CASE LAW UPDATE-OCTOBER 2011

I. FOURTH AMENDMENT

A. AUTO EXCEPTION/TERRY STOPS

1.Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). Vehicle search-incident-to-arrest. Court determined that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment did not justify the search because arrestees were already handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars. The Court narrows the reading of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). People v. Bridgewater, 235 Ill. 2d 85, 918 N.E. 2d 553 (2009). Il. S. Ct. follows Gant. Court indicates that it would be a “rare case” when an officer cannot effectuate an arrest in a manner eliminating any real possibility of access to the vehicle by the arrestee.

2.People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 927 N.E. 2d 1179 (2010). When passenger was detained pursuant to a valid traffic stop, he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle in order to contest the search of the vehicle. Good discussion of the factors to consider when determining whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy.

3.People v. Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d 285, 903 N.E. 2d 409 (2009). Following a traffic stop for a seat belt violation, police officers have the right to conduct a warrant check on the driver and the passenger. The warrant check is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.

4.People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 822, 886 N.E. 2d 947 (2008). When a passenger in a car is lawfully seized, the police officers may request that the person provide identification and then use that information to conduct a warrant check so long as it does not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop. The Court follows the reasoning in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed. 2d 842 (2005), and partially overrules its prior decision in People v. Gonzales, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003).

5.People v. Salinas, 383 Ill. App. 3d 481, 891 N.E. 2d 884 (2008); People v. Galarza, 391 Ill. App. 3d 805, 910 N.E. 2d 1160 (2009). Cases follow Harris.

6.People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 898 N.E. 2d 603 (2008). Police officer’s request to search defendant’s vehicle after a traffic stop had ended did not constitute a second seizure in these consolidated cases. Whether or not there was a new seizure is analyzed under the factors set forth in U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Followed by People v. Oliver, 236 Ill. 2d 448, 925 N.E. 2d 1107 (2010) (Defendant not seized even though 10-15 minutes elapsed from the time the traffic stop ended and the time the car was searched.); People v. Roa, 398 Ill. App. 3d 158, 923 N.3. 2d 401 (2010).

7.People v. Bennett, 376 Ill. App. 3d 554, 876 N.E.2d 256 (2007). Defendant was not unreasonably detained when he is transported two blocks to crime scene for purposes of identification. Also, good discussion on 48-Hour Rule post-Willis.

8.Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694, (2009). Traffic stop. The detention and questioning of the passenger was reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court provides an in depth analysis supporting the detention and search of drivers and passengers following a legitimate traffic stop. See, also People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 939 N.E. 2d 463 (2010).

B.ATTENUATION FACTORS

1.People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 927 N.E. 2d 1179 (2010) Good discussion of factors the court should look at in determining whether a statement is attenuated from the 4th Amendment violation. See, also People v. Salgado,396 Ill. App. 3d 856, 920 N.E. 2d 1194 (1st Dist. 2009); People v. Scott, 366 Ill. App. 3d 38, 852 N.E. 2d 531 (2006).

C.MISCELLANEOUS

1.Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). Good Faith Exception. Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that is later overturned, are not subject to the exclusionary rule.

2.Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011). Exigent Circumstances. When police officers do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the 4th Amendment, the warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and allowed.

3.Safford v. Redding, 557 U.S. 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed. 2d 354 (2009). Strip search of student violated student’s 4th Amendment rights. However, Court held school officials were protected by qualified immunity because clearly established law did not show the search violated the 4th Amendment.

4.Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed. 2d 496 (2009). Police officers stop the defendant and search him based on an arrest warrant that is later found to be invalid. The Supreme Court held that when police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.

a. People v. Morgan, 388 Ill. App. 3d 252, 901 N.E. 2d 1049 (2009). Fourth District Court of Appeals distinguishes Herring.

5.People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 892 N.E. 2d 1047 (2008).

  1. 4th Amendment—although the Court found the suspect voluntarily went to the police station, circumstances at the police station would lead a reasonable juvenile to believe that he was under arrest.
  2. 5th Amendment—Good discussion of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed. 2d 643 (2004) (“question first, warn later” technique). Court found detectives engaged in question first, warn later technique and suppressed the statement.
  3. People v. Alfaro, 386 Ill. App. 3d 271, 896 N.E. 2d 658 (2008). The Second District Court of Appeals follows the reasoning in Lopez and Seibert and upholds trial court’s suppression of defendant’s statement. See, also People v. Griffin, 385 Ill. App. 3d 202, 898 N.E. 2d 704 (4th Dist. 2008).

6.People v. Hunt, 234 Ill. 2d 49, 914 N.E. 2d 477 (2009), rev. on other grounds, 2010 Ill. App. LEXIS 219 (March 18, 2010). Appellate Court erred in finding that statements made during a temporary transfer from county jail to police station were illegally obtained because plain language of County Jail Act (735 ILCS 135/19.5) does not require a court order for the transfer to occur. S. Ct upheld the suppression of defendant’s statements on other grounds (tapes inaudible).

7.People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 950 N.E. 2d 659 (2011). Probationer. The warrantless search of probationer’s home was upheld. Defendant was sentenced to IPS and agreed to suspicionless searches as a written condition of his probation. The Supreme Court limits its holding to the facts of this case.

8.People v. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d 35, 885 N.E. 2d 1033 (2008). Parolee. The warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee is upheld where the defendant signs a consent-to-search of his person, property, or residence as part of his MSR agreement.

9.People v. Maxey, 949 N.E. 2d 755 (2011). Terry Stop. Good discussion of the type of evidence the police may use in establishing reasonable suspicion to detain. The court also held that is was proper for the police to briefly detain the suspect and transport him to the crime scene for purposes of immediate identification.

10.People v. Glorioso, 398 Ill. App. 3d 975, 924 N.E. 2d 1153 (2010). Court follows the reasoning in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006). Failure to comply with knock and announce requirement is not grounds for suppression under the 4th Amendment.

11.People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 922 N.E. 2d 1042 (2009). Good discussion of the steps/facts necessary to proceed from reasonable suspicion to probable cause.

12.People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 940 N.E. 2d 1100 (2010). Good discussion regarding the police officers’ community caretaking function and the difference between the community caretaking and the third tier consensual encounters discussed in People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E. 2d 187 (2006).

  1. FIFTH AMENDMENT & SIXTH AMENDMENTS
  1. J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011). Miranda Custody. A child’s age is a proper factor to take into account when determining if a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda.
  1. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 2250, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010). A suspect who wishes to invoke his right to remain silent must do so unambiguously. A suspect’s silence after being given his Miranda warnings is not an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent.
  1. People v. Polk, 407 Ill. App. 3d 80, 942 N.E. 2d 44 (2010). Good discussion of Berghuis. The Court held defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent or his right to an attorney. Also, the trial court properly excluded testimony of a defense expert on the issue of suggestibility and false confessions.
  1. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010). U.S. S. Ct places a 14-day limit on questioning when a defendant invokes his right to an attorney after Miranda.
  1. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed. 2d 1009 (2010). Precise recitation of Miranda warnings is unnecessary. The warnings in this case adequately informed the defendant of his rights. Court follows its previous holding in California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
  1. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed. 2d 366 (2008). 6th Amendment. Defendant’s initial appearance before a judge, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of the adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the 6th Amendment right to counsel.
  1. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed. 2d 955 (2009). U.S S.Ct overrules Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (police prohibited from initiating interrogation of defendant once he has invoked his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding). Question of whether defendant waived his right to an attorney after attorney was appointed for him by the court is now governed by the 5th Amendment rules.
  1. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 886 N.E. 2d 986 (2008). 5th Amendment/Miranda. Defendant who gave statements at a child advocacy center was not in custody for purposes of the 5th Amendment.
  1. People v. Miller, 393 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 916 N.E. 2d 10 (2009). Trial court reversed. Appellate Court finds defendant initiated conversation after he had previously invoked his right to an attorney. Police officer’s response reminding defendant he had previously invoked his right to an attorney and re-advising defendant of his Miranda warnings proper. Good discussion of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) and People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382 (1995). See, also People v. Outlaw, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1072 (2009). App. Ct. finds defendant initiated conversation after previously invoking right to an attorney.
  1. People v. Clarke, 391 Ill. App. 3d 596, 915 N.E. 2d 1 (2009). Good discussion of when polygraph evidence may be used to rebut defendant’s claim of coercion. See also, People v. Anderson, 395 Ill. App. 3d 241, 917 N.E. 2d 18 (2009).
  1. People v. Daniels, 391 Ill. App. 3d 750, 908 N.E. 2d 1104 (2009). App. Ct. reversed trial court’s findings that mentally handicapped defendant knowingly understood and waived Miranda. Court discusses Braggs and Bernasco.
  1. People v. White, 334 Ill. Dec. 943, 917 N.E. 2d 1018 (2009). Good discussion regarding the distinction between the 5th and 6th Amendment right to have an attorney present at a line-up.
  1. People v. Armstrong, 335 Ill. Dec. 536, 919 N.E. 2d 57 (2009). The trial court properly held that an exception to the statute requiring videotaping of murder suspects statement (735 ILCS 5/103-2.1) applied in that the statement was given at a time when the police were unaware that a death occurred.
  1. People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 917 N.E. 2d 501 (2009). Under the 5th Amendment, where evidence is presented, or where it is conceded defendant was injured while in police custody, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statement was not a product of coercion. In this case, although it was undisputed that the defendant received a bruise on his face while in police custody, the State met its burden of proving the statement was not the product of coercion.
  1. People v. Santiago, 236 Ill. 2d 417, 925 N.E. 2d 1122 (2010). Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 (prohibits a lawyer from communicating on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer) does not preclude an ASA from speaking with a suspect who is represented by counsel in a civil matter. Should read.
  1. People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908. Waiver of Miranda was voluntary even though defendant claims to have ingested drugs to commit suicide. Good discussion of when intoxication will render a Miranda waiver involuntary.

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