Background to conflict and gang culture, El Salvador
The civil war officially ran from 1980 – 1992, between the military government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) – left-wing guerrilla groups. The country had experienced tensions for sometime already during the 1970s and even as far back as 1932.
p. ix. Categories of violence and the continuum.
Category / Defintion / ManifestationPolitical/institutional: / The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power. / Guerrilla conflict; paramilitary conflict; political assassinations; armed conflict between political
parties; violence perpetrated by state ‘political institutions’ such as the army and police.
Economic / The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power. / Street crime; carjacking; robbery/theft; drug trafficking; kidnapping; assaults including killing and rape made during economic crimes.
Social / The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power. / Interpersonal violence such as spouse and child abuse; sexual assault of women and children; arguments that get out of control.
Source: Moser (2000: 36).
ODI report underscores the need to recognise the last point – random gratuitous violence, as it pervades the lives of local populations, and ‘can be associated with a lack of, or limited conception of, citizenship’ (Moser & Winton 2002: ix).
The significance of demystifying some common perceptions about the ‘maras’ (gangs)
Since the ubiquitous gang culture of the ‘maras’ is the most visible, and often the most brutal, manifestation
of Central American violence it is important to deconstruct some of prevailing myths about them, including
the following:
• All gangs have the same objectives: It is important to differentiate between bandas that are gangs
specifically structured around criminal (economic) violence and that may be closely linked to organised
crime, and maras, that range from normal groups of friends to bandas, in terms of their level of
criminality.
• All youth are intrinsically violent: Although ‘maras’ are responsible for a range of social and
economic violence, not all young people are intrinsically violent. Consequently not all gang activity is
violent or illicit, not all delinquents are gang members, and not all young people are either (or both).
• Gangs are exclusively a male phenomenon: Although they are overwhelmingly a male phenomenon,
some maras have female leaders, while, in a few cases, female only gangs exist.
• Gang violence is exclusively economic in nature: Although maras engage in economic violence, some
of their violence is social. This is frequently linked to issues of peer group identity. It can also include
the sexual abuse of young women.
• Youth gangs are caused by violent motives: Young people do not join gangs entirely due to violent
aspirations, but rather in response to a number of social, economic and cultural factors. These culminate
in their seeking in a gang what they do not find at home – understanding, communication and respect.
Causes include the deportation of gang members from the US; intra-regional migration; the exclusion of
youth in poor marginal urban; and precarious living conditions including severe overcrowding, the lack
of recreational space, and the lack of basic services which all serve to weaken the socialisation function
of the family.
Source: ODI 2002 p. x
Causal, structural factors underpinning violence:
Legacy of violence in the region – extra-judicial killings by police and members of non-state groups, allegations of social cleansing. Lynching, contract revenge killings and family revenge massacres have been documented. Associated with lack of trust in system?
Organised crime exacerbated by civil conflict (demobilised ex-combatants forming armed gangs and groups).
Proliferation of arms and cross-regional traffic – associated with economic activities like kidnappings, regional/local/international drug trafficking, contraband activities, armed robbery etc.
Poverty, inequality and exclusion in distribution of eco/pol/social resources – poverty and inequality overlap to ‘generate conditions in which some people resort to crime and violence.’ (ODI 2002: x).
Multi-causal epidemiological model of causal factors of violence: 3 contributory factors –
1. Social/familial position and situation (gender, age, education, socialisation, alcohol/drug use).
2. Social, economic and cultural factors (unemployment, poverty, overcrowding, social inequality, violence in media and culture of violence).
3. Institutional and contextual factors (war, drug trafficking, corruption, availability of firearms etc).
Source: Arriagada and Godoy (1999).
Background info (socio-economic):
El Salvador as a country: smallest (compared to Hondusras, Guatemala and Nicaragua). But densely populated (7 times greater than Nicaragua per square km). Young population. 5.7 million population (UN data), as of 2001 (UNDP data) ES had higher GDP per capita than the other 3 countries, and a much higher annual growth rate (1990-1999) of 2.8, compared to 0.3 – 1.5 in the others. But all 3 have low human development and gender-related development indices and high human poverty indices (UNDP 2001).
48.3% of population were below the poverty line from 1984 – 1999 (GET MORE RECENT DATA).
Historical context to understanding gang violence:
Is violence embedded in Latin American societal evolution? Nature of the state itself is violent.
Different forms of violence overlap each other forming a ‘complex, multiple layering of violent manisfestations’ (ODI 2002: 5). Legacy of the civil conflicts? Conflict and violence peaked in the 80s with US military and financial support to the right-wing governments fighting ‘communist’ threats (perceived – underscored by fact that the FMLN was receving arms shipments from Cuba). Though ‘peace’ came in the early 1990s throughout the region, the transition process to ‘post-conflict; has been shaky at best.
The political violence of the 80s has been replaced by socio-economic violence (in the form of those manifestations listed above) – much more multifaceted.
Rise in delinquency - ‘the problem of delinquency is of such magnitude that Salvadorans have become
more alarmed by criminal violence than what concerned them during the war…’ (Cruz, 1998, cited in
Arriagada and Godoy, 1999:16). Also to be mentioned – fear and insecurity associated with this violence, pervading people’s lives – exacerbated by high reportings by media (overzealous?) – play significant role in shaping and distorting public opinion (ODI 2002). Maras dominating the headlines. Media telling people (effectively) that they have no solution but to arm themselves. It’s entirely sensationalist – and creates pervasive culture of fear and notions of vulnerability that are not always genuine or consistent with the observed violence (Arriagada & Godoy 2000).
The legacy of regional political conflict on everyday violence
What is the impact of the political violence legacy on everyday and gang patterns of violence? Importance of implications of protracted political conflicts:
Civil war:
· Inheritance of culture of violence – system of norms and values that encourages the use of violence to resolve any type of conflict or relations with other people (Cruz 1998 quoted in ODI report). Normalization of violence comes from the protracted experience of the violent political conflict, which has permeated everyday life and behavior.
· The trust in the state is incredibly low due to the civil conflict experienced in the past and perpetrated by the state. It is eroded further by the fact that the post-conflict state is weak and corrupt and where the powerful ‘remain shielded by impunity’ (ODI 2002: 11). Lack of policing and judicial efficacy. These factors can directly cause violence in the form of community and individual vigilantism (ibid.).
· High crime rate thus therefore both cause and effect of ineffectual policing?
· Cruz 1998 – 40% adults in El Salvador believe it’s best to ignore a law if you do not agree with it.
· Increase in violent crime lowers inhibitions about conflict (criminals provide example to copy) and erosion of social norms that regulate interpersonal relations (good for Emily section?)
· Remnant of the civil wars = weapons in general circulation, easy to come across and cheap to buy (?)
Agrarian system:
· Inherited from Spanish colonization) – inequitable land distribution has led to unequal distribution of resources (most land owned by dominant elite).
· Peasants seek land and livelihood rights (principally through land reform) – experiences of military oppression when tried to change these trends and challenge the power relations.
· Rural areas – suffer worst oppression by elite, and military COIN campaigns attempt to stop local communities turning into or sheltering guerrilla ‘sympathisers’.
US involvement in the region:
· Since mid 19th century. Impact on national political and economic structure of region.
· Cold War interest in region – changed interest from being economic to political.
· End of Cold War transformed interests of US again – promotion of peaceful solutions to conflict, establish consolidated democratic regimes.
Proliferation of arms:
· Widespread acceptance of use of arms to control and protect (associated with arms possession).
· San Salvador – 49% of adults in favour of neighbours arming themselves to combat delinquency (ACTIVA survey, quoted in ‘Stray bullets’ small arms survey 2002).
· Conflict led to black market of weapons (high caliber military grade – ODI 2002: 22).
· Few collected/destroyed following peace signings.
· Increase in private security firms also contributed to more guns on market and in use.
ODI data 2002 on arms in El Salvador:
Estimates for current civilian circulation of firearms range from 250,000 to 400,000 (Cruz and Beltrán, 2000)
7% of people surveyed in the metropolitan area of San Salvador reported owning a firearm. Projecting this onto
the whole urban population, suggests some 25,000 people admit to being armed (Cruz, 1998)
In 1998, 6 out of every 10 violent deaths in the department of San Salvador were the result of firearms or
explosives, and in 1999, an average of 5 people a day died as the result of homicide by a firearm nationwide
(Cruz and Beltrán, 2000), which is equivalent to a homicide rate of approximately 30 per 100,000 inhabitants
In 1993, it was found that at least one member of 30% of families in urban El Salvador has been the victim of an
armed assault (Cruz, 1999)
A 1999 survey in the metropolitan area of San Salvador, showed 7% of school children between 13 and 19
admitted having taken a firearm to school (ibid.)
A law introduced in 1999 meant that any citizen could obtain a semi-automatic weapon with enough power to
kill a two tonne animal (ibid.)
30% of respondents in the ACTIVA survey of San Salvador had seen someone robbed with a weapon (Londoño
and Guerrero, 1999).
Bibliography:
Arriagada, I. and Godoy, L. (2000) ‘Prevention or Repression? The False Dilemma of Citizen Security’ in
CEPAL Review, 70: 111–136
Cruz, J.M. (1998) ‘Los Factores Posibilitadores de la Violencia en El Salvador’ in UNDP, Violencia en una Sociedad en Transición, UNDP: San Salvador, 88–95
Moser, C. (2000) Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital, World Bank Country Study, World Bank: Washington D.C.
Moser ODI report.