NH – green, bold

Sean in Blue

Table of Contents

MESA CLIENT NEEDS

TURKEY

  • Security
  • Military
  • Political issues
  • International Relations

IRAQ

  • Security
  • Military
  • Political issues
  • International Relations
  • Economics

IRAN

  • Security
  • Political issues
  • Military
  • International Relations
  • Economics

SAUDI ARABIA

  • Security
  • Political issues
  • Military
  • International Relations
  • Economics

AFGHANISTAN

  • Security
  • Political issues
  • International Relations

PAKISTAN

  • Security
  • Military
  • Political issues

INDIA

  • Security
  • Defense
  • Political
  • International Relations
  • Economics

ISRAEL

  • Security/Defense
  • Political
  • International Relations
  • Economics

EGYPT

  • Security
  • Political
  • International Relations
  • Economics

SYRIA

  • Security/Defense
  • Political
  • International Relations
  • Economic

LEBANON

  • Political
  • Security/Defense
  • Economics

MESA CLIENT NEEDS

Special Instructions: For each of the OSINT items that qualify as a client interest under the following guidance, use a “GV” tag in the subject line of the email to ensure that information is delivered to the briefer team.

MESA-WIDE

  • General Stability - Client interested in events that may affect the level of political stability in the region, to include protests and security threats. Major economic developments, to include regulation on foreign business operations in the region.
  • Energy - All major oil and natural gas developments, to include pipeline deals, supply deals, and exploration and production projects. Also, oil/gas issues or unrest that will affect oil/gas distribution throughout the region. General instability in countries with important energy reserves;
  • Personal security - Threats to extractive industry and foreign personnel anywhere in the region.

IRAN - Oil and gas issues.

MIDDLE EAST - LNG, natural gas and oil developments

QATAR, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA - Regulatory developments affecting energy; energy ministry developments.

ISRAEL-IRAN - Looking to answer the question of if/when Israel will attack Iranian nuclear facilities and what sort of regional impact a strike would cause, including impacts to Western business operations and brand reputation.

Country Monitoring

For each of these countries:

  • Algeria
  • Egypt
  • India
  • Iran
  • Kuwait
  • Libya
  • Oman
  • Pakistan
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Tunisia
  • United Arab Emirates
  • Qatar
  • Yemen

Monitor and tag with “GV” each of the following:

  • Basic Political Developments
  • National Economic Trends
  • Business, Energy or Environmental regulations or discussions
  • Activity in the Oil and Gas sector (including regulatory)

SPECIAL GV MONITORING

  • India
  • Militant Activity/Terrorism (particularly Bangalore, Mumbai, Noida, Chani, Coimbatore)
  • Labor/Social unrest
  • Pakistan -- Terrorism/Militant activity
  • Saudi Arabia -- Personal Security/Terrorism
  • United Arab Emirates and Qatar --
  • Personal Security/Terrorism
  • Shipbuilding industry (particularly oil and gas rigs)
  • Yemen -- Militant and Insurgency Activity

Table of Contents

TURKEY

Security

  • There are three types of militants active in Turkey - Kurdish, leftists, and Islamists. Most of the activity involves the Main Kurdish separatist group,Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and other factions but there has been action on the part of left wing groups as well as Islamist militants linked to aQ. Also, need to keep an eye on ultra-nationalist right-wing activity.
  • From time to time there are small and even medium-sized bombings in places like Istanbul and other key cities as well. Security forces and Kurdish rebels are engaged in fighting in the southeastern parts of the country, especially with the recent resurgence of PKK activity, which has forced the government to come up with a new strategy to dealing with the threat.
  • Every now and then there are airstrikes and ground operations conducted by the Turkish military against Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. These have become pretty routine but do need to keep an eye on a major offensive especially now that Turkey is trying to step in geopolitically and fill the for vacuum created by the U.S. military drawdown. In addition to the standard military guidance, we need to be sensitive to what Iraqi, Kurdish Regional Government and potentially American forces might be in the area during such operations.This becomes even more critical given the Turkish move to create a new special ground force to deal with the PKK threat on both sides of the border with Iraq as well as ramped up intelligence efforts both unilaterally as well as multilaterally seeking American, Iraqi, and Iraqi Kurdish involvement.I would say we need to be tracking this closely, even if what we actually rep is more limited.

Military

  • Turkey is a NATO member and fields a considerable and modern military. Watch for major weapons sales (Turkey is in the market for a new strategic air defense system and is reportedly courting both the U.S. Patriot and Russian S-300) as well as exercises or indications of improving naval capability in the Black Sea and beyond.
  • As with above, we need to be keeping an eye on the status, disposition, organization (including manpower issues) and activities (including equipment and training) of the forces in Kurdish areas of Turkey, along the border with Iraq and obviously any operations within Iraq.
  • Given Turkey’s rise, we need to keep an eye out for any moves by Turkey to flex its muscles in the various regions it straddles. As mentioned above and in keeping with the net assessment for the most part such moves will largely manifest in Iraq but we should keep an eye on other places and particularly any efforts by the Turks to enhance their naval capabilities. Similarly, note any deployment of Turkish military forces around the region, be it for peacekeeping or any other purpose.
  • Military activity against Kurdish fighters near the Iraqi border – and especially across the Iraqi border – should be noted and monitored per military guidance.

Political issues

  • The main political fault line in the country is that between the ruling Justice & Development Party and the country’s military-led secularist establishment. Need to watch for any/all moves in this regard from both sides. These could be meetings between top government officials such as PM/President and the military chief or moves from key players in the judiciary, academia, business community, and media. At present this govt-establishment struggle is being played out in the context of the Ergenekon and otherprobes launched by the government against current and former military officers and their civilian allies who the ruling AK Party claims is/was trying to oust them thru a coup. Watch for arrests of suspected members of the shadowy Ergenekon group and the response from the ultra-secularists. The country’s apex court has largely approved thegovernment’sconstitutional amendment package, which will now be voted on in a national referendum in September. The ruling party is engaged in talks with the various opposition parties, especially the main Peoples’ Republican Party (CHP) (especially since it now has a new leader who appears to be trying to steer the party towards the politics of accommodation with the government). Let us track the AKP-CHP dealings and those with the other opposition groups such as the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and others, particularly since the governmening party has taken a hit on the domestic political scene with the flotilla fiasco with Israel and the return of Kurdish separatist violence.
  • The moderate Islamist Fethullah Gulen social movement with complex ties to the ruling AK Party is an emerging sore point in the country, especially because it is expanding its influence in the law enforcement community. Watch for how the various elements of the Kemalist establishment seek to counter the movement. Monitor the statements and actions of the government in this regard as well.Its founder/leader’s move to criticizethe Turkish flotilla mission to Gaza has exacerbated pre-existing tensions between the Gulenites and the AKP and likely creating rifts within the movement and even the wider political Islamist community in the country. So, let us see if this is having an impact on the movement’s ability to develop inroads into the state or AKP’s social support base.
  • How to deal with the country’s Kurdish minority is an ongoing theme. The government’s efforts totryandreach out to the Turkish Kurds in order to enhance the governing party’s influence within the Kurdish community and isolate the PKKhas taken a hitbecause of the renewed violence by the PKK. Watch for how the government deals with this reversal and tries to regain its bearing (or not). More importantly, pay attention to how the Kemalists, especially the militarybecause the revival of Kurdish militant threat is a key issue that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) can use to try and regain the ground it has lost to the AKP in recent years.

International Relations

  • Turkey is in the process of shedding its hitherto image of simply being a pro-western ally and is instead seekingto emerge as an independent player with interests in the Middle East, the Caucuses, Southeastern Europe, Central and South Asia. Watch for Ankara’s diplomatic moves in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Syria, Palestinians), Iraq, the Balkans, Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Stans, and Afghanistan/Pakistan. That said, we need to keep an eye on potential arrestors to this Turkish ambition whether they are domestic or international or a mixture of both, especially with the unfavorable outcome of the flotilla incident with Israel and the tension with Washington over Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, brings it into competition with Iran, especially as the Turks move beyond the Kurds and the Sunnis and try to expand their influence among the Shia. Watch for both Turkish moves and Iranian counter-moves and also any signs of apparent cooperationbetween the two.
  • Turkish-Israeli relations are evolving because of Ankara’s growing interest in affairs Middle Eastern, so we need to see how Ankara manages its ties with the Jewish state as it emerges a player in the Islamic world, particularly with the damage to bilateral relations in the wake of the May 31 Israeli naval commando assault on the Gaza-bound Turkish aid vessel in international waters, which led to the killing of 9 Turkish nationals. We need to see what becomes of the Turkish demand that Israel apologize for the incident and the Israeli response that it won’t. Both sides need each other but Turkey’s drive towards an independent foreign policy greatly complicates matters.
  • Turkish forays into the Caucuses and to a lesser degree in Central Asia means that Ankara will have to deal with Moscow. Watch for any/all movement on the Russian-Turkish diplomatic front, especially since the Turks depend greatly on the Russians for their natural gas needs. Need to monitor relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan closely as Turkey attempts to pursue a peace deal with Armeniahas created problems between Baku and Ankara. Ankara is having to deal with a Baku that is trying to move away from simply being little brother to Turkey and seek to balance between its ties to Turkey and Russia. It is thus essential to watch how this multi-player complex regional Caucasian game plays out.
  • With Turkey playing with Russia and adopting an increasingly independent foreign policy posture, we will need to keep an eye on how it balances this new shift with its existing status as a U.S. ally and NATO member state.

Economics

  • Turkey is the world’s 17th largest economy and a country which STRATFOR believes is on a gradual pathto becoming a great power. Therefore we need to keep a close watch on how it is doing on the economic front, especially as it has been largelyable to weather the global downturn.
  • Turkey is no longer activelyseeking what would amount to a multi-billion dollar stand-by loan from the IMF. Butlet us keep an eye on what is happening on this front, especially since the economy isn’t doing all that great and we have parliamentary next year.
  • Turkey sees itself as emerging as a major regional hub for the transit of energy from the Caucasus, Middle East, and Central Asia to Europe. This aim does complicate its energy relationship with Russia, which does not want to see Europe bypassing the Kremlin for its energy needs. Therefore keep a close eye on anything and everything related to this complex international web of energy relations., especially any Turkish talk on Nabucco (a stalemated project) and Turkish talk or action on building an addition line for Blue Stream (a project that has a real chance). Likewise, from the Turkish point of view Iraq is a major source of energy, which could lessen Ankara’s dependence on other sources. We will need to watch how Turkey moves to secure energy supplies from Iraq.

^Table of Contents

IRAQ

Security

  • While it has greatly improved since early 2007, the Iraqi security situation needs to be watched closely, especially as U.S. effects a military drawdown to 50k troops by the end of Augustthe Iraqi forces assume greater responsibility for securityat a time of political uncertainty created by the inability of the 4 major factions (that emerged victorious in the March 7 parliamentary elections) to come up with a coalition government.Watch for details or activity of Iranian proxies, the movement of weapons or training or the influx of Iranian operatives.
    Watch for details or activity of AQI/ISI, the operations they conduct, how strong and robust the movement is, etc. Watch for correlations between AQI/ISI and bank robberies or kidnappings that might indicate they’re hurting for cash or evolving from a true-believer movement to more of a criminal entity. Also for security operations against AQI/ISI.
  • Jihadists despite haverecentlytaken a major hit with the killing and arrest of a number of their top leadersbut we will need to keep an eye on any majorattacks against Shia, security, Kurdish, and even Sunni targets. Likewise the sectarian violence has calmed down quite a bit since the 2003-07 period but the relative calm is fragile so keep a close eye for any resurgence in Shia-Sunni violence, especially as the Shia seek to limit the share of the Sunnis in the next government. The efforts of both the Shia and the Sunni to limit the extent of Kurdish power in the north should also be monitored closely for signs that the political feud may be turning violent.At the same time the Shia have an interest in cooperating with the Kurds to limit the power of the Sunnis, especially since the coalition they voted for, former interim premier Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiyah List, came in first place in the March 7 vote.
  • The matter of integrating Sunni militiamen into the Shia-dominated state security apparatus remains a key powder keg given Baghdad’s desire to severely limit the number of Sunni fighters it is willing to admit into the security organs. We should therefore watch for signs of recidivism and signs that of a reviving Sunni insurgency.This also requires careful monitoring of developments and incidents within the security and intelligence communities. All sides are fighting for control of the most powerful, but fledgling, institutions in Iraq, and we have seen all types of political violence and maneuvering. We can only expect this to continue in 2011 until they are consolidated.
  • In addition to the inter-communal violence, there is also a great degree of intra-communal violence, especially within the Sunni and Shia communities with struggles for communal domination by rival factions. Need to keep an eye on the moves by the various factions.
  • Need to keep an eye on the moves to unify rival Kurdish Peshmerga militias into a single KRG security force, especially in the context of KRG-Baghdad tensions, particularly with the KRG trying to take advantage of the political deadlock in Baghdad to expand its influence beyond the official Kurdistan region.

Military

  • The status of U.S. forces, including the drawdown and consolidation of bases, etc. continues to be important. Note when units are being drawn down and not replaced, what that unit was doing up until its departure and where it is being pulled from and its designation. Note the provisions/arrangements being made in the vacuum left behind.
    we need to watch for what the U.S. is pushing for in terms of its troop presence beyond 2011, when the current SOFA requires all troops to be out of the country. Also be looking for signs or indications that the U.S. military presence is being rebalanced and reoriented towards a blocking presence against Iran. For this, we need to be watching the status and disposition of U.S. forces in both Iraq and Kuwait, and to a lesser extent elsewhere in the PG region.
  • This year we need to be watching military activity closely. This includes, but is not limited to: the disposition, deployment and activities of U.S. forces in country. What are they doing, how many are still doing joint operations, what sort of operations are they still involved in, what is the nature of their participation, how critical is that participation, how often and where do these operations take place?