Was President Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb justified?
Author: Nicole Charles
School: Middletown High School
District: Middletown Public Schools
Overview: The U.S. decision to drop atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 has generated much controversy over the years. Some argue that the bombing was necessary to end World War II, while others believe that more than 200,000 civilians died in vain. The documents chosen for this topic are ones outlining the arguments for or against the decision to drop the bomb prior to the event.
Document Summary:
Document 1: Memorandum from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to Secretary of War, September 30, 1944, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District (MED), Harrison-Bundy Files (H-B Files), folder 69
Months before the bomb would be available, key War Department advisers, among others, worried about the political and military problems and possibilities raised by the project—the possibility of enormously powerful hydrogen bombs, enormous military potential, the limits of secrecy, the danger of a global arms race, and the need for international exchange of information and international inspection to stem dangerous nuclear competition. Martin Sherwin and James Hershberg see this memorandum flowing from Bush and Conant’s concern about President Roosevelt's "cavalier" belief that it would be possible to maintain an Anglo-American atomic monopoly after World War II. To disabuse senior officials that such a monopoly was possible, they drafted this memorandum. This document would be used to argue against Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb.
Document 2. Memorandum discussed with the President, April 25, 1945
Source: Henry Stimson Diary, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Henry Lewis Stimson Papers (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Soon after he was sworn in as president, after President Roosevelt's death, Harry Truman learned about the top secret Manhattan Project. It was not until he received a briefing from Secretary of War Stimson and Manhattan Project chief General Groves, who went through the "back door" to escape the watchful press, that Truman understood the full scope of the enterprise. Stimson, who later wrote up the meeting in his diary, also prepared a discussion paper, which raised broader policy issues associated with the imminent possession of "the most terrible weapon ever known in human history." This document primarily argues against the decision to bomb Japan but part of the document could be interpreted in favor as well.
Document 3: Memorandum from J. R. Oppenheimer to Brigadier General Farrell, May 11, 1945
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g (copy from microfilm)
Discussing the radiological dangers of a nuclear detonation, Oppenheimer explained to General Farrell, Groves's deputy, the need for precautions. This document outlines reasons against dropping a nuclear bomb at that time.
Document 4: "Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting Thursday, 31 May 1945, 10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M. – 2:15 P.M. to 4:15 P.M.," n.d., Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 (copy from microfilm)
With Secretary of War Stimson presiding, members of the committee heard reports on a variety of Manhattan Project issues, including the stages of development of the atomic project, problems of secrecy, the possibility of informing the Soviet Union, cooperation with “like-minded” powers, the military impact of the bomb on Japan, and the problem of “undesirable scientists.” Interested in producing the “greatest psychological effect,” the Committee members agreed that the “most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses.” Bernstein argues that this target choice represented an uneasy endorsement of “terror bombing”--the target was not exclusively military or civilian; nevertheless, workers' housing would include noncombatant men, women, and children. This document describes how the “psychological effect” the bombing would have, was needed therefore this document argues in favor of the bomb. A student could argue against this however.
Document 5: General George A. Lincoln to General Hull, June 4, 1945, enclosing draft, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, American-British-Canadian Top Secret Correspondence, Box 504, ABC 387 Japan (15 Feb. 45)
George A. Lincoln, chief of the Strategy and Policy Group at the U.S. Army’s Operations Department, commented on a memorandum by former President Herbert Hoover that Stimson had passed on for analysis. Hoover proposed a compromise solution with Japan that would allow Tokyo to retain part of its empire in East Asia (including Korea and Japan) as a way to head off Soviet influence in the region. While Lincoln believed that the proposed peace teams were militarily acceptable he doubted that they were workable or that they could check Soviet “expansion” which he saw as an inescapable result of World War II. As to how the war with Japan would end, he saw it as “unpredictable” but speculated about “Russian entry into the war, combined with a landing, or imminent threat of a landing, on Japan proper by us, to convince them of the hopelessness of their situation.” Lincoln derided Hoover’s casualty estimate of 500,000. J. Samuel Walker has cited this document to make the point that “contrary to revisionist assertions, American policymakers in the summer of 1945 were far from certain that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would be enough in itself to force a Japanese surrender.” This document argues in favor of dropping the bomb.
Document 6: Memorandum from Chief of Staff Marshall to the Secretary of War, 15 June 1945, enclosing "Memorandum of Comments on 'Ending the Japanese War,'" June 14, 1945
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
Commenting on another memorandum by Herbert Hoover, George A. Lincoln discussed war aims, face-saving proposals for Japan, and the nature of the proposed declaration to the Japanese government, including the problem of defining “unconditional surrender.” Lincoln argued against modifying the concept of unconditional surrender: if it is “phrased so as to invite negotiation” he saw risks of prolonging the war or a “compromise peace.” J. Samuel Walker has observed that those risks help explain why senior officials were unwilling to modify the demand for unconditional surrender. This argues in favor of dropping the bomb.
Procedure (80 minutes):
1. Introduction of lesson, objectives, overview of SAC procedure (15 minutes)
2. SAC group assignments (30 minutes)
a. Assign groups of four and assign arguments to each team of two.
b. In each group, teams read and examine the Document Packet
c. Each student completes the Preparation part of the Capture Sheet (#2), and works with their partner to prepare their argument using supporting evidence.
d. Students should summarize your argument in #3.
3. Position Presentation (10 minutes)
a. Team 1 presents their position using supporting evidence recorded and summarized on the Preparation part of the Capture Sheet (#2 & #3) on the Preparation matrix. Team 2 records Team 1’s argument in #4.
b. Team 2 restates Team 1’s position to their satisfaction.
c. Team 2 asks clarifying questions and records Team 1’s answers.
d. Team 2 presents their position using supporting evidence recorded and summarized on the Preparation part of the Capture Sheet (#2 & #3) on the Preparation matrix. Team 1 records Team 2’s argument in #4.
e. Team 1 restates Team 2’s position to their satisfaction.
f. Team 1 asks clarifying questions and records Team 2’s answers.
4. Consensus Building (10 minutes)
a. Team 1 and 2 put their roles aside.
b. Teams discuss ideas that have been presented, and figure out where they can agree or where they have differences about the historical question
5. Closing the lesson (15 minutes)
a. Whole-group Discussion
b. Make connection to unit
c. Assessment (suggested writing activity addressing the question)
DOCUMENT PACKET
Document 1
The following document is an explanation by President Truman of how he had thoroughly investigated the pros and cons of dropping the bomb and had concluded without a doubt that it should be used.
“I had then set up a committee of top men and had asked them to study with great care the implications the new weapons might have for us. It was their recommendation that the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done. They recommended further that it should be used without specific warning I had realized, of course, that an atomic bomb explosion would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination. On the other hand, the scientific advisors of the committee reported that no technical demonstration they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. It had to be used against an enemy target.The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never doubted it should be used."
-President Harry S. Truman
Vocabulary
Implications: consequences
Inflict: cause
Casualties: deaths
Regarded: considered
Source: http://www.teachablemoment.org/high/dbq3.html
Document 2
The following excerpt is written by Admiral William E. Leahy, President Truman’s Chief of Staff. This piece clearly outlines Leahy’s opinion that it was the wrong decision to drop the bomb on the Japanese.
“The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender...In being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."
Admiral William E. Leahy, President Truman's Chief of Staff, in his memoirs "I Was There"
Vocabulary
Barbarous: brutal, cruel
Surrender: admit defeat
Ethical: moral
Source: Admiral William E. Leahy, President Truman's Chief of Staff, in his memoirs "I Was There" (adopted from http://www.teachablemoment.org/high/dbq3.html)
Document 3
The following excerpt explains Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s view that although the decision to drop the bomb took many lives, in war death in unfortunately inevitable. Although death is bad at this point dropping the bomb was the only alternative at the time.
"The face of war is the face of death; death is an inevitable part of every order that a wartime leader gives. The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese."But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent alternative. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies. In this last great action of the Second World War we were given final proof that war is death."
-Secretary of War Henry Stimson
Vocabulary
Inevitable: unavoidable
Deliberate: done on purpose
Premeditated: Planned, thought out
Abhorrent: objectionable
Ghastly: shocking, horrifying
Specter: threat
Source: Document adopted from http://www.teachablemoment.org/high/dbq3.html
Document 4
This excerpt was written in a Japanese newspaper a day after the second atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. Clearly the writer states his disgust with decision and how poorly it represents humanity.
"How can a human being with any claim to a sense of moral responsibility deliberately let loose an instrument of destruction which can at one stroke annihilate an appalling segment of mankind? This is not war: this is not even murder; this is pure nihilism. This is a crime against God and humanity which strikes at the very basis of moral existence. What meaning is there in any international law, in any rule of human conduct, in any concept of right and wrong, if the very foundations of morality are to be overthrown as the use of this instrument of total destruction threatens to do?"Nippon Times (Tokyo), August 10,1945
Vocabulary
Deliberately: do on purpose
Annihilate: Crush, beat, conquer
Appalling: Awful, terrible
Nihilism: Negativism
Source: Nippon Times (Tokyo), August 10, 1945, adopted from http://www.teachablemoment.org/high/dbq3.html
Document 5
The following pictures were taken in Nagasaki, Japan the day after the bombing.
Images of Nagasaki, 1945Source: Yamahata photographs © Shogo Yamahata, The Day After the Nagasaki Bombing. The Japan Peace Museum (www.peace-museum.org)
Document 6
The following excerpt was written by Lester Bernstein who was a soldier during WWII. In this piece Lester refers to dropping the bombs as a “sunburst of deliverance” showing his support of the decision.
"The day was August 6, 1945. I was a G.I. who had weathered the war in Europe and now awaited my place in the storming of Japan's home islands. On Truman's orders, the first atomic bomb ever wielded in war exploded over Hiroshima. For Americans in uniform and those who waited for them to come home, outrageous as this might appear from the moral heights of hindsight, it was a sunburst of deliverance."-Lester Bernstein, New York Times, 10/24/65
Vocabulary:
Wielded: used, employed
Hindsight: realizing after the fact, retrospect
Deliverance: Relief, escape, liberation
Source: Lester Bernstein, New York Times, 10/24/65 adopted from http://www.teachablemoment.org/high/dbq3.html
Some of the language and phrasing in these documents have been modified from the originals.
CAPTURE SHEET