Notes
Chapter One: Critics
1Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian, p 4-12, 19.
2Ibid, p 22.
3Ibid.
4Ibid, p 16.
5Ibid, p 50-51.
6Karl Marx (Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt Guddat, ed.) Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p 7.
7Ludwig Feuerbach. The Essence of Christianity, p 140.
8Ibid, p 130.
9Ibid, p 131.
10Ibid, p 198.
11Ibid, p 200.
12Walter Kauffman, The Faith of a Heretic, p 235, 247.
13Ibid, p 215.
14Ibid, p 219.
14a Ibid, p 406
15Sigmund Freud. The Future of an Illusion, p 30, 52.
16Ibid, p 63.
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
19Ibid, p 38-39.
20Paramahansa Yogananda. Autobiography of a Yogi, p 135, 194-5, 198-9, 275, 278, 347, 371
21Ibid, p 276.
22Ibid, p 371-2.
23Gandhi. The Message of Jesus Christ, p 6-7, 53
24Ibid, p 48.
25Ibid, p 40, 46.
26Ibid, p 30, 46. Gandhi says (p 46), “From my youth upward, I learnt the art of estimating the value of scriptures on the basis of their ethical teaching. … you must not forget that we have started with the fundamental principle that all religions are true.”
27Ibid, p 36.
28Hugh Schonfield, The Passover Plot, p 13, 19, 26-27.
29Ibid, p 14, 191-2.
30Ibid, p 220.
31Ibid, p 148-180.
32Erich Von Daniken. Miracles of the Gods, p 84.
33Ibid, through the book.
34Ibid, p 99. He says, “The Bible does not contain a single religious or moral idea which was not already contained in some form in the holy scriptures of earlier or contemporary religions. … Practically everything that forms present-day Pauline Christianity is to be found in particular in the cults of Attis, Dionysius, Mithras, and Isis.” He quotes Dr. Robert Kehl.
35Ibid, p 70, 75-7. On page 76, Von Daniken gives a table of comparisons; nowhere does he provide a list of differences.
36Ibid, p 53-54.
37Ibid, p 52-53.
38Ibid, p 93.
39Ibid, p 58+.
Chapter Two: Epistemology
1Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p 31.
2Ibid, p 34-5.
3Jn 14.6-7, Rom 1.25, Jn 17.3, Eph 1.17, Col 2.3, Gal 2.5, Eph 3.4
42 Tim 1.12, Phil 3.10, Phil 3.8, Jn 17.3
5Jn 18.37-8, Jn 8.14, Mt 9.6
6Jn 19.35, Jn 21.24, 1 Jn 5.20
72 Cor 6.6, Acts 26.27
81 Tim 2.4, Acts 26.27
9Col 4.6, Jn 7.17
10Rom 1.25
112 Tim 4.4
122 Cor 11.6
13Acts 26.25, 1 Jn 2.4
14Jn 19.35, Jn 8.32
15Jn 5.24, Jn 17.3
16Jn 8.32
171 Jn 3.2
182 Thes 2.10
19Acts 6.7, 13.8, 14.22, Gal 1.23, Eph 4.5, 1 Tim 4.1, 2 Tim 2.18, Jn 20.31
20Acts 14.9, Rom 1.17, Rom 4.5 Rom 4.11-12
21Heb 11
22Jn 3.12, Jn 10.38, Jn 10.37
23Jn 20.31, Jn 17.21
24Rom 10.14-15
25Jn 20.25
26Mk 1.14-15, Jn 6.29, Jn 11.27, Acts 15.7
27Acts 16.31, Rom 10.9
28Jn 8.24
28a Mendelbaum (with Gramlich, Anderson, et al), Philosophical Problems (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p 336. He quotes Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy): “If I believe that charles I died on the scaffold, I believe truly, not because of any intrinsic quality of my belief, which could be discovered by merely examining the belief, but because of an historical event which happened two and a half centuries ago. If I believe that Charles I died in his bed, I believe falsely: no degree of vividness in my belief, or of care in arriving at it, prevents it from being false, again because of what happened long ago, and not because of any intrinsic property of my belief. Hence, although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs.”
29Roderick Chisholm (and others), Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p 138. Quotes Manley Thompson.
30Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays, p 82.
31I. Copi, Readings on Logic, p 82 – quoting J.S. Mill (from System of Logic). On pages 55-6, Mill is quoted by Copi as saying “Truths are known to us in two ways: some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of Intuition, or Consciousness; the latter, of Inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others are inferred. Our assent to the conclusion being grounded on the truth of the premises, we never could arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known antecedently to all reasoning. Examples of truths known to us by immediate consciousness, are our own bodily sensations and mental feelings. … Examples of truths which we know only be way of inference, are occurrences which took place while we were absent, the events recorded in history, or the theorems of mathematics. … Whatever we are capable of knowing must belong to the one class or to the other; must be in the number of the primitive data, or of the conclusions which can be drawn from these.”
31a C.S. Lewis, The Best of C.S. Lewis, p 270. In addition, Mendelaum, op citp 131, quotes Russell concerning primary data and the inference of an objective world: “If we are to know of the existence of matter, of other people of the past before our individual memory begins, or of the future, we must know general principles of some kind by means of which such inferences can be drawn. It must be known to us that the existence of some one sort of thing, A, is a sign of the existence of some other sort of thing, B, either at the same time as A or at some earlier or later time, as, for example, thunder is a sign of the earlier existence of lightning. If this were not known to us, we could never extend our knowledge beyond the sphere of our private experience.
32Mendelbaum, op cit, p 160-190.
33Ibid, p 178.
34Ibid, p 160-190.
35Ibid, p 150.
36Ibid, p 186.
36a Ibid, p 187
37Ibid, p 153.
38Tillich, op cit, p 33
Chapter Three: Metaphysics
1Descartes, op cit, p 94-109.
2George Berkeley, Principles, Dialogues, and Correspondence (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p 23-35.
3John Locke, Locke: Selections, p 271.
4David Hume, The Essential David Hume, p 111.
5Locke, op cit, p 112, 118, 135, 225, 228.
6D.D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, p 189.
7Lewis, op cit, p 217-218.
8Ibid, p 219. He says, “The whole disruptive power of Marxism and Freudianism against traditional beliefs has lain in their claim to expose irrational causes for them. If any Marxist is reading these lines at this moment, he is murmuring to himself, “All this argument really results from the fact that the author is a bourgeois” – in fact he is applying the rule I have just stated. Because he thinks that my thoughts result from an irrational cause he therefore discounts them.”
9Ibid, p 219, 220, 218.
10Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reasons, p 38.
11Ibid, p 23+, 29+
12Ibid, p 56, 62 (see Copleston, p 44-45). Kant gives a table of judgments and categories. Judgments = Quantity (universal, particular, singular), Quality (affirmative negative, infinite), Relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive). Categories (unity, plurality, totality), Quality (reality, negation, limitation), Relation (inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community).
13Ibid, p 193.
14Ibid, p 199.
15William Frankena, Ethics; Chisholm op cit
16Lewis, op cit, p 403.
17Ibid. Lewis adds: “In actual fact Gaius and Titius [two debunkers] will be found to hold, with complete uncritical dogmatism, the whol system of values which happened to be in vogue among moderately educated young men of the professional classes during the period between the two wars. Their skepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people’s values, about the values current in their own set they are not nearly skeptical enough.”
18Plato, The Republic, p 18+
19Chisholm, op cit, p 358-9. Frankenna, although he confuses the term “naturalist” with a subjectivist theory, points out that subjectivist theories do not commit the naturalistic fallacy: “The need for definitions of ‘ethical’ and ‘factual’ is there readily apparent. Even if we put the contention by saying that a conclusion involving the word ‘ought’ cannot be logically deduced from premises, none of which contains this word, then, though it will be true, it will not serve to refute the naturalist. For he is not maintaining that such a deduction is possible; but only that “ought” can be defined in other terms. … The definition he is offering may not be correct, but this cannot be shown by citing the dogma about Ought and Is, for if his definition is correct, the ‘ought’-statements can be derived from ‘is’-statements in the only sense in which we he is concerned to hold that they can.
20J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, p 44, 48-49.
21Aristotle (ed. Wheelwright), Aristotle, p 167.
22Mendelbaum, op cit, p 538. Notes Jeremy Bentham’s seven tests in judging between pleasures: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent (for number of persons).
23Mill, op cit, p 12, 14.
24Lewis, op cit, p 406.
25Mill, op cit, p 39. Aristotle (op cit, p 160-1, 184), gives us his reasons for the importance of education in learning what the highest good is: “what is the highest of all realizable good? … the majority of men, as well as the cultured few, speak of it as happiness (eudaimonia); and they would maintain that to live well and to do well are the same thing as to be happy. They differ, however, as to what happiness is, and the mass of mankind give a different account of it from philosophers. … Our own method, at any rate, must be to start with what is familiar to us. That is why a sound moral training is required before a man can listen intelligently to discussions about excellence and justice, and generally speaking, about statecraft … by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and when temperance has been acquired we are best able to abstain. And in the vase of courage, similarly, it is by habituating ourselves to despise and stand up to danger that we become brave, and after we have become brave we are able to face dangers all the more readily … This is evident, first, from the fact that it is pleasure which prompts us to base deeds, and pain which deters us from noble ones; and therefore men ought, as Plato observes, to be trained from youth to find pleasure and pain in the right objectives – which is just what we mean by a sound education.”
26Herman Shapiro (ed) Hellenistic Philosophy (new York: Random House, 1965), p 7-9.
27Walter Kauffman, Nietzsche (New York: Random, 1950), p 279.
28Mill, op cit, p 27.
29Ibid, p 12, 15.
30Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Craig Press, 1973), Vol VI, p 115. See C.S. Lewis, Abolition of Man, p 43.
31Plato, op cit, p 227+
32See Walter Kauffman, Nietzsche, p 102, and J.P. Sartre The Wall.
33Runes, op cit, p 316, 319.
34Ibid, p 316.
35See C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain; J.W. Wenham,The Goodness of God; J.S. Mill op cit p 28+; Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian, p 12; Copleston, op cit, p 122; C.S. Lewis, Christian Reflections, p 80; Norman Geisler, Philosophy of Religion, pare iv.
36Rune, op cit, p 26.
37J.P. Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Random House, 1965), p 22.
38Rune op cit, p 223. Also see C.S. Lewis Best p 428+; Os Guiness, The Dust of Death, p 213+.
39J.W. Montgomery (ed) Christianity for the Tough-Minded, p 22.
Chapter Four: Verification
1W.H. Halverson, A Concise Introduction to Philosophy, p 364-9; J.E. Barnhart, Religion and the Challenge of Philosophy, p 96-109; John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, p 16-20; Kant, op cit, p 398-403; Geisler, op cit, p 133-162; Descartes, op cit, p 100-103; B. Spinoza, Selections, p 45-48; Anselm as preserved in John Hick’s Classical and Contemporary Readings in Philosophy of Religion (Prentice-Hall, 1964), p 28-37.
2Geisler, op cit, p 135.
3Summary of the position is given in Geisler, op cit, p 134.
4Barnhart, op cit, p 104-5, 108.
5Kant, op cit, p 401-2
6See Halverson, op cit, p 371-7; Barhard, op cit, p 80-95; John Hick, paperback , op cit, p 20-23; Kant, op cit, p 404-410; Geisler, op cit, p 163-228.
7Hume, op cit, p 72-89
8Geisler, op cit, p 182; Kant, op cit, p 407.
9Geisler, op cit, p 182, 184; Bertrand Russell, , op cit, p 6-7; Barnhart, op cit, p 93.
10Geisler, op cit, p 221-2.
11Ibid, p 197-9.
12Ibid, p 182-3.
13Hume, op cit, p 122-3.
14Malcolm A. Jeeves, Pyschology and Christianity (IVP, 1976), p 122-3. See C.S. Lewis, Best, p 300-3, for an explanation of induction relative to Miracles. Bertrand Russell, quoted by Mendelbaum, op cit, p 135-6, shows we must assume that events have causes, for this is derived from the principle of induction (assumed as the beginning of the paper): “All arguments which, on the basis of experience, argue as to the future or the unexperienced parts of the past or present, assume the inductive principle; hence we can never use experience to prove the inductive principle on the ground of its intrinsic evidence, or forego all justification of our expectations about the future. If the principle is unsound, we have no reason to expect the sun to rise tomorrow, to expect bread to be more nourishing than a stone, or to expect that if we throw ourselves off the roof we shall fall.” (See this paper, 2.9)
15See C.S. Lewis, Best, p 255+ (billiard balls, and a person intervenes), and p 259 (fish tank affected by explosion in the distance).
16C.S. Lewis said it, but I coulnd’t find it.
17Tillich, op cit, p 49, 52.
18C.S. Lewis, Best, p 266-78.
19Ibid, p 272
20Hick, op cit, p 69-71.
21The principle of verification and falsification is explained relative to God’s existence by Antony Flew, whose essay appears in Hick, op cit, p 465-6: “A fine brash hypothesis may thus be killed by inches the death by a thousand qualifications. And in this, it seems to me, lies the peculiar danger, the endemic evil, of theological utterance. Take such utterances as “God has a plan”, “God created the world”, “God loves us as a father loves his children.” They look at first sight very much like assertions, vast cosmological assertions. … Now to assert that such and such is the case is necessarily equivalent to denying that such and such is not the case. Suppose then that we are in doubt as to what someone who gives vent to an utterance is asserting, or suppose that, more radically, we are skeptical as to whether he is really asserting anything at all, one way of trying to understand (or perhaps it will be to expose) his utterance is to attempt to find what he would regard as counting against, or as being incompatible with, its truth. For if his utterance is indeed an assertion, it will necessarily be equivalent to a denial of the negation of that assertion. And anything which would count against the assertion or which would induce the speaker to withdraw it and to admit that it had been mistaken, must be part of (or the whole of) the meaning of the negation of that assertion. … Now it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding “There wasn’t a God after all” or “God does not really love us then.” Someone tells us that God loves us as a father loves his children. We are reassured. But then we see a child dying of inoperable cancer of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but his Heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of concern. … I therefore put to the succeeding symposiasts the simple central questions, ‘What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?’”
22J.M. Maguire, Common Sense and Common Law, p 17-18.
23McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, p 584. Also wee J.W. Montgomery, The Law Above the Law (Minneapolis: Bethany, 1975), p 88; and Maguire, op cit, p 25. Norman Anderson, in A Lawyer Among the Theologians, p 21-22, adds to this: “The rule against hearsay evidence means that ‘assertions of persons other than the witness who is testifying are inadmissible as evidence of the truth of that which was asserted.’ … The further rule which insists that a witness must speak to facts which he has observed or are within his personal knowledge, not to his opinion about these facts, seems to have grown out of the rule about hearsay.”
24Simon Greenleaf, included in Appendix of J.W. Montgomery’s Law, p 99.
25Maguire, op cit, p 24; McCormick, op cit, p 29-30; Anderson, op cit, p 21-23.
26Anderson, op cit, p 23.
27Maguire, op cit, p 32.
28McCormick, op cit, p 57-59.
29Ibid, p 66, 97-98.
30Ibid, p 78-79, 671-3, 680; Maguire, op cit, p 42; Greenleaf in Montgomery , op cit, p 118.
31McCormick, op cit, p 66, 81, 90; Maguire, op cit, p 42; Greenleaf in Montgomery, op cit, p 118.
32Greenleaf in Montgomery, op cit, p 118.
33McCormick, op cit, p 66, 93-4; Greenleaf in Montgomery, op cit, p 118.
34McCormick, op cit, p 66.
35Maguire, op cit, p 42.
36McCormick, op cit, p 784, 788
37Ibid, 785-6; Maguire, op cit, p 179.
38Ibid
39Ibid
40Greenleaf in Montgomery, op cit, p 114-116.
41Ibid; McCormick, op cit, p 793-5; Anderson, op cit, p 23-24; Maguire, op cit, p 180
42McCormick, op cit, p 798-9; Anderson, op cit, p 23-4; Maguire, op cit, p 180.
43McCormick, op cit, p 796-8.
44Anderson, op cit, p 24.
45McCormick, op cit, p 45.
46Maguire, op cit, p 133-4.
47McCormick, op cit, p 559, 570.
48Greenleaf in Montgomery, op cit, p 98. Also McCormick , op cit, p 549-51; Montgomery, op cit, p 87-8.
49L.R. Gottschalk, Understanding History (New York: Knopf, 1950), p 48; G.J. Renier, History: its Purpose and Method (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), p 96-100.
50Renier, op cit, p 96-100; A. Nevins, The Gateway to History (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938), p 70; Renier, op cit, p 128, 132, 155.
51Gottschalk, op cit, p 122, 125; Nevins, op cit, p 155; Renier, op cit, p 109.
52Gottschalk, op cit, p 166.
53Ibid, p 53-5; 150.
54Ibid, p 165; Nevins, op cit, p 155.
55Renier, op cit, p 101; Gottschalk, op cit, p 94-101, 161.
56Gottschalk, op cit, p 138.
Chapter Five: Materials
1Justin Martyr, First Apology, 35.7-9, 48.3
2Suetonius, Claudius, 25.4
3Suetonius, Nero, 16.2
4Tacitus, Annals, 15.44
5Pliny, Epistles, 10.96
6F.F. Bruce, Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), p 29-30.
7Ibid, p 30-31
8Josephus, Antiquities, 18.116-119.
9Ibid, p 20.20.
10Origen, Against Celsus, 1.47
11Josephus, op cit, 18.63
12W.D. Davies, Invitation to the New Testament (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p 66
13Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, 43a
14Geisler and Nix, A General Introduction to the Bible, p 271-282; F.G. Kenyon, Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament, p 129.
15Geisler and Nix, op cit, p 268-71; A.T. Robertson, Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament, p 76.
16Geisler and Nix, op cit, p 282-84; Lake, Text of the New Testament, p 19.
17Geisler and Nix, op cit, p 316-43.
17a Ibid, p 344-57.
18Charles Leach, Our Bible: How We Got It (Bible Institute Colportage Ass., Chicago, 1898), p 35-6.
19F.G. Kenyon, op cit; Geisler and Nix, op cit, p 294-6.
20Geisler and Nix, op cit, p 271-84, 316-43; F.G. Kenyon, op cit, p 129; A.T. Robertson, op cit, p 76; Lake, op cit, p 19.
21Robertson, op cit, p 150+; Geisler and Nix, op cit, p 361-5.
22Ibid
23Geisler and Nix, op cit, p 365-6; taken from Philip Schaff Companion to the Greek New Testament and the English Version, 3rd edition, p 177
24F.F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable?, p 16-17.
25F.G. Kenyon, The Bible and Archeology, (new York and London: Harper, 1940), p 288+
Chapter Six: the Claim
1Amos 9:8b-12
22 Samuel 7:11-16
3-
4G.E. Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), p 137-8; F.F. Bruce, New Testament History (New York: Doubleday, 1969), p 125-7; R. Martin, New Testament Foundations (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1975), p 115-116, 108, and see 109-14 for text, translation, and notes. Also used: for Messianic prophecy in the Old Testament, C.A. Briggs, Messianic Prophecy (New York: Scribner, 1893). For intertestamental literature, James Drummand, The Jewish Messiah (Longdon: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1877). Also A.W. Kac, The Messianic Hope (Grand Rapids; Baker, 1975) for later messianic concepts.
5Ladd, op cit, p 147.
6F.F. Bruce, New Testament History, p 130; Ladd, op cit, p 148.
7Bruce, op cit, p 131-2; Ladd, op cit, p 148-9. For a chart containing scriptural indications in the N.T. of the earthly, heavenly, and suffering Messiah, see Ladd, op cit, p 149-151.
8Bruce, op cit, p 93-100.
9Bruce, op cit, p 82-92, 101-21; Joseph Klausner, Jesus of Nazareth, p 210.
10Klausner, op cit, p 211
11F.F. Bruce, Second Thoughts on the Dead Sea Scrolls, p 134.
12Bruce, op cit, p 80-91, esp p 89. On page 152, Bruce summarizes the messianic expectations at Qumran: “The men of Qumran, like the pious community into which Jesus was born, looked for ‘the consolation of Israel’, and expected its consolation to be brought about by the Messiah of David’s line. This Messiah, in Qumran expectation would arise in the last days to deliver Israel, born from the travail of the righteous community. He would be the victorious captain of the sons of light in the last conflict with the sons of darkness, and in the new age following that victory he would enjoy a position as prince, second only to the anointed priest. In its essentials this expectation of a militant Davidic Messiah was shared by many other Israelites (probably by the vast majority). And Jesus repudiated this kind of Messiahship as wholeheartedly as He could, from the days of the wilderness temptation right on to His death.
13Bruce, Second Thoughts, p 140.
14Ibid, p
15W.S. LaSor, The Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament (Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1972), p 232.
16Ibid, p 227-8.
17Ibid, p 228.
18Ibid, p 229 (1 QH 4:35, 1:22).
19I. Howard Marshall, The Origins of the New Testament Christology (IVP, 1976), p 63.
20Ibid, p 64.
21Ibid; see also G. Vermes Jesus the Jew, p 164-8, 189.
22Ladd, op cit
23Joseph Klausner, Jesus to Paul, p 103-5.