Supreme Court of Victoria17 March 2016
Summary of Judgment
Clark-Ugle v Clark [2016] VSCA 44
17 March 2016
Today the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought by Mr Clark-Ugle from orders made by Sifris J declaring that a general meeting of the Framlingham Aboriginal Trust (‘the Trust’) was valid where a quorum was not present. The Aboriginal Lands Act 1970 (‘the Act’)stipulates that a quorum is one-half of the persons who are entitled to vote and who are residents of the reserve on the day the meeting is called. At issue was whether the Supreme Court has the power under the Act to dispense with the quorum requirement.
The orders of Sifris J followed on from earlier orders, made by Robson J, declaring that an earlier meeting of the Trust had been conducted in a manner that involved a contravention of the Act, was oppressive to certain members of the Trust, and was null and void and of no effect. Robson J’s orders vacated all seven positions of the Trust’s Committee of Management (‘the Committee’), appointed Receivers and directed that an election for new members of the Committee be conducted at a general meeting. Although the Receivers convened a general meeting, the meeting could not proceed because the number of residents in attendance did not meet the quorum requirement.
Sifris J held that the failure to obtain a quorum frustrated the implementation of the orders made by Robson J. He ordered that another general meeting be convened for the purpose of electing members of the Committee. The judge required the Receivers to inform the members of the Trust, both residents and non-residents, that the meeting would take place even in the absence of a quorum. The general meeting was convened. It took place and a Committee was elected despite there not being a quorum. The judge declared this meeting to be valid and effective. He upheld the validity of the election of the new members of the Committee.
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that Sifris J was correct in concluding that the conduct of the resident members had frustrated the Court’s earlier orders and processes. Without fresh elections the orders of Robson J would be rendered nugatory and the members of the Trust would not receive full and effective relief. The quorum requirement could not be used to obstruct the relief that had been ordered. The Court held that Sifris J had the power to dispense with the quorum requirement. His orders were supplemental to the orders made by Robson J in that they sought to aid in the enforcement and working out of those orders.
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the quorum requirement was a ‘gateway’ provision, or veto, designed to ensure that the only resolutions that could be passed at a general meeting were resolutions in favour of the interests of resident members of the Trust. The Court held that rights under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities were not relevantly engaged.
NOTE: This summary is necessarily incomplete. It is not intended as a substitute for the Court’s reasons or to be used in any later consideration of the Court’s reasons. The only authoritative pronouncement of the Court’s reasons and conclusions is that contained in the published reasons for judgment.
Summary of Judgment –Clark-Ugle v Clark [2016] VSCA 44Page 1 of 2