Title: BRIEFING BY MR DESMOND FITZGERALD ON CIA CUBAN OPERATIONS ANDPLANNING
Author: n/a Pages: 6 Agency: JCS
RIF#: 202-10001-10028
Subjects: CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Source: History Matters
AGENCY
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
Date Page
06/02/98
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RECORD NUMBERRECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER
202-10001-10028
J-3
DOC 29
ORIGINATOR
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION
FROM
TO TITLE
DATE PAGES SUBJECTS
DOCUMENT TYPECLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS
DATE OF LAST REVIEWOPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
WALTER M. HIGGINS, JR. THE RECORD
BRIEFING BY MR DESMOND FITZGERALD ON CIA CUBAN OPERATIONS AND PLANNING
09/25/63
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CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET OPEN IN FULL OPEN 04/17/98
Memo from Higgins for theRecordre:BriefingbyDesmond Fitzgerald onCIACuban OperationsandPlanning.
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TOPSECRETSENSITIVE
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
TIii IOINT STA,,OFFICEOFTHESPECIALASSISTANTFORCOUNTERINSURGENCYANDSPECIALACTIVITIES
25September1963
MEMORANDUM FORTHE RECORD
Subject:BriefingbyMr.DesmondFitzGeraldonCIACubanOperationsandPlanning
- AttheJCSmeetingat1400on25September,Mr. DesmondFitzGeraldbriefedtheJointChiefsofStaff.
- ExceptforGeneralTaylorandAdmiralMcDonald, theJointChiefswerepresent,asweretheDirectors andSecretariat. ColonelHigginsfromSACSAwastheonlyotherofficerinattendance.
- GeneralLeMayopenedthemeetingbyreferringtopapersrecentlydiecuseedbytheJointChiefsonpolicy andactionsconcerningmilitarysupportoftheCIAfor operationeagainstCuba. GeneralLeMayexpressedtheJCSpoeitionashadbeenreflected1nthememorandato Mr.VancewhichineffectisthattheJointChiefsdo notbelievethattheoperationstodateareofasize andimportano,enoughtojustifytheueeofmilitarysup portforprotection.
- Mr.FitzOeraldthendiscussedhiepersonalfeeling astochangedconditionsinCuba. Essentially,hebelieves that Castro's hoid in Cuba has been seriously weakenedsincelastJuly. Hebelievesthattheminorraidsconductedby theCIAhavecontributedtothisdeterioration1nCastro'sinfluenceandstability. He isfirmlyconvincedthatCastrowillfallatsomefuture, nottoodtstant,date,andthatsuchactionsastheCIA areconducting,aswellasthoseofexiles,arecontribu tingtounrestanduneettlement.
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- Mr.F1tzOerald,incommentinguponcriteriaas
towhenthemilitarysupportehouldbeprovided,offered thefollowing.'l'hegreateetdangerfromhiepointof viewiethatthemotherehipemaybecapturedrather thanbesunk. Thiswillresultinthecapturecfcrewmenwhohavetoomuchinformationandwhichcouldresult 1ndangerouepublicityfortheUnitedStates.'l'helo
cationortheseraidscontributestcthepossibilityof
capture.Hence,onlywhenthel"aidsareconductedintheDIONvulnerableareasfromthatpointofv1ew.,1a itlikelythattheCIAwillnqueetmilitarysupport. BefurtherstatedthatCIAhasnointentionofrequest ing aidforthe comingraid.
- GeneralLeMayquestionedthedangerorcapture
inviewofthecapabilitiesofCubansandridiculedthe ideathatsmallmotorboatsshouldhavethecapability ofcapturingsuchaship.
- GeneralLeMaandothersgaveopinionsconoeming auohtechnicalitiesasthecapabilityofradarbothon landand1ntheair,capabilityofshipradarofthe
U.S.andCuba,thespeedofthemothereh1p1whiehwas
o1tedas 10to12knots,andotherrelateditems.
- Mr.F1tzGeraldmademuchoftheCubanvolatile nature. HecitedthatmanyCubansarenowwalkingwiththeirheadsupandalertbecaueeoftherealization thattherearepoes1b111tiesofra1deandotherout sidesupports,suchasthelightaircraftraids. He voicedtheopinionthatCastrowouldprobablytake desperatemeaeuresaehiesituationfurtherdeteriorated
an<1.,wouldturntocreatingrevolutionsinLatinAmerica. Bestatedthateventhoughhieoperationsmaybecon sideredasonlyminor,hethoughttheyweredoingabout asauchascouldbe doneunderthepresentpo11c1ee.
Oneofhieproblemswasthathefelttherewasonlya totalor50logicaltargetsandifheconductedasmany as10ra1deamonth,hewouldsoonrunoutoffavorable targets,andwouldbeunabletosustainthebuild-upof
Cubanhopes.Hefurtherstatedthatthereweretimeswhencertaintypesofraideweremorefavorablethan others;forinstance,onsugarcentrals.
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- Inrespondingtothequestionconcerni.ngthenon attributal1tyotu.s.equipnent,hestatedthatall equipnenttheyuaecouldbeboughtontheopenmarket
inmanyoountr1ea,eventhoughitwaaorAmerioanorigin.
Hestatedthatintelligencewasnotaagood7etasthey wouldliketohave;however,theyarehavinggreeter successinhavingagentaenteranddepartCuba.
- GeneralWheelerinjectedthathesympathizes
withsuchplannersasMr.FitzGeraldbeoaueeberealized thatmanygoodideasareneveracceptedbythecautioua policymakers. However,Mr.PitzGeraldreportedthat
hebelievedhehadaclearergo-aheadontheseoperations
thanhehaaeverhadinhiapastexperience.
- Mr.FitzOeraldaaidthatoverthenexttwoorthreemonthahisplaneincludecriticaltargetsotthree claasesi electricalayatema,augaroentrala,and011.•Hecitedthatelectricalsystema,althoughatoppriority andakeytotheeconomy,wereverydif"ticulttargets. Thesugarcentralsareonlyoraseasonalnaturebecause unlesshitatthepeakseason,theycouldberepaired withoutditf'ioultyorloss time.Inregardtooil,the:retinerieaaremoatimportantbutwerealsothe toughesttohit.
- InresponsetoacommentbyGeneralShoupre:gard
ingthesabotagebymine•Mr.FitaGeraldsaidthere
hadbeenarecentoaeeofinternalsabotagetoamine.
Hethenexplainedhowthesuccessofhieoperations
oanonlybemeasuredwheninternalsabotage1aincreased. Inresponsetoaquestion,headmittedthattherewas notanycoordinationasyetwiththeinternalsabotage program.
;13.HecommentedthattherewaBnothingnew1nthepropagandafield. However,hefeltthattherehod been greatsuccessingettingclosertomilitarypersonnel whomightbreakwithCastro,andstatedthattherewere atleasttenhigh-levelmilitarypersonnelwhoaretalk ingwtbhCIAbutasyetarenottalld.ngtoeachother, sincethatdegreeofconfidencehasnotyetdeveloped.
Heconsidersit as2 pa.rallelinh11StoryJ 1.e.,theplot tokillHitler;arrlthisplotisbeingstudied1ndetail todevelopanapproach.
broaacaaue..tte B"G81-ea -vnat,anHJ..1" .rurv• uu.J.ce,i;.- m1w'l!u
McElroywasavailabletotalktoMr.FitzOealdonthis matter,and Mr.F1ts0eraldacceptedthieoffer.
- TheconferenceoloeedwithGeneralLeMaydirect ingthatMr.F1tcOerald'splanneremeetwithGeneral Krulak' e people andworkout t h - details as tohow themilitary canasa1etin eupport1ng··tl).•eeoperatione.AfterMr.PitzOeralddeparted,Oeneal'IA!Maygaveadded d1reot1onetoColonelH1gg1neto1ntiateneceasary stepeforplanning.
- AftertheJCSmeetingAdmiralRileycalledCol onelHiggin.aintohisofficeandreadaletterfrom Mr.NcOeorgeBundywhichdiscueeedaeore._,,measures
necessary-relatedtoCubaCIAoperations.AdmiralRileydirectedColonelHigginstohavethenatureofthis letterputoutthroughSACSAcontroltoSACSAcontact pointstoinsureanadequatesystemtoreecrecywithin the military aenices. Admiral Riley stated hewas returningthelettertoMr.Gilpatricashedidnotwant writtenaommun1cationbytACSA,buttoputthisout orally. Thiewasti-anam1ttedtoColonelWymanwho
willtaketheactiontoprepareanappropriatememoran dum orthereooX'dtobefiledwithGeneralIngelido
inaccordancewithfurtherdirectionsbyAdmiralRiley.
- GeneralWheeler,ChiefofStaffoftheArmy, calledandquestionedueconcerning8AC8A'saoceeeliet fortheknowledgeofsuchoperationsaementionedin the McOeorge Bundy letter. I advised him that our Pendulumsystemwas1nbeingbutthatIwouldlook
intoitingreaterdetailtodeterminethatitmet
theletteraswellasthespiritofthememorandum.
IstatedIbelievedthiswaseobuthadnothadreason todo1tuntjlthisdateandthereforedidnotgive himapositiveansweratthattime.
vYI/VJ- II/-r
W:\LTERM.HIGGINS,JR.
Colonel, US /:.
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