Emil Pain
Director, Center for Ethno-political Studies (NGO/Moscow),
Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution of
the Kennan Institute (2000-2001)
Evolution of Center–Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation: From Yeltsin to Putin.
Myths of Putin
Before comparing the particulars of Putin's policies with those of his predecessors, I would like to remind you that on the one hand, Putin is not a new political actor. He is a part of the Yeltsin legacy. On the other hand, Yeltsin's politics were also different at various periods.
His government began at the time of liberalism, and its main task was to reduce the role of the state in the life of Russian society. In the second period, his approach was said to be based on the necessity of strengthening the role of the state. In the first stages, the closeness of the positions of Russia and the west were noticed in foreign policy right up to the support of Russian leadership in the action of America against Saddam Hussein. Than the second period Russia demonstrated a separate position in the majority of serious international problems-Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Iran. If in the first period the brighter, famous people played a larger role in surrounding Yeltsin- Gaidar, Chubais, Kozirev, and others, than in the second stage, there were darker, less noted bureaucrats such as Borodin, Korzjakov Yumashev, Voloshin.
Namely at this time, after 1996, when the former liberal goals were forgotten and the oligarchic, or so-called "family", form of administration of Russia strengthened Vladimir Putin was born as an independent political actor. At this time Putin received his first post in the rank of minister and became the head of the Federal Security Forces. Than Yeltsin publicly named him his successor. However, in the consciousness of the majority of Russians, he wasn't perceived as the successor to Yeltsin and that is the most important, as a continuer of the anti-liberal tendencies of the second stage of Yeltsin’s governance. Moreover, a part of the Russian intelligentsia, which traditionally connects all of their hope for a better future with the new leader, be it tsar or General Secretary of the Communist Party, and at this time wanted to have confidence in the new president as a messiah, deliverer of Russia from all her woes. Namely Russian intellectuals contrived several myths of Putin "liberal and reformer" and these myths in part shared with the West.
The first myth: "Putin wants reformation of Russia, but the “Yeltsin Family” is inhibiting him." This is a very typical Russian myth, resembling the traditional Russian fairy-tale about the "good tsar" and the "bad boyars." Therefore it is natural that part of the Russian intelligentsia supported this myth. But I was surprised that some of my American Colleagues, spoke in the terms of this myth when they described the modern political situation in Russia. I should remind you that the Yeltsin family named Putin the guarantor of the family’s preservation. And still now they are quite satisfied with him.
I am speaking of the family, not only in the narrow sense (such as relatives of Yeltsin), but in the wider meaning, such as groups of people and corporations, which having received in the course of privatization of Soviet property most of the profit. This group is striving to retain these advantages in three directions.
First of all, they apply all power to surprising political and economic competitors, especially such s as the Moscow group, leading by Mayor Luzhkov, who openly stated that he plans to re-examine the results of privatization. It happened that the casualty of the company became Berezovskii, who, not long ago, playing a more important role in the "big family." But Berezovskii is not the first man in history to become a victom of the team he himself defeated.
Secondly, the group is striving to subordinate the government, (in fact themselves) by means of mass information, most of all television, enabling the retention of power on the basis of manipulating the conscious of the population especially before the elections.
Thirdly, striving to weaken the political influence of regional leaders, which are the only political strength potentially capable of restricting the all powerful Kremlin in Russia where until now no parties, no other institutions of civil society were developed. Besides this, decreasing the political weight of the regional leaders allows those closest to the Kremlin oligarchy groups to place the regional economies under their control.
Everything that Putin has already done during his presidency had not exceeded the goals of the self-preservation of the family in the broader sense of the word. It is possible that with time, he will drag out the presence of his administration officials, associates with the "Yeltsin family", and then they will inevitably leave. However, they are still useful to him.
Mainly is that there are not any kind of substitutions or divergence from the goals and values of the "Yeltsin family" and Putin. The myth of contradictions between them is superficially supported by the president political technologists, such as Gleba Pavlovsky in order to separate the popularity of Putin from the unpopular Yeltsin.
In my opinion, the retention of the influence on Putin of representatives from the former "family" is the lesser evil than the influence of other representatives of his political coalition namely, his friends form the Liningrad KGB. The example for this is the story with the return of the Soviet anthem. Yeltsin publicly and categorically announced his opposition to the anthem[1]. This by the way was the first open break between Yelsin and Putin after the later was elected president of Russia.
The Second Myth: Russian Society expects from President Putin the development of economic reform. Nothing could be farther from the truth than this notion. Russian society is tired of reform; politicians, namely, those who are connected with reforms, such as Gaidar or Chubais, for example, have the most negative rating. The majority of Russians expect no new reforms from the President, but the punishment of those guilty for the previous political results during the time of President Yeltsin, which today are considered the failures or even the national shame of Russia. As the disgraces they min: the fall of the Soviet Union; the shame of the Russian army in the first Chechen war (1994-1996); privatization; the excessive authority given to leaders of Russian regions, especially of the republics etc. Who is to blame in all of this from the point of view of public opinion? Again it is the oligarchs, regional barons and liberal mass media.
Putin is acting in full accordance with these societal expectations, in the basis of these negative reforms, and has considered all of the Yeltsin period as a " time lost."
The Third Myth: under President Yeltsin, anarchy grew between Moscow and these republics and President Putin brought order and stabilized the situation. In fact it is the opposite. Yeltsin became president of Russia at a very critical period in its history. Russia was feeling the consequences of the disintegration of the USSR, the inertia of this process. In 1990-1991 all of the Russian Federation republics proclaimed declarations of sovereignty. This was the same declaration, which was taken before as republics of the Soviet Union. The threat of the disintegration of Russian in its time was the worst.
Yeltsin managed to stabilize the situation at the expense of concessions to the republics. If in the beginning of his actions, the leaders of the republics supported the most radical national movements, already by 1993, the situation would have been radically changed. At that time something resembling a secret pact between Yeltsin and the leaders of the republics appeared against radical nationalists. And since that time not one serious manifestation of separatism, appeared with the exception of Chechenya[2]. The situation has changed for the worse now, since Putin began to exert pressure on the leaders of the republics. In answer to this they have revived their nationalistic separatist strength. The leaders of the republics do not exhibit their negative sentiments against Putin’s policies openly. Instead they secretly allow nationalistic movements in their Republics to develop.
Creation of seven administrative areas with a governer-general at the helm is seen in the regions as a method of intimidation, so it is without doubt disliked by all the leaders of the regions. Added to that is the fact that none of them want to share power. But only few show their dislike publicly, for example, the president of the Chuvash republic, Nikolai Fedorov, and the governor of Sverdlov oblast, Eduard Rosel. Others either keep their mouths shut or publicly support presidential appointees hoping to quietly subotage the implementation of their directives.
Federal authorities do not have to be concerned with collective opposition by the leaders of the regions, they are incapable of joint political activity, as was demonstrated by their behavior in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1999. The real threat to Moscow comes not from the governors of regions or the presidents of republics, but from local political movements that are not dependent on Moscow. Only the leaders of the regions can have real influence on these movements, but today they do not want to avail themselves of that potential influence in order to resist the Kremlin.
There seems to be some point to the alleged main function of governer-generals to make the laws of the regions consistent with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. But presidential appointees carry out their main mission very selectively: they demand the repeal of laws that give greater autonomy to the regions, but do not demand that regional leaders correct laws that violate human rights and the rights of national minoraties. For example, in the Krasnodar kray there are a number of laws that are in glaring violation of international and national standards on the treatment of refugees, especialy national minorities, but the representative of the president in the Southern Region, general Victor Kazansev, did not even once bring up the question of repealling these laws- his main mission being to guarantee public support for the war with Chechnia[3]. The governor of the Sounthern region has been increasingly and openly abusive to many ethinc groups living in the region. (Turks, Armenians, Jews) But the representative of the president, the guarantor of Russian laws in the region, did not even reprimand him.
The power of regions’ heads should be limited. But not from above, not at the risk of concentrating even more power in the Kremlin, but in the development of municipal self-government. Putin’s reform proposes to weaken further an already insignificant role of municipal authorities, because as compensation for loss of power on the federal level the leaders of the regions are to receive a free hand in their dealings with the municipalities.
The historic precurors of administrative regions are general-gubernatorstva in the tsarist Russia and sovnarhoz in the Soviet era. Even these forms of governance, more antiquated for the soviet times than super regions are for ours, proved that fear and force alone will not keep together a multyethinic state. And since those times the level of economic independence of the regions has substantialy increased, most of the economy is privatized. Bullying is all that presidential appointees have to use. They can not influence the state of affairs in the regions, and the bureacracies that they create only raise the threat of corruption.
The idea of Nikita Khrushev to create sovnarxoz fell through. Very large territories (a sovnarhoz was to include 3-4 oblasts, rupublics or krays) were poorly governed. But the administrative regions are even bigger (they include 12-13 regions), in addition the party discipline of the Soviet times that supported the command hierarchy is gone. This alone condemns Putin’s administrative system to failure.
The Chechen War as a factor in the disintegration of Russia.
Russian Powers in starting the Second Chechen war say, that they have prevented the fall of Russia, but they are not correct. If, in its time, the Russian Federation excluded Chechenya from its composition, cut it out like a cancerous tumor, this would not at all have brought on the “domino effect” --that is the departure of other republics from Russia. The example of the destitute and criminal Chechenya did not infect or inspire anyone and its relationship with its neighbors before the war became worse everyday. But now, since the beginning of the war, solidarity with Chechnya grows. There are: 1) the solidarity of all non-Russian nationalities, including Volga Tartars and Siberian Yakuts; 2) Islamic solidarity; 3) solidarity of all offended nationalities. The last is especially important.
With the beginning of the war, practically all Caucasians, including those people who traditionally do not like the Chechens, are experiencing some of the same pressures of the Chechens: in that for the majority of the Russian people, all Caucasians have one face—they are all “dark” and all “terrorist”. These phobias especially grew after several terrorist acts in Russian cities.
Of course the second Chechen war is a special problem. It has already dragged on for exactly a year and the losses of the Russian troops, according to official statistics from Oct. 1999 to 4 Oct 2000 consists of 2,500 killed and more than 7 thousand wounded—that is more than the first year of the previous (first) Chechen war of 1994-1996.[4]
Chechen wars