Corporations Law
Exam notes
Contents
1Key cases – generally
2KEY CORPORATE COLLAPSES/SCANDALS AND LEGAL ISSUES
(i)Australian Wheat Board
(ii)Enron Corp
(iii)HIH Insurance
(iv)James Hardie Industries
(v)Sanlu Dairy Group
(vi)Storm Financial
3Key legal doctrines and issues
(vii)Corporate form v non-corporate forms
(viii)Separate legal entity doctrine
(ix)Subsidiary companies
(x)Statutory contract
(xi)Constitution
(xii)Pre-registration dealings
(xiii)Dealing with outsiders
(xiv)Membership
(xv)Members remedies
(xvi)Meetings
(xvii)Corporate governance
(xviii)Directors & officers
(xix)Share capital
(xx)Share capital maintenance doctrine
(xxi)Loan capital
(xxii)Dividends – L9
(xxiii)Fundraising
(xxiv)Insolvency
4Oppression remedy
5Derivative action
6Challenge variation of class rights
7External administration
8Winding up application
9General law remedies
9.1Fraud on minority
10Inspection of books
11Injunction
12Director’s duties
13Irregularities
14Summaries completed
1Key cases – generally
Saloman v Saloman & Co Ltd
The company is a separate legal entity from its members
Gambotto v WCP Ltd
Proper purpose requirement
Since a share is property,[1] expropriation of minority interests is permitted (i) pursuant to the principles decided in Gambotto v WCP Ltd,[2] provided it is necessary to avoid serious detriment to the company[3] (ii) for regulatory compliance (iii) because the shareholder is competing with the company[4] or (iv) by the Corporations Act.[5] The primary basis for the proposal is for reasons of financial performance and this was not considered to be a proper purpose in Gambotto v WCP Ltd.[6]
’Fair in the circumstances’ requirement
The amendment must also be considered to be ‘fair in the circumstances’.[7] The oppression remedy was discussed above. If the amendment was procedurally and substantively fair, especially with respect to the purchase price, then the amendment would not be oppressive, however that would not cure the improper purpose. Accordingly, the majority of shareholders are constrained from expropriating Adam’s shares.
ASIC v Adler
Financial assistance
Breach directors duties
See notes on HIH collapse
Wayde v NSW Rugby League
The appellants, representing a club which the respondent's board excluded from a football competition on the grounds that only 12 clubs might compete, sought relief.
Oppression meaning is a composite whole
Although action might be discriminatory, it can still be in good faith for the benefit of the company as a whole. The court will consider whether the decisions of the directors were such that no board acting reasonably could have made them.
Foss v Harbottle
2 key issues for members remedies:
- proper plaintiff is the company not the member
- the alleged wrong can be ratified by a simple majority of members by way of resolution as provided by the company’s constitution (the internal management rule)
See statutory derivative action
Walker v Wimbourne
Single economic unit principle
The argument that transactions were undertaken for the benefit of a group of companies or another company in the group provides no justification for a misapplication of funds. Here the companies were not members of a "group" in the sense in which the word is generally applied, that is to a number of companies associated by common or interlocking shareholdings, allied to unified control or capacity to control. It was the duty of the directors of the company making payments to consult its interests alone. In discharging their duty to the company they must take account of the interest of its shareholders and creditors. Any failure to take into account the interests of creditors would have adverse consequences also for the company.
Tesco supermarkets
Store assistant restocked shelves with product at normal price, not discounted price.
For a company to be liable, the person acting must have been the “directing mind or will” of the company
- there was no delegation of any part of the functions or responsibilities
2KEY CORPORATE COLLAPSES/SCANDALS AND LEGAL ISSUES
(i)Australian Wheat Board
- AWB’s involvement in paying bribes to the Iraqi regime
- Possible contraventions by the officers of AWB of; sections 180, 181, 182, 184, 1307(1) and 1309 of the Corporations Act,[8] sections 135.1(7), 135.4 (7) and 136.1 of the Criminal Code,[9]sections 29A, 29B and 29D of the Crimes Act[10]and sections 81, 82 and 321 of the Crimes Act.[11]
- The Federal Court of Australia Act[12] permits the commencement of class actions.
- A derivative class action[13] brought against AWB alleged misleading and deceptive conduct[14] and breaches of the Corporations Act[15] by AWB arising from the failure to maintain their continuous disclosure obligations to the ASX.[16]
(ii)Enron Corp
The Enron failure demonstrated a failure of corporate governance, in which internal control mechanisms were short-circuited by conflicts of interest that enriched certain managers at the expense of the shareholders.
Had Enron complied with existing market practices, not to mention existing accounting and disclosure requirements, it could not have built the house of cards that eventually led to its downfall
Sarbanes–Oxley Act – enhanced disclosure requirements, officer liability for financial statements, auditor independence
(iii)HIH Insurance
In the Judgment, HIH and HIHC (who were not parties to the proceedings) were held in the circumstances found to have contravened
- s208 (related party financial benefits without shareholder approval) of the Corporations Law by the payment of $10 million to AEUT in the circumstances;
- s260A (financial assistance for the purchase of shares) of the Corporations Law by such payment of $10 million followed by the purchase of shares by AEUT from part of the $10 million; paras [182], [183] and[355].
- Mr Adler and Adler Corporation, as well as the Second Defendant ("Mr Williams") and Third Defendant ("Mr Fodera"), were also found to have been relevantly "involved" in those contraventions, so as to place themselves in breach of (respectively) ss209(2) and 260D(2) of the Corporations Law; [199], [217] & [369].
- Mr Adler was held to have contravened his directorial duties, or duties as an officer, that were owed to HIH and HIHC and (save in relation to s183) PEE, under ss180, 181, 182 and 183 of the Corporations Law, by reason of the transactions, described above: [387], [577], [694], [706] & [730]. Adler Corporation was found to have been "involved" in these contraventions, so as to be liable itself under ss181(2), 182(2) and 183(2) of the Corporations Law: [578]. Mr Adler was also relevantly involved in Williams' contravention of his duty under s182 so as to be liable himself under s182(2): [731].
- Mr Williams was held to have contravened his directorial duties, or duties as an officer, owed to HIH and HIHC, under ss180 and 182 of the Corporations Law, through his involvement with the payment of $10 million by HIHC to PEE: [453], [461].
Corporate governance
- There was a culture where senior management failed to bring important facts to the Board's attention
- The Board failed to monitor systematically the performance of management and generally failed to hold executives to account in the interests of the company
(iv)James Hardie Industries
- With respect to corporate governance, the directors considered that the short-term profitability of the company was paramount.[17] The objectives of the company were to be dogmatically pursued, including running the risk to the health of employees and consumers of the products. This may have been exacerbated by the failure of the first asbestos diseases law suit against JHI.[18]
- Two key aspects of JHI’s conduct permitted the continuous illegality; (i) silence and (ii) a ‘corporate culture of deceit’.[19]
- JHI’s directors breached their duties[20] to hide illegality with respect to breaching trade sanction imposed upon South Africa,[21] the actuarial compensation studies[22] and the cancellation of the partly paid shares[23] which had the effect of denying $1.96 billion[24] to the foundation.[25]
- In Australian Securities & Investments Commission v McDonald (No 11),[26] it was held that JHIL[27] and JHI[28] had breached their obligations and that three of its officers and seven non-executive[29] directors had breached their duties.[30]
- Those breaches included; (i) failures to advise the directors of key matters, that there were limitations in analysis and whether disclosure was required, (ii) a failure to seek advice about disclosure requirements, (iii) the release of misleading or deceptive information and (iv) a failure to ensure their continuous disclosure obligations.
- Corporate social responsibility in the form of full compensation funding was resisted by the directors until the very end. It was the combined effect of global union boycotts, media scrutiny, public opinion and political maneuvering[31] that finally saw JHI agree to fully fund the Asbestos Injuries Compensation Trust.[32]
(v)Sanlu Dairy Group
Executives at Sanlu Dairy Group in 2008 were involved in the deadly tainting of milk by the addition of melamine
(vi)Storm Financial
Personal advice & s 945A
- the majority of Storm clients were given the same, or substantially similar, financial advice.
- Storm advisers strongly downplayed the risk of losing the family home
- Some investors report being reassured by the fact that Storm held a professional indemnity insurance policy
- s 953B – civil action for loss for contraventions of section 945A, 945B, 949A or 949B.
3Key legal doctrines and issues
(vii)Corporate form v non-corporate forms
- (sole trader, partnership, unincorporated association, trust, joint venture)
(viii)Separate legal entity doctrine
- 119 – comes into existence on registration
- 112 – limited by shares
- 113 – no of shareholders
- 124 – legal capacity and powers
- 125 – company can restrict its powers. Abolishes doctrine of ultra vires.
- 516 - Limited liability
The corporate veil
Saloman v Saloman & Co Ltd - The company is a separate legal entity from its members.
Walker v Wimbourne
Industrial Equity v Blackburn
Lifting the corporate veil
Statute
- 588G – insolvent trading
- 588FB-FG – uncommercial transactions
- 588FDA – unreasonable director related transactions
- 267 – Company officer charges
- 260A – financial assistance
- 233 - Trustees
Common law
Re Darby - fraudulent purpose
Gilford Motor Co v Home – avoid legal obligation
Green v Bestobell – involvement in director ‘s fiduciary breach
Tesco Supermaket Ltd v Nattrass – attributing mind and will of company
(ix)Subsidiary companies
- 46(a) – definition
- 47 – control
- 50 – related body corporate
- 260A – financial assistance
- 588V-X – insolvent trading
- 202B – remuneration disclosure
- Briggs v James Hardie & Co; CSR Ltd v Young – parent liability for subsidiary
- Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 P/L v MUA
- 187 – director duties of subsidiaries modified
(x)Statutory contract
- 140(1)
- Hickman v Kent – contract between company and members
- Caratti Holdings Co P/L – contract between members
- Forbes v NSW Trotting Club – non-members cannot enforce member’s rights even if granted
- Hickman v Kent; Eley v Positive GSLA Co – only enforce member’s rights in their capacity as members
- Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence – can enforce special contract
- 1322(2) – court invalidate irregularity
- Carrier Australasia Ltd v Hunt – ‘director for life’ clause was a separate contract
- Breach of 140 not contravention
- Remedies limited to injunction not damages
(xi)Constitution
- 135 – companies after 1 July 1998
- 135(2) – can displace/modify RR
- 134 – RR or constitution or both
- 141 – RR list
- 136(2) – power to alter
- Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd; Malleson v National Insurance and Guarantee Corporation – cannot deprive itself of power
- 75% majority to amend constitution
- Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd Peters’ American Delicacy Ltd v Heath– The power to alter articles must be exercised bona fidefor the benefit of the company as a whole
- Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese & Co Ltd; Peters’ American Delicacy Ltd v Heath- The fact that an alteration prejudices or diminishes some of the rights of the shareholders is not in itself a ground for attacking the validity of an alteration
- Shuttleworth v. Cox Brothers & Co. (Maidenhead) Ltd; Peters’ American Delicacy Ltd v Heath- the decision is not such as no reasonable man could have reached
Modification limits
- 140(2)
- Ding v Sylvania Waterways Ltd – members protected by 140(2)
- variation of rights
- cannot be oppressive
- Gambotto v WCP Ltd – fairness test in expropriation
- Allen v Gold Reef of West Africa – bona fide for benefit of the Co as a whole
- Breach: Part 2D.1; Part 2F.1; Winding up (461(1)(k)
(xii)Pre-registration dealings
- Pre registration dealings refer to transactions/contracts entered into by promoters
- Twycross v Grant
- May be active (Aequitas v AEFC)or passive promoter (Tracy v Mandalay Pty Ltd)
Duties of promoters
- fiduciary duties (Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co; Gluckstein v Barnes)
- 711(2)-(3) - Fundraising disclosure – nature and extent of interest in formation, property acquired, offer of securities
- Promoters are within “related entities” in s9 and may be liable to a liquidator under the voidable antecedent transaction provisions
Contracts
- 131(1) - Aztech Science Pty ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (woy woy) Pty Ltd
- 131(2) – personal liability for non-performance
- 131(4) – Failure to perform after ratification
- 131(3) – Court orders
(xiii)Dealing with outsiders
- 128-130 – outsider entitled to make assumptions when dealing with the company
- 129 – each assumption is separate and discrete
- 129(8) – cumulative operation to assumptions
- 129(1) – Turquand’s case (indoor management rule); Oris Fund Management v NAB, unless outsider has actual knowledge or irregularity or is put on inquiry
- 129(2)-(3) – “customary authority”. Compare director/MD/Chairperson/Co Sec
- 129(3) - Freeman and Lockyer v Bathurst Park Properties; ANZ v Australian Glass and Mirrors
- 129(3) – Story v Advance Bank Australia Ltd - covers fraud/forgery
- 129(4)–knew or suspected assumption incorrect
- 129(5) – Brick & Pipe Ind Ltd v Occidental Life Nominees
- NAB v Sparrow Green P/L – actual authority of Co. agents
- Freeman and Lockyer v Bathurst Park Properties –Apparent/ostensible authority of Co. Agents (eg. not properly appointed)
Contractual liability
Freeman and Lockyer v Bathurst Park Properties – 4 preconditions to enforce contract if agent had no authority; (i) representation of authority (ii) by a person who had actual authority (iii) induced (iv) Co. had power to enter the contract.
Not binding:
- ANZ Executors & Trustee Co v Quintex Australia – not for the benefit of the company
- Walker v Wimbourne – made when near or in insolvency
Criminal liability
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
- 12.1(2)
- 12.2
- 12.3(6)
- 12.5(1)
- Tesco Supermaket case
Tort liability
- 128(3) – common law vicarious liability
- Co vicariously liable for torts committed by employees in the course of their employment
- Daniels v Anderson
(xiv)Membership
- 231 – upon registration or after of Co.
- 1070C(2) – Re Independent Quarries Pty Ltd - share certificate is evidence of title
- 129 – reliance on share certificate strengthened by assumptions in s 129
- 168 – register of members
- 169 – names must be entered
- 176 – Re Clifton Springs Hotel Ltd - is proof of matters shown in it
- 172 – place of register
- 173(1) – inspection of register
- 177(1) prohibited use of registers
- 177(1A) – exceptions to prohibitions in 177(1); IMF (Aust) Ltd v Sons of Gwalia Ltd
- Axa Asia Pacific Holdings Limited v Direct Share Purchasing Corporation Pty Ltd - $250 to access register
- applying for shares
- 1070A - transfer of shares as per constitution
- Greenhalgh v Mallard - any restriction on transfer contained the co’s constitution must be clear and unambiguous
- 1071E – must give notice of refusal
- 1072G – P/L may refuse transfer
- 1072F(3) – Co. may refuse transfer of partly paid shares
- 1071F – remedy refused transfer
- Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd – directors acted in bad faith or improper purpose
- 1071F – refusal was without just cause
- 232 - Re Winmardun Pty ltd - oppression remedy
- 1072A – transmission by operation of law on death
- 1072B - transmission by operation of law on bankruptcy
- exercise option
Rights
- Right to vote at General Meeting
- Right to receive dividends
- right in certain circumstances to force dividend payment
- 140 – right to enforce statutory contract
- 485 – right to surplus assets
- 247A – right to inspect books
- 175 – right to correct register
- Right to be informed and participate in certain decisions (i) affecting the constitution, (ii) affecting share capital (iii) rights as a member and (iv) rights attached to shares
- member’s remedies (see below)
Certain rights depend upon the class of shares issued
- Entitlement to dividend;
- Rights to priority in payment of dividend;
- Voting rights;
- Rights to repayment of capital on winding up;
- Rights to participate in surplus assets on winding up; and
- Rights of enjoyment of certain assets such as co’s property.
Liabilities
- 254M(2) - Pay calls on partly paid shares
- 516 – on winding up liability limited to unpaid amount on shares
- Chase Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd v North Sydney Brick and Tile Co ltd – lien may secure debts of shareholder
- cannot pass liability to a man of straw
(xv)Members remedies
- 232 - Oppression remedy (Part 2F.1)
- 236 - Statutory derivative action (Part 2F.1A)
- Breach member’s personal rights (3rd exception to Foss v Harbottle) – personal action
- Enforce statutory contract
- Enforce express contract
- 461 – Wind up application
- 1324 – Injunction to prevent contravention
- Part 2F.2 – Variation or cancellation of class rights
- 247A - Part 2F.3 – Right to inspect books
- 1322 - Seek to invalidate irregularities
Available when:
- breach of director’s duties and Co. not likely to institute recovery proceedings
- action taken by directors or majority which is unfairly detrimental to minority interests
(xvi)Meetings
- 249C – director may call a meeting
- 249D – shareholders holding at least 5% or 100 members
- 249F - shareholders holding at least 5%
- 249G – Court may call a meeting
- 249E – members can call meeting if directors do not comply with 249D
- 249Q – NRMA v parker - meeting must be held for a proper purpose
- 249H – notice of meeting
- 249L – content of notice
- 1309 – Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd - offence if notice misleading, not full and fair disclosure
- 249T - Quorum
Duomatic principle
- If shareholders are in agreement, business may be transacted without the formalities of calling a meeting and passing a resolution
- Herrman v Simon
(xvii)Corporate governance
Cadbury Reportdefinition - “..the system by which companies are directed and controlled …board of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies”
HIH, Royal Commissioner, Justice Owen - “Corporate governance – describes the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which, authority is exercised and controlled in corporations. …it embraces not only the models and systems themselves but also the practices by which that exercise and control of authority is in fact effected”
ASX Corporate Governance Council - “…corporate governance influences how the objectives of the company are set and achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed, and how performance is optimised”
Regulation of Corporate Governance
- 180-184; 588G - Director’s duties
- 232, 236, 237 - Member’s remedies
- Member’s rights
- Internal corporate organs
- 140 - Internal Management rules
- 191, 674 - Market disclosure rules
- Ch 2M - Integrity of financial information
Non-legal regulation