Critical Citizens Revisited: Chapter 810/9/2018 1:46 AM
Chapter 8
Citizens: Rising aspirations and cultural values
In the social sciences, perhaps the most common account of the erosion of trust in government theorizes that citizens have changedgradually over time, whether in terms ofvalues and orientations towards authority (Inglehart), levels of social trust and community networks (Putnam), or in terms of cognitive and civic skills (Dalton).[1] Fundamental value shifts are believed to have occurred due to long-term processes of societal modernization and generational replacement, with culturalaccountsemphasizing the ‘demand’ side of the equation. Even if the state does not alter, in this perspective, theorists emphasize that in post-industrial societies and established democracies, citizens have gradually become more informed and less deferential. Societal modernization has been accompanied, according to this account, by rising demands about democratic processes, such as the most appropriate ethical standards in public life and opportunities for public engagement in decision-making processes, as well as higher standards for evaluating the policy performance of the state.
Value change
The most prominent accountof processes of value change is exemplified by the work of Ronald Inglehart, based on a long series of studies based on analyzing successive waves of the World Values Surveys/European Values Surveys.[2] The earlier studies by Inglehart emphasized how citizens’ values in post-industrial societies gradually evolved over time, with the pre-war generationconcerned primarily about bread-and-butter material values, such as jobs, growth and prices, while the post-war generation gave greater emphasis to ‘post-material’ values, exemplified by concern about environmental protection, gender equality and sexual liberalization. Cultural shifts were thought to have occurred in response to societal modernization, especially rising levels of human development associated with expanding literacy, education, and access to information in post-industrial economies, with more traditional values continuing to prevail in poorer developing societies. Inglehart has shown that post-material values among the younger generation in richer nations were associated with elite-challenging behavior, exemplified by protest politics and mass demonstrations, and declining respect for government and hierarchical institutions. Any sustained erosion of deference towards political leaders, parliaments and parties which has occurred in modern societies, in this theory, is in line with more searching scrutiny of other traditional sources of hierarchical authority, such as churches and the military. What matters for any democratic deficit in this perspective is less any failure of government performance whenmanaging the delivery of public goods and services, or indeed any change in the actual democratic quality of states, than the changing expectations of citizens, especially in affluent societies: “In the short run”, Inglehart argues, “economic development tends to bring rising levels of political satisfaction; in the long-run, however, it leads to the emergence of new and more demanding standards by which government performance is evaluated – and to lower levels of respect and confidence in their authorities.”[3] At the same time, value change in post-industrial societies is thought to have encouraged support for democratic principles, a rejection of autocracy, and demands for more participatory decision-making.
In more recent work, Inglehart broadened the conceptualization of value change and emphasized a generational shift towards ‘emancipative’ values, of which post-materialism is only one part. In particular, Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate that the strength of a composite emancipative values index (measured in 1990) was significantlyrelated to subsequent levels of democracy in any state (in 2000-2004).[4] The authors theorize that emancipative values undermine the legitimacy of authoritarian rule, so that these regimes become more vulnerable to being toppled by democratic reform movements and opposition forces. These cultural shifts, which are most apparent among the younger generation in affluent post-industrial societies, are thought to have many consequences for civic orientations.
If the value thesis is correct, then this generates several testable propositions. In particular, at macro-level, adherence to democratic values and the rejection of autocratic principles would be expected to predominate in affluent post-industrialized societies, rather than in emerging manufacturing economies, or in poorer developing nations.Moreover at micro-level, the endorsement of democratic values and the rejection of autocracy should bestronger among the younger generation, the well-educated, and those with access to the mass media, as well as being closely associated with endorsing post-material values.
Social capital
A second popular cultural explanation why trust in government has declined relates this phenomenon to an erosion of social capital. Theorists from de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill to Durkheim, Simmel, and Kornhauser have long emphasized the importance of civic society and voluntary associations as vital to the lifeblood of democracy. For Putnam, social capital represents both horizontal social networks, connecting individuals face-to-face within communities, as well as norms of reciprocity and interpersonal trust, which are thought to cement these bonds.[5] Dense bonds are believed to foster the conditions for collaboration, coordination and cooperation to create collective goods within local communities. The erosion of social capital in the Unites States is the leit motif of Bowling Alone. Nevertheless if the erosion of social trust is the root cause behind a decline in political trust, the exact reasons are neither straightforward nor self-evident. After all, people can easily trust their neighbors or work colleagues, without necessarily trusting the state, or vica versa. In particular, based on the analysis of the performance of Italian regional government, Putnam claims that communities with abundant and dense skeins of associational connections and rich civic societies encourage more effective democratic governance. Dense networks of voluntary associations, Putnam suggests, should instill norms and values such as collaboration and shared responsibilities among their members, while also affecting the wider polity, as pluralists have long argued, through interest articulation and aggregation.[6] In democracies rich in social capital, Putnam argues, watchful citizens are more likely to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions, and leaders are more likely to believe that their acts will be held to account.[7] Other theorists have reversed this relationship, however, or regarded it as reciprocal.[8] Hence Rothstein argues that when the performance of representative government is effective, then this increasing public confidence in the working of legislatures, the judiciary, and the executive.[9] In particular, democratic states which promote social justice and equality, maintain public security and rule of law, and deliver comprehensive welfare services which meet people’s needs, are also regarded by Rothstein as most likely to maximize well-functioning societies and thus social trust.
In Bowling Alone, Putnam uses a range of U.S. social survey evidence to demonstrate that Americans with low social trust are also significantly less satisfied with government.[10]The cross-national evidence,however, allowing us to generalize more broadly about the linkages between social and political trust, generates less robust results. Hence research by Newton and Norris, based on the 1981-1995 waves of the World Values Survey in post-industrial societies, detected that social trust was positively related to confidence in public and private institutions; people who trust each other also have more confidence in public and private institutions.[11]The individual-level association, however, while statistically significant, was generally very weak. More recent analysis using the 2002 European Social Survey in two-dozen nations reported a stronger association at individual level among generalized social trust, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy.[12] The results of comparative studies seem sensitive to measurement issues. Moreover the relationship between social capital, political trust, and democracy across a broader range of countries remains unclear.[13] If the social capital thesis lies at the heart of the phenomenon of critical citizens, then this suggests that we should be able to detect a link between any erosion over time in social trust and voluntary association activism, on the one hand, and the decline in confidence in public institutions, on the other.
H#1.3: Institutional confidence and trust in government will be related to social trust and voluntary association activism.
Social structure and civic skills
The third closely-related cultural explanation emphasizes in particular the social developments of rising levels of literacy, numeracy, and formal education which are thought to have altered the skills and capacities of citizens.[14]The social structure of developing societies and emerging economies has been transformed by the spread of primary schooling, for girls as well as boys, as well as by the expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors. Cognitive mobilization derived from formal education should facilitate the capacity of citizens to analyze, monitor, and understand debates about public affairs, especially those concerning complex, abstract, and controversial public policies, such as the effects of climate change on global warming, or the impact of macroeconomic policies on economic recovery. Basic literacy, numeracy and cognitive skills derived from schooling make it easier to absorb, organize, and process information derived from the news media, especially printed newspapers and the internet. Formal education also strengthens knowledge of civics, including information about the role of citizens and the structure of government, which Milner argues is essential for informed participation in democratic societies.[15] An extensive body of research on the antecedents of political participation, by Verba and colleagues, has long demonstrated that levels of formal education are also closely associated with cultural attitudes such as tolerance and trust, and with political participation, with the more educated displaying greater political interest, knowledge, efficacy and activism in public affairs.[16] Verba suggests that the link between education and internal efficacy is particularly important for political participation; formal schooling strengthens confidence in the ability of citizens to affect the public policymaking process. Education also provides important communication and organizational skills, which facilitate engagement in local community associations, voluntary groups and political parties, as well as running for elected office. For all these reasons, this suggests that critical citizens will be found disproportionately among those with higher education and with greater knowledge of civic affairs.
H#1.4 Critical citizens will have higher education and knowledge.
Table 8.1: The social characteristics of critical citizens
Enlightened democratic knowledge(i) / Endorse democratic values
(ii) / Dissatisfaction with democratic performance
(iii) / Deficit
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
Demographic characteristics
Age (years)
Gender (male=1)
Socioeconomic resources
Household income 10-pt scale
Education 9-pt scale
Media use
News media use scale
NATIONAL-LEVEL
Historical experience of democracy
Levels of economic development
Human development index
Constant (intercept)
Schwartz BIC
N. respondents
N. nations
Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models (for details, see Appendix C) including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 6.1. The 100-point media use scale combined use of newspapers, radio/TV news, the internet, books, and magazines. P.*=.05 **=.01 ***=.001. See appendix A for details about the measurement, coding and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in bold.
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
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[1]Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: the human development sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press; Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster; Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press.
[2] Ronald Inglehart. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ronald Inglehart. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ronald Inglehart. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economicand Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press;Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2003. ‘Political culture and democracy: Analyzing cross-level linkages’.Comparative Politics. 36(1): p. 61-+; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: the human development sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press; Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. (eds). 2009. Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[3]Ronald Inglehart. 1999. ‘Postmodernization erodes respect for authority, but increases support for democracy.’ In Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[4]Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: the human development sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press; Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. (eds). 2009. Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[5] Robert D. Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Robert D. Putnam. 1996. 'The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.' The American Prospect, 24; Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster. More recent comparative research is presented in Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Robert D. Putnam. Ed. 200X. The Dynamics of Social Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[6] Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work:Civic Traditions in Modern Italy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P.89-90.
[7] Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[8]Pamela Paxton. 2002. ‘Social capital and democracy: an interdependent relationship.’ American Sociological Review 67(2): 254-277.
[9] Bo Rothstein. 2005. Social traps and the problem of trust. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
[10]Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster.
[11] Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris. 2000. ‘Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture or Performance?’ In Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Kenneth Newton, 1999. ‘Social and political trust.’ In Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Robert D. Putnam. Ed. 2006. The Dynamics of Social Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[12] Sonja Zmerli and Kenneth Newton. 2008. ‘Social trust and attitudes toward democracy.’ Public Opinion Quarterly. 72(4): 706-724.
[13] See, for example, Pippa Norris. 2004. Democratic Phoenix. Chapter 8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Pamela Paxton. 2002. ‘Social capital and democracy: an interdependent relationship.’ American Sociological Review 67(2): 254-277.
[14]Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press.
[15] Henry Milner. 2002. Civic literacy: how informed citizens make democracy work. Hanover: University Press of New England.
[16]SidneyVerba and Norman Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row; Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1978. Participation and Political Equality: a Seven-Nation Comparison. New York: Cambridge University Press; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Volunteerism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.