FP7-SEC-2007-217862
DETECTER
Detection Technologies, Terrorism, Ethics and Human Rights
Collaborative Project
D11. Meeting on Border Security, Technologies and Human Rights:
Report on Meeting
Due date of deliverable: 31.5.2011
Actual submission date: 15.6.2011
Start date of project: 1.12.2008 Duration: 36 months
Work Package no. and lead: WP05, Kristina Stenman
Author(s): Audelina Ahumada
Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme (2002-2006)Dissemination Level
PU / Public / X
PP / Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)
RE / Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)
CO / Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)
DETECTER Project Meeting 6
Thematic Programme 11th – 12th May 2011
The thematic programme consisted of three panel sessions that were held on the 11th and the 12th of May 2011. Professor Elina Pirjatanniemi (director of the Institute for Human Rights at Åbo Akademi University) opened the meeting and welcomed the participants to Åbo. Professor Martin Scheinin (EUI), leader of work package 2 (Unilateral Exceptions to International Law and their Implications for Counter‐terrorism and Detection Technologies) then introduced the meeting by giving an overview of DETECTER research. He mentioned that the aims of the project include the maintenance of a dialogue between the consortium and representatives from the technology sector.
Session 1
Pasi Nokelainen, System Manager, Border Guard Headquarters, Finland:
The use of technology in external border control: the Finnish approach
The speaker started by giving an overview of the tasks of the Finnish Border Guard (FBG). The FBG is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Interior; it is responsible for the internal security of the country and its protection from external threats. The FBG has a multifunctional mandate. Its tasks include border surveillance, border checks, guarding the territorial waters, and international cooperation. It is also a security authority, since it carries out crime prevention and investigation. Crimes investigated by the border guard are cross border crimes and human trafficking. The FBG is also the main authority in sea rescue operations. Although Finland has a long land border with Russia as well as a long sea border, it is important to note that airports constitute the main access points to the area. The border with Sweden and Norway falls under the framework of the Schengen agreement. The FBG has to respond to a set of qualitative and quantitative requirements, including environmental requirements. Its tasks have to be carried out in response to the needs of the government and the public and in accordance with national and international obligations, such as those set out in the Schengen agreement.
The speaker then gave an overview of how the Finnish border guard is structured, emphasising that, while technology is used to enhance the use of personnel, it is the human factor that is at the core of the system. He mentioned some problems related to document security and said that alphanumeric data is not enough to prevent identity theft or fraud. Reference was made to the current arrangement regarding border checks on the new Allegro train from Helsinki to St Petersburg. In order to meet challenges and future obligations (SIS searches, VIS and fingerprint checks) concerning border checks on a moving train, mobile border check units have been purchased and deployed. The Finnish border guard service is an active user and developer of new technology pertinent to its tasks; it aims to carry out border checks in an appropriate and cost-efficient way as required and expected, which produces added value for developers and society. Technology plays different roles and can be used in different situations. In border control the common denominator is the detection of irregular crossings at all borders and in all circumstances. However, following detection there must be appropriate processing in accordance with the operational procedures and guidelines based on the national and international legal framework, and under close supervision.
Challenges faced by the border guard:
· What happens after detection?
· Ensuring an adequate and sufficient amount of information and proportionality in the use of information
· Obtaining information useful to the detection, prevention, and investigation of cross border crime
· When it comes to terrorism, it is important to remember that it is not necessarily the terrorists themselves who move across the borders, and that terrorists are not always third-country nationals. Similarly, equipment used for terrorism is not always moved across borders, but can be acquired within the country. After a terrorist crime has been committed it is important to have information available for investigative purposes. This influences the way in which border controls are conducted and the kind of information that is gathered, made available etc.
· Lack of information-sharing creates challenges: There might be information about suspected terrorists, but if that information is not shared with the border guards it creates a problem and could even be harmful. As regards EU-citizens suspected of terrorism, for example: even if the info would be available in some systems available at the border, systematic database searches are not allowed on EU citizens (see Schengen Borders Code). As regards fingerprint searches in a database using fingerprint information from a crime scene, we don’t have the technology at the border to run searches on unidentified imprints. So, there are both technical and legal restrictions on the use of information.
· Awareness of technical possibilities, on the one hand, and legislation, on the other, needs to be coordinated in order to better regulate access and usage of information in accordance with the legal framework (possibly restricting the use of the same technology for other purposes)
The question and answer session raised the following issues:
· What would happen if Finland were faced with a similar scenario to that currently taking place in the Mediterranean Sea? Finland has a very long border with Russia, which at the same time constitutes an external border of the whole EU, but is it a “forgotten border”?
Timothy Cooper, Principal Research Officer, Research & Development Unit, FRONTEX, Poland:
Ethics of border security
The FRONTEX research and development unit operates as an intermediary between researchers and border guard authorities. The unit surveys common needs of border guards at the EU/Schengen level, follows developments in the research community and co-operates with the Commission concerning issues of relevance in the field, also suggesting that some of the problems faced might be dealt with through the use of technology. In order to carry out its tasks, the unit cooperates with a range of different actors. The unit also has a coordinating role between Member States and industry in terms of gathering knowledge both on the current needs for and the availability of technology. The unit also organizes workshops with Member States and border guard officers with a view to promoting closer cooperation between these and to raise and harmonize standards. Illegal immigration is a common problem, and the way in which countries deal with it should therefore be harmonized. As concerns border checks, certain systems should work in a coordinated way in order to avoid different treatment depending on which country you go to. The unit has been looking into ABC-systems; e-passport security; the Visa Information System, which is to go live in October 2011; and related opportunities and challenges for border guards. As regards border surveillance, much focus is on the establishment of EUROSUR.
Social research is of relevance for border guarding, and FRONTEX is involved in a range of research concerning fundamental rights, in particular as regards joint operations. On March 31 2011, the FRONTEX management board endorsed the fundamental rights strategy, which will be followed by a fundamental rights action plan. A study on the ethics of border security was carried out in April 2011. The study contains a survey of 23 national codes of conduct with a view to mapping existing specific and written codes for border guards and possible gaps as regards, for example, non-refoulement, protection, asylum and vulnerable groups. The study is also of relevance to Frontex’s own code of conduct, which covers its own staff and those border guards that take part in joint operations. The study compiles relevant EU legislation and policies, including the required standards to be met in border control, and it elaborates on ethical difficulties created by the technologies themselves (detection, surveillance, the use of biometrics as well as a large number of databases to be checked in relation to entry).
Among the ethical issues that arise in border control are border checks, border surveillance, return, vulnerable groups, corruption (a problem in a number of states within the EU), and the rights of border guards themselves as well as the difficulties in meeting required standards in certain situations. One of the biggest ethical problems arises in relation to databases. For example, situations in which border guards may be required to check up to 10 databases create a range of opportunities for mistakes and misuse.
Final questions raised by the speaker were:
1) Theory vs. practice
o It is difficult to implement codes of conduct under certain difficult circumstances, such as in search and rescue situations in the middle of the night and in situations where several hundreds of people are arriving at the same time (Lampedusa).
2) Outsourcing the border
o Giving the EU border control function to the border guards in third countries.
3) Border controls are just one piece of the puzzle, not the solution – the interception of large numbers of people also implies further questions and responsibilities, which require resources in order to be met.
The question and answer session raised the following issues:
· What about the measures in the countries of origin? Should we just accept the fact that people are “pouring in” and then find the best ways of dealing with it, including several requirements on border guards? What is being done to eliminate the problem in the first place?
· We should be careful not to bind everything together, not to harmonize everything, especially with regards to databases. The definition of a “criminal” or a crime is not the same in every country, and problems with harmonization might therefore arise. There is not a common legal framework for each of the databases (cf Eurodac with the Prüm system).
Sirkku Päivärinne, Director, Migration Department, Ministry of the Interior, Finland:
Immigration policy and border security
The speaker talked about steps taken towards the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Through the development of a Global Approach to Migration, the external dimension of the EU migration policy focuses on dialogue and partnerships with third countries. In the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted during the French Presidency, the Union adopted five overall objectives for the development of a common immigration and asylum policy. These objectives were reiterated in the context of the Stockholm Programme. The objectives are 1) to organize legal immigration, taking account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each member state, and to encourage integration; 2) to control illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or to a country of transit; 3) to make border controls more effective; 4) to construct a Europe of asylum; 5) to create a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and development. Finland supports the development of the integrated EU border management system in order to, among other things, make operations more effective.
The speaker then talked about the different goals of the CEAS (ensure access; provide for a single, common procedure; establish uniform statuses for asylum and for subsidiary protection; increase practical cooperation; determine responsibility and support solidarity; ensure coherence with other policies that have an impact on international protection).
Referring to the causes of illegal immigration, the speaker discussed migration and development, and what could be done to improve the livelihood options in third countries in order to stop excessive illegal immigration. Cooperation between the EU and countries of origin is of utmost importance. It is essential to support development projects.
The council has for a long time now discussed burden-sharing and solidarity between member states. Finland is in favour of any efforts taken to find new burden-sharing mechanisms in the case of international protection. The speaker added that we should, however, make efforts to find sustainable solutions which do not increase the pull effect or weaken the functioning of present systems. The speaker concluded by stating that it is difficult to discuss burden sharing in the case of the EU immigration and asylum policy, because member states have very different opinions of best practices and the best interests of the EU.
The question and answer session raised the following issues:
· One participant claimed that burden-sharing ideas don’t work anymore. Border guards are frustrated and immigration officers have said for 10-15 years that burden sharing ideas don’t work. What would work are voluntary returns to their country of origin.
· A representative replied that although he can understand that the border guards in some countries are frustrated, the code of ethics and the code of conduct for the Finnish border guards quite strictly and clearly regulate how they should act. The representative also said that regardless of any frustration on a personal level amongst the border guards, he has full confidence in that they carry out their duties in a professional manner.
Session 2
Martina Huber, Programme Manager / Social Research, FRA, Austria:
Fundamental rights challenges at the border
The speaker began by talking about the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, which is legally binding on EU agencies as well as for all Member States when implementing EU legislation. Other EU legislation with relevance for the border control field is the Schengen Borders Code (which contains a number of safeguards), the Asylum acquis (reception conditions, qualifications, asylum procedures directives, Dublin II) and the Returns Directive.
The speaker then introduced an FRA project on the treatment of third-country nationals at the external border. The intention is to complement the Schengen evaluation system, which does not have a fundamental rights focus and the results of which are not available in the public domain.