Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons
By Joseph Cirincione
Summary by Elaine Lynn for Book Club discussion
Concise, authoritative and fascinating, this book was originally published in 2006. The paperback edition was updated to 2007.
The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have been both wise and spectacularly lucky. No one doubts that the world is safer today because the danger of global thermonuclear war has been greatly diminished. The American and Soviet leaders gradually developed command and control systems that were successful in preventing accidents, unauthorized attacks and other immediate causes of war.
Most of the accidents and close calls are probably still hidden away, yet to be uncovered by historians. Cirincione mentions one we know of in 1995 when Russia mistook a Norwegian weather rocket for a US submarine-launched ballistic missile. Yeltsin had only a few minutes to launch havoc on the world, but he decided that the “information”must be a mistake.
Since the 1980’s, the two superpowers have reduced their nuclear weapons by almost 70%. Today, we still have more nuclear weapons than any military purpose could justify. Unfortunately, the command and control system in Russia has deteriorated further.
In addition to the reduction in weapons, the number of countries which were developing, had developed or were seriously discussing nuclear programs has dropped since the 1980’s. This was due to a combination of factors that still determine such decisions today, including security, expense, need for status or prestige, internal politics and other factors.
New nuclear nations have been born. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Ukraine instantly became the third greatest nuclear power on the face of the globe. Kazakhstan and Belarus also became part of the nuclear family by virtue of the Soviet military facilities left in their territory. It wasn’t immediately obvious to all their citizens that they should give up that status. Through much diplomacy and much assurance that they would have immediate economic benefits and long-term integration with the West politically, they relinquished the weapons and joined the Non-proliferation Treaty signatories as non-nuclear states..
Not surprisingly, the author identifies nuclear weapons in the possession of terrorists as the greatest threat in the world today, followed by the danger of existing arsenals being used, and the possibility of more nuclear nations as individual states make that decision.
The fourth great danger is that the whole non-proliferation regime becomes unraveled. In this sense, a regime refers to the network of prevailing arrangements and practices mostly based on treaties, but including organizations of nuclear export suppliers and other activity.
It has been surprisingly successful but itis fragile, as are so many things that exist by virtue of many individuals and groupseach acting independently based on assumptions about the “rules” and practices. Something like a huge, complex free-market system in 2008.
Fortunately, we already know a lot about our vulnerability to would-be nuclear terrorists. The most difficult part of getting a nuclear weapon is getting the fissile material, compared to which bomb design is relatively easy. We have programs in existence now to secure fissile material, and they could be even more successful with more focus and more funds devoted to them. For example, we have the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs which have removed, destroyed, or upgraded the security of fissile material, nuclear warheads, missiles and more in the former Soviet Union.
As for non-nuclear nations deciding to develop nuclear weapons, their choices are more complex. For example, Americans observing Iran’s nuclear posturing see the possible destruction of Israel and the possible involvement of the US if an ally is attacked. Iran’s representatives also tend to describe their nuclear program in those terms. But in 2007, all the Arab states and Turkey suddenly began “peaceful” nuclear programs. They are still in the early stages, discussing, especially with France, the purchase of nuclear reactors for generating energy. Today there are no such nuclear reactors in the Middle East, except the one being built in Iran. They are responding to Iran’s nuclear program and their perception that Iran is gaining much greater influence in the world. All things considered, Iran might be much more secure if it doesn’t build nuclear weapons, and a rational decision to that effect would be consistent with threats for political purposes.
Looking at the influences on national decisions, they vary enormously on a case-by-case basis, often on an individual-by-individual basis, because the strength of internal pressures from nuclear scientists themselves, politicians and other players are often significant.
Every US administration has taken some steps that were crucial to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, the current US administration has taken an alternate approach to nuclear proliferation; viz., removing hostile regimes suspected of harboring nuclear weapons. Explicit policy decisions are detailed in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 and The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Nuclear proliferation is not considered a problem itself;rather it is the nuclear proliferation to countries that do not support freedom.
We may see changes in the wake of elections this year.