Loggins1

Aristotle’s Four Causes and their Increased Effectiveness Through the Union of Cause and Explanation

Kenny Loggins

Abstract: Given an in depth interpretation of Aristotle’s Four Causes and how to apply them, it is possible to solve or avoid certain problems that other theories of causation cannot handle effectively. Despite being considered outdated compared to current post-Humean views, Aristotle’s causes are able to stand their ground against these same thought experiments,.

In Aristotle’s Metaphysics he provides four causes that can be used for anything that needs an explanation. These Four Causes are versatile because one, all, or any combination of the causes may be invoked to establish causation. Further interpretation of Aristotle’s causes and that of others has led to the conclusion thatAristotle’s word choice we translate as “cause” is stronger than that of the English language. All this provides for Aristotle’s Four Causes to effectively handle several problems that cause more contemporary theories of causation trouble.

The Four Causes are:

  • The material cause: “that out of which,” e.g., the bronze of a statue.
  • The formal cause: “the form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape of a statue.
  • The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change or rest”, e.g., the artisan, the art of the bronze-casting the statue, the man who gives advice, the father of the child.
  • The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losing weight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools. (Falcon)

These causes are different than those in some Post-Humean theories of causation because of the special context believed to surround Aristotle’s use of the Latin word for cause, aitia.

Aristotle believed that any cause is an answer to the question, “why?” He believes it is in the explanation of the “why?” we find the cause and that that cause(or aitia) will be one or a number of his Four Causes. It is here that several philosophers (Hocutt 392, Annas 319) make the distinction that perhaps a closer translation for “aitia” may in fact becloser to “because” due to the emphasis Aristotle places on the idea of aitia being a causal explanation. Annas goes on to detail how this, “‘fuses’ cause and explanation…”(320)Thanks in Aristotle’s view. This inclusion of explanation (as most believe was his original intent) makes his account of causation stronger than it may have seemed at first glance.

Another source of strength for Aristotle’s Causes lies in his third cause:Efficient Cause. The Efficient cause or “the primary source of the change or rest” (Falcon) is a stronger cause because Aristotle’s definition has the potential to talk about causation in which some sort of change takes place, for example, the casting of the bronze statue. According to Aristotle the efficient cause is the art of, or knowledge of casting the statue not necessarily the artist herself. This move makes the efficient cause is free from the artists desires, intentions, etc. and this account lines up with the foundation that the Efficient Cause, and the other causes, have been built uponour revised definition of aitia to that of “because.” The first problem of causation that the Four Causes can thwart is that of Transitivity.

Though causation doesn’t necessarily need to be transitive it is both commonly held and intuitively thought to be part of what makes up causation is its transitive properties. One example would be there are three people, namely, P, Q, and R. P and Q have levers in front of them which they can move up or down. If at any point in time the levers are both up or both down, a piano will fall onto person R. It just so happens that that P does not wish R any harm, so upon seeing Q’s lever in the up position, P moves hers to down. Unfortunately person Q does wish R harm and then moves her lever to the down position releasing the baby grand.

One would most likely wish to say that P did not cause harm to come to R but it seems that through ordinary transitivity P’s moving her lever cause Q to move hers. It is in this situation that it is likely Aristotle would invoke the Efficient cause and state that the explanation for the source of change is not contingent on P’s desires. With only the knowledge of the way the death contraption was intended to function she took the only action that did not result in R’s immediate death. It is possible that a Final Cause would be brought to bear as well simply stating that P acted in a way that was towards the ends of preventing bodily harm to R.

A second case that challenges theories of causation is that of preemption. Suppose Lily and Sam are throwing rocks at a window and they both throw their rocks at the same time. Lily’s rock reaches the window first and breaks it, less than a second later Sam’s flies through the open space. Unfortunately Lewis’ Counterfactual Theory of Causation cannot account for this case of late preemption because had Lily’s rock not broken the window Sam’s would have and is there in not counterfactually dependent. It is in this case that the Aristotelian move would be again to appeal to the Efficient Cause and state that the explanation for the major change or affect had on the window was that Lily’s rock smashed it. Had Lily’s rock not smashed the window Sam’s would have and would in that case be the aitia for that event.

A possible counterexampleto the strength of the Four Causes would be to question the merit of the argument because of the things it may possibly exclude things that don’t quite satisfy the conditions of being an explanation. The concern would be that adding a condition to that which governs what is and isn’t causes would limit the number of things that may be aitiaand further narrow the scope to which Aristotle’s Four causes dramatically. This not a concern, however, because Hocutt has interpreted Aristotle’s work to include that of the four causes each may be divided up into three sets of two opposing sub-types, meaning six possibilities for each cause for a total of twenty-four possible outcomes for justifying causation of any aitia.

With the help of the revised translation of aitia it is possible to make a more concise account of exactly what Aristotle meant in his Metaphysics. This revision has mad the theory stronger and more effective at solving problems of causality. Not only did the theory thwart several causal problems that plague the counterfactual theory, but it is also now much more diverse and elastic when it comes to providing a solid explanation for what caused what.

Work Cited

Andrea, Falcon. "Aristotle on Causality." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2011. Web. 1 Apr. 2012. <

Annas, Julia. “Aristotle on Inefficient Causes” The Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 32, No. 129 (Oct., 1982), pp. 311-326. Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly Article

Hocutt, Matt. “Aristotle's Four Becauses.” Philosophy , Vol. 49, No. 190 (Oct., 1974), pp. 385-399. Cambridge University Press. Royal Institute of Philosophy.

Hume, David, Tom L. Beauchamp, and John Cottingham. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.