Cherie Metcalf & Jonathan Nash

Institutions & Information: Public Perception of Climate Change Information provided by Government vs. the Market

Cherie Metcalf & Jonathan Nash

ISNIE Proposal

Climate Change presents one of the most pressing policy problems facing the global political community. One of the challenges associated with formulating effective climate policy is the gap between the consensus view of climate scientists and public opinion.[1] While climate scientists have increasingly converged in their certainty that climate change is occurring and attributable to anthropocentric causes, significant portions of the public remain skeptical. This is particularly true in the United States; recent polling data indicate that the public has become increasingly polarized in their opinions about climate change and that the number of skeptics has grown.[2] Scholars have suggested that political / cultural orientations of individuals play a role in their receptiveness to climate information[3], a view that is consistent with recent polling data.[4]

Scholars have suggested that one possible means of bridging this gap and more effectively conveying information to individuals would be the development of climate science prediction markets.[5] There are several possible advantages associated with the use of markets to generate and disseminate climate science information. Markets may produce more accurate information, drawing on and assessing broader sources than government agencies. This accuracy may enhance the trustworthiness of information for individuals.[6]The use of markets may also offset distrust individuals exhibit toward government-sponsored scientists.[7]In theory, the use of markets might make accurate climate science information accessible to a broader cross section of the public, enhancing the prospects for mitigation and adaptation policy development.

This paper addresses a gap in the literature urging development of climate science markets – the provision of empirical evidence testing the hypothesized links between institutional source and the perceived trustworthiness of climate science information.

The paper generates relevant data through the use of experimental surveys administered via online participation. The surveys present information related to two aspects of climate science; predicted changes in the severity and extent of cold and hot days, and the predicted increase in heavy precipitation events. The factual information conveyed tracks the most recent predictions from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) AR5 Report (Physical Science).[8]For each of the scenarios the source of the information is randomized across two alternatives: the information is ascribed to the IPCC, or the information is ascribed to activity on a new market for climate options at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Individual’s beliefs about the existence of climate change, and its attribution to anthropocentric causes are solicited prior to exposure to the climate science information randomized scenarios. Following exposure to the scenarios, individuals are asked to indicate the accuracy of the climate science information, and trustworthiness of the institution providing it (7-point scales). Individuals are then asked to revisit their prior assessments as to the likelihood that climate change is occurring, and attributable to anthropocentric causes in light of the new information. The surveys also collect information on individual’s political affiliation (party), political views, and cultural cognition orientation (via short form cultural cognition question set). The data generated by the experimental surveys will allow us to test for a causal connection between the both persuasiveness (change in climate change beliefs) and perceived trustworthiness (direct self-report) of information, based on its attribution to government (IPCC) sources as opposed to markets. We will be able to test whether any such effect is aligned with individuals’ political or cultural ideology in the ways suggested in the literature.

[1] See e.g. Jonathan Gilligan, Kaitlin Toner & Michael Vandenbergh, “Energy & Climate Change: A Climate Prediction Market” (2014) 61 UCLA L. Rev. XX, available at :

[2] See “One in Four in U.S. are Solidly Skeptical of Global Warming” (Gallup Poll, April 22, 2014), available at:

[3] See e.g. Dan Kahan, XX.

[4]Op cit., finding that those who identify as Republican are more likely to be climate skeptics, while Democrats are more likely to be “concerned believers”.

[5] See e.g. Gilliagan, Toner & Vandenbergy, supra note 1; Tom Bell, “Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts” (2006) 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 37; Shi-Ling Hsu, “”A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes” (2011) 83 Colo. L. Rev. 179.

[6] See e.g. Gilligan, Toner & Vandenbergy, supra note 1 at 14.

[7]Ibid at 15, 18 (hypothesizing that this effect may be stronger for climate skeptics who self-identify as having conservative ideology and a preference for free markets over regulation).

[8]Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policymakers SPM-12 (Sept. 2013).