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Wed Mar 25, 2009 1330h FINAL VERSION
DR RUSSELL ONG
China’s strategic convergence with Russia
7525words
ABSTRACT: This article examines the basis for China’s strategic convergence with Russia in the current era as well as assesses the viability of this convergence in the longer term. It will be argued that the convergence primarily reflects both Chinese and Russian concerns about the lone superpower’s preponderance in the international system and its perceived intentions. These concerns relate to the military sphere as well as non-military considerations such as ideological differences. Ultimately, Sino-Russia strategic convergence exists as long as a huge capability gap between each partner and the US persists. In the short run at least,China and Russia will continue to balance against the US. (102 words)
Introduction
The aim of this article is to examine the factors for China’s strategic convergence with Russia in post-Cold War era. The first factor relates to China’s search for an effective partner to counter USpreponderance in international politics as Beijingwants to promote a multipolar world, which would in turn give itself more room to manoeuvre. The second factor for China’s strategic convergence with Russia stems from theUSexport of liberal values across the world, which is viewed as indirectly undermining the Chinese political system over the longer term. This article focuses on China’s viewpointsalthough Russian perspectives are added insofar as they shedfurther light on the analysis. Certain assumptions are implicit here: the UScontinues to display assertiveness in international politics and on the whole still acts unilaterally on key international security issues.
At the same time, it will be noted that there are limitations to China’s strategic convergence with Russia:primarily, national interests may differ and traditional great power rivalry remains, testing the durability of this strategic convergence. It will be argued that as long as the perceived threat of a lone superpower looms larger, China and Russia will be more willing to support each other in the international system. Theoretically, this reinforces the Realist proposition that great powers will balance against a hegemon: to a certain extent, powerful structural forces compel China and Russia, irrespective of their histories and domestic conditions, to join together in temporary alliances.[1]A vindication of this balancing behaviour is the twenty-year Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Co-operation of 2001, which arose following America’s enhanced geopolitical position after the ending of the Cold War.[2]Following on from the 2001Treaty, China created for the first time an intergovernmental consultation mechanism on security issues with another country – Russia – in 2005. The undertaking arose also because of a commonperspective on a wide range of international issues, which are often different from the US’s.Today, the Chinese and Russian prime ministers have a regular meeting mechanism with three major components - a regular meeting committee for the prime ministers, a humanistic co-operation committee, and meetings for energy representatives. In many ways, this consultation mechanism has one of the widest-ranging in scope in China's foreign relations and serves to enhance the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is buttressed by two additional factors, which does not relate directly to the US. The first is the resolution ofterritorial disputes that persisted over 300 years. In 2004, after 40 years of negotiations, China and Russia – the two largest powers on the Eurasian continent - signed an agreement on their4300km long border.[3]The second factor that buttressesChina’s strategic convergence with Russia lies in Beijing’s quest for economic security, or more specifically energy security. Russia is a key energy supplier and China needs oil to fuel its economic growth, which would in turn provide the basis to achieve truly global power status. The volume of Sino-Russian trade has also increased nearly 10 times during the decade between 1998 and 2007, and was expected to reach US$50billon in 2008 from US$48billion in 2007;both states have set atarget of US$60-80bn in bilateral trade by 2010. In particular, transborder co-operation can reinvigorate the old industrial bases in China's northeastern provinces and the development of the Russian Far East so both parties have much to gain. We can now turn to the main factors for China’s strategic convergence with Russia and these relate to perceptions of the lone superpower in the post-Cold War era.
Countering USpreponderance
Firstly, China’s strategic convergence with Russialies in Beijing’s need to meet the challenges posed by the lone superpower.From the Chinese perspective, the defeat of communism across the world has in general meant a global re-assertion of US power and values since the early 1990s;this was epitomised by a “new world order” proclaimed by America after the demise of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, the war on terror provides the US with further impetus to reinforce its global leadership as American military might preserves international security through, among other means, defeating terrorists. In terms of waging the war on terror, the US strategy of pre-emption (xianfa zhiren) that entails using force to respond to an imminent threat is seen as particularly threatening.[4]This strategy is perhaps the most controversial of all US military doctrines simply because its entails encroaching on the sovereignty of other states in the name of self-defence against terrorism.[5] As one of the ardent advocates of sovereignty, China has elicited grave concerns about US actions that may justify intervention in the affairs of another state.Overall, a consensus exists between China and Russia that the US use of military force, at times in circumvention of the UN Charter and Security Council, undermines the basic principles of international law.
In reality, China knows that military supremacy has enabled the US projection of its power across the globe and maintains its forward presence in various parts of the globe. This serves to protect as well as enhance US national interests in the international system, which may at times be conflicting with China’s. Essentially, China now shares with Russia similar concerns over the US projection its military power too close to its borders. Geopolitically, the USis viewed by China as limiting Russia’s strategic space; in recent years, the eastern enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the deployment of US anti-missile bases in Eastern Europe are cases in point.[6]
In terms of actual military power, China lags behind the US.In the nuclear field, the superiority of US in strategic forces remains unchallenged.[7]In 2002, the US’s unilateral withdrawal from the bilateral Anti-ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty with Russia alarmed China, which had joined forces with Russia earlier to oppose any revisions of the Treaty, mainly on the grounds that this would allow the deployment of new missile defense systems.Basically, China holds the view that US plans to establish global missile systems is detrimental to maintaining international strategic balance and stability, arguing that they would not be conducive to promoting mutual trust between the big countries and regional security, and may even trigger new proliferation. [8]
Accordingly, both China and Russia have to various degrees opposed the lone superpower’s proposals to create global missile defence systems, namely a National Missile Defence (NMD) scheme to protect itself from missile attacks together with plans for deployment of a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in the western Pacific.[9] Such systems would deprive countries hostile to the USof the main missile and nuclear weapons, either by a pre-emptive strike or destroying the remaining ones using those missile defence systems.At present, China has only about 20 strategic missiles capable of reaching the US mainland so even a limited NMD system would be concern in Beijing’s long run quest for parity.[10] At the same time, although the NMD represents a greater strategic challenge, China is more vocal in its opposition to the TMD system, largely because traditional regional rival Japan is an integral part of this system. Importantly, Beijing has received support from Russia on this issue.
The Chinese concern over US military supremacy is extended to the realm of outer space. This was evident when China and Russia submitted a joint proposal for an international treaty to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space in 2008.[11] Even with the launch of Shenzhou VII spacecraft, China knows that it is still far behind the US and even Russia in the field of spaceflight.[12]Here China'smastery of nuclear bomb technology vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the US in the past is instructive.The point is that like the acquisition of the nuclear bomb in 1964, space exploration by any country is in essence a symbol of the country's defence strength and hence its overall national strength.As the third country to master manned spaceflight technology, Chinaaims to consolidate its position in the three-way rivalry in space exploration against the USand Russia. In general, China’s concerns on US perfecting its missile defense systems and spaced-based weapons platforms relate to overall American military might in the long run and how this gives the US the means to act unilaterally in international politics.
In terms of conventional forces, China is modernising its armed forces in the bid to close gap with the US. In this regard, Russiahas helped by providing military hardware to China. Between 1992 and 2006, when total Russian arms exports amounted to US$58.4 billion, China took delivery of about US$26 billion worth of military equipment and weapons.[13] At the same time, China is aware that the actual transfer of military technology from Russiaremains limited due to issues such as intellectual property rights. It also seems that Russia is unwilling to move China into India’s category and become eligible for more advanced weapons and technology. Hence, China needs to find a way out of the current impasse in which it has essentially purchased almost all major weapon systems that Russia is willing to sell. Upgrading its conventional forces through the acquisition of advanced technology remains a key goal for Beijingin the era of information warfare as the Chinese military is still far behind its UScounterpart in this area.[14]
From a wider perspective, upgrading the military forces – conventional and nuclear – increases China’s “comprehensive national strength” and this is viewed by China often in comparison with the lone superpower.[15]From China’s perspective, its grand strategy in the twenty-first century revolves around the need to achieve comprehensive security, with the emphasis on achieving rapid modernisation and driving to truly global power status in the long run.[16] In this sense, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 means that the US now serves as a comparison and benchmark for China. Both China and the US have divergent worldviews and conflicts are bound to surface, notwithstanding deepening economic integration between the two great powers.[17] Therefore, an element of strategic competition persists in China’s relations with the US and Russia appears a useful counterweight against the lone superpower.
In general, despite the advent of globalisation, it can be discerned that a Realist strand remains in China’s security thinking whereby great power competition is deemed as central and inevitable. To a certain extent, the USis seen as taking steps to prevent another powerful foe, like the Soviet Union had once been, from challenging American hegemony.[18] Pertinently, the US has evinced the tendency to pursue its national security goals on its own accord, at times without consultation with allies or authorisation from international organisations such as the United Nations. In recent times, this unilateralist trend has drawn concerns from China as well as Russia. Basically, Chinadesires a multipolar world where the US should be just one of several poles of power. For China, an international system tending towards unipolarity means that there is little or no room to manoeuvre;thecurrentdistribution of power and influence within the international system is overly in the US’s favour and this is seen as undesirable.Basically, China now has to face the US on its own in the absence of a strategic triangle, where it had been able to play one superpower off the other to enhance its security during the 1970s and 1980s.In the quest for multipolarity in the international system, Chinahas sought out strategic partnersand Russiahas fitted in at the appropriate time.
In addition to Russia, China’s advocacy of multipolarity in the international system is extended to pursuing close ties with emerging states such as India and Brazil. China-India-Russia trilateralism was largely a brainchild of former Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov and subsequent efforts led to meetings among China, Russia and India. [19] From China’s perspective, such moves are partly aimed at coping with US predominance in international affairs. In this vein, Russia has shown support by stating that it continues to “seek the strengthening of principles of multilateralism in international affairs.”[20]A further step taken by China to achieve multilateralism – as opposed to US unilateralism - is evident in the United Nations (UN) ministerial meetings between Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). The BRIC group is still in the stage of development but it could have a bigger voice in international relations in the long run.
At a regional levelin Central Asia, the call for multilateralism is also evident when one examines China’s emphasis on regional institutions, namelythe Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), as the US advances in this energy-rich region.[21]Chinaneeds vast energy resources to fue1 its growing economy and has already invested heavily inprocuring oil suppliesfrom the region. It sees the US as a strategic competitor in Central Asia:the UShas used the war on terror as a pretext to establish and then enhance its military and economic presence in Central Asia.[22]In this regard, US military presence inCentral Asia is seen as part of a wider plot to control energy resources in the Central Asian and CaspianSea regions. In reality,the US does seek alternative oil sources to reduce its importdependence on Persian Gulf supplies, with theBaku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that circumvented hostile states such as Iran - as well as Russia - being a case in point.[23]Through the SCO, Chinahas developed a partnership with Russiathe aim of countering US advancement in Central Asia.As long as the US looms as the bigger threat in Central Asia, the region’s traditional overlord Russia seems content to align with China in the near term. As for the relatively young states of Central Asia – Kazakhastan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan –resisting great power influence is difficult hence a realistic policy would be to maintain cordial relations with China, Russia and US simultaneously.[24]
For China itself, the US has moved too close to its western front in Central Asia (which includes Afghanistan) since the events of September 11, 2001.Moreover, the US war on terror in Afghanistan could have an indirect effect of stifling China’s access to the energy resources of Central Asia in the longer run. Essentially, it must be noted that the US has an interest in supporting its business interests and investments in Central Asia while supporting economic and political independence as well as democracy building, free market policies, human rights, and regional economic integration.[25]For Russia, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia are still regarded as part of its strategic sphere. Hence, American intrusion into this region under the pretext of eliminating terrorists, most prominently in neighbouring Afghanistan, has elicited shared concerns from China and Russia.
Overall, China watches the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy towards the US closely. It is important to note that the impact of domestic factors on Russia’s foreign policy. In post-Soviet era, there exist groups that advocate close ties with the Westand those who emphasised Russian national interests, albeit to various degrees.[26] During the Boris Yeltsin era, on the whole, joining Western institutions and having good relations with the US was central. However, throughout most of the 2000s, the pragmatic nationalists’ agenda was the norm and combating US hegemony through alliances with other great power such as China was deemed as an important task. Basically, the decline of Russia’s international status since the ending of Cold War was a major factor behind its decision to seek a strategic partnership with China.GiventhattheUS is seen as the bigger threat, Russia naturally draws closer to China.
To a large extent, the US’s recent policy towards Russia is also studied closely by China. It may be argued that the US formulates its Russian policy on two assumptions. One was that Russia is innately aggressive and that the end of the Cold War could not possibly change this hence expanding the USmilitary alliance up to Russia’s borders is an appropriate strategy. The other premise was that Russia would always be too weak to endanger any new North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members, so the US might never need to commit troops to defend them. These assumptions have proved to be inaccurate as a resurgent Russia can provide a stiffer challenge to the US. An example was the Georgian crisis in August 2008, which illustrated that Russia’s sense of being a great power remains important to the conception of its role in international system. For a significant portion of the Russian elite, it has been noted that the fear of US preponderance is often mixed with wounded pride and resentment.[27]Nowadays, Russia may be able to respond more effectively to an assertive US and one of Moscow’s key objectives is to demonstrate that it is still a great power that cannot be entirely ignored in key security issues. If that is the case,China’s strategic convergence with Russia is likely to endure for some years to come.