PUBPOL 579S.01 & ENVIRON 579S.01, Duke University, Sanford School of Public Policy, Spring 2018
Collective Action Professor Alexander Pfaff
Rubenstein Hall ; 919-613-9240
Monday3:05-5:35Rubenstein Hall 186, Wednesday 3-4pm
OverviewMuch of the economics training one usually receives, or the discussion of rational actors in other disciplines, focuses upon individuals. One great benefit from mathematical models of individuals, and their interactions in markets, is that they facilitate being complete concerning possible responses one may(not) expect if varied shifts / shocks occur.
However, some elements of the decision makingbehind actual responses are not easily derivedfrom principles + math. They include emotions such as anger, including about varied inequities, and interpersonal connections such as altruism. They also include expectationsabout what others will choose, e.g.,how all others will react to the inequities of interest.
Those may not matter a lot among millions of small actors withinglobal markets, yet theydo matter in many situations,and these elementsmatter a lot for collective action, such as individuals acting together to regulate usage of resources.
Collective actions include ‘participation’, i.e., representatives of affected groups beingincluded in decision processes. From the US’ EPA to the World Bank and beyond, people ask whether and when ‘participatory decisions are better'. Relevant evidence is growingand is a focus of this course. Some suggests that social norms − whilenot universal − influence outcomes frommany collective processes.Some suggests self-interested strategies dominate such settings. We draw on many cases, most within developing countries. Water quantity andqualityissuesoffer many examples.
Section 1We start with tools from experimental economics. Researchers can face 'groups' (often two to five people) with decision situations the researchers control. These ‘fake worlds’ in which people earnmoney based on decisions they and others make are one approachto empirical learning when inference from real-world observations about the questions of interest is daunting or impossible, due to shortages of comparable data on institutions and thus controls.
Section 2We move to common-property-resource literature, starting with ‘the tragedy of the commons’and when it might arise. Ostrom and othersare central in pushing reflection onwhen groups are able to self-organize in order to: monitor resource usage; punish deviations from agreementseven when punishment is costly; and improve outcomes. Given limits on its initial inspiration, i.e., cases, such literature includes examinations using economic experiments. We draw upon a suite of analyses of contributions by groups’ members to public goods,within different situations.
Section 3With such evidence in mind, we return to experiments, focusing on behavioral economics and evidence formotivationsunderlying non-selfish behaviors: doesbeing trusted by others matter? or whether acts arereciprocated? What conceptual frameworks might explain why external efforts to monitor resource use may reduce desired action? Which definition of ‘equity’ seems to explain best how people make choices that affect the outcome for their group?
Section 4We end with‘participation’. We cite claims about benefits of participation, while focusing to some extent on variations inincentives for individuals to participate pluswhether participation turns out to be socially beneficial. These questions are easier to study with theabove in the background, withsome authors making explicit connection to Ostrom-like analyses and others being easily connected to some of the theory and cases inexperimental literature.
Logistics
Tasks:attend class and really participate; complete regular assignments; complete the midterm exam & the final exam.
ReadingsMostly PDFs (on Sakai) butpurchase Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing The Commons. Cambridge Univ. Press.
Assignments Often you will be summarizing prior literature then adding your own perspective – e.g., you might present yourself as entering into some existing debate to disagree or to add a point. When doing so, to show and to earn respect,it helps to demonstratethat you have given sufficient attention to the part of prior work relevant to what you are saying. Please email all assignments to me as PDFs with the filename A#-XY.pdf (where # = assignment#, XY = your initials).
GradingWeights to compute grades are: 25% Class;25% Regular Assignments;20% Midterm;30% Cumulative Final.
PrerequisitesNone, though it is possible that prior political science +/or microeconomicswill provide relevant support. In terms of all the key points for this class, everything can be absorbed as we read (& we skip all the technical models). Students with varied disciplinary backgrounds and levels of experience absolutely can engage with the same materials, from 1st-year undergraduates through masters students, including non-economic, all the way through economics PhDs.
1. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (fake, well-controlled worlds)
For Class 1 (1/10)
1A. Motivations & Tools Brief Overview
Dan Ariely's1/10/2011blog post New York Times 12/7/2013 article entitled "Britain's Ministry of Nudges".
Camerer, C.F. and E. Fehr (2001). “Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: a guide for social scientists”. U. of Zurich Working Paper ISSN[Sections 1&2 w/focus on table listing varied games]
Harrison, Glen W. and John List (2004). “Field Experiments.” Journalof Economic Literature 52 [pp.1009-1014]
List, John A. (2006). “Field Experiments: a bridge between lab and naturally occurring data”. Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 6(2; article 8) [Overview pp.1-2, Section 2 pp9-25, Section 3 pp.31-33]
Camerer, C.F. and E. Fehr (2006). “When Does ‘Economic Man’ Dominate Social Behavior?”. Science 311:47.
[BOOK THAT WE WILL NOT USE HERE, THOUGH IT IS OFTEN CITED; GOOD BACKGROUND TEXT --The Handbook of Experimental Economics. 1995. J.H. Kagel and A.E.Roth (Eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton. ]
[BOOK THAT WE WILL NOT USE HERE, THOUGH IT IS OFTEN CITED; GOOD BACKGROUND TOO -- Camerer, Colin, 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Russell Sage Fdn. Princeton.]
For Class2 (1/22)
1B. Sharing-Bargaining Example(s)
Henrich, Joseph. 2000. Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazaon. American Economic Review, 90, 973-79.
Henrich , Joseph; Robert Boyd; Samuel Bowles; Colin Camerer; Ernst Fehr; Herbert Gintis; Richard McElreath; Michael Alvard; Abigail Barr; Jean Ensminger; Natalie Smith Henrich; Kim Hill; Francisco Gil-White; Michael Gurven; Frank W. Marlowe; John Q. Patton and David Tracer. 2005. “Economic Man in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, 795-855, where we will spend a decent bit of time also with the many critiques included here plus the authors’ response.
Henrich et al. extensions – J. Ensminger’s powerpoint about “Phase II” (which includes response to prior criticisms)
Henrich et al. (2010). “Evolution of Fairness and PunishmentMarkets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment”, which comes with a Silverstein critiques and response file too.
Hirschman, Albert (1982). "Rival Interpretatios of Market Society: civilizing, destructive or feeble?". JEL 20(4).
[BOOK THAT WE WILL NOT USE HERE BUT PROVIDING AS A REFERENCE -- Henrich, Joseph;
Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr and Herbert Gintis. 2004. Foundations of Human Sociality. Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford University Press, Oxford]
2. THE COMMONS (groups & resources settings)
For Class3(1/29)
ASSIGNMENT #1: summarize & critique 2comments/responses on Henrich et al.(in Beh&BrainSci or Silverstein)(less than a page but more than a paragraph on each, emphasizing insights over length; can be in bullets) [using Forum in Sakai, you can post to claim your 1st and 2nd choices (2nd can be another person's 1st) ]
2A. Tragedy (at least without beneficent coercion)
Hardin, G. (1968). “The tragedy of the commons”. Science 162: 1243-1248.
2B. Collective (people can organize to self-coerce)
Feeny, D., F. Berkes, B. J. McCay and J. M. Acheson. 1990. The tragedy of the commons: twenty-two years later. Human Ecology 18(1): 1-19.
Feeny, D., S. Hanna and A.F. McEvoy (1996). Questioning the Assumptions of the “Tragedy of the commons” Model of Fisheries. Land Economics 72(2): 187-205.
Fehr, E. and A. Leibbrandt (2011) A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons. Journal of Public Economics 95: 1144-1155
For Class 4(2/05)
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 (plus some additional selected small segments) from Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
For Class 05(2/12)
ASSIGNMENT #2: findtwo articlesof interest to you cited in 2B. readings & summarize/critique them as before (and again claim by posting to Sakai's Forum but this time two people should not have the same paper)
May still be finishingdiscussion of the Ostrom above. [in particular including pp.185-192 on the three challenges]
Ostrom, Elinor, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, David Policansky (1999). “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284:278-282.
[ARTICLE THAT WE WILL NOT USE; GOOD BACKGROUND Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker and Roy Gardner.1992. “Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible.” American Political Science Review, 86:2, 404-417]
[BOOK WE WILL NOT USE HERE, THOUGH IT IS CITED; GOOD BACKGROUND TEXT Ostrom, E., James Walker and Roy Gardener. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.]
For Class6 (2/19)
ASSIGNMENT: Study forMIDTERM EXAM (which will occur during the first half of this class before chat more).
Bowles, Sam and Herbert Gintis. 2002a. “Social Capital and Community Governance.” Economic Journal, 112:483
Walker, James M., Roy Gardner, Andrew Herr and Elinor Ostrom (2000). “Collective Choice in the Commons: experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes”. The Economic Journal 110:212-234.
Casari, Marco and Charles R. Plott. 2003. “Decentralized Management of Common Property Resources: Experiments with a Centuries-Old Institution.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51, 217-247.
Rustagi, D., S. Engel and M. Kosfeld (2010). "Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management". Science 330:961-965.
For Class7 (2/26)
2C. Public Goods (another form of collective)
Andreoni, James (1995). “Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: kindness or confusion?”. American Economic Review 85(4): 891-904.
Keser, Claudia and Frans van Winden (2000). “Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102(1):23-39.
Masclet, D., C. Noussair, S. Tucker and M. Villeval (2003). “Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism”. American Economic Review 93(1): 366-380.
Noussair, Charles and Steven Tucker. 2005. “Combining Monetary and Social Sanctions to Promote Cooperation.” Economic Inquiry, 43:3, 649-660.
Kroll, Stephan, Todd L. Cherry and Jason F. Shogren (????). “Voting, Punishment and Public Goods”. Mimeo.
Tyran, Jean Robert and Feld Lars. 2002, “Why People Obey the Law. Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods". CESifo Working Paper Series No. 651; U of St. Gallen, Econ. Discussion Paper No. 2001-14.
Cherry, T., Kroll S. and J.F. Shogren (2005). "The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Public Good Contributions: Evidence from the Lab.” J. of Economic Behavior and Organization, 57(3): 357-365.
Oxoby, Robert and John Spraggon (2006). “A Clear and Present Minority: Heterogeneity in the Source of Endowments and the Provision of Public Goods.” Working Paper, University of Calgary, Canada.
[Note: ‘Tiebout sorting’ is an important concept here -- endogenous membership of PG-varied communities]
For Class8(3/05)
ASSIGNMENT #3: think of an experiment you would like to do & explain how to do it to learn what want to learn (spend only 2 hours & use only 2pp for everything, i.e., motivation, prior literature, methods, "results"...)
2D. Exogenous with Collective (clash of the frameworks)
Hoffman, E. and M.L. Spitzer (1986). “Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups”. Journal of Legal Studies 15(1):149-171.
Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini. 2000. “A Fine is a Price.” Journal of Legal Studies, 29:1, 1-17.
Cardenas, Juan Camilo, John Stranlund and Cleve Willis. 2000. “Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding Out.” World Development, 28:10, 1719-1733.
Andreoni, James. 1993. “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding Out Hypothesis.” The American Economic Review, 83:5, 1317-1327.
Kazianga, H. (2006). “Motives for Private Household Transfers in Burkina Faso”. J. Development Econ 79:73.
3. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (if beyond self interest, how?)
For Class 09(3/19)
World Bank, World Development Report 2015 "Mind, Society and Behavior",read the Overview (as motivation!).
3A. Other-Regarding Preferences (distinguishing particular motives & focusing often on only parts of thesearticles)
Frey, Bruno and Reto Jegen. 2001. “Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Economics Surveys, 15:5, 589-611.
Bowles, Sam. 1998. “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions.” Journal of Economic Literature, 36: 3, 75 – 111.
Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:3, 817-868. [only abstract and Sections I,II]
Bolton, G.E. and A. Ockenfels. 2000. “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition.” American Economic Review, 90:1, 166-193.
Cox, J.C. 2004. “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity.” Games and Economic Behavior, 46:2, 260-281.
Bowles, Sam 2008. "Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments": evidence from economic experiments". Science 320(5883):1605-9.
[MORE EQUITY: Croson, R. 1996. “Information in ultimatum games: an experimental study.” JEBO 30,197]
Kritikos, A. and F. Bolle (2001). “Distributional Concerns: equity- or efficiency-oriented” Econ Letters 73:333-338.
Charness, G. and M. Rabin (2002). “Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics ??: 817-869. [only abstract and Sections I,II]
Engelmann, D. and M. Strobel (2004). “Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments.” American Economic Review 94(4):857-869.
Engelmann, D. and M. Strobel (2006). “Preferences Over Income Distributions...” [only abstract and Sections 1,2,7]
[MORE EQUITY: Cardenas, Juan Camilo, John Stranlund and Cleve Willis. 2002. “Economic Inequality and Burden-Sharing in the Provision of Local Environmental Quality.” Ecological Economics, 40:3, 379.]
For Class 10(3/26)
3B. Trust, Emotion, Procedure(what does it take to show a given motivation?)
Berg, Joyce E, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, 1995. “Trust, Reciprocity and Social History”. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-42.
Burnham, Terence, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith (2002). “Friend – or – Foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 43: 57-73.
Xiao, E. and D. Houser 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior" PNAS 102(20):7398-7401.
Tyler, T.R. (2000). "Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure". International Journal of Psychology 35(2): 117-125.
3C. Social Norms (and their evolution)
Allcott, Hunt (2011). "Social norms and energy conservation". Journal of Public Economics 95:1082-1095.
Kurzban, R. and D. Houser 2005. “Experiments Investigating Cooperative Types in Humans: A Complement to Evolutionary Theory and Simulations.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102: 5, 1803-1807.
[BOOK THAT WE WILL NOT USE, THOUGH IT IS WIDELY CITED IN THIS AREA:
Tversky and Kahneman, 2000. Choices, Values, and Frame Cambridge University Press]
3D. Information (setting for inference if varied types)
Kagel, John, Chung Kim and Donald Moser, 1996. “Fairness in Ultimatum games with Incomplete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior, 13, 100-110.
Huck, Steffen 1999. “Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Offer Games with Incomplete Information” Journal of Economic Psychology. 20, 183-206.
Croson Rachel, Terry Boles, J. Keith Murnighan, 2003. “Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in UG.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, 143-149.
Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993. “Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information.” International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171-198.
Rapoport , A., James A. Sundali and Darryl A. Seale, 1996. “Ultimatums in two Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Demand Games”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 30, 173-196.
Rapoport, A. and James A. Sundali, 1996. “Ultimatums in 2 Person Bargaining with One –Sided Uncertainty: Offer games”. International Journal of Game Theory, 25:4, pp. 475-494.
4. PARTICIPATION (is ‘participatory’ always ‘better’?)
For Class 11 (4/02)
ASSIGNMENT #4: comment (again paragraph-to-page on each) on the two articles in the assignment#4 folder or, instead, on a close read of the introductory chapter and a skim of the other chapters of the book by Keck
Gibson, D.R. (1993). Review Of Learning from Gal Oya: possibilities for participatory development and post-Newtonian social science by Norman Uphoff. In Journal of Politics 55(3):844-847.
Cohen, J.M. and N.T. Uphoff (1980). “Participation’s Place in Rural Development: seeking clarity through specificity”. World Development 8:213-235.
Agrawal, A. and C.G.Gibson (1999). “Enchantment and Disenchantment: the role of community in natural resource conservation”. World Development 27(4):629-649.
Cleaver, F. (1999). “Paradoxes Of Participation: questioning participatory approaches to development”. Journal of International Development 11:597-612.
For Class 12(4/09)
Chess, C. and K. Purcell (1999). “Public Participation and the Environment: do we know what works?”. Environmental Science and Technology 33(16):2685-2692.
Blair, H. (2000). “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: democratic local governance in six countries”. World Development 28(1):21-39.
Mompati, T. and G.Prinsen (2000). “Ethnicity and Participatory Development Methods in Botswana: some participants are to be seen and not heard”. Development in Practice 10(5):625-637.
Konisky, D.M. and T.C. Beierle (2001). “Innovations in Public Participation and Environmental Decision Making: examples from the Great Lakes Region”. Society and Natural Resources 14:815-826.
Jordans, E. (2001). “WUAs: framework for analysis and success factors”. Mimeo, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
Hernandez, A. and W. Kempton (2003). “Changes in Fisheries Management in Mexico: effects of increasing scientific input and public participation”. Ocean & Coastal Management 46:507-526.
Botchway, K. (2001). “Paradox of Empowerment: reflections on a case study from Northern Ghana”. World Development 29(1):135-153.
Campbell, L.M. and A. Vainio-Mattila (2003). “Participatory Development and Community-Based Conservation: opportunities missed for lessons learned?”. Human Ecology 31(3):417-437.
[WON’T USE FOR LACK OF TIME: Baiocchi G 2003. Participation, activism, and politics. In Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, ed. A Fung, EO Wright]
For Class 13(4/16)
ASSIGNMENT #5: comment (again paragraph-to page on each) on EITHER two of the articles in the ConsBio file OR two of the other three articles in assignment#5 folder OR two related articles you found on your own
Brody, S.D. (2003). “Measuring the Effects of Stakeholder Participation on the Quality of Local Plans Based on the Principles of Collaborative Ecosystem Management”. J. of Planning Education and Research 22:407-419.