Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
SPECIAL PROGRAMME FOR FOOD SECURITY, PHASE 1
GCSP/DRK/003/ITA
Evaluation Mission Report
By
Mr. Ayadurai Somesan
Mr. Giuseppe Romalli
Mr. Kim Chol Hun
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BANGKOK, THAILAND
JUNE 2005
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AREPAgricultural Rehabilitation and Environmental Protection Programme
ATSAdvisory Technical Services
DCPDouble Cropping Programme
DPRKDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea
EMEffective Micro-organisms
EUEuropean Union
FAOFood and Agriculture Organization
GOIGovernment of Italy
IPMIntegrated Pest Management
IFADInternational Fund for Agricultural Development
MRIMechanization Research Institute of the Academy of Science
MOAMinistry of Agriculture
NFMNational Field Manager
NGONon-Governmental Organization
O & MOperation and Maintenance
OPECOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PMUProject Management Unit
PRECProvincial Rural Economic Committee
PDSPublic Distribution System
ROKRepublic of Korea
SPFSSpecial Programme for Food Security
STSSupervisory Technical Services
TCDCTechnical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TCPTechnical Cooperation Programme
TORTerms of Reference
WFPWorld Food Programme
Table of Contents
SectionPage
I.Executive Summary4
II.Introduction 5
III.Background and Context6
IV.Assessment of Project Objectives and Design14
V.Assessment of Project Implementation, Efficiency
and Management16
VI.Assessment of Results and Effectiveness24
VII.Lessons Learned276
VIII.Key Lesson Learned28
IX.Conclusions and Recommendations 31
X.List of Annexes332
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.The A project evaluation mission consisting of FAO Team Leader, Mr. Ayadurai Somesan Irrigation and Water Management Specialist and Mr. Giuseppe Romalli Agronomist representing the Donor, the Italian Government, and Mr. Kim Chol, representing DPRK, was undertakenvisited DPRK from the 28 May to 07 June 2005. The Terms of Reference of the evaluation mission and the in-country programme can be found in Annex…… IX10. Wwith officials of the DPRK Government and relevant agencies andrelevant institutions, and the Project Management Unit, as well as with theFAO Assistant FAOResident Representative in Pyongyang, the final evaluation was carried out the Tripartite Evaluation offor project, “GCSP/DRK/003/ITA this SPFS Project. . The mMission wishes to acknowledge the warm support it received and the cordiality shown during its entire time in DPRK. The mMission also wishes to acknowledge the strong support it received from the FAO Regional Office as well as the FAO Country office in Beijing and Pyongyang which is responsible for DPRK.
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2.The Project, with a budget of US$ 970,000 and funded by the Italian Government was operational duringcommenced in January 2002 and is due to terminateclose at the end of June 2005.after an extension of one year was granted. The three representative cooperative farms (Waeso, Samhun and Gopi) were selected for the project all located in from the central western part of the country with each farm considered representative of a particular agro-eco-climatological zone and for within this part, and for their proximity to Pyongyang.with its urban population. The overall objective was to strengthen food security, revitalize the rural economy and alleviate rural poverty to enhance the socio-economic and nutritional well-being of the beneficiaries. The direct beneficiaries of the project are the members of the three cooperative farms,; 1,250 families amounting to 6,058 persons as well as part of the urban population of Pyongyang, which receives approximatelysome 50 percent of the agricultural production of these cooperative farms.
3.The Project has, as its the first objective toof strengthening the capacity of cooperative farm management committees to address specific problems in the consolidated county plan and the national crop production programme. The second objective is to increase food production through improved water control and management, intensifying and diversifying crop production, promoting appropriate mechanization and better post harvest techniques.
4.The mMission, together with the whole review team as above was based in Pyongyang and followed the progarmme set for the mission (see Annex….) IX)arranged and visited the three Ccooperative Ffarms Waeso, Samhun and Gopi,in the Project on three separate day trips. The mission met with the farm management and technical officials and discussed the inputs made, the performance of the project components at the farm level, and the mission wasere shown samples of various interventions made by the Project. Matters of concern at the farm level were also discussed and noted. They mission subsequently spent the remainder of the period in Pyongyang with the PMU and representatives of the Cooperating Research Institutes and further assessed the performance of each of these components as well as the Project as a whole,.clarified issues and finalised the findings.
5.The mMission finds that the Project has met the first objective bythrough carrying out constraints analysis and preparation and implementation of several training programmes at various levels, including conservation farming, IPM techniques, baseline studyies, and conduct of workshops.
6.The mMission finds that the second objective has been achieved through the introduction of sprinkler irrigation systems, better irrigation water management through construction of small weirs, delivery of irrigation water through gravity canals, rehabilitation of pumped irrigation systems, training in appropriate technologies including intermittent irrigation, and installing pump and reel irrigation machines with sprinklers.
76.The mission finds project interventions to increasecrop yields were very successful and of the order of some 50 percent forin the cereals and introduced vegetable varieties. This very impressive result has been achieved by introducing shorter duration higher yielding varieties of both cereals as well as vegetables without increased inputs such as synthetic fertilizers or pesticides, but utilizing IPM, conservation farming, and green manuring.
8.The mMission noted the positive and forward thinking of some farmerss[or farm managers or planners – a farm cannot think!!] which have suggestsed that they will benefit more if they were enabled to process some of the surplus produce, particularly small- scale soybean oil presses as the resulting cooking oil can be consumed locally or even sold at nearby population centers. This is noted by themission for inclusion in any future phase of the project.
9.The mMission finds the successful conversion of pumped irrigation systems in four locations to gravity fed irrigation systems, a very positive lesson to be replicated wherever possible. This is a lesson duringfor the implementation of for similar activities in the futurefuture projects.
10.The mMission finds that the mechanization component has essentially met the project objectivesso far and the post harvest components of the Project was successful have now been more clearly defined but urgently need to be addressed further{was it really successful???},. The mechanization was found to which partly alleviated the labor scarcity constraint during at peak labour demand. periods. Nevertheless, there is considerable room for innovative combinations of appropriate machinery, farm labor and draught animal power to be utilized in future projects. Most significantly, there is room for considerable improvements in the reduction and minimization of all a range of pre and post harvest losses, as detailed in Section…. “key findings below”.
10.aExamine possibilities for provision and adaptation of low cost heating (rice husk fuelled and other) machines for drying rice grains, low cost threshers, bin driers and other simple machinery for drying the wet grain; field testing of appropriate rice harvesting and threshing machines; suitable transport to haul the harvest to processing areas; covered areas to store the harvest prior to processing, reducing post harvest losses; improvements to existing stores to reduce rodent damage to grains. Implement methods for storing the harvest of rice and maize to deny access to rodents birds and other pests.
10.bPilot trials of providing small- scale machinery for processing surplus produce, including items such as small -scale soybean presses to extract oil for consumption in the farms or for barter with or sale to, people outside the farms including factory sites, mine operations where there is a likely potential concentration of people; processing wheat flour to noodles etc, full fat soyflour and rice flour for weaning food ingredients.
110.Based on the mission’s findings and the successes of this current phase, a follow up phase II is essential to further consolidate further itsthe project’s impact on the three participating farms and demonstrate itthe experience and technologies on other cooperative farms in the country so that these other farmsthewouldmaybenefit and would become model farms in their areas.s of the multiplier effect will spread.
- INTRODUCTION
This report is prepared by anof the independent evaluation mission on the performance and achievements of the project “Special Programme for Food Security (Phase 1)” GCSP/DRK/003/ITA, in DPRK. The Project started in January 2002, and is due to terminateclose at the end of June 2005. In some ways this Mission is unique in addressing not only issues common at Pproject closure but also addressing matters including estimation of its impact, replicability and possible follow up. The Missionactivities started on the 24th May with discussions at the FAO RAP in Bangkok with FAO ADG/RR and the concerned officers at RAP, followed by in country visit to the three Project farms in DPRK and ended on the 11th June, 2005 with de-briefing atin the FAO RAP, inBangkok. In DPRK, the Mission met with the Assistant FAO Representative, the SPFS team, PMU, senior Government officials, relevant UN agencies in Pyongyang, and target beneficiaries in the 3 cooperative farms and verified the Project components directly. On leaving DPRK, the Mission debriefed the FAO Representative for DPRK, who is resident in Beijing, followed by debriefing at the FAO RAP in Bangkok. The full mission itinerary is presented in Annex....IX and the list of key persons met is in Annex IV.
As the possibility for a Phase II of this Project exists, this Mission paid close attention to lessons learned both positive and negative, issues and constraints, and discussed possible further expansion both in geographical area as well as in scope. The assessments for replicability and more importantly sustainability for the medium to long- term were carefully considered carefully. The mMission however fully recognizes that the realities of the underlying causes, issues and constraints facing sustainable agricultural development in DPRK as matters that need serious consideration in a cooperative manner by all stakeholders.
The Mission members were:
Mr. A Somesan, FAO Team Leader, Irrigation/ Water Management Expert;
Mr. G. Romalli, Agronomist, Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, representing the Italian Government;
Mr. Jong Sun Won, Secretary-General, National Committee for FAO;
Mr. Rim Song Chol, Coordinator for FAO, National Committee for FAO;
Mr. Kim Chol Hun, Programme Coordinator, Senior Officer, Ministry of Agriculture.
- BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
A. BACKGROUND
The Special Programme for Food Security was launched in FAO in 1994 after its unanimous approval by the FAO Council. In September 1997, the Government of DPR Korea expressed interest in participating in the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) project which would assist in implementing its food security policies and strategies. At the request of the Government, an FAO exploratory mission visited the country in November 1997 to initiate preparation of the SPFS. Based on the findings of this mission, the Government in March 1998 identified the main elements of Phase I in an SPFS National Programme Document and a Plan of Operations was prepared, with a tentative budget of US$2.8 million, having the following components:
Intensification involving demonstration of multiple cropping systems and crop rotations; labor and energy saving farming techniques; seed improvement; pest control; and fertility management.;
Water control including drainage improvement and water harvesting in lowland and upland areas;.
Diversification, including livestock (also encompassing animal feed), aquaculture and irrigated vegetable production.;
Constraints analysis including identification of opportunities and constraints to food security, with a view to engaging Government in a dialogue on the general environment for food security.
Four cooperative farms and an aquaculture hatchery were initially selected for pilot demonstrations, in South Pyongan, NorthHwanghaeProvincesand PyongyangCity. The farms are typical of central-western parts of the country, which have high agricultural potential and have relatively easy access to Pyongyang, the capital city.
In September 1998, FAO provided US$ 88,241 (project TCP/DRK/8801) from TCP resources in order to start the SPFS, commencing withwith the Water Control programme between May 1999 and February 2001. The Republic of Korea gave further support with US$ 500,000 (project GCP/DRK/0021/ROK) for implementation of the Diversification component between October 1999 and December 2001.
The current SPFS project, GCSP/DRK/003/ITA, with a budget of US$ 970,000 funded by the Italian Government followed on from the above projects. Project implementation commenced in January 2002 for a period of three years. Three representative cooperative farms (Waeso, Samhun and Gopi) were selected for the project from the central western part of the country with each considered representative of a particular agro-eco-climatological zone within this part. The overall objective was to strengthen food security, revitalize the rural economy and alleviate rural poverty to enhance socio-economic and nutritional well-being of the beneficiaries.
B. CONTEXT
B.1General
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ( DPRK) covers 122,762 km2 or about 55 percent of the Korean Peninsula and has China on the North, Russia on the extreme North East and South Korea on the Southern borders as well as the East and West Seas of Korea in the East and West respectively. Only 20 percent of the land mass is arable of which flat land is primarily used for irrigated rice paddy fields. Much of this lies in the central western coastal areas. However, there is considerable undulating land intermingling with the low lands. Rainfed crops including maize and soybeans are planted in the rolling hills much of which is not terraced. The lower hillsides are planted with fruit and other tree crops and the upper hills and mountains are forest lands.
The population as of mid 1998 was estimated at 22.6 million with an annual rate of growth of 1.5 percent, with over 65 percent classed as urban and the rest as rural. The trend for urbanizsation appears to have slowed down from 1995. Some 14 percent of the population live in the capital Pyongyang and some consider that it would be prudent to not let the numbers grow further in the Capital. The active labour force is around 50 percent of the population at some 11 million, with industry accounting for 42, agriculture 31 and service and other sectors 27 percent respectively.
DPR Korea’s production strategy was very much based on intensive agriculture relying on the heavy use of mineral fertiliser and chemical pesticides. Pesticides had been mainly imported from China and the former USSR when DPR Korea enjoyed extensive economic and trading relations. From the early-1990s, with the collapse of the former Eastern Bloc, DPR Korea was obliged to adjust to a new set of external economic conditions. In the meantime, in-country availability of fertiliser suffered dramatically as a consequence of the breakdown of local production due to plant obsolescence, lack of raw material, power shortages and international economic sanctions.
The collapse of the traditional partners of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc was a tremendous blow; seriously negatively impacting on the domestic situation which was further compounded by ageing industrial plants, outworn equipment, ineffectual capital investment, and economic sanctions. By the late 1980s, DPR Korea had defaulted on its international debt. Unable to access international capital markets, and unable to continue barter trade with the USSR and the Eastern Bloc after 1990, the value of the repayments on past aid exceeded the inflow of new assistance. Because of the high input intensive nature of DPRK agriculture, the changed situation led to a 50% decrease in crop production within six years following the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Crop production was further decreased by a series of severe natural disasters in the mid-1990s, which caused extensive damage to agriculture and economic infrastructure.
Economic liberalisation in China and other transition economies have led to difficulties in DPR Korea’s international economic relations, which are in part responsible for the ongoing economic decline. These changes have seriously lowered productivity and output inall sectors, including agriculture. Domesticproduction and imports of inputs such as fertiliser, pesticides, fuel and spare parts, as well as of raw materials for their production fell sharply. Even though droughts and typhoonsare verycommon in the peninsula,a seriesof these in the mid 1990s have had a disproportionately negative and large impact on the overall economic development of the country resulting in serious food insecurity.