“Russell tried to give objectivity to ethics by basing it on the common desires of all or the majority of human beings. He was needlessly apologetic about his formulations, because he had the ideal of physical sciences in his mind. Ethical ends are, after all, human ends, and there would be no ethics in a world devoid of human beings.”
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The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell
by Dr. Ramendra
rev. 19.04.2013
Published by the Buddhiwadi Foundation
First Smashwords edition 2011
Second Revised and expanded edition 2011
Copyright Ramendra 2011-13
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Smashwords Edition
License Notes
This eBook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This eBook may not be resold or given away to other people.
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Cover design by Priya
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Also by Dr. Ramendra, Published at Smashwords:
Why I am Not a Hindu
Is God Dead?
The Myth of Unity of all Religions
and
Some Reflections on Ethics
Table of Contents
Adolescent view
Philosophical Essays
Transition to Non-cognitivism
Religion and Science
Human Society in Ethics and Politics
Critical Comments
References
About the Author
The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, who studied together at Cambridge, are two important British thinkers of 20th Century. They carried on an intellectual battle against Hegelian idealism and initiated the analytical and realistic trend in Philosophy, which later became the dominant trend not only in England but also in America.
It is generally acknowledged that Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) has influenced ethical philosophy of twentieth century in important ways. Russell's ethical ideas, on the other hand, have not earned sufficient academic recognition. In fact, some of Russell's writings do deal with fundamental ethical problems.
Adolescent view
First, to begin with, Russell was in his adolescence, before going to Cambridge, a utilitarian. It appeared so self-evident to him that "happiness of mankind should be the aim of all actions" that he believed that it must be the universal view. Therefore, he was surprised to find that this was only one among a number of ethical theories and was called "utilitarianism". He declared himself a utilitarian after this discovery. In this stage of thinking, he treated "greatest happiness of greatest number" as his ideal and, then, applied reason to find out the course most conducive to this end.
Philosophical Essays
However, the first mature exposition of Russell's ethical views is to be found in "The Elements of Ethics", an essay contained in his book Philosophical Essays (1910). In "The Elements" Russell expounds an ethics largely based on G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. At the time of writing "The Elements" Russell was, like Moore, a cognitivist in ethics. He believed that (1)"good" is the most fundamental ethical concept and (2) that "good" is indefinable. He further maintained that we know a priori certain propositions about the kind of things that are good on their own account. In addition, that when we make a statement such as "X is good", we make a statement like "this table is round", which is either true or false, and whose truth or falsity is independent of our opinions and emotions.
According to Moore, pleasure of human intercourse and enjoyment of beautiful objects are the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine. Russell, on the other hand, gives no such list of things, which are good in themselves, because he holds that his readers are probably as capable as him of judging what things are good and what bad.
Roughly speaking, Russell's conception of "right" in "the elements" is also the same as that of Moore's conception of right or duty. Irrespective of details, both Moore and Russell regard consequences or results as of vital importance for judging an action as right or wrong. In other words, both are teleologists or consequentialists like utilitarians.
Transition to Non-cognitivism
Nonetheless, the cognitivist phase of Russell's thinking did not last long. Soon he started moving from ethical cognitivism to ethical non-cognitivism. The change was mainly brought about by Santayana's criticism of Russell's "The Element" in his book Winds of Doctrine (1913). The main thrust of Santayana's criticism was that "good" cannot be totally independent of human interests and feelings; and that propositions about intrinsic goodness -- if they can be called propositions at all -- cannot be true or false in a manner in which propositions in physical sciences are, because they are not statements about certain objective state of affairs but are only expressions of "preferences we feel". As he says, "to speak of the truth of an ultimate good would be a false collocation of terms; an ultimate good is chosen, found or aimed at; it is not opined".
Santayana is also at pains to emphasize that "good" cannot be totally independent of human interests and feelings. As he says, "For the human system whiskey is truly more intoxicating than coffee, and the contrary opinion would be an error; but what a strange way of vindicating this real, though relative distinction to insist that whiskey is more intoxicating in itself, without reference to any animal; that it is pervaded, as it were, by an inherent intoxication, and stands dead drunk in its bottle!"
Another factor, apart from Santayana's criticism, which stimulated the change in Russell's ethical thinking, was the impact of the First World War, which Russell passionately opposed. The war forced him to think afresh on a number of fundamental questions.
Religion and Science
An exposition of Russell's ethical non-cognitivism in its developed form is found in Religion and Science (1935), which was published one year before A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic in which Ayer has expounded the emotive theory of ethics. In Religion and Science, Russell regards, as he does in "The Elements", defining "good" as the fundamental problem of ethics. According to him, once "good" is defined, the rest of ethics follows: we ought to act in the way we believe most likely to create as much good as possible, and as little of its correlative evil. In other words, once we define "good", framing of moral rules is a matter for science.
However, points out Russell, when we try to be definite as to what we mean by "good", we land ourselves in great difficulties, because unlike in scientific questions, in a question as to whether this or that is the ultimate good, there is no evidence either way. The disputants can only appeal to their own emotions, and employ rhetorical devices to rouse similar emotions in others.
According to Russell, when we assert that this or that has "value", we are giving expression to our emotions, not to a fact, which would still be true if our personal feelings were different.
Further, when a person says "this is good in itself"; he seems to be making a statement like "this is square" or "this is sweet". Nevertheless, what he really means, according to Russell, is "I wish everybody to desire this" or "Would that everybody desire this".
The first of these sentences, which may be true or false, does not, says Russell, belong to ethics but to psychology or biography. The second sentence which does belong to ethics, expresses a desire for something, but asserts nothing and since it asserts nothing it is logically impossible that there should be evidence for or against it, or for it to possess either truth or falsehood.
Thus, there are two aspects of Russell's ethical ideas as expressed in Religion and Science: (1) that ethical statements are not fact-stating though they seem to be so when expressed in indicative mood, and (2) they are optative or desire expressing.
Human Society in Ethics and Politics
Russell's final ethical views are to be found in Human Society in Ethics and Politics (1954), which might be regarded as the most important ethical writing of Russell. As Russell says in the preface of the Human Society, he originally intended to include the discussion of ethics in his book Human Knowledge, but he decided not to do so, because he was uncertain as to the sense in which ethics can be regarded as "knowledge".
The book, as pointed out by Russell, has two purposes: first, to set forth an undogmatic ethic; and second, to apply this ethic to various current political problems.
In Human Society, Russell adopts as his guiding principle David Hume's maxim that "Reason is, and ought, only to be the slave of the passions". According to Russell, desires, emotions or passions are the only possible causes of action. Reason is not a cause of action but only a regulator. "The world that I should wish to see," says Russell, 'is one where emotions are strong but not destructive, and where, because they are acknowledged, they lead to no deception either of oneself or of others. Such a world would include love and friendship and the pursuit of art and knowledge."
In effect, what Russell says in Human Society, is not very different from what he says in Religion and Science; when an ethical disagreement is about means for achieving certain ends, it can be resolved by the use of reason; but when the disagreement is about ends reason is of no help, because what ends we pursue depends ultimately on our desires.
As in Religion and Science, Russell is also at pains to emphasize that our desires are not "irrational" just because we cannot give any reason for them. According to Russell, a desire cannot, in itself, be either rational or irrational. We may desire A because it is a means to B, but in the end, when we have done with mere means we must come to something, which we desire for no reasons. Nevertheless, the desire cannot be called irrational merely because no reasons can be given for feeling it.
However, Russell's dissatisfaction with his own theory of ethics, which earlier finds an expression in "Reply to Criticism" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (1946) reappears in Human Society and we find him wondering once again whether there is such a thing as ethical knowledge. In an important passage he says: "It may be that there is some (similar) way of arriving at objectivity in ethics; if so, since it must involve appeal to the majority, it will take us from personal ethics into the sphere of politics, which is, in fact, very difficult to separate from ethics."
Russell sums up his efforts to arrive at an objective ethics in the following fundamental propositions and definitions:
(1) Surveying the acts which arouse emotions of approval or disapproval, we find that, as a general rule, the acts which are approved of are those believed likely to have, on the balance, effects of certain kinds while opposite effects are expected from acts that are disapproved of.
(2) Effects that lead to approval are defined as "good" and those leading to disapproval are as "bad".
(3) An act of which, on the available evidence, the effects are likely to be better than those of any other act that is possible in the circumstances, is defined as "right"; any other act is "wrong". What we "ought" to do is, by definition, the act which is right.
(4) It is right to feel approval of a right act and disapproval of a wrong act.
According to Russell, these definitions and propositions, if accepted, provide a coherent body of ethical propositions, which are true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science. He admits that different societies in different ages have given approval to a wide diversity of acts; but, argues Russell, the difference between ourselves and other ages in these respects is attributable to a difference between our beliefs and theirs as to the effects of actions. Thus, Russell is led to the conclusion that there is more agreement among humankind as to the effects that we should aim than as to the kinds of acts that are approved. "I think", he says, " the contention of Henry Sidgwick, that acts which are approved of are those that are likely to bring happiness or pleasure, is, broadly speaking, true".
If, points out Russell, it is admitted that the great majority of approved acts are such as are believed to have certain effects, and it is found, further, that exceptional acts, which are approved without having this character, tend to be no longer approved when their exceptional character is realized; then it becomes possible, in a certain sense, to speak of ethical error. We may say, according to Russell, that it is "wrong" to approve of such exceptional acts, meaning that such approval does not have the effects which mark the great majority of approved acts.
Although on the above theory, ethics contains statements, which are true or false, and not merely optative or imperative, Russell points out that its basis is still one of emotion and feeling. The emotion of approval is involved in the definition of "right" and "wrong" and the feeling of enjoyment or satisfaction is involved in the definition of "good" or "intrinsic value". Thus, according to Russell, the appeal upon which we depend for the acceptance of our ethical theory is not the appeal to the facts of perception, but to emotions and feelings, which have given rise to the concepts of "right" and "wrong", "good" and "bad".
Interestingly, in his Autobiography, Russell has summarized his conclusion in Human Society in Ethics and Politics in the following manner: "The conclusion that I reach is that ethics is never an independent constituent, but is reducible to politics in the last analysis." He reiterates that there is no such thing as ethical knowledge, and that "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." An ethical opinion, maintains Russell, can only be defended by an ethical axiom, but if the axiom is not accepted, there is no way of reaching a rational conclusion.