Week 3

Objections, Defences, and more Objections to Relativism.

3 parts to today’s lecture:

  1. Essay topics, and talk on expectations
  2. Waluchow on the standard objections to Relativism and how they are (partially) misleading
  3. Shaw and Waluchow ‘finish-off’ Relativism

Part 2: Waluchow, pgs. 71 – 86

There are said to be three standard problems with Moral Conventionalism:

  1. It precludes the possibility of cross-cultural moral criticism
  2. It does not allow me to criticize the moral practices of my own culture, because morality is whatever my culture says it is
  1. Whose culture do the standards come from? That is, which of the many cultures in a given society, and which of the many cultural connections of a given individual, are those that establish moral principles?

There are commonly thought to be two major problems with Moral Subjectivism.

  1. If it were true, then genuine moral disagreement would be impossible because we each have our own moral standards. So while it might appear as though we disagree on some particular moral issue, this is only because we legitimately rely on different moral standards, so we don’t really disagree, we just see the issue differently.
  2. There is no means of moral reasoning or judgment because morality just is whatever I or you or whoever says it is.

If these five objections to the two forms of Relativism are accurate, then there are solid reasons for rejecting them. But it is not clear that either form of Relativism is incompatible with the commonly accepted existence of moral critique or judgment. We still need moral reasoning to assess the impact of facts, to determine how to apply, or to ensure consistency between, our moral principles, irrespective of whether those principles are objective, cultural or subjective.

Facts:

What often appears to be moral disagreement turns out to be disagreement over how a particular set of facts ought to be interpreted.

Whatever one’s belief about the facts of a matter, these beliefs will impact one’s moral understanding of the situation… Each person will have to assess these beliefs against their moral principles, and that is (one type of) moral reasoning.

What’s more, we can criticize the factual beliefs that support a particular moral practice… this may not be a moral criticism, but if the facts are wrong, and they are the basis for a nasty cultural practice, we can develop good (moral) reasons to abandon that practice.

The Application of Moral Principles:

Everyone will have to apply their principles in particular situations, even the Subjectivist, and that will involve, at least in part, moral reasoning.

And the fact that application principles must be adopted means that Subjectivists and Conventionalists both have room for moral reasoning and criticism.

Logical Consistency:

We must be able to evaluate the consistency of our moral principles and their relations, as well as the consistency of the specific actions those principles require. If the actions required are not humanly possible, or I am required to perform two simultaneously incompatible acts, I would have to revise my principles.

If my principles conflict, I must revise or order them in terms of importance. If either form of Relativism is true, then that would mean that there would be no objective standard to which I could appeal in choosing between, or deciding upon the importance of, these inconsistent principles. Any choice I made would be arbitrary.

W.H. Shaw: A refutation of Relativism in all its forms. (pgs. 12 – 31).

C: There are strong reasons to believe that ‘normative’ moral conventionalism and moral subjectivism, as well as ‘meta-ethical’ relativism, whether supported by the Diversity argument or the Demonstrability argument, are seriously flawed.

Shaw’s piece is a little confusing because he doesn’t present his argumentative (rhetorical) strategy, nor does he define his important terms, from the beginning (a mistake I’m sure none of you will make in your essays!!!). So you don’t get a clear sense of the scope of his conclusion until pg. 17, when he presents the distinction between ‘normative’ ethical relativism and ‘meta-ethical’ relativism.

‘Normative’ ethical relativism is, according to Shaw, the claim that what is right or wrong is a matter of social convention or individual choice.

‘Meta-Ethical’ relativism, by contrast, is the claim that because morality is either a matter of convention or personal choice, there is no objective standard to which we can turn to decide which moral system ought to be preferred.

Section 1 of Shaw’s article presents and dismisses ‘normative’ ethical relativism. Sections 2 through 5 are Shaw’s attempt to build a case against what he clearly takes to be the more troubling position, i.e., ‘Meta-Ethical’ relativism.

Section 1 (pgs 12 – 16)

Starts with an account of normative ethical relativism that relies on the diversity argument.

A brief refutation of normative subjectivism on the grounds that it suggests that just because we believe something is right, it is right. Also because we would have no means to evaluate the rightness of our decisions.

Refutation of Conventionalism:

the fact that some society believes an action to be wrong is not a good reason to accept that the action is wrong

undermines the possibility of external moral criticism

undermines the possibility of internal moral reform, which means the majority will always be right on moral questions

Section 2 (pgs 16 – 19)

Starts with a definition of meta-ethical relativism that is based on the diversity argument.

Refutation of Meta-Ethical relativism as defended by the diversity argument.

the fact of diversity and fundamental moral disagreement is not so obvious because different cultures have different interpretations of different facts

even if we grant diversity, the mere fact of diversity does not show that there isn’t a right answer – indeed, agreement has little to do with the existence of an objective moral truth

Section 3 (pgs 19 – 23)

The key to moral truth is finding the proper objective standard by which to judge the value of any specific moral principles… precisely what Meta-Ethical Relativist’s who rely on the Demonstrability Argument claim is not possible.

These last three sections are a progressive attempt to show that there are objective standards to which we can turn to help us decide which moral system is superior or correct. If Shaw succeeds, then he will have shown that the demonstrability argument for meta-ethical relativism is false because there are objective moral standards by which we can assess the relative strength of any moral system.

There have been (broadly speaking) three attempts to identify a standard by which to assess moral systems.

  1. Naturalism
  2. Intuitionism
  3. Emotivism

All of these have strengths and weaknesses, but only the last of these is compatible with meta-ethical relativism, because emotivism maintains that there are no moral judgments. But this connection is precisely what we typically think morality does involve.

Section 4 (pgs 23 – 26)

Whatever morality is, it is more than just an accurate collection of empirical facts; we do reason with and about our moral principles. And there are limits on what counts as an acceptable moral reason, reasons with which we are all in tune inasmuch as we are all moral agents.

Traditionally, it was believed morality was immutable and universal, ‘waiting to be discovered’. The more recent view is that morality is a practice that changes with progress in moral reasoning. Morality is a social enterprise in which we all participate.

Section 5. (pgs 26 – 30).

With this account of morality, we can confront the relativist claim that there is no standard by which to choose a moral system…There have been three attempts to exclude relativism based on their misunderstanding morality.

  1. Moral judgments and principles are by definition universalizable/universal
  2. Moral discussion presupposes a commitment to impartiality, rational benevolence and liberty
  3. Morality is a distinct value system, one that requires taking a moral point of view that involves regarding others as ends in themselves

The relativist could still reply that these definitions are nothing more than their authors’ own moral codes.

Shaw thinks the best means to an objective moral standard is to look at the purpose of morality, i.e., to promote human flourishing. Moral systems that fail in the promotion of human flourishing can be said to be lesser than those that succeed. That is, a moral code must work, and to the extent that it does not, it is not a good, or the right, moral code.

Shaw ends by conceding that he has not provided a complete refutation of both forms of relativism because there may be moral codes that work equally well in a given set of circumstances. At the very least, he believes he has reduced the number of possibly arbitrary (non-morally-reasoned) choices for a moral system.

Waluchow – Final objections to Relativism (pgs 86 – 93)

The Diversity Argument:

  1. The fact of disagreement does not mean there’s no right answer.
  2. Moral progress seems to be a fact
  3. Disagreement is often the result of factual errors
  4. The extent to which there actually is disagreement may be exaggerated

The Demonstrability Argument:

  1. Based on flawed assumption that a universal standard must yield uniquely correct answers
  2. Exaggerated analogy with the objectivity of the scientific method
  3. We all agree at least that we must first get our facts straight to tackle moral problems, and that our moral principles and their application must be consistent.

The Divine Authority Argument:

  1. Morality is not a set of commands

So moral relativism cannot be conclusively thwarted, but it also seems clear that morality is more than just a mere matter of opinion.