DAVIS V. HUTCHINSON, INC. D/B/A H. W. BRAND EQUIPMENT, INC.
Page 1
BEFORE THE IOWA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER
______
:
PAUL DAVIS, :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 5007608
HUTCHINSON, INC. D/B/A H. W. :
BRAND EQUIPMENT, INC., :
: A R B I T R A T I O N
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
EMC INSURANCE COMPANY, :
:
Insurance Carrier, : HEAD NOTE NO.: 1400
Defendants. :
______
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a contested case proceeding in arbitration under Iowa Code chapters 85 and 17A. Claimant, Paul Davis, claims to have sustained a work injury in the employ of defendant Hutchinson, Inc., d/b/a H.W. Brand Equipment, Inc., on November 5, 2002. He accordingly seeks benefits under the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Act from that employer and its insurance carrier, defendant EMC Insurance Co.
The claim was heard and fully submitted in Des Moines, Iowa, on April 19, 2004. The record consists of Davis’ testimony, his exhibits 1-19, and defendants’ exhibits A-D.
ISSUES
STIPULATIONS:
- An employment relationship existed between Paul Davis and Hutchinson, Inc., on November 5, 2002.
- Davis was off work during the time he claims as temporary disability: November 5, 2002 – April 21, 2003.
- Permanent disability, if any, should be compensated by the industrial method (loss of earning capacity).
- The correct rate of weekly compensation is $254.48.
- Disputed medical treatment and associated costs are reasonable, necessary, and causally related to the medical conditions upon which Davis’ claim is based.
ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION:
- Whether Davis sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment on November 5, 2002.
- Whether the alleged injury caused temporary disability.
- Whether the alleged injury caused permanent disability.
- Extent of temporary disability.
- Extent and commencement date of permanent disability.
- Entitlement to medical benefits.
- Whether defendants have subrogation rights under Iowa Code section 85.22.
FINDINGS OF FACT
This contested case turns on a legal issue: under the peculiar facts present here, is an injury sustained while on a paid “coffee break” compensable?
Paul Davis, age 25, worked for H. W. Brand Equipment as a production painter on November 5, 2002. David worked the day shift, 5:00 a.m. to when the work was done. At 9:00 a.m., production stopped plant-wide for a half-hour break during which workers were still on the clock.
The plant lacked sufficient facilities to readily accommodate the workers, some 35 or 40 in number. A break room was available, but only seated approximately 15. No food service was available, other than vending machine candy bars, and refrigeration was not offered.
As a matter of routine, Davis and two or three other workers traveled by private vehicle to a nearby convenience store for breakfast pizza. One of those individuals, Dan Kriegel, was also Davis’ supervisor, and the practice of workers leaving the premises during break was clearly acceptable to management.
During the morning break on November 5, 2002, Davis, Kriegel and a third worker, Shane, drove to the convenience store in Shane’s car. Unfortunately, the men were involved in a motor vehicle accident on the way, allegedly causing injury to Davis.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged injury occurred and that it arose out of and in the course of employment, McDowell v. Town of Clarksville, 241 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1976); Musselman v. Central Telephone Co., 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 128 (1967). The words “arising out of” refer to the cause or source of the injury. The words “in the course of” refer to the time, place and circumstances of injury, Sheerin v. Holin Co., 380 N.W.2d 415 (Iowa 1986); McClure v. Union, et al., Counties, 188 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1971). The requirement is satisfied by proof of a causal relationship between the employment and the injury, Sheerin.
An injury occurs in the course of employment when an employee is where he was directed to be, and in the process of performing, about to perform, or engaging in acts incidental to the required job duties. See, Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1996).
An injury must also arise out of the employment, and does so only if there is a “rational consequence of the hazard connected with the employment.” Burt v. John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, 247 Iowa 691, 700, 73 N.W.2d 732, 737 (1955). The “arising out of” element is satisfied if “the nature of the employment exposes the employee to risk of such an injury.” Hanson v. Reichelt, 452 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Iowa 1990).
The Iowa Supreme Court went on to state in Miedema:
There must be a sufficient showing of a causal connection to satisfy the “arising out of” test. To ignore the causation requirement would render the two-tiered approach of Iowa’s workers’ compensation statute meaningless. The workers’ compensation statute is not a general health insurance policy that extends to any and all injuries that happen to occur while on the job, but rather exists to compensate workers who are injured as a result of a condition of their employment.
(Miedema, at 312).
Iowa Code section 85.61(7) offers the controlling definition:
The words “personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment” shall include injuries to employees whose services are being performed on, in, or about the premises which are occupied, used, or controlled by the employer, and also injuries to those who are engaged elsewhere in places where their employer’s business requires their presence and subjects them to dangers incident to the business.
In Halstead v. Johnson’s Texaco, 264 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1978), the Supreme Court concluded that injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident while on an unpaid break were not compensable on facts demonstrating a recognized exception to the otherwise disqualifying “coming and going” rule. The Court noted:
The same [going and coming] rule ordinarily applies when the employee has a place and hours of work, his hours of work do not include his meal period, and he leaves his place of employment to go to and return from his meal elsewhere.
(Halstead, at 759)
Davis, however, quite properly points out a highly relevant distinguishing fact: his hours of work did include the meal period; he was on company time with at least tacit approval of his employer, and in the presence of his supervisor at the time of his alleged injury. Halstead specifically declined to address that situation:
We thus have no occasion to say and we do not say whether Iowa recognizes an exception in the so-called off-premises coffee break and lunch break situations where the employee proves circumstances which he claims show the break was actually on company time.
(Id, at 760)
Davis, of course, was indisputably on company time. But he must show more than this to recover: under the requirements of section 85.61(7), he must establish that he was engaged “where [his] employer’s business requires [his] presence and subjects [him] to dangers incident to the business.” Under the circumstances, Davis has failed to meet this threshold standard. Although he was with his supervisor (also a social friend) at the time, Davis was not acting under orders and his presence in the car or at the restaurant was not required by his employer.
Agency precedent established in Coulter v. Holdiman Motors, File No. 1033115 (App. Dec. 1996) holds that even if a worker is on clear company business (transporting company vehicles), a deviation for personal purposes (going into a convenience store to purchase cigarettes) takes one away from activities that were either express or implied employment duties. It is accordingly held that, while Davis may have been “in the course of” his employment on November 5, 2002, he did not sustain injury “arising out of” that employment. Defendants therefore prevail.
ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
Davis takes nothing.
Costs are taxed to Davis.
Signed and filed this _____17th______day of May, 2004.
______
DAVID RASEY
DEPUTY WORKERS’
COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER
Copies to:
Mr. Dennis F. Chalupa
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 726
Newton, IA 50208-3723
Mr. D. Brian Scieszinski
Attorney at Law
801 Grand Ave., Ste. 3700
Des Moines, IA 50309-2727
DRR/smb