Curriculum Vitae
Michael McKenna
Professor and Keith Lehrer Chair
Department of Philosophy
Center for the Philosophy of Freedom
University of Arizona
Social Sciences Bldg., Rm 213 work: 520-621-3985
Tucson, AZ 85721-0027 cell: 520-548-0111
email: fax: 520-621-9559
Education
Ph.D., University of Virginia, Philosophy, 1993
B.A., Thiel College, Philosophy, Political Science, 1984
Areas of Specialization
Research Specializations Free Will Moral Responsibility
Primary Teaching Competence Ethics, Metaphysics, Action Theory
Employment
Professor University of Arizona, Fall 2010 - present
Florida State University, Fall 2008 – Spring 2010
Associate Professor Florida State University, Fall 2006 – Spring 2008
Ithaca College: Fall 2001 – Spring 2006 (Chair 01-04)
University of Colorado, Boulder (visiting) Spring 2005
Assistant Professor Ithaca College: Fall 1994 - Spring 2001
Bryn Mawr College (visiting): Fall 1999 – Spring 2000
Lecturer California State U., Long Beach, Fall 1993 – Spring 1994
University of Virginia, Fall 1992 – Spring 1993
Courses Taught:
Graduate Level Moral Responsibility, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Free Will:
Compatibilist Style, Metaphysics and Epistemology: Core Course, Identity and Persistence, Moral Psychology
Upper Level Dimensions of Freedom, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Metaphysics,
Epistemology, Moral Theory, Metaethics, Persons Human Condition
Mid-level Applied Ethics, Medical Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind,
Autonomy & Responsibility, Philosophy in Film, War & Terrorism
Lower Level Intro to Philosophy, Intro to Ethics, History of Modern Philosophy,
Informal Logic, Existentialism
Publications
Books Authored
2016 with Derk Pereboom. Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge.
2012. Conversation & Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
Books Edited
2015 eds., with Randolph Clarke and Angela Smith. The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New
Essays. New York: Oxford University Press.
2008 eds., with Paul Russell. Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson's
"Freedom and Resentment" Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press.
2003 eds., with David Widerker. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press.
Articles
2018 (forthcoming). “A Critical Assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-Style Example.”
Philosophical Studies. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-017-0997-z.
2018 (forthcoming). “Watsonian Compatibilism.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility,
Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini, eds. Vol. 5.
2017 with Brandon Warmke. “Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?”
Journal of Moral Philosophy: 1-36.
2017 (forthcoming). “Power, Social Inequities, and the Conversational Theory of Moral
Responsibility.” In K. Hutchison, C. Mackenzie, and M. Oshana, eds., Social Dimensions of
Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
2017. “Reasons-Responsive Theories of Freedom.” Routledge Handbook on Free Will. Routledge
Press: 27-40.
2017. “Theories of Moral Responsibility and the Responsibility Barter Game.” In Z. Goldberg, ed.,
Of Morals and Merels: Essays Inspired by the Work of Peter A. French. Springer: 71-84.
2016. “A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Ethics. 20: 83-105.
2016. “Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk
Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.” Criminal Law and Philosophy.
2016. “Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and
Vargas.” Criminal Law and Philosophy.
2015. “In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsibility Skepticism: A Reply to Levy.” In
A. Buckareff, C. Moya, and S. Rosell, Agency, Freedom, and Responsibility. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan: 204-6.
2015 with Chad Van Schoelandt. “Crossing a Mesh Theory with a Reasons-Responsive Theory.”
In A. Buckareff, C. Moya, and S. Rosell, Agency, Freedom, and Responsibility. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 44-64.
2015 with Benjamin Kozuch, “Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mental Illness.” In D.
Moseley and G. Gala, eds., Philosophy and Psychiatry. New York: Routledge Press: 89-113.
2014. “Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U Condition.” In D. Palmer, ed.
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates. NY: Oxford University Press: 71-87.
2014. “Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.”
Philosophical Studies. 171: 73-84.
2014. “Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-liner Takes it on the Chin.”Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research: 89: 467-84.
2014. “The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question: Comments on Mark
Ballaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Question.” Philosophical Studies 169, 1: 39-50.
2013. “Directed Blame and Conversation.” In Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. Justin Coates and
Neal Tognazinni. New York: Oxford University Press: 119-40.
2013 with Brandon Warmke. “Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and Conversation.” Free Will
and Moral Responsibility, In Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette, eds. (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Series): 189-212.
2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms” In Oxford Studies in Agency and
Responsibility, David Shoemaker, ed., Vol. 1 (NY: OUP): 151-84.
2013. “Seven Questions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” Methode. Analytic
Perspectives http://www.methodejournal.org. vol. II, no. 3: 98-111.
2013. “Source Compatibilism and that Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana
Nelkin’s Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 162: 105-16.
2012. “Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers.”Philosophical Issues,
vol. 22: 264-80.
2012. “Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of
Nonhistorical Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics. 16: 145-74.
2011. “Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories.” In R.
Kane, ed., 2011, Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press): 175-98.
2011 with Ishtiyaque Haji. “Disenabling Levy’s Frankfurt-style Enabling Cases.” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 92: 400-14.
2010. “Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments? Getting the Dialectic
Right.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88.3: 429-43.
2009. “Understanding Terrorism and the Limits of Just War Theory.” In M. Morgan, ed., The
Impact of 9/11 on Religion and Philosophy: The Day that Changed Everything? NY:
Palgrave MacMillan: 247-60.
2009. "Compatibilism" (updated from 2004). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Edward N. Zalta(ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism.
2009. “Compatibilism and Desert.” Philosophical Studies 144.1: 3-13.
2009. “Moral Monster or Responsible Person? Memento’s Leonard as a Case Study in Defective
Agency” in Andrew Kania, ed., Philosophers on Memento. Routledge.
2009. “Naturalism and Free Agency” in J.H. Aguilar & A.A. Buckareff, eds., Philosophy of
Action: 5 Questions, Automatic Press/VIP: 165-82.
2008. “A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-case Argument” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 77.1: 142-59.
2008. “Frankfurt’s Argument against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples,”
Nous 42: 770-93.
2008. “Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical
Studies 139.1: 29-37.
2008. with Neil Levy. “Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical
Compass 3: 96-133.
2008. “Saying Goodbye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.” Philosophical Review 117.3:
349-383.
2008. “The Loss of Innocence and the Things that Remain,” APA Newsletter in Philosophy and
Law Vo.7, No.2: 5-9.
2008. “Ultimacy and Sweet Jane,” In D. Cohen and N. Trakakis, eds., Essays on Free Will and
Moral Responsibility. (New Castel upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press).
2006 with Ishtiyaque Haji. “Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A
Reply to Palmer.” Journal of Philosophy 103: 363-72.
2006. “Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy
30: 16-34.
2006. “John Martin Fischer’s Work on Freedom and Responsibility: Introduction.” Guest editor.
Special Issue. Journal of Ethics 10: 211-27.
2005. “Reasons Reactivity & Incompatibilist Intuitions.” Philosophical Explorations vol. 8,
No.2: 131-43.
2005. “Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 163-80.
2004. "Compatibilism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta(ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism.
2004. with Ishtiyaque Haji. “Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and
Alternative Possibilities.” Journal of Philosophy 101: 299-314. Reprinted in J.M. Fischer,
ed., Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Free Will, UK.: Routledge, forthcoming 2005.
2004. “The Relationship Between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency.” In J. S.
Taylor, ed., Personal Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205-34.
2004. “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.” Philosophical Topics 32: 169-92.
2003. "A Metaphysics for Krausz." In A. Deciu and G.L. Pandit, eds., Interpretation and
Ontology: Studies in the Philosophy of Michael Krausz. Amsterdam: Radopi, 129-46.
2003. “Neo’s Freedom…’Whoa!’” Online publication at http://philosophy.thematrix.com.
Reprinted in Christopher Grau, ed., Philosophers Explore the Matrix. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005: 218-38.
2003. “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives.” In Widerker
and McKenna, eds., 2003: 201-17. Reprinted in J.M. Fischer, ed., Critical Concepts in
Philosophy: Free Will, UK.: Routledge, forthcoming 2005.
2003. “What is Terrorism?” Ithaca College Quarterly. Vol. 21, No.4. 27-9. An expanded
version also can be found on line at http://www.ithaca.edu/icq/2003v4.
2001. “Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-responsibility.” American
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 38, No. 1: 37-52.
2000. “Assessing Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism: Fischer and Ravizza’s Responsibility and
Control.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 8, No.1: 89-114.
2000. “Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views.” Guest editor’s introduction to
special issue. Journal of Ethics. Vol. 4, No.4: 309-12.
2000. “Toward a Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility.” In Ton van den Beld, ed.,
Responsibility & Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 247-58.
1998. “Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt-Style Counter-Examples?” Philosophical
Studies Vol. 91, No.3: 259-64.
1998. “Moral Theory and Modified Compatibilism.” Journal of Philosophical Research Vol. 23:
441-58.
1998. “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian
Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics Vol. 2, No. 2: 123-42.
1997. “A Reply to McDonald: A Defense of the Presumption in Favor of Requirement Conflict.”
Journal of Social Philosophy Vol. 28, No. 1, Spring: 51-7.
1997. “Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counter-Example Strategy.” Journal of
Social Philosophy Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter: 71-85.
1997. “John Martin Fischer’s The Metaphysics of Free Will.” Review article. Legal Theory 3:
379-97.
Book Reviews and Critical Notices
2009 with Michael Robinson. “Carlos J. Moya’s Moral Responsibility: The Ways
of Skepticism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
2008 with Aron Vadakin. “George Sher, In Praise of Blame.” Ethics Vol. 18, No.4: 751-7.
2008 with Joshua Gert. “R. Jay Wallace, Normativity and the Will.” Philosophical Quarterly
Vol., 58. No. 232: 559-4.
2002. “Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents.” Philosophical Review Vol. 111, No. 4: 612-15.
2002. “Hilary Bok, Freedom & Responsibility.” Ethics. Vol. 113, No. 1: 144-5.
2001. “Ishtiyaque Haji,, Moral Appraisability.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 63, No. 3: 711-5.
2001. “John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility & Control.” Journal of
Philosophy, XCVIII, No. 2: 93-100.
1999. “David Ray Griffin, Unsnarling the World Knot.” Ethics Vol. 110, No. 1: 242.
1996. “R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.” Philosophical Review 105:
415-18.
Work in Progress
Reasons-Responsiveness and the Sources of Agency: A Compatibilist Theory of Free Will
(under contract, OUP)
“Free Will and Basic Desert”
“Deserved Blame and its Value”
“Resisting Todd’s Moral-Standing Zygote Argument”
“Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering”
“Facing the Luck Problem for Compatibilists”
Editorial Board
Philosophical Studies
Philosophical Explorations
Editorial Journal Work
2001 to 2008. Journal of Ethics. Book review editor.
2007. Guest editor (with Neil Levy). Special issue devoted to Alfred Mele’s Free
Will & Luck, in Philosophical Explorations.
2006. “John Martin Fischer’s Work on Freedom and Responsibility.” Guest editor. Special
Issue. Journal of Ethics. Vol. 10
2000. “Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views.” Guest Editor. Special issue.
Proceedings of conference sponsored by the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium.
Journal of Ethics. Vol. 4, No.4.
Referee
American Philosophical Quarterly; Australasian Journal of Philosophy; Canadian Journal of Philosophy; Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review; Erkenntnis; Ethics; International Journal of Philosophical Studies; Inquiry; Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly; Journal of Ethics; Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy; Journal of Philosophical Research; Journal of Social Philosophy; Mind; Nous; Oxford University Press; Pacific Philosophical Quarterly; Philosophical Explorations; Philosophical Studies; Philosophical Quarterly; Philosophy of Science
Graduate Supervision
Committee Member, Dissertation Committee, Hannah Tierney, Spring 2016
External Examiner, Dissertation Committee, Tulane Phil Dept, Nathan Stout, Spring 2016
Committee Member, Dissertation Committee, Keith Hankins, Arizona, Spring, 2015
Chair, Doctoral Supervisor, Brandon Warmke, Arizona, Spring 2014
Committee Member, Dissertation Committee, Daniel Silvermint, Arizona, Spring 2013
Chair, Special Area Exam, Daniel Haas, FSU, Spring 2010
Chair, Special Area Exam, Megan McGrew, FSU, Fall 2009
Chair, Master’s Thesis, Thomas Reed, FSU, Fall 2009
Committee Member, Jason Turner, Special Area Exam, FSU, Fall 2009
Chair, Master’s Committee, Dennis Millarker, FSU, Spring 2009
Chair, Special Area Exam, Brandon Warmke, FSU, Spring 2009
Committee Member, Special Area Exam, Ben Miller, FSU, Fall 2008
Committee Member, Special Area Exam, Heather Perez, FSU, Spring 2008
Chair, Special Area Exam, Michael Robinson, FSU, Fall 2007
Chair, Master’s Committee, Jason Miller, FSU, Fall 2007
Committee Member, Special Area Exam, FSU, Ali Brown, Fall 2007
Committee Member, Special Area Exam, FSU, Joseph Long, Fall 2007
Committee Member, Special Area Exam, FSU, Shidan Lotfi, Fall 2007
External examiner, Seth Shabo, Ph.D. dissertation committee, Syracuse University, Spring 2003
External examiner, Kristin Mickelson, M.A. thesis committee, UC, Boulder, Spring 2006
Honors and Awards
Florida State University, COFRS Summer Research Grant, Summer 2009
Ithaca College, Faculty Summer Research Grant, Summer 2003.
Ithaca College, Faculty Summer Research Grant, Summer 2001.
Ithaca College Faculty Summer Research Grant, Summer 1998.
Cornell University Society for the Humanities, 1996 Summer Research Grant.
NEH Summer Seminar for College Teachers, Summer 1995.
University of Virginia Graduate Fellowship, Spring 1993.
University of Virginia, Dissertation Year Fellowship, Grad School of H&S, 1991-2.
Dupont Fellowship, Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, 1990-1.
Professional Presentations
“Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering,” Keynote for Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and
Agency Graduate Student Conference, Philosophy Department, Florida State University, Tallahassee,
FL, October 6, 2017.
“Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering,” Workshop on Responsibility, Conversation, and
Communication, Gothenburg University, Philosophy Dept., Gothenburg, Sweden, May 30, 2017.