Control + 1 Block Headings s14

DDI-IraqConditons-Genrics.doc DDI10 21

1NC 2

Solvency (1/2) 4

Pressure Key (1/2) 6

Article 140 Good – Conflict Prevention 8

Article 140 Good – Conflict Prevention 9

Article 140 Good – Stability 10

Article 140 Good – Iran 13

Say Yes – Generic 14

Say Yes - Kurds 15

Say Yes – Allawi 16

Say Yes – Maliki 17

Maliki – Wants US Out 18

AT – Article 140 Good 19

Fast Withdrawal Key 20

{aff} Maliki will say no 21

1NC

The United States federal government should withdraw its military presence from Iraq if the Government of Iraq agrees to implement Article 140 of the constitution.

1. US should condition military support on constitutional reform in Iraq—they’ll say yes.

Montgomery, 2008 (Julie, “The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq,” Panel: Kimberley Kagan, President of the Institute for the Study of War, Colin Kahl, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Society, Charles Knight, Co-Director of the Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute, and Rend al-Rahim, United States Institute of Peace Iraq Fellow, USIPeace Briefing, September, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/USIP_0908.PDF)

The question of U.S. leverage on Iraqi leaders was one of the areas of greatest divergence in the panel. Knight’s proposal relies principally on non-military leverage gained through strong support of international agency, regional diplomatic engagement, support to refugees and displaced persons and employment of Iraqis. Kahl and Rahim both argued that the U.S. should condition its military, economic and political support for the government of Iraq (GOI) to resolve critical political issues. Military support—both troop presence and critical enablers like logistics and air support—obviously provides the greatest amount of leverage and is the area in which Iraq is most dependent on the U.S. However, Iraq also relies heavily on U.S. governance and economic support, as well as political support in Iraq’s relations with other states and in international institutions. Only through a U.S. threat to end this essential support are Iraqis likely to make the tough compromises necessary for the establishment of a stable, secure Iraq. Kagan agreed with Kahl and Rahim about conditional support and leverage, but only to a point. The U.S. must lean on Iraqi leaders to make certain political compromises, and even withhold support to pressure these leaders. However, she made a critical distinction that others did not: the U.S. should only condition support for Iraq in ways that are “non-fatal.” By this line of reasoning, no failure of leaders in the GOI to achieve political progress is so grave that the U.S. should be willing to “let Iraq fail.” Kahl and Rahim agreed that some necessary compromises are unlikely to occur unless Iraqi leaders’ political future is at risk. Kagan’s approach was, therefore, too lenient to be effective.

2. Only pressure from the US can solve implementation of Article 140

Nezan and Shali 08 (Dr. Kendal Nezan is a nuclear physicist by profession and president of the Kurdish Institute of Paris , Dr. Saman Shali is the former Head of the Kurdish National Congress of North America (KNCNA) , 5/09/08 “Article 140 and the Future of Iraq”, http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/ppec/events/article_140_future_iraq.pdf. MX)

Dr. Kendal Nezan, President of the Kurdish Institute of Paris, mainly spoke about the concerns of neighboring countries regarding Article 140. Dr. Nezan said that Iran and Syria are dissatisfied with the developments in Iraq Kurdistan because of their own marginalized Kurdish populations, but the U.S. does not take account of these concerns. The United States does, however, consider the concerns of Turkey, where the Kurdish issue remains unresolved, he said. Dr. Dr. Nezan urged the United States to address the moral responsibility of Kurdish issue and its history. He also argued that Iraq’s constitution is not simply a piece of paper -- it is the only political agreement for the new democratic Iraq, he said. If the conditions of the constitution are not met, Dr. Nezan said, Kurds have no reason to remain part of the country. Dr. Saman Shali, President of the KNC, said that Iraq's constitution was endorsed by United Nations, the U.S., and Iraq, and that Article 140 provides the people who live in disputed territories freedom to "choose their d9estiny." Dr. Shali urged the U.S. to use it authority to implement Article 140, but stressed that the responsibility lies with all parties within Iraq to resolve the situation through the constitution. He stressed that a failure to implement Article 140 would be a great injustice, and would restart the cycle of mistrust between Kurdistan and governments in Baghdad.

1NC

3. Implementing Article 140 before US withdrawal is key to prevent civil war in Iraq

O’Leary 9 – Professor of Political Science at UPenn (Brendan, Spring, Dissent “Departing Responsibly”, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=110&sid=c7f43f20-0614-4b02-93e8-beabcd027250%40sessionmgr111. MX)

Once the Obama administration questions the idée fixe that Iraq must be recentralized, as Biden did in his capacity as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it will realize that it is much wiser to adopt a pro-Constitution policy, not just because it is legally and democratically better, but because it will enable a more judicious and just U.S. exit. There is no point in building up a strong Baghdad military if that leads to a renewed war with Kurdistan. It would repeat the pattern of Iraqi history since 1920. Each successive Iraqi regime that has sought to consolidate its power has broken its previous commitments to Kurdistan’s autonomy and sought to conquer it. Ensuing Arab-Kurdish wars have then encouraged interventions by the neighboring powers. It is time to end this cycle. Washington must therefore seek to resolve major Kurdish-Arab tensions before it leaves. That way Iraq’s internal territorial boundaries will be clarified, and the prospects of subsequent Turkish and Iranian interventions reduced. The means are clear—supporting the implementation of the Constitution’s Article 140, which, executed fairly, will facilitate Kirkuk’s and other disputed territories’ unifying with the KRG, in line with local majority opinion. As a quid pro quo, Washington should promote power-sharing provisions in the KRG’s Constitution for the Turkomen, Arabs, and Christians of Kirkuk city and offer to monitor minority rights protections that the Kurds have already promoted in good faith. Such a policy would also require supporting the formal transfer into the KRG of the Kurdish majority districts and sub-districts currently below its southern boundary. Such a policy is just: Saddam drew the existing borders, not elected Kurds or Arabs. It is required: the Kurdistan region’s boundary does not coincide with existing provincial boundaries, creating an administrative mess. The policy is constitutional. And it is democratic at the relevant level—the local one: Kurdistan’s lists appear to have triumphed throughout nearly all the disputed territories in the recent provincial elections. The policy will be stabilizing— provided the Turkomen are appropriately accommodated. A satisfied Kurdistan will be a champion of a federal Iraq. By contrast, a U.S. withdrawal before the just implementation of Article 140 will lead to war between factions in Baghdad and Kurdistan.

4. Civil war in Iraq causes Middle East instability

Jeremy Bowen, BBC Middle East editor, “Iraq’s civil war nightmare”, February 23, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4741616.stm)

But their challenge for the leaders is to control and channel the anger, to let it be expressed but not to get out of control. A civil war in Iraq would destroy the chances of the elected central government, which will be led and dominated by Shias when eventually it is formed. Civil war could lead to the break-up of the country, and would export even more instability and violence across the wider Middle East and beyond. That is why most Iraqis, of all sides, do not want one - and why some extremists do, and are trying as hard as they can to make it happen.

Solvency (1/2)

US should condition further support of Iraq on political progress

Kahl 8 (Colin, professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, July, “WALK BEFORE RUNNING”, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64458/colin-h-kahl-and-william-e-odom/when-to-leave-iraq?page=show. MX)

Simultaneous with these decisions, the United States should start negotiations to establish a broad time horizon for the transition of the remaining U.S. forces to an overwatch role and the conditions for continued U.S. support for the Iraqi government. Once U.S. forces have reached a sustainable overwatch level, the primary mission of the U.S. military in Iraq will switch to counterterrorism, training and advising of the Iraqi security forces, and force protection for U.S. civilians and advisers. U.S. negotiators should make clear, however, that continued economic and diplomatic support, as well as continued support for the Iraqi security forces (something the Iraqi government deeply desires and needs), will hinge on continued progress toward political accommodation. U.S. negotiators should emphasize that over the long run, the United States intends to normalize its relationship with the Iraqi government and redeploy all of its remaining forces as conditions permit. This policy of conditional engagement should be nested within a wider regional diplomatic initiative that seeks to leverage the U.S. drawdown in Iraq and the common interest among Iraq's neighbors in avoiding a failed Iraqi state. In the end, this approach may not work. If the Iraqis prove unwilling to move toward accommodation, then no number of U.S. forces will be able to produce sustainable stability, and the strategic costs of maintaining a significant presence will outweigh the benefits. If so, the new administration should shift to Simon's unconditional disengagement as Plan B.

The US should implement a policy of conditional engagement in Iraq – provides the most stable out comes.

Colin H. Kahl is an Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security., “Walk Before Running”, July/August 2008 Issue of Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64458/colin-h-kahl-and-william-e-odom/when-to-leave-iraq )

In "The Price of the Surge" (May/June 2008), Steven Simon correctly observes that the Sunni turn against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), known as the Sunni Awakening, has been a key factor in security progress during the period of "the surge." Simon is also on point when he notes that the Awakening, which began before the surge, was not a direct consequence of additional U.S. troops. But although Simon gets much of the past right, he ultimately draws the wrong lessons for U.S. policy moving forward. Rather than unilaterally and unconditionally withdrawing from Iraq and hoping that the international community will fill the void and push the Iraqis toward accommodation -- a very unlikely scenario -- the United States must embrace a policy of "conditional engagement." This approach would couple a phased redeployment of combat forces with a commitment to providing residual support for the Iraqi government if and only if it moves toward genuine reconciliation. Conditional engagement -- rather than Simon's policy of unconditional disengagement -- would incorporate the real lesson from the Sunni Awakening.

Solvency (2/2)

US should condition its withdrawal from Iraq, it maintains stability in the region, and forces the government to reconcile on political issues.

A new policy of conditional engagement would take advantage of the ongoing talks aimed at shaping a long-term U.S.-Iraqi security framework to push the Iraqis toward political accommodation. U.S. negotiators should exploit the continuing discontent among Democrats in Congress and the impending presidential election to signal that a long-term U.S. commitment to Iraq is not politically sustainable unless there is tangible evidence of reconciliation. Because the Iraqi government has an interest in a long-term security relationship with the United States, especially continued U.S. support for the Iraqi security forces, this tactic could prove very effective. The presidential candidates from both parties should reinforce this strategy by publicly endorsing the conditions the Iraqi government must meet in order to influence the pace of future U.S. withdrawals and gain their future administrations' support for the Iraqi security forces in the years ahead. This will require the Democratic nominee to clarify his or her stance on the disposition of residual forces in Iraq after a withdrawal of most of the combat troops (only Senator Barack Obama [D-Ill.] has proposed explicit conditions to be placed on continued support for the Iraqi security forces), and it will require McCain to abandon his unconditional pledge to stay in Iraq. When the new administration takes office in January 2009, it must follow up on this approach by initiating a down payment on redeployment. Starting from the roughly 15 combat brigades (a total of 130,000-140,000 troops) it is likely to inherit, the new administration should signal its intention to transition to a "support," or "overwatch," role by announcing the near-term reduction of U.S. forces to perhaps 12 brigades. The new administration should also immediately sign a formal pledge with the Iraqi government stating unequivocally that it will not seek, accept, or under any conditions establish permanent or "enduring" military bases in Iraq. Taken together, these actions would signal to the Iraqi government that the U.S. commitment is no longer open-ended while still maintaining enough forces in the near term to prevent a major reversal of progress on security. These steps would also signal to groups inside the Iraqi parliament that strongly oppose the occupation (especially the Sadrists), as well as to the organizations representing the nationalist wing of the Sunni insurgency, that the United States does not intend to stay forever. This might open up additional avenues for bringing those Sunnis into formal and informal negotiations. Simultaneous with these decisions, the United States should start negotiations to establish a broad time horizon for the transition of the remaining U.S. forces to an overwatch role and the conditions for continued U.S. support for the Iraqi government. Once U.S. forces have reached a sustainable overwatch level, the primary mission of the U.S. military in Iraq will switch to counterterrorism, training and advising of the Iraqi security forces, and force protection for U.S. civilians and advisers. U.S. negotiators should make clear, however, that continued economic and diplomatic support, as well as continued support for the Iraqi security forces (something the Iraqi government deeply desires and needs), will hinge on continued progress toward political accommodation. U.S. negotiators should emphasize that over the long run, the United States intends to normalize its relationship with the Iraqi government and redeploy all of its remaining forces as conditions permit. This policy of conditional engagement should be nested within a wider regional diplomatic initiative that seeks to leverage the U.S. drawdown in Iraq and the common interest among Iraq's neighbors in avoiding a failed Iraqi state.