PANEL TWO
DIMENSIONS OF THE CONTEST
MICHAEL MCFAUL (Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University),
"Trends in Campaigning"
I will start with several general comments, add a few specifics about different campaign strategies I have observed, and finally, try to generate controversy in terms of several of the earlier comments. In my overview points, I will compare this campaign with the 1995 campaign. I will also compare the campaign with the hypotheses put forward in a recent Carnegie Endowment publication, which provides an overview of this election. Although the book was written only a month ago, things have already changed. My job in terms of looking at the campaign is to compare what has changed since a month ago, and to determine what has caused the changes.
The first general point is that the most effective campaign so far is being run by a non-participant. That of course is the negative Kremlin campaign being lodged first and foremost against Fatherland. This is a new phenomenon in Russian politics in that the Kremlin in both 1995 and 1993 were relatively neutral when it came to the parliamentary elections. Now it is being very aggressive in attacking other parties. The forum, a new Russian television program, is a gross, overt negative campaign, first and foremost against Fatherland. The person behind the campaign is Sergei Dorenko. His program, aired on Sunday nights, includes such stories as how Luzhkov killed businessman Paul Tatum, how Yevgeny Primakov was responsible for the assassination attempts against Eduard Shevardnadze, and how Primakov was a lackey of NATO. In addition there have been interviews with prostitutes involving Mr. Skuratov, as well as some incredibly harsh footage of Chechen "terrorists" torturing a Russian soldier. I cannot remember a time, except the early 1980s, when I have seen such vivid, hard-core negative campaigns.
Some polling firms report that as many as 60% of the population watches Dorenko's show. His ratings are rising at the same time as Mr. Kisilev's numbers are declining. It turns out that not all of those people like the show. Of those who watch, 38% like Mr. Dorenko, while 25% do not. However, they all are still watching.
Part of this negative campaign is directed not only against Fatherland, but also against Fatherland's resources. So NTV has been a major target, with threats of shutting it down and declaring it bankrupt. Lukoil initially funded Fatherland-All Russia rather overtly. Once it got the deals it wanted with the government, it stopped the funding. Similar pressure has been put on Gazprom. In other words this is a frontal attack, not just through the media, to try to destroy Fatherland.
The first target was Luzhkov. Because he has many skeletons in the closet, Luzhkov was an easy target. Lately however, they have gone after Mr. Primakov, who is a fairly difficult fellow to go after. My sources told me that this is not the end of the negative campaign and that there is much compromising material being prepared against Mr. Yavlinsky as well.
It is also interesting to note who is not in the sights of this negative campaign, namely the Communist Party. In 1996, we saw much negative campaigning against the Communists. This time, there is absolutely none of it. I am not sure what the effect has been in terms of the Communist numbers, but they themselves believe that it has helped to keep their numbers stable and out of this mudslinging campaign.
The other important part of this has been Fatherland's response to these attacks. Fatherland has gone on the defensive and tried to counterattack with an offensive against the Kremlin. In a meeting two weeks ago with campaign consultants and pollsters in Moscow, most people thought that this was a big mistake. First, it brings Primakov down to the level of just another politician, in the mudslinging campaign. His image was to be the stable prime minister above it all. Now he is trading barbs with Dorenko. It lowers his stature considerably. Secondly, negative campaign action-reaction works very well in a two-person race, because everyone comes down. But in a three- or four-person race, negativity against someone else does not necessarily mean a positive for the mudslinger. Polls two weeks ago suggested that Fatherland's numbers were dropping and floating into the undecided vote. But their negative campaign against the Kremlin is not having the effect that they had wished because the Kremlin is not in the parliamentary race. So I think that this action-reaction negative campaign looks to be bad for Fatherland.
I am not ready to trace the direct causal links or even to say that there is a direct causal link. But we can say that people are watching Dorenko in greater numbers. There is a negative correlation between those who watch it and those who are not supporting Fatherland. In mid-November, 13% of those who are fond of ORT planned to vote for Fatherland, compared to 22% of NTV viewers who were favorably disposed towards Fatherland. I do not know what is the independent and dependent variable here. But it seems that this campaign is having a big effect on Fatherland. It is too early to say who benefits. Right now it looks like the undecided voters are the major beneficiary.
The second noteworthy trend is that there had been a much greater regional focus of the campaigns and a regionalization of the campaigns. The national campaign is hardly visible today. You would see more Union of Right Wing Forces posters in Ryazan than in Moscow. The use of regional television has increased considerably compared to 1995. There is a real emphasis on cable television, which was not really used in 1995. There has been incredible decentralization in every major campaign. Instead of Moscow printing everything and then shipping to the regions, materials are now being printed in the regions themselves. In some campaigns, a real decentralization has occurred where slogans and messages are even being generated at the regional level.
The third new trend, which is related to the second, is the role of the governors and the use of their "administrative resources." This includes everything from having a printer and copying machine available to a particular candidate to falsifying the elections at the regional level. Everyone is lining up their regional leaders. What is interesting is that there is not one dominant party of power to which every regional leader is beholden. Bashkortostan has an anti-Yabloko campaign, but a pro-Fatherland campaign. Even the Communists have their 10-12 governors from whose "administrative resources" they hope to get a boost. I am still skeptical about what the real causal effect of these resources will be. We all assume that an endorsement from a governor or president means something in a campaign. We assume that a presidential endorsement means more than a gubernatorial endorsement, but we really do not know. We have to remember that a lot of these administrative resources particularly beholden to the Kremlin are being leveraged in a rather coercive way. Rutskoi has endorsed Yedinstvo, but that is to get his colleagues out of jail. Whether that translates into votes for Yedinstvo, I do not know.
The fourth trend has been in the increased focus on single mandate races. First, big money is now in the single mandate races, and not in the party. Gazprom for instance has invested in 120 single mandate races and has done only a smattering of investment in the national campaigns. They were burned in 1995 when they put all their eggs in parties that did not cross the 5% threshold. They decided that it was better to invest in the single mandate races for two reasons. First, they feel like they have more control over the campaign process, and secondly, they think they will have more control over the candidates once they get in the Duma. They will be the faction of Gazprom, not the faction of Our Home is Russia. Everyone else is making a similar kind of calculation.
Single mandate races see a much greater role for campaign consultants and image-makers. Where money has dried up for the national campaigns, real resources are devoted to the single mandate races. Katya Egorova is running Stepashin's single mandate campaign. Yulia Russova, another rather famous image-maker who ran Lebed's campaign in 1996, is running Boris Berezovsky's campaign, not Edinstvo's.
Concerning the single-mandate race, the quality and talent of the candidates as candidates, not as Duma deputies, have improved. This has to do with incumbency. I suspect that the rate of incumbency will increase, not decrease, as it did between 1993 and 1995.
A fifth trend is related to the fourth trend. Hired guns played a significant role in 1995-96 in the party campaigns, but are not playing as large a role in the current election. Yabloko, for instance, which hired an outside group to run their campaign in 1995-96, is now running it internally. Likewise, SPS, the Union of Right Forces, is relying on local resources, just as the Communists are. Party members, not the hired guns, are running the national campaign. Fatherland is the one group that is also relying on internal resources, while it really does not have internal resources. The people running their campaign have never run real national campaigns, and it shows.
The sixth trend is the non-existence of cleavage. The campaign is not about issues. It is striking that it is virtually impossible to find a cleavage issue on the economy, Chechnya, or the ethnic card. This is in contrast to 1995 when the economy in particular was a real issue. It does raise the issue of what the campaign is about. I will run through the parties and define what it is they want to accomplish.
It is clear that the KPRF's goal is to keep the core, to which end they are using their traditional resources, including about 200 publications. A recent survey showed that in half the regions in Russia, the Communist publication is the number one most widely read publication in the region. This is something that went totally unnoticed by those of us following the election while sitting in Moscow watching national television. But what the Communist party has managed to accomplish in terms of their campaign techniques has been dramatic. This has not been reflected in the rise of their numbers, but they have managed to consolidate their core. Also, in terms of consolidating their core, Communists are using regional television much more. They have about five or six national campaign ads, but they are targeting 30 at the regional level where their focus is on Fatherland, whom they consider their enemy.
Fatherland is fighting a dual-front defensive campaign. At the national level they have to deal with the Kremlin. At the regional level, they have to deal with the Communist party. This is creating a real problem in terms of campaign message. They are genuinely struggling with where to focus their energy and where to focus their increasingly limited resources. Their main phrase is "party of doers." They use such slogans as "Vote for deeds, not platforms." Luzhkov is the builder, Primakov is the stabilizer, and Yakovlev represents the regional representation. But they are struggling with that line because of the Putin rise. People are wondering why should they vote for an old man who represents zastoi, stagnation. Six months ago zastoi looked pretty good. But now that there is a young guy who can do all of that for you and still be young and aggressive, suddenly zastoi and stagnation are less attractive.
Yabloko has big problems. They had big ambitions in terms of expanding the core. But now it looks like they are not going to be able to do that. They have a very loyal core who will be with them the whole way. But all their different tricks, like trying to bring Stepashin on board, have not been effective. They have made two big campaign mistakes: their position on Chechnya and their budget vote. But the biggest problem is that there is no message. When you look at the ads, you do not see any reason to vote for them. They are positioning themselves between the Communists on the one hand and the Union of Right Forces on the other, neither of which are in the government. So, it does not make sense now, like it made sense in 1993 and 1995, to be the democratic opposition.
The main goal of SPS, the Union of Right Forces, is to convince their very rational voters that they will cross the 5% threshold. Their opinion polls show that they are between 4% and 6%, but that there is between 15% and 20% who are thinking about voting for them. The number one thing they must do is to convince 2% of that group that they are going to cross the 5% threshold. This used to be the party of Gaidar versus the party of Sakharov. With this campaign, they have made a firm move that they are the party of Gaidar. They are targeting the young businessmen who have property and who are just as anti-Chechen as the Communists. SPS is using the referendum, which is a brilliant campaign technique. The choice of the specific four questions on the referendum is predicated on the fact that those are the questions that when asked of Russians in polls are sure to garner an 80% response of support. The questions that got less than 80% were left off the referendum.
Unity's main goal is just to destroy Fatherland. They have no other mission in life. They are doing this through massive television campaigns for Mr. Shoigu and now through Mr. Putin's endorsement. They are also doing it by coercive measures, like threatening Tatarstan President Shaimiyev to back away from Fatherland, and in some cases paying up to $100,000 for people to quit Fatherland.
A final surprise concerns Women of Russia. This party went from .5% to 2.3% just because of a change in the way that the poll was done. Before, there was a list and the poll was open. When asked whom they would vote for, Women of Russia did not show up. Now that there is a card with a list of 29 parties to choose from, Women of Russia increased its rating to 2.3%.
SERGEI GRIGORIEV (All-Russian Television and Radio),
"The Politicized Media"
I admit that I am tempted to speak only about politics in response to McFaul's presentation. I am still holding back tears for Fatherland. All the other parties look like innocent children in comparison with the bad government attacking Fatherland. It was not the government that initiated the attacks. The government reminds me of a clumsy ice hockey player who is constantly punched, while everyone in the stands watches. Then the hockey player finally fights back and the referee throws him out. This is what is happening in the relationship between the government and Fatherland. There have been too many attacks, too much dirt, and too much slander from the Luzhkov camp. The government finally reorganized its ranks and decided to shoot back.
Concerning Dorenko, I would characterize him as a terminator. He has been hired and paid $1 million per year and his purpose is to destroy Luzhkov. He must either take the money or go. So he is taking the money and destroying Luzhkov the way he can.
In reality I do not mean to criticize Michael [McFaul], but I want to describe from the inside how dramatic the situation is. I expect the next two weeks to be even more dramatic and dirty. Somehow, most Russians got the idea that the real campaigning should begin at the end of the campaign. In Moscow there are hardly any posters. TV ads began to run only on November 20, with the parties presenting the most boring material and no one really watching. This is a dramatic change, even compared to 1995-96. There is a loss of interest on behalf of most of the spectators.
Most of the struggle is taking place not in the analytical television programs, but in the news. It is the way you position your person in the news coverage. Even though we are trying to control the situation, and sometimes even publish news in favor of the other side, it is true that the media is very political and politicized today. It is also true that the level of commercialization of the media has reached such an enormous level that at some point someone has to say no.
I have a price list in my bag. You can publish an anti-Luzhkov article on the front page of Moskovskii Komsomolets. It all depends on how much money you are willing to pay. It is easy. You can publish an anti-Berezovsky article in Kommersant. It will cost a lot of money, but the editor will take the money, just because he needs it, and because the journalists need it. This is a very serious problem.
Another problem is that today the media is serving the interests of two major forces. Zyuganov is actually winning votes because no one is attacking the Communists, because the two sides have no time or money to waste on attacking Zyuganov. They are too engaged in attacking each other and plotting against each other.