Aristotle on choosing virtuous action for its own sake
Yannig Luthra
1 Introduction
Aristotle claims that ethically virtuous action is to be chosen for its own sake.1
But Aristotle also acknowledges that at least some ethically virtuous action is to be chosen as a means to further ends. He claims that political activity, which manifests practical virtue, aims at securing eudaimonia for oneself and for others.2 And he claims that just actions aim at producing an equal distribution of goods,3 and generous actions aim at benefitting others.4 Indeed, the arc of the Nicomachean Ethics suggests that, for Aristotle, contemplation is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of further ends, whereas practically virtuous action is choiceworthy both for its own sake and for the sake of further ends.
Much ethically virtuous action really does seem to aim at further ends. Moreover, the choiceworthiness of many such actions seems to depend essentially on their reasonably perceived potential to serve further ends—like medical care or nourishment for recipients of charitable giving. It would be a mistake to give charity if it were not reasonable to think it had a chance of being useful.
It is natural to assume that an action is to be chosen for its own sake only when it is to be chosen independently of whether it serves further ends. Aris- totle might seem to express a view along these lines in characterizing things choiceworthy for their own sakes as things that we pursue apart from further ends.5 As a result, it seems that an action can be chosen as a means to further ends and for its own sake only if its choiceworthiness is overdetermined, like a meal that is delicious and nutritious. Given that the choiceworthiness of an action depends essentially on its serving further ends, it seems that, as a matter of definition, the action is not choiceworthy for its own sake. It is hard to see, then, how virtuous actions could be choiceworthy both for their own sakes, and as means to further ends.6
The interest of this difficulty goes beyond Aristotle interpretation. There
is something attractive-yet-elusive about the idea that many virtuous actions essentially serve further ends, but are also choiceworthy for their own sakes.
Usually this problem is approached by trying to show that virtuous action in fact does not depend for its choiceworthiness on its serving further valued ends. This approach is understandable, since it seems to be a matter of definition that actions choiceworthy for their own sakes are not to be chosen for the sake of further ends. In what follows, I criticize two such accounts of what Aristotle means when he says that virtuous actions are to be chosen for their own sakes, due to John Ackrill and Jennifer Whiting, respectively. Then, as an alternative, I propose an interpretation of what it means for an action to be choiceworthy for its own sake, according to which such an action can also depend for its choiceworthiness on it serving further valued ends.
I suggest that choosing an action for its own sake should be understood in a way that contrasts primarily with choosing an action as a necessary evil. A necessary evil, like undergoing painful treatment for an injury, is a misfortune for the agent. Some rightly chosen actions constitute misfortunes for the agent, whereas others are actions the agent is glad to have the chance to do. Such actions are appropriate sources of fulfillment, gratification, and pleasure for the agent. Such actions are rightly valued by the agent in a way that necessary evils are not. My proposal is that for an action to be choiceworthy for its own sake is for the action to be rightly valued in this way. I argue that, following Plato, Aristotle has this conception of an action’s being choiceworthy for its own sake. This interpretation provides a way of understanding how virtuous actions can be choiceworthy both for their own sakes, and as means to further ends. An action can be an appropriate source of fulfillment or gratification for the agent, even if it is to be undertaken as a means to further ends.
2 Two attempts to resolve the difficulty
2.1 Ackrill’s proposal
I want to begin by considering Akrill’s remarks about choosing virtuous action for its own sake.7 Ackrill’s discussion of choosing action for its own sake is part of a discussion of the difference between praxis and poiesis. According to Aristotle, praxis is action that is chosen for its own sake, whereas poiesis (production, roughly) is not. It would seem that instances of praxis —like virtuous actions— often are productive acts. Ackrill offers the example of a person who acts justly in mending a neighbor’s fence. Ackrill’s aims to explain how Aristotle’s distinction applies to examples like that. Is mending the fence a case of praxis or poiesis ?8
Ackrill suggests that the action is a means to further ends under the de-
scription “mending the fence.” And the action is done for its own sake under the description “acting justly.” Ackrill says, “when it is asked whether the doer chose to do it for itself the question is of course whether he chose to do it because it was just, not whether he chose to do it because it was mending a neighbour’s fence.” According to Ackrill, the agent acts justly for its own sake in that she performs her just action because the action is just. More generally, to carry out a virtuous action for its own sake is to carry out that action because it is virtuous.9
Ackrill’s proposal seems to be that an agent φs for its own sake when she
would justify her φing by pointing out that her action is an instance of φing. Simlarly, an action is choiceworthy for its own sake when it is right to justify the action in this way. This proposal is initially plausible. If an action is to be chosen for the sake of further ends, it would seem that one would have to adduce those further ends as reasons for φing, instead of just pointing out that one’s action is an instance of φing.
When an action is described as virtuous, one does not need to adduce further ends served by the action to establish that the action is choiceworthy. If we are given that an action is an instance of acting justly, courageously, or generously, that suffices to establish that the action is choiceworthy.10
However, this characteristic of virtuous actions does not mean that virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sakes. Every choiceworthy action falls under a description such that, given that it falls under that description, no further ends need to be adduced to justify the action.11 The fact that an action falls under such a description does not reveal it to be choiceworthy for its own sake.
If an action is choiceworthy as a means to further ends, one can describe the action in a way that builds in its instrumental profile. For example, injecting insulin to help with diabetes can be described as maintaining one’s health. Described that way, further ends do not have to be adduced to explain why the action is choiceworthy. But that is because the action’s serving the valued ends is already captured in the description of the action. A shortcut would be to describe an action undertaken as a means to further ends as a means to valued further ends. If an individual taking her medicine says “I am acting prudently” or “I am taking appropriate means to valued further ends,” it would not make sense to ask her “what use is that?” But that does not mean the action is choiceworthy for its own sake. The usefulness of the action is already built into the description of the action. To tell whether an action of a certain type is choiceworthy for its own sake it is not enough just to consider whether describing the action as being of that type suffices to establish that it is choiceworthy. One must seek a full explanation of why actions of that type are choiceworthy.
It is true that if one describes an action as generous, or beneficent, or helpful, one does not need to adduce further ends to establish that the action is choice- worthy. But to tell whether such an action is choiceworthy for its own sake, one must seek a full explanation of why actions of that sort are choiceworthy. It seems that the choiceworthiness of such actions depends essentially on their serving further ends, like nutrition and medicine for people in need. The fact that describing an action as generous makes it unnecessary to mention further ends to justify the action provides no reason to doubt that. Indeed, describing an action as generous seems to build in that the action is worth doing as a means to further ends, in roughly the way that describing an action as prudent builds in that the action is worth doing as a means to further ends. If an action is not undertaken as a means to providing something of value to others, that would undermine its claim to counting as a generous action.
3 Whiting’s proposal
In outline, Whiting’s account is that choosing virtuous actions for their own sakes is choosing the actions “simply for being actions of a certain sort and insofar as each is just the action it is.”12 The core claim of her account is that, “Aristotle’s notion of virtuous action is expansive, and so takes in, as it were, the external results at which it aims.” For example, the effects of generous action, like benefits to others, are “included within my virtuous action itself.”13
The ends of virtuous action are included within the action in that the re- alization of those ends “completes” the actions.14 According to Aristotle, the activity of teaching is completed by learning in the student.15 Whiting suggests that, in a similar way, the improved well-being of a beneficiary of charitable giving completes that virtuous act. She suggests that, in this way, the improved well-being is part of the virtuous agent’s activity of giving.
So, in aiming at ends like the well-being of others, virtuous agents aim at an aspect of the virtuous action itself. Virtuous agents value these sorts of ends for their own sakes, and not for the sake of something further. So their actions are not chosen for the sake of any end external to the action itself. Virtuous actions are chosen for the sake of ends that are contained within the actions themselves, and not for the sake of further ends beyond the action itself.16
3.1 Concerns about whiting’s proposal
I want to quickly sketch three concerns about Whiting’s proposal. First, it seems that an action can be choosen as a means to a further end, even if that end completes the action. For example, consider a reluctant teacher, who values her students’ learning for its own sake, but wishes it was not her who had to teach them. Even if it is true that the students’ learning completes her action of teaching, still she chooses to teach as a means to that further end, and not for its own sake. If there were some way for them to learn other than by her teaching, she would much prefer that they learn that way. If there is a sense in which the end of teaching is contained within the action, one must claim that choosing an action for the sake of an end contained within the action does not always amount to choosing the action for its own sake. The proposal that the “further” ends of virtuous actions complete those actions does not show that they are chosen for their own sakes.17
The second worry is that Aristotle specifically claims that the ends of some
virtuous actions are different from the actions themselves. In NE 10.7, Aristotle argues for the superiority of contemplation over virtuous political activity partly on the grounds that political activity aims at further ends—namely eudaimonia for oneself and for fellow citizens. Aristotle specifies that these ends are different from political activity itself, and that we seek them as being different. This passage suggests that the ends of virtuous political activity are not included within the activity itself. Still, political activity is choiceworthy for its own sake.
The third worry is that Whiting’s proposal cannot succeed in explaining how virtuous actions are to be chosen both as means to further ends and for their own sakes. Whiting’s proposal is that the ends of virtuous actions are included within the actions themselves, so choosing the virtuous actions for the sake of those ends is choosing the actions for their own sakes. But if that is right, then there are no ends beyond the actions themselves for the sake of which virtuous actions are to be chosen. So virtous actions are not to be chosen for the sake of further ends.18
4 An alternative proposal
It is natural think an action is choiceworthy for its own sake only if it is worth doing independently of its reasonably perceived potential to serve further ends. If one accepts this view, then either virtuous actions are worth doing indepen- dently of their potential to serve further ends, or they are not to be chosen for their own sakes. I want to suggest that Aristotle has a conception of an action’s being choiceworthy for its own sake which does not require that such actions be choiceworthy independently of its potential to serve further ends.
My proposal is that, for Aristotle, an action is choiceworthy for its own sake if the action is rightly valued by the agent in a certain way. An activity’s being valued in this way contrasts with an activity’s being regarded as a necessary evil, like undergoing an amputation (or a necessary waste of time, like brushing one’s teeth). There is a family of ideas which contrast with being a mere necessity. These include, for example, being fulfilling, gratifying, rewarding, enjoyable, satisfying, meaningful, and so on. An action is choiceworthy for its own sake when there is something good about the action which makes ideas in this family apply to the action.19
Before arguing that this view is Aristotle’s, let me explain how it helps with