Session8

박민아

Discouragingopportunistic behavior in collaborative R&D: A new role for government

Mary Tripsas, Stephan Schrader, Maurizio Sobrero

The primary role of government in collaborative R&D is thought as orchestrating funding however government also can decrease opportunistic behavior and promote active engagement among partners. During collaborative R&D, firms fear being exploited by other with opportunisticbehavior which makes them reluctant and less likely to commit their resources. By using transaction cost framework, the author observed how opportunistic behavior can increase the cost and government’s role reducing the cost through institutional and administrative mechanisms, exhibitingItalianSocietadiRiveraca as an example. First, ex-ante transaction costs can be reduced through institutional mechanisms. Before firms decide to jointly work together, settlement needs to be made regarding control of ownership, distribution of research result, contribution, the goal of project, and protection of proprietary technology. Negotiation process can be long and costly but by providing legal menu of options and decreasing risk of ex-post exploitation, government can help firms to save their resources. On the other hand, an administrative mechanism is related to involvementofgovernment in the cooperation through monitoring, enforcing agreement and establishing long-termrelationship. Through example of ItalianSocietadiRiveraca, the paper shows government can control opportunism and promote efficient collaborative R&D. Firms with prior experience in collaborative R&D activity tend to less appreciate the institutional role of government but administrative role, reducing ex-post opportunistic behavior, was still recognized and appreciated .

The author set ItalianSocietadiRiveraca as example to show government play important role in Italian collaborative R&D. However, the paper presentedgovernment as third party that does not have agenda or wanted goal. In the case of developing new technology, government often has its own agenda and sometimes even select or limit the participants to effectively develop technology in short-term. Examples can be South Korea or Japan where government play a central role of collaborative R&D, including orchestrating activity, funding, monitoring. In such case, it is less likely for firms to exhibit opportunistic behavior since they are constantly evaluated and monitored by government. Although the author mentioned ItalianSocietadiRiveracaincluded IMI to do the similar job, still the situation is different therefore the study needs to be divided into two circumstances.

The ex ante assessment of knowledge spillovers: Government R&D policy, economic incentives and private firm behavior

Maryann P. Feldman, Maryellen R. Kelley

Government funding for university lead to social benefit but government funding for private firm is trickier. When private firm get government funding, they are likely to be spent on development and less likely on basic science, which consequences in limited knowledge spillover. To accelerateknowledge flow and promote public benefit, government’s selection in programs has been examined in the paper. A greater potential for knowledge spillover exist, when firm is more connected to others through collaborative R&D and to non-profit organization such as universities. Additionally, R&D associated with basic scienceproject has higher potential for knowledge spillover. But in order for knowledge spillover to actually occur, the willingness to open and share the information among organization is essential, which is greatly affected by institution. Hence, government’s role in promoting knowledge spillover is emphasized by performing ex-ante assessment of spillover potential and firm characteristic. Support of government can be economically beneficial to the firm. While some suggested the crowding effect, the author revealed that government fund will attract others to engage in R&D project of focal firm by certifying the worthiness of ongoing project.

In the paper, to measure the knowledge spillover potential of R&D projects, the connectedness of firm to other profit and no-profit organization, willingness to volunteer information and project of basic science are stated. It seems to make sense but it made me wonder the potential was fully captured by the three factors and whether patent or licensing can be recognized as spillover. Also whether the knowledge is tacit or explicit will also have effect on spillover. In the case of tacit knowledge, despite the government’s effect to promote spillover, due to the stickiness of information, the spillover might not occur smoothly as government intended. In such case, what action or policy can government promote to help?

Objectives, agreements and matching in science-industry collaboration: reassembling the pieces of the puzzle

Nicolas Carayol

Collaboration between science field and industry is increasing due to the expectation of bring out positive impact on economic performance and social benefit. To set and implement policies for the collaboration, the paper observed the microeconomics of science industry collaboration and identified 5 typologies of collaboration and assortative matching process as rationale. There are a various forms of interaction and intensity of interaction so through contractual agreement both side clear possible ex-post concerns such as sharing knowledge. From the academia’s perspective, collaboration gives them opportunity to secure fund, gain insight, and support graduate school student and equipment. On the other hand, firms expect synergy effect which will increase R&D productivity by complementing research capability. Based on the insights from previous studies, the author addsvariables such as characteristic of the relation, environment of the relation, firm characteristics and academic partner characteristics to identify five types of collaboration. Furthermore, the matchingprocess between labs and firm’s R&D fund has been observed deeper. In the case of well known researcher, when he is making decision of collaboration, the opportunity cost is high. Also scientist takes synergy effect, closeness between interests of scientists and those of industrial partner, under consideration. On the other hand, to sustain their innovation, firms tend to develop research agenda which are more risky. Therefore, industrial firm who is developing riskier project tends to prefer academic partner of a high excellence whileacademic partner with a lower opportunity cost will collaborate with industrial partners with relatively low risk project (assortative matching).

The paper exhibited five types of collaborations and proposed assortative matching process as a rationale behind choosing partners. However, personally, I find the assortative matching hypothesis hard to understand. The author’s reasoning does not convince me fully. It is stated in the paper that academics with have high opportunity cost and low exploitable synergies would see their willingness to co-operate with firms to depend much more on the contents of the collaborative research, but I do not understand how he jumped into that conclusion.