READING for Brad Hooker’s Olso Course on CONSEQUENTIALISM

Items marked by * are especially important.

Sept. 16: Common-sense Morality and Reflective Equilibrium

*• W. D. Ross, ch. 2 of The Right and the Good. Available at

*• Thomas Nagel, ‘Fragmentation of Value’, in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 128–41; and reprinted in James Rachels, Ethical Theory, and Ethical Theory, II.

• John Rawls, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics’, Philosophical Review 60, pp. 177–97. Available at (

*• Norman Daniels, ‘Reflective Equilibrium’, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/

• John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, secs. 9 and 87.

• Dale Jamieson, ‘Method and Moral Theory’, chapter 42 of Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics.

• Rober Audi, ‘Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons (eds.) Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 101–36.

• Norman Daniels, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, Journal of Philosophy (May, 1979), pp. 256-282, and ( and reprinted in many books, including (1) Norman Daniels’s own collected essays Justice and Justification; (2) George Sher (ed.), Moral Philosophy: Selected Readings, and (3) Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (eds), Foundations of Ethics.

• Mark Timmons, Moral Theory, chs. 1 & 3.

210 pages

Sept. 17: What is the good to be promoted? Hedonism, Desire-fulfilment, Objective List Theory, Equality, Prioritarianism, Agent-relative Value, Impartiality

*• Appendix I of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons.

• Richard Arneson, ‘Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction’, Social Philosophy & Policy 16 (1999), pp. 113–42.

*• Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, Routledge, 1997, esp. chapters 1-3.

*• Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio 10, (1997), pp. 202–21.

*• Amartya Sen, ‘Rights and Agency’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, no. 1 (1982): 3–39

*• Amartya Sen, ‘Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 2 (1983): 113–32

• Amartya Sen, ‘Positional Objectivity’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 2 (1993): 126–45.

• Douglas Portmore, ‘Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation’, Ethics 113, no. 2 (2003): 303–32

• Douglas Portmore, ‘Consequentializing Moral Theories’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88, no. 1 (2007): 39–73.

*• Brad Hooker, ‘When Is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?’ (circulated)

250 pages

Sept. 18: Act-consequentialism: Maximizing, Satisficing, Scalar, Indirect

• J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press, 1973.

• Philip Pettit, ‘Consequentialism’, in Companion to Ethics, edited by Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell) pp. 230–40.

• Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Consequentialism’, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/

• Shelly Kagan, ‘Demanding Too Much’ and ‘Options’, Normative Ethics, ch. 5.1-5.2

*• Tim Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 129–42.

*• Alasdair Norcross ‘The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism’, in Henry West (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Blackwell Publishers, 2006).

*• Railton, Peter. 1984: ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, pp. 174–31.

• Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 24–49.

325 pages

Sept. 19: Rule-consequentialism

• Richard Brandt, ‘Some Merits of One Form of Rule-Utilitarianism’, University of Colorado Studies in Philosophy, 1967, pp. 39–65. Reprinted in Brandt, Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press) 1992, pp. 111–36, and reprinted in many other anthologies.

*• Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

• Brad Hooker, ‘Reply to Arneson and McIntyre’, Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005), pp. 264–81.

*• Brad Hooker, ‘Rule-consequentialism and Internal Consistency: A Reply to Card’, Utilitas 19, 2007, pp. 514–9.

• Tim Mulgan, Future People (Oxford: Oxford University Press), chs. 2 and 6.

• Tom Hill Jr., ‘Assessing Moral Rules: Utilitarian and Kantian Perspectives’, Philosophical Issues 15 (2005), 158–178.

320 pages