Art Law – Outline

Professor Amy Adler

Fall 2006

  1. ART AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
  2. Introduction
  3. First amendment
  4. Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
  5. Exodus 20, Ten Commandments
  6. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth
  7. Is postmodernism a kind of iconoclasm, breaking down worship of authorship, originality, etc?
  8. The Artist’s Right to Free Expression: Censorship Law and Theory
  9. Obscenity Law
  10. Themes
  11. Defining obscenity
  12. Justifying excluding obscenity from first amendment protection
  13. Evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence
  14. Roth (1957) to Miller and Paris Adult Theater (1973)
  15. Roth says obscenity is not an idea and thus does not trigger first amendment protection
  16. Upholds marketplace of ideas vision of the 1st amendment
  17. Does not look at obscenity’s harm
  18. Miller test
  19. Appeals to prurient interest
  20. Under community standards
  21. Patently offensive
  22. Under community standards
  23. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
  24. Under reasonable person standard, per Pope v. Illinois
  25. Paris Adult Theater
  26. Introduces a moral rationale, including right to maintain a decent society, setting the tone of commerce, and possibly public safety
  27. Miller in practice
  28. Jenkins v. GA (1974)
  29. Film Carnal Knowledge not “patently offensive,” so not obscene
  30. Looks like it filters out some works, but the Sup Ct is a very high-level filter
  31. Obscenity and Post-Modernism
  32. Art reacts against notion that it must have “serious artistic value”
  33. Case studies
  34. Mapplethorp at the CincinnatiContemporaryArtsCenter
  35. Photography
  36. Maybe an easy case because his style is traditional
  37. Corcoran cancelled his show, ex. of self-censorship
  38. Barbara Nitke’s photography website requires an 18+ disclaimer
  39. Major theory readings and discussion
  40. Adler, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law
  41. Post-Modern art
  42. Attacks distinctions b/w good and bad art, high art and pop culture
  43. Marks end of originality
  44. No sincere genius artist
  45. Intersects with obscenity
  46. Legal definition of art
  47. References Bleistein to say cts shouldn’t judge art’s worth
  48. Can’t be defined by artist’s intention
  49. Opens defense of intent to all pornographers
  50. Post-modern artists eschew sincere intent
  51. Can’t be defined by art world’s acceptance
  52. Doesn’t account for performance artists like Karen Finley who perform in clubs
  53. Doesn’t protect undiscovered artists
  54. Fact finders won’t know art when they see it
  55. “‘Art,’ by its nature, will call into question any definition that we ascribe to it. As soon as we put up a boundary, an artist will violate it, because that is what artists do.”
  56. Impossible to simultaneously both protect art and protect people from obscenity
  57. Discussion
  58. Marketplace of ideas rationale may be grounded in assumption that it will uncover political truth
  59. Tied to concepts of democracy
  60. Not the same as liberty
  61. Obscene material may speak to the body rather than the mind
  62. Marketing something as porn may reduce the likelihood that a court will find it valuable
  63. But artist may not have control of this
  64. Speech with some value can be banned under Miller
  65. Child Pornography Law
  66. Federal statute developed after Ferber
  67. Child Protection Act of 1984
  68. Prohibits use of child (under 18) in a sexual performance
  69. Defines performance as any play, motion picture, photo, or dance
  70. Emphasizes live or photographic displays, not text
  71. Defines sexual conduct as
  72. Actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, s-m abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals
  73. Banning child porn a categorical approach to censorship
  74. No exceptions for works of value
  75. Brennan in Ferber would make an exception
  76. O’Connor would not
  77. Material can be child porn without being obscene
  78. Diverges from traditional 1st amendment principles
  79. Speech banned b/c of underlying crime it expresses
  80. No overbreadth doctrine
  81. Doctrinal development
  82. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)
  83. Upholds NY’s child porn law under the rational that children are harmed in the production of the material
  84. Also, record of abuse haunts child, need to dry up the market, value of speech de minimis
  85. Does not include a rationale that looking at child porn is harmful
  86. Suggests that if one really needs to create such works, use older actors or simulation
  87. U.S. v. Dost, (S.D. Cal. 1986)
  88. Test for determining “lascivious exhibition of genitals”
  89. Focal point is the genital or pubic area?
  90. Setting sexually suggestive?
  91. Unnatural pose or inappropriate attire?
  92. Nude?
  93. Suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity?
  94. Intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer?
  95. Test prevails in most jurisdictions
  96. Osborne v. Ohio (1990)
  97. Criminalizes mere possession of child porn
  98. Differs from Stanley v. GA in the obscenity context
  99. Which said “the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.”
  100. U.S. v. Knox, (3d. Cir. 1994)
  101. Ct holds that lascivious exhibition of the genitals can include clothed, indiscernible genitals
  102. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition(2002)
  103. Virtual child porn law struck down
  104. Prospect of harm doesn’t justify censorship
  105. Shows concern about content, not harm in production
  106. Congress’ rationale for law
  107. Photos used to seduce kids, whet appetite of potential pedophiles, create a market
  108. Hard to prosecute underlying act
  109. Case studies
  110. Sally Mann
  111. A serious artist, but maybe only prosecutorial discretion has kept her out of jail
  112. Lesser artists
  113. Jock Sturges, Richard Prince’s Spiritual America
  114. Larry Clark
  115. Complicit. Perhaps his camera even encourages behavior.
  116. Calvin Klein ad campaign
  117. Hugely controversial, but hugely popular
  118. Major theory readings and discussion
  119. Adler, Inverting the First Amendment (2001)
  120. Cts have never defined child pornography
  121. A passive approach
  122. Expansion of law increasingly unrelated to harms of production
  123. Tries to encompass all the things pedophiles find arousing
  124. Sweeps in artists and family photographers
  125. Constitutional problems
  126. Vague and overbroad
  127. Allows prosecution for pictures w/o underlying act of child molestation
  128. Without an exception for works of value, child porn viewing has become a thought crime
  129. Law treats speech as so powerful that it will conjure up what it depicts
  130. Reverts distinction b/w speech and what it represents or causes
  131. A superstitious view of speech
  132. Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography (2001)
  133. Child porn law has reinforced the problem it seeks to attack
  134. Focus on child pornography makes children sexual objects
  135. “Censorship law responds to and shapes a cultural crisis.”
  136. Law has acquired a “sense of boundlessness” in its development
  137. Legislatures push limits w/o judicial restraint
  138. Discussion
  139. Cases like Knox contribute to the changed way of looking at children
  140. Ask us to take on the mind of a pedophile
  141. Creates intrusion of sexuality in otherwise nonsexual situations
  142. Photography particular focus of child porn angst
  143. Creates/perpetuates a crime
  144. Betrays subject
  145. Betrays viewer
  146. The Feminist Anti Pornography Movement
  147. Catharine Mackinnon’s view of pornography
  148. Central to the subordination of women
  149. Women harmed during the production
  150. Representation perpetuates subordination
  151. “All pornography is the documentation of a rape”
  152. Conflates the underlying act, the image, and the image’s effect
  153. Proposed legislation
  154. Definition of pornography
  155. The sexually explicit subordination of women
  156. Bans images and words
  157. Does not incorporate a Miller obscenity standard
  158. Should not be included in the marketplace of ideas
  159. Free speech by men silences women
  160. A market failure
  161. Value is irrelevant
  162. Porn is not speech
  163. It is the act of sex
  164. Suggests that this is more of a 14th amendment issue than a 1st
  165. Case studies
  166. Andrea Fraser’s videoUntitled in which she’s commissioned to have sex
  167. She is the agent, but Mackinnon still sees the image as subordination
  168. Adler said the people at the gallery were all teenage boys
  169. Carolee Schneemann’sInterior Scroll
  170. Reclamation of the female body in the 1970s
  171. Annie Sprinkle
  172. Combines art and porn
  173. Major theory readings and discussion
  174. MacKinnon’s Not a Moral Issue (1983)
  175. Compares obscenity to pornography
  176. Obscenity is an abstract moral idea
  177. Standard based on the male perspective
  178. Obscenity makes rules, but does not truly make porn unavailable or illegitimate
  179. In fact, it may enhance appeal
  180. Porn is a concrete political practice
  181. Men have sex with images
  182. Porn is like segregation
  183. Whites only signs
  184. Porn’s value is irrelevant because all porn harms women
  185. Porn chills women’s speech
  186. “Silence is not eloquent”
  187. Porn creates a social reality
  188. Its harm becomes invisible
  189. MacKinnon’s Only Words (1993)
  190. Harm is relived in images
  191. Other harmful speech is treated as an act
  192. E.g., saying kill to an attack law
  193. All porn made under conditions of inequality based on sex
  194. American Booksellers v. Hudnut (7th Cir. 1985)
  195. Finds Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance unconstitutional
  196. Easterbrook’s majority opinion
  197. Ordinance amounts to thought control
  198. Discriminates based on content
  199. “Under the First Amendment…there is no such thing as a false idea”
  200. “Governments that want stasis start by restricting speech.”
  201. Accepts ordinance’s premise
  202. Porn perpetuates subordination
  203. Believes porn is protected because of its harm
  204. Distinguishes b/w speech and conduct
  205. “Unhappy effects depend on mental intermediation.”
  206. “Indianapolis seeks to prohibit certain speech b/c it . . . influences social relations and politics on a grand scale, that it controls attitudes at home and in the legislature. This precludes a characterization of the speech as low value.”
  207. “The image of pain is not necessarily pain”
  208. Debate over Mackinnon
  209. Infantilizes women
  210. Dismisses their own agency b/c women live with a false consciousness
  211. Sees pleasure as Pavlovian
  212. But rightly recognizes that women have less agency than men
  213. Trouble harmonizing liberty and equality
  214. Hate Speech
  215. Background
  216. Chaplinsky standards
  217. Two types of speech not protected by the First Amendment
  218. Fighting words
  219. NB: requires person to be empowered enough to strike back
  220. Incitement to imminent lawless action
  221. Speech that’s limited outside the 1st amendment
  222. Securities law
  223. Contract
  224. Hate speech allowed under the 1st amendment
  225. Matsuda’s definition of hate speech
  226. Message of racial inferiority
  227. Directed against a historically oppressed group
  228. Message persecutorial, hateful, and degrading
  229. Under a community standard, thus possibly allowing victims to use hate speech to other victims?
  230. For hard cases, ask victims
  231. Irony, intent may not matter
  232. Case studies
  233. Serrano’s KKK portraits
  234. Artists not making a judgment about his subjects
  235. Unclear if subject or photographer is in power
  236. Unclear if these portraits can be distinguished from KKK promotional photos
  237. Jewish Museum’s exhibit Mirroring Evil: Nazi Imagery/Recent Art
  238. Ali G./Borat
  239. “Throw the Jew Down the Well”
  240. Activist “hate art”
  241. Pink Triangle
  242. Central symbol of AIDS movement originally used to identify homosexuals during Holocaust
  243. Wojnarowicz’s America
  244. Photograph of “Fight AIDS Kill a Quere” scrawled in graffiti
  245. Karen Finley’sI’m an Ass Man
  246. Brutal monologue about a rape from the rapist’s point of view”
  247. Major theory readings and discussion
  248. Matsuda’sPublic Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story (1989)
  249. Identifies two harms
  250. Individual
  251. Pain and psychic harm for victims
  252. Spirit murder
  253. Social
  254. Mechanism of subordination and inequality
  255. Recommends criminal and civil sanctions as response to racist speech
  256. NB: Mackinnon didn’t want to entrust sexist state to enforce criminal laws
  257. Hate speech restricts victims’ liberty
  258. They quit jobs, avoid certain public places, self-censor
  259. Sees protection of hate speech as state action
  260. Believes limited definition will prevent censorship floodgates
  261. Adler’sWhat’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression (1996)
  262. In calling for censorship, leftists endanger activist speech that seeks to undermine porno and hate speech
  263. “Victims” adopting the language of “victimizers” to turn oppression on its head
  264. How can Mackinnon, Matsuda, et al. distinguish b/w subversion and oppression?
  265. “There is no way to draw a principled distinction between ‘art’ and ‘pornography,’ or ‘art’ and ‘hate speech’; a substantial overlap between these terms will always exist.”
  266. “Leftists must make a choice: they can adopt a system of censorship, or they can offer full protection to activism. They can’t do both.”
  267. Potential ways to distinguish good speech and bad
  268. Artistic status?
  269. Over and under inclusive
  270. Context?
  271. Always changing, and changing meaning of speech.
  272. Victims as judge?
  273. Problems of essentialism.
  274. Intentionality: is the speaker a victim?
  275. Impossible to discern intent.
  276. Effect is effect.
  277. Insider-status may not reveal intent?
  278. Other considerations
  279. Mackinnonwould likely reject use of pornography by gay, lesbian, and AIDS activists
  280. Right-wings appropriate leftist rhetoric of discrimination and victimization and use it to fight anti-discrimination policies
  281. What is Art and (Why) Is Art Protected by the First Amendment?
  282. What is art?
  283. Tariff and customs cases
  284. U.S. v. Perry (U.S. 1892)
  285. 4 categories
  286. Fine art, minor objects of art, objects of art with a primarily ornamental and incidentally useful purpose, useful objects that please the eye
  287. Based on a standard of beauty, ornament, and pleasure to the eye
  288. Hurley v. Irish-American Parade,U.S. 1995
  289. “the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll”
  290. An under-theorized statement
  291. Bery v. NYC (SDNY 1995) – I
  292. Artists not exempt from NYC’s outdoor vendor licensing law
  293. Law has a rational basis of keeping sidewalks clear
  294. Law is content-neutral
  295. Art does not implicate the 1st amendment
  296. No verbal elements
  297. Does not add to political dialog
  298. Bery v. NYC (2d Cir. 1996) – II
  299. Law fails under strict scrutiny
  300. Strict scrutiny req’d b/c 1st amendment rights are implicated
  301. “Our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters . . . is not entitled full 1st amendment protection.”
  302. But what about art that doesn’t convey ideas?
  303. “Visual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts, and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet . . .”
  304. But are ideas in art that transparent?
  305. Ideas in art transcend verbal language to both the educated and the illiterate
  306. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, SDNY 2004
  307. To determine if graffiti-painted hats are art ct looks to
  308. Individualized creation by the particular artist
  309. Artist’s primary motivation for producing and selling the item
  310. Vendor’s bona fides as an artists
  311. Whether the vendor attempts to convey a message
  312. Whether item appears to contain any elements of expression
  313. Decision
  314. “Art . . . is intentionally produced by the artist to communicate some idea or message.”
  315. Is this so?
  316. Case studies
  317. Warhol
  318. Danto says Warhol made art purely conceptual
  319. Warhol didn’t even make or touch some of his “art”
  320. Major theory readings and discussion
  321. Bery II ct doesn’t provides a satisfactory reason for why art should be protected under the 1st amendment
  322. Does uniqueness v. mass production determine whether Mastrovincenzo’s hats are art?
  323. Art v. craft, fashion, commerce?
  324. Text v. Image
  325. Greater protection of verbal than visual speech
  326. Obscenity generally about images
  327. Kaplan v. California (1973) allows prosecution of obscene textual material
  328. But, “A book seems to have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be.”
  329. Child porn exclusively about images
  330. Texas v. Johnson, U.S. (1989)
  331. Flag burning treated as speech insofar as it is expressive conduct (symbolic speech)
  332. Test
  333. Is it expressive?
  334. Spence test
  335. Intent to convey a particularized message?
  336. Likelihood great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it?
  337. Context of the conduct?
  338. If expressive, can the gov’t still restrict it?
  339. O’Brien test
  340. W/in gov’t’s const’l power?
  341. Furthers an important or substantial gov’t interest?
  342. Gov’t’s interested unrelated to the suppression of free expression?
  343. Incidental restriction on speech no greater than essential for furtherance of interest?
  344. Rehnquist’s dissent
  345. Conflates image with something much larger
  346. “The American flag…has come to be the visible symbol embodying our Nation”
  347. Armed forces “fight and perhaps die for the flag”
  348. Acknowledges mystical power of the symbol
  349. “Millions and millions of Americans regard it with an almost mystical reverence regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs they may have.”
  350. “The uniquely deep awe and respect for our flag felt by virtually all of us…”
  351. Case studies
  352. Glenn Ligon’s text paintings
  353. Reflect on the difference b/w seeing an image and reading about it
  354. “dead” and “two naked children in bed with a naked man”
  355. Serrano’s KKK photos
  356. What sort of wall text would not influence the meaning of these portraits?
  357. Nazi degenerate art show
  358. Graffiti-like wall text influenced the perception of the pieces
  359. Major theory readings and discussion
  360. Adler, The Art of Censorship
  361. Contemporary 1st amendment debates must be understood in context of historical iconoclasm and anxiety about visual representation
  362. “Visual images are frequently perceived as more powerful and less controllable than verbal speech. They do not fit comfortably w/in our current notion of a reasoned, rational marketplace of ideas.”
  363. Reexamines flag burning in visual terms
  364. Power assigned to the flag a kind of idolatry
  365. Contradictions
  366. Art dismissed as pointless and self-indulgent
  367. Yet ferociously resisted
  368. Art’s dangerousness valuable under the 1st amendment
  369. Bypasses reason – appeals directly to the senses
  370. Freedberg, Idolatry and Iconoclasm from The Power of Images
  371. The power of the image, which is fused to its prototype, inspires an impulse to both worship and destroy.
  372. Images destroyed for political and religious reasons
  373. Nazis as lovers and destroyers of art
  374. Those in power seek to control images
  375. Images dangerous b/c their effects cannot be controlled
  376. Themes
  377. Gender
  378. Danger of seduction
  379. Class
  380. Images used to educate but also incite the lower classes/illiterate
  381. Religion
  382. Images a threat to God
  383. Few art historians acknowledge the anxiety surrounding images
  384. Think Elgin Marbles
  385. Dance
  386. Doctrine
  387. Miller v.