Working Paper

By

Peter W. Connors, PhD

8165906821

COALITION EFFORTS TO LEGITIMIZE THE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT

Introduction and Background

The years 2005 and 2006 were demanding times for Coalition Forces in Iraq. The election of a Transitional National Assembly and Provincial Councils, the writing of a new constitution, a national constitutional referendum, the Council of Representatives election, the naming of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime minister and the appointment of his cabinet, the rise of Sunni-Shia sectarian violence, the numerous attempts at national reconciliation, the Sunni awakening, and the prelude to the “troop surge” all took place within this timeframe. This chapter will review in detail each of these governance-related accomplishments and occurrences, as well as Multi-National Force-Iraq’s efforts to set the conditions for successful elections, to integrate legitimacy and democratic principles into all levels of Iraqi government, to help build institutions, and to improve the daily lives of everyday Iraqi citizens across the country. The United States’ strategic objective in OIF was for Iraq to be unified, democratic, and federal, and be capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself in order to ultimately become an ally in the war on terror.[1] Thus, vigorously pursuing MNF-I’s key governance line of operations and helping Iraqis legitimize their new government was paramount in the minds of MNF-I Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines during 2005 and 2006.[2]

At its 4,987th meeting on 4 June 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1546 which authorized full sovereignty for the Interim Government of Iraq and ushered in a new phase in Iraq’s transition to democracy. The Resolution reiterated the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own political future and set forth a timetable for electing a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), forming a transitional government, drafting a permanent constitution, and establishing a constitutionally elected Parliament. Annexed to Resolution 1546 was a memorandum from United States Secretary of State, Colin L. Powell, acknowledging Iraq’s request for the continued presence of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) to maintain security, deter terrorism, facilitate reconstruction, and assist the Iraqi people in their transition to democracy.[3]

As a key component of full spectrum operations, fostering effective governance in Iraq had always been a top priority for Coalition forces. In the summer of 2003, CJTF-7 commander, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, declared Governance one of four lines of operations in his campaign plan. The 4th Infantry, 82d Airborne, and 1st Cavalry Divisions followed suit, proclaiming governance a key “pillar” of their respective plans of operation. When General George Casey assumed command of MNF-I in June 2004, he reaffirmed the critical nature of good governance, particularly in a society heretofore unfamiliar with the democratic process. Casey considered creating a secure environment for the January 2005 TNA elections his most significant mission and credited the goals and objectives outlined in UN Resolution 1546 with providing critical guidance.[4]

Summary of Key Events Leading to Democracy in Iraq

On 20 March 2003, President George W. Bush declared war on Iraq and the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom the next day. By 9 April, Baghdad had fallen and Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner and his Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) arrived shortly thereafter to assume administrative responsibility for post-war Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the leadership of L. Paul Bremer, U.S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq, succeeded ORHA in May. Bremer quickly issued two controversial CPA Orders – No. 1 disbanding the Baath Party and No. 2 dissolving the Iraqi Armed Forces. Later that month, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 that lifted economic sanctions against Iraq and officially acknowledged the U.S.-led administration in the country. Next, Bremer appointed a 25 member Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC) that was inaugurated in July. As the year ended, an agreement was reached between the United States and the IGC to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government by 30 June 2004 and former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. forces near his hometown of Tikrit.[5]

The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), Iraq’s interim constitution, was approved by the IGC in March 2004. The TAL specified a system of checks and balances and the subordination of the military to civilian rule, as well as an Iraqi bill rights.[6] In June, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1546 that appointed an interim government in Iraq and authorized continued U.S. military presence in the country; the IGC dissolved; and the U.S. transferred power to the 33-member Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), led by newly-designated Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. During the remainder of 2004, the IIG concentrated on preparations for the 275-member national assembly and provincial council elections, which took place as scheduled on 30 January 2005. Fifty-eight percent of eligible Iraqis voted despite a Sunni boycott, and the United Iraq Alliance, a Shia coalition, won a majority of assembly seats. Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim al-Jaafari were selected president and prime minister, respectively, in April. Over the spring and summer, assembly delegates negotiated the terms and conditions of the new Iraqi constitution. The Iraqi electorate then ratified the proposed permanent constitution by a 79% majority in a referendum vote on 15 October. In what became the third national election of the year, Iraqis voted once again in December – this time to select members of a new parliament (the Council of Representatives or CoR) to four-year terms of office. This time, more than 50% of Sunnis participated, violence at the poles was minimal, and the United Iraqi Alliance won 128 of the 275 total seats.[7]

Efforts to form a national unity government in Iraq were deadlocked, however, for nearly four months until 22 April 2006, when Shia compromise candidate, Nuri al-Maliki, was nominated and approved as the new prime minister. Sectarian violence continued to escalate during the remainder of 2006, prompting the bipartisan Iraq Survey Group to declare the situation in Iraq as grave and deteriorating and to call for a change of U.S. policy. In January 2007, President Bush announced his own revised strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Entitled The New Way Forward in Iraq, the President’s plan directed the deployment of additional 21,500 U.S. troops (the surge) to provide increased security for the citizens of Baghdad and Anbar province and exhorted the new Iraqi government to vigorously pursue reconciliation initiatives and to improve delivery of essential services.[8]

Partnership and Understanding - Overview of the MNF-I Governance LOO

As with the CJTF-7 campaign plan, governance was one of the lines of operation for MNF-I beginning in 2004. Establishing a secure environment, fostering Iraqi self-reliance, and legitimizing Iraq’s new government were all key elements of the MNF-I strategy. In accordance with U.N. Resolution 1546, creating safety and security in advance of the January 2005 Iraqi TNA elections was a primary Coalition objective, followed subsequently by a major effort to promote the new Assembly’s legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi citizens. Coalition forces, who were initially liberators, then occupiers, would now move on to become supporters, protectors, and partners with Iraqis as the December 2005 Parliamentary elections approached. MNF-I, whose headquarters was at Camp Victory near BIAP, established MNF-I (Fwd) at the presidential palace in the International Zone, downtown Baghdad, to further enhance engagement and cordial relations with Iraqi officials and to assist them with various democracy issues, such as the rules of law, tribal concerns, provincial and local governance, Sunni/Shia reconciliation, reconstituting working-level bureaucracies, and becoming self-sufficient in conducting their own affairs. MNF-I (Fwd) was staffed with strategic planners, policy experts, and STRATCOM and Civil/Military officers, and was led by MNF-I’s Deputy Commanding General, British Army Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely.

By the end of 2005, Iraq’s 18 Provincial Councils, that were powerless under Saddam’s authoritarian regime, were now up and running, along with 90 District Councils, 194 city or sub-district councils, 437 neighborhood councils, and 660 Iraqi community associations supporting grassroots democracy.[9] General Casey encouraged MNF-I Soldiers to view the constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections with a sense of irreversible momentum pushing the Iraqi people forward on the road to democracy. He also called for joint efforts with the U.S. Embassy to reach out to Sunni Arab countries for support of the constitutional and political process in Iraq. As a supplement to the official MNF-I campaign plan, Casey further set the conditions for post-election success in Iraq by outlining a seven-point plan to defeat foreign fighters, secure Iraq’s borders, build ministerial capacity, transfer security responsibilities to the ISF, refine Iraq’s justice system, provide adequate funding for reconstruction, redefine the MNF-I mandate, and sustain the Coalition. Continued stability, however, was still the bedrock issue in Iraq and crucial to Iraqi’s successful completion of the political process.[10]

MNF-I Support of the January 2005 Iraqi National Assembly Election

During the summer and fall of 2004, the insurgency in Iraq continued to escalate. U.S. forces and the Iraqi government became increasingly concerned that insurgent-held areas would not be pacified prior to the January 2005 elections. A series of successful offensive operations, however, carried out by a combined force of U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers, sent a powerful message to both insurgents and Iraqi citizens alike that the Interim Government would not tolerate interference with the upcoming national elections. Nevertheless, a limited amount of election-related violence continued throughout the country, prompting the Iraqi Islamic party, the largest mainstream Sunni Muslim party, to withdraw from the race in late December.[11] Despite the dissention, Prime Minister Allawi dismissed the notion of postponement and insisted that the elections would go ahead as planned on 30 January 2005. In a similar demonstration of support, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani proclaimed in a fatwa that all Iraqi citizens had a duty to vote in the upcoming elections. Sunnis, on the other hand, discouraged participation in the voting, apparently fearing retribution from the majority Shiites if they gained political power.[12] And on January 23rd, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in an effort to dissuade Iraqi citizens from voting, released an internet recording declaring a bitter war against democracy and all those who seek to enact it. Zarqawi went on to denounce the Interim Iraqi Government “as a tool used by the Americans to promote the lie that is called democracy.”[13]

In further anticipation of the January elections, MNF-I took steps to increase combat power in Iraq to help maintain security. Additional U.S. forces were quickly deployed to Iraq and several units, already there, had their tours extended until after the election. In all, the pre-election force in Iraq increased by nearly 12,000 Soldiers, Marines, and British Royal Highland Fusiliers. Iraqi police and military forces assumed primary polling-site security duty, while significant numbers of U.S. troops patrolled the streets and waited behind-the-scenes, ready to provide immediate backup whenever necessary.[14]

As insurgent violence continued, officials from the Independent Electoral Commission announced the closing of Iraq’s international borders in an effort to tighten security.[15] Less than a week later, Iraq’s government proclaimed an 8pm to 6am nationwide curfew, restricted election day driving to officials only, prevented traveling between provinces, banned weapons, cancelled all leave for Iraqi police and military forces, declared January 29-31 holidays, and announce closure of Baghdad International Airport for three days during the election.[16] On election day, Iraqi police and military forces assumed primary polling-site security duty, while significant numbers of U.S. troops patrolled the streets and waited behind-the-scenes, ready to provide immediate backup whenever necessary.[17]

Election Day in Iraq – 30 January 2005

Although 45 Iraqis were killed in violence on election day, the anticipated rise in insurgent attacks never fully materialized. By day’s end, an estimated 8.4 million citizens had voted, representing a surprising 60% turnout. Along with the 275 representatives who were elected from 111 political parties to the Transitional National Assembly, provincial councils were established in each of the 18 provinces and a new Kurdish legislature was elected. 140,000election workers and 6,000 organizing officials had worked tirelessly at 5,000 polling places to make this historic election day a remarkable success. In many instances, Iraqis had to wait in long line to cast their votes. Most were proud to do so.

There was dancing in the streets, and Baghdad took on the air of a carnival town. “It’s like a wedding. I swear to God, it’s a wedding for all Iraq. No one has ever witnessed this before, no one has ever seen anything like. And we did it ourselves,” proclaimed Mohammed Nuhair Rubaie from Baghdad’s Tunis neighborhood.[18] Hamid Azawi raised his purple finger so everyone could see and said, “Whatever they do, I would still vote. Even if I were dead, I would still participate. The vote comes from the bottom of my heart.”[19] After casting his vote, Prime Minister Allawi addressed the sense of hope that those who had voted were now feeling when he noted, “This is the starting point on the path to democracy, rule of law, prosperity, and security for Iraq and the entire region.”[20]

In a show of pride, Iraqi citizens continued to display their ink-stained fingers for several days after the election. At the U.S. State of the Union address in Washington the following week, members of Congress dyed their own index fingers purple as a show of support for the Iraqi people and their successful election. President Bush had closely followed the Iraqi election returns. He would later compliment those who had voted. “For millions of Iraqis, it was an act of personal courage,” he said, “and they have earned the respect of us all.”[21]

Although the majority of Sunni Arabs had boycotted, and the insurgents had threatened widespread attacks, and many Iraqis had thought that Americans would manipulate the vote, the 2005 election was, nonetheless, an enormous achievement. The election’s success was not without cost however. One U.S., 10 British, and eight Iraqi Soldiers, along with 26 Iraqi civilians, were killed on election day. In all, 260 insurgent attacks occurred (four times the daily average) throughout Iraq in an effort to disrupt election procedures.[22]

Iraqi Legislative Election Results

On February 13, 2005, after nearly two weeks of counting the votes, the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) announced the results. One hundred eleven electoral alliances had candidates running in the election and 8.55 million Iraqi citizens had voted. Only about a dozen alliances received sufficient votes to earn seats in the 275-member Transitional National Assembly. The Assembly’s first order of business was to choose a three-person presidential council, a president and two deputies, that would appoint a prime minister. Drafting a new Iraqi constitution was to be the Assembly’s next immediate undertaking.[23]

As was expected, Iraq’s majority Shiites won nearly half (4.1M / 48.2 %) of the votes – enough to control 140 of the 275 Assembly seats. The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), also known as “the Shia house,” “the clerics’ list,” or the “list of 169,” fielded a slate of 228 Shiite political candidates and was tacitly supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.[24] The UIA consisted of three separate electoral alliances: the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) led by Shiite cleric Abdel al-Hakim, the Dawa Party headed by Interim Vice President Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and the Iraq National Congress (INC) whose leader was Ahmed Chalabi.[25]

The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan won the second-largest bloc of votes (2.2M / 25 %), thereby earning 75 Assembly seats. These favorable results enhanced the Kurdish alliance’s chances of preserving autonomy in northern Iraq. Two principal sub-parties made up the Kurdish alliance: the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led, respectively, by Sunni Kurds Massoud Barzani and Jala Talabani.[26] U.S.-supported interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his Iraq List party came in third place (1.2M / 14 %), while the Sunni Arab alliance, The Iraqis, led by Interim President Ghazi al-Yawar, was fourth (150,680 votes / 1.8 %).[27]

The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq followed principles of the Hare System of Proportional Representation in establishing guidelines for the January Iraqi elections. This system, also known as “single transferable vote”, was developed by British attorney Thomas Hare in the 19th century, and insures equal representation among the electorate in direct proportion to numerical strength.[28] Consequently, Iraqi women turned out to vote in higher-than-expected numbers since approximately 25 % of the seats in the Transitional National Assembly had been reserved for them. Surprisingly, Ayatollah Sistani issued a Fatwa encouraging women to vote even if their husbands disapproved.[29]