Ch 4: The Junior Officer Positions 49 – 31BC

The period of the civil wars saw dramatic change among the junior officer positions. In part, this was due to the demand for troops. While the large number of troops in service in the period 91 – 50BC was not unprecedented, the period 49 – 31BC saw record numbers of troops in service, and also saw Roman forces engaged extensively in war at sea. A large number of officers were required to command the expanded armed forces, and the recruitment of experienced soldiers became increasingly difficult. Moreover, the leaders of the various factions needed to reward their allies, with the result that many Italians, and even some provincials, were able to obtain high office, while many of the traditional status barriers between junior officers and centurions began to break down.

In addition, the junior officer positions of the period were affected by the changing nature of warfare itself. Perhaps for the first time since the First Punic War, naval power became a decisive factor in Roman warfare. The late Republic had, of course, seen a number of important naval commands, particularly in the campaigns against piracy and against Mithridates, but in none of these was control of the Roman state decided by sea power. The use of naval power, both for fighting battles at sea and for moving huge numbers of troops and supplies, meant that a large number of commanders were needed to organise the rival fleets.

Moreover, the civil wars tested the loyalty of regions, and of cities, that had rarely been a concern to Roman commanders in the late Republic. During the civil wars, garrisons were needed for areas that might offer an opponent a tactical advantage, or which might not otherwise give a commander their full support. The rise in the number of military prefects needed to command previously secure areas is a characteristic of the Roman military system in this period.

There were, of course, periods of relative peace, and the protagonists and factions involved changed over time. However, the large-scale use of naval power and the pressure on recruitment caused by the unprecedented size of the Roman armed forces were consistent factors throughout the period. Moreover, many of the changes observed for the period, such as the decline in the status of the military tribunate, are observable from the early years of the war between Caesar and Pompeius to the post-Actium settlement. It is the scale and nature of the warfare, and not the names of the commanders involved, that most defined the junior officer positions from 49 to 31BC and necessitates consideration of these years as a single period (rather than as separate ‘Caesarian’ and ‘Triumviral’ periods).

At the outset, it should be noted that the irregularity which is is a common feature of the period affects the identification and understanding of junior officer posts. With almost the entire Mediterranean a theatre of war, many duties were assigned on an ad hoc basis and the titles of many officers are not preserved. For example, in 47BC [###68] D. Carfulenus – who was to be tribunus plebis in 44BC – was an experienced soldier and senior member of Caesar’s entourage who was given a number of cohorts with which to perform an important role at a critical moment in a battle[1]: the title of his position was probably not of much concern at the time. It is often extremely difficult to separate legates who are given no title from prefects, and, given that the late Republican procedures for the appointment of legates may well have been ignored or altered, it is possible that any individual of senatorial rank may have been a legate[2]. This ambiguity is present in the evidence of the late Republic, but becomes magnified in the period of civil turmoil by the placement of large numbers of individuals in roles, such as that of garrison commander or naval commander, which appear to have had no clearly defined status in earlier periods, and by the assignment of roles to freedmen and non-Romans throughout the period. It is sometimes only the social status of an individual that has led to his being designated a legate rather than a prefect: the long lists of legati gathered in Broughton bear testimony to this. Moreover, a number of officer commands, particularly certain naval commands, should not be regarded as junior officer positions in this period, although their holders may not have been legates. Pompeius Menodorus and Pompeius Demochares, naval commanders who mainly served under Sextus Pompeius, are referred to as praefecti classis by Velleius[3]. Their roles and status, however, mean that while they were not legates, they were not junior officers either: the accusation that Menodorus behaved as if he were a praetorian governor while in Sardinia suggests this strongly, as does his importance to Octavian[4]. Sextus Pompeius was styled on coinage as “praefectus classis et orae maritimae ex s(enatus) c(onsulto)”[5] in 43BC, but he cannot be considered as a junior officer[6], nor can D. Laelius, despite his description in an inscription as an “ἔπαρχοςeparchos”[7], or Machaeras, in charge of two legions and 1,000 cavalry[8]. Such prefectures are analogous to the positions of praefectus praetorii and praefectus Aegypti in the Principate, prefectures involving command of military forces that were held by equestrians, but were not junior officer positions.

The number of junior officer positions available

Establishing the size of the Roman army during this period is a matter of considerable complexity. At various points over the course of these years, large forces were formed, reformed, and discharged under a number of different commanders, and our sources are not precise enough or detailed enough to allow for the number of legions in service to be counted exactly. Brunt argues that there were at least 45-47 legions in service at the time of Pharsalus, requiring 270-282 military tribunes, and, after discharges and casualties, 34-36 legions in service at the time of Caesar’s death (18-20 legions to guard the provinces, and 16 legions for service against the Parthians), requiring 204-216 military tribunes[9]. This latter figure was not spectacularly high, and figures for the late Republic had occasionally been even higher[10]: during 73-72BC at least 33 legions were in service each year, 38 if one includes Perperna’s forces. While some of these legions were not at full strength, and a certain number of troops in them were not Roman citizens, they still required officers to command them. Moreover, in addition to legionary tribunes, there would have been a number of tribunes, possibly tribuni militum, in charge of those cohorts of (mainly) citizen infantry that were not formed into legions (on which below). There were 30 such cohorts in the Pompeian forces in Spain in 49BC (thus requiring 30 tribunes), but the creation of cohorts of citizen troops appears to have been a short lived phenomenon, and the total number of such commanders in this period is difficult to estimate with any precision. It is likely that these cohorts were only intended to operate independently as an interim measure, and that they were later formed into legions[11]

In the years following Caesar’s death, the number of legions in service soared. By the time of Philippi, the Republicans had approximately 21 legions in service, and the Triumvirs 40, to which can be added the forces of Sextus Pompeius, as well as forces under Cornificius[12] and other commanders. The combined force of approximately 75 legions required approximately 450 military tribunes, a sizeable increase compared to the average of approximately 138 in the period 80-50BC.

This figure remained roughly constant until 36, when Antonius had approximately 22 legions, Octavian around 30, Lepidus around 14 and Sextus Pompeius 10, a total of 76[13]. After the victory over Sextus Pompeius and the exclusion of Lepidus from the Triumvirate, and with the discharge and settlement of troops, the number of legions in service dropped, with perhaps 51 legions in service at the time of Actium, 23 under Antonius and 28 under Octavian, requiring around 306 military tribunes[14]. Even this number of legions represents more than twice the average in service during the period 80-50BC. [### Effect of the legio uernacula etc on the numbers?]

The period saw a substantial rise in the number of naval units in service. Roman fleets were in action throughout the period, transporting troops and supplies, attempting to disrupt enemy troop movements, or trying to control the corn supply into Rome. Such fleets might be very large: Octavian had a fleet of over 350 ships for the Actium campaign[###Say when], and the Pompeians had had a similar fleet in 49-48BC[15]. These fleets needed commanders, and the 15individuals recorded who were probable junior naval prefects make up a large proportion of the total number of prefects known from the period, a reflection of their increased military importance. However, unlike cavalry units, the size of a fleet or a command varied immensely, and even the kind of rough estimates made abovebelow, which would in this case involve dividing the number of ships in service by the size of the probable units, are not possible: the size of individual naval commands was determined by the needs of the situation and the size of the force available, and it is therefore not possible to estimate the number of naval prefects with any confidence. However, given the nature of such prefectures, it is likely that there were fewer naval prefects than any other kind of junior officer.

The number of auxiliary prefects in service – cavalry prefects and prefects of infantry – is hard to estimate. Our evidence for the period is scanty and weighted towards the early 40s BC, and the influence upon our perception of this period of Caesar, who often records the actions of praefecti,is unavoidable: over one third of all officers from the years 49 – 31BC are recorded in his works and in those attributed to him by his successors. Other historians, as Appian notes, appear to have paid scant attention to the identities and roles of the auxiliary units themselves[16], so it can come as no surprise that so little information has survived on their commanders. Only 11 cavalry prefects are recorded for the period, and no commanders of individual auxiliary infantry cohorts are recorded[17]. Moreover, as is discussed below, we have no clear picture of the command structure for the auxiliary cavalry, and almost no information at all about the command structure for auxiliary infantry (including specialist troops such as slingers and archers). Many units may have been commanded by native commanders, and others by Roman officers, as the requirements of the situation and the availability of personnel dictated. In addition, much of the auxiliary infantry recruited at the time was formed into cohorts, and even legions[18], commanded by military tribunes[19], which may well account to some extent for the relative lack of information about infantry prefects. [### Impact of this on estimated numbers of military tribunes?]

However, while we have little evidence for the commanders or command structures of auxiliary units, we have enough information to deduce that there were a great number of such units in service. Saddington’s study on the Roman use of auxiliary forces at this time[20] demonstrates both their size, and the range of communities from which they were drawn. On the basis of the data assembled by Saddington, it is safe to say that the number of cavalry prefects in service rose significantly from the numbers of the late Republic. Some examples may help to illustrate this. If, for example, Pompeius had 7,000 cavalry at Pharsalus[21], then he would have required approximately 14 cavalry prefects, or non-Roman native commanders, to command them, with the probable addition of a legate or superior officer in charge of groups of units or the whole cavalry force[22]. This command structure can be seen in the case of Q. Atius Varus, who had at least 2,600 cavalry (as well as 400 infantry) under his command in 486BC[### 48BC in catalogue], and these would have required around five cavalry prefects (along with one infantry prefect), or their non-Roman equivalents, to command them[23]. Brutus and Cassius had around 20,000 cavalry at Philippi, including 4,000 horse archers, and the Triumvirs around 13,000 – the combined force would probably have required approximately 66 cavalry prefects or their non-Roman equivalents[24]. Antonius had a force of 10,000 cavalry in his Parthian expedition of 36BC, requiring approximately 20 commanders[25], and each side in the final campaigns of the Triumviral era had about 12,000 cavalry, requiring approximately 48 commanders[26]. It is likely, given the development of units named after a particular commander[27], that cavalry prefects remained in their posts for more than a year at a time, as was the case with[###276] M. Tullius Cicero’s commands in 49-48BC and 43-42BC[28]. However, it is likely that many of these units retained their own native commanders and were not commanded by Roman prefects. This consideration, combined with the scantiness of our evidence and the difficulties of using models of cavalry organisation drawn from the Principate as evidence for this period, makes it difficult to estimate how many of the cavalry commanders of the period were Romans, and therefore prefects.

It is even harder to estimate the numbers of prefects who were in charge of infantry. The numbers of auxiliary infantry present are reported far more rarely than the numbers of cavalry. Moreover, many of those who would, in earlier eras, have been auxiliary infantry were not commanded by prefects in the period, as they were incorporated either into legions such as the legio uernacula or into infantry cohorts commanded by tribunes. As Brunt and Fear argue, a great number of legions throughout the period were raised from Latins, non-Roman provincials, and even slaves[29]. This was a trend which began in the 50s, as the formation of thelegio uernacula and Legio V Alaudae show, but there were probably as many as eight of these legions in service in 42BC, a significant proportion of the Roman armed forces, and many non-citizens remained in service until after Actium[30]. Moreover, in the Spanish campaign of 49BC, the Pompeian forces raised approximately 30 cohorts of auxiliary infantry[31], and it is likely that it was a group of six of these cohorts that was stationed at Gades with [130] C. Gallonius, cohorts commanded, according to Caesar, by tribuni[32]. If the commanders of these units were tribunes, presumably tribuni militum given the lack of any qualifying adjective[33], then this provides a clue about why we have so little information on auxiliary infantry prefects: it may be that infantry forces were often formed into legionary style cohorts, or amalgamated into legions such as the legio uernacula, and commanded by military tribunes. In other cases, auxiliary troops might be placed under a garrison commander: the former euocatus[###95] P. Cornelius, in charge of Suessa, had a garrison of Numidian troops under his command[34].That Cornelius was an euocatusmay be regarded as testimony to the low status of such commands. Light troops, however, were still needed: Octavian had 5,000 light-armed troops under his command in Sicily in 36BC, along with 20,000 cavalry[35], requiring, by the standards of the Principate, around 10 infantry prefects and 40 cavalry prefects. The low priority given to light infantry in our sources – perhaps, but not necessarily, indicative of the relatively small numbers of light infantry in use – , frustrates any serious attempt to work out how many infantry prefects were in service. Moreover, it is important to note that a high proportion of the infantry forces of the period were specialist archers and slingers[36]: even with the development in the Augustan period of the post of praefectus cohortis, there is only one inscription from the period covered by this thesis which may refer to a Roman officer in charge of a unit of archers[37]. It may well be that such specialist troops were commanded by their own native officers, or that, as with the command at Thabena of the legate Q. Marcius Crispus[38], they were divided among other units.

There are 13 garrison commanders recorded from the period. This relatively large figure is probably the result of two trends. Firstly, the widespread violence, chaos and confusion of the Triumviral period, along with the need to raise troops and money, necessitated an increased use of garrisons, and therefore an increase in the number of officers needed to command them. Secondly, both sides at war were Roman, and therefore any town that fell which was worthy of comment was likely to have been commanded by a Roman officer, who might then be mentioned by name in our sources. The use of garrisons was always part of the Roman campaign strategy, if only to provide a secure supply route[39], but in earlier periods garrison commanders are less likely to be mentioned and it is probable that there were far more garrison commanders in service in the late Republic of whom we have no record. As garrison commanders were appointed as needed, we cannot calculate the number of them in service in the period. However, given their relatively high status and the nature of their duties, it is likely that there were fewer of them than cavalry prefects. The same can be said of other military prefects – officers given another specific task or role, often in battle.