist to the mills of philosophers and myth-makers alike. But we know,
roughly, what happened along the way, and that is the story of human
evolution [1944:3].
Considerations of process, then, make up the major concerns of the evo-
lutionist. Therefore let us postpone the consideration of origins to another
context.
I find Simpson's three "modes" or aspects of evolution extremely use-
ful for purposes of analysis, and comparison with the Creationist position.
The first of these is speciation or "splitting" which, as Simpson points out,
"is almost the only mode accessible for experimental biology, neozoology.
and genetics. It embraces almost all the dynamic evolutionary phenomena
subject to direct experimental attack." The second mode Simpson calls
"phyletic" evolution, which "involves the sustained, directional (but not
necessarily rectilinear) shift of the average characters of populations. It is
not primarily the splitting up of a population, but the change of the popu-
lation as a whole." While speciation may be called an explanation for
races, species, and sometimes genera, Simpson points out that the phyletic
mode "is typically related to middle taxonomic levels, usually genera, sub-
families, and families." He also observes that "nine tenths of the pertinent
data of paleontology fall into patterns of the phyletic mode" (1944: 202-203).
Thus, although evolution does not consist of wholly distinct processes,
and a fossil series, for example, can exhibit speciation, or splitting, in a
phyletic pattern through geological time, nevertheless the well documented
data of natural selection on these levels--the genetic and geological pro-
cesses--may be abstracted from the over-all theory of organic evolution.
It is the position of the creationist, at this point, that he can accept all of
the facts within these two areas of consideration. Thus the creationist
need have no quarrel with the transmutation of species or other taxonomic
categories, and may fully accept the genetic explanation for variation.
Similarly he may accept the evidence of the "evolution" of the horse, and
other such well documented paleontological series, upon the basis of the
adaptive dynamic interaction of genetic and environmental change called
natural selection.
[5]
Gordon Review 1959 6
Turning to more anthropological matters, the creationist accepts the
evidence for the age of prehistoric man and his culture. He has no quarrel
with an antiquity of hundreds of thousands of years; there is nothing in
the Bible to indicate how long ago man was created. The date of 4004
B.C. which has been an item of ridicule by evolutionists and a rallying
point for the hyper-traditionalist, now finds itself a cultural survival, firmly
ensconced in the notes on page 1 of certain editions of the Bible, but with-
out a valid function in either modern Christian theology or chronology.
Neither has the creationist any quarrel with morphological features of
ancient man. The Bible, which is the creationist's basis of belief and life,
simply says nothing about what Adam looked like. And, although the
creationist, Protestant and Catholic alike, must of necessity hold to the
belief (which will be further discussed below) that there was a "first man,"
it is of no consequence whether he looked like a pithecanthropoid or a
Caucasoid. Furthermore, if anthropological opinion swings in favor of
calling some prehistoric types by separate specific or generic names, and
other types Homo Sapiens with modern man, this is of relatively little con-
sequence. For the creationist recognizes the arbitrary and non-qualitative
nature of taxonomic categories and is not bound to equate any one of
them with the "kind" spoken of in Genesis 1.
Thus the creationist looks on with the same interest, or relief, as any
anthropologist, when a classic Neanderthaloid posture is straightened up,
or a Piltdown forgery exposed. Here, of course, is a characteristic difference
from the hyper-traditionalist reaction. When the Piltdown news hit the
press early in 1954 the anti-evolutionist and many religious journals were
full of "I told you so's" and another major pillar of evolution had fallen!
One creationist on the other hand simply expressed "relief that one of the
more perplexing riddles of man's prehistory is finally solved." Presumably
the same sort of reactions can be expected once Professor Strauss's re-analysis
of the La Chappele bones3 gains wider circulation.
III
So far we have discussed chiefly those areas of concurrence between
the evolutionary and the creationist positions. With the consideration of
Simpson's third mode, however, we introduce the area of disagreement
between the two. Essentially it boils down to a matter of facts vs. theory,