Are Open Units Appropriate for RHC

Are Open Units Appropriate for RHC?

1. RHC's Security Level
   

-Are we a Max or MultiLevel?

-What is the difference between the two levels?

-How will the new units operate? As a Medium, Max, both?

The first issue that needs clarification is RHC's Security Classification. The Infonet lists RHC as a Multilevel Institution under the Institutional Profiles (1:1, 4:7), and also as a Maximum Security Institution under the Pacific Region address list (2:1). As per RHC's CCO, RHC is currently classified as a Maximum Security Institution (3:1).

CD006, Classification of Institutions, describes the differences in operations between institutions with various security classifications and the respective inmate profile. Of note is the difference in the "Objectives", "Behavioural Norms", and "Security" between the Medium Security Institutions and the Maximum Security Institutions (4:24). If RHC will house Maximum Security offenders in Medium Security Living Units, the Security Requirements of CDO06 are not being adhered to. If all of the new Living Units currently under construction are built with equal operational functions and equal security measures, and these functions and measures do not include a safe area for staff to enter in the event of an emergency or the ability of staff to isolate and contain an emergency situation (which will be discussed later), then RHC appears to operate as a Medium Security Institution rather than a Maximum or Multilevel Institution. During an emergency, the front door of the Living Unit may be locked, as well as the inmate cell doors, but inside the front doors and outside of the inmate cells is a large area that may be impossible for staff to control in some situations. CDO06 states that within MultiLevel Institutions, "distinctions may be made between programming and privileges extended to the different security levels" (4:2). It would appear more appropriate to operate the new Living Units at RHC according to their individual security classification, which would mean increasing the security and use of barriers/bubbles in some of the new Living Units. The two units that staff feels should operate as Maximum Security, with unit bubbles and barriers, are RRAC and the Psychiatric Unit.

1. Management of Emergencies

How do we isolate and control situations?

The CSC Security Manual Part 11 May 1997 Edition describes the ideal operations of an institution during an emergency, including the five stages of emergency and the actions required in each stage (5:1). The stages are:

a)locate and verify

b)contain, isolate and control

c)evacuate

d)resolve

e)restore normal operations

The first and second stages are a concern if RHC's new living units do not include control bubbles in the living units or barriers at the entrance of each tier. Among the actions required of an officer in the "Locate and Verify" stage, the Security Manual clearly states that the "officer in charge must be able to detect and control all elements involved in resolving the incident at all times, and must avoid being placed in a vulnerable position" (5:2). The officer in charge during an emergency situation within RHC's new units may be in a vulnerable position if he or she does not have a safe place, such as a bubble, from which to control the situation. The present open layout for RHC's new Living Units does not provide the officers with a safe area to control a situation while maintaining an adequate view of the scene.

"Contain, Isolate and Control", the second stage of "Operations in an Emergency", can only be accomplished to a limited degree. The Security Manual states that the "emergency should then be contained in the smallest area possible" (5:2). Once this is completed, "The best way to establish control is to use the structural features of the institution to reduce the number of access routes and the number of staff needed to control them" (5:2). If an incident occurs in a new living unit, it can be contained to a single unit. But it will be difficult to contain the incident within the unit because the physical barriers will not exist. The incident must be contained through officer use of force or through inmate compliance. The security of the institution should not rest on the good behavior of inmates, especially when the inmates are yet unknown (RRAC) or psychologically unstable (Psychiatric Unit).

CD600, Management of Emergencies, states that the "Policy Objective" is "To ensure that operational units are prepared to deal effectively with internal or external emergencies in order to protect the safety and security of the public, staff and inmates" (6 :1). Within CD600, "Emergency Planning" states: "All emergency planning activities are designed to ensure that, in the event of an emergency; a. the interests and well being of staff are safeguarded" (6:1). Has the well being of staff been fully considered and reflected in the layout of the new Living Units?

1. Health and Safety

-The CSC policy on Health and Safety.

-Will some units be defined as unsafe work environments?

-Is job action necessary? SeeStonyMountain story.

The Occupational Safety and Health is policy that is integral to maintaining a safe and healthy workplace. Key concepts included in this policy are prevention and the right of staff to make a complaint about a dangerous situation. RHC staff is concerned that the new open Living Units are not appropriate given the security level and nature of some of the inmates housed here. If employees are in dangerous situations more than before because of the open unit layout, then this will be the fault of the employer and the approved redevelopment project. Employees have the right to refuse to work in dangerous situations, as long as the danger does not constitute a normal condition of employment (8:2). While Correctional Officers understand the potential danger that may be experienced in the work environment, this potential should not be increased. Of note is the recent situation that arose from StonyMountain (9:2): see "Great News from StonyMountain: Work Stoppage Justified".

CD043, Security Surveys, is a key policy here (10:1). Its objective is to ensure that institutions have proper security measures place. This is accomplished through periodic, independent evaluation of living units. These surveys are to be conducted at least once every two years: "A security survey is an indepth, technical examination of the unit's security posture. The survey shall include, but not be limited to, examinations of: a. security measures in place to control inmates; and b. security measures in place to control access to and to protect equipment, valuables and information". RHC’s new Living Units must meet the Security Survey's standards, and must be appropriate for our inmate profiles.

1. RRAC

-It currently operates very securely, high observation and no interaction with inmates from other units. How is this level maintained?

-How safe is it for new inmates to be housed in Medium Security environment, when their risk is unknown.

A specific concern is with the new RRAC Unit. This unit should be operated as a Maximum Security area for a number of reasons. First, because the inmates who enter this unit are not usually known to staff. Because he is yet to be determined as a Maximum or Medium Security inmate, the inmate must be strictly observed in order to make the appropriate determination. The controlled movement of the inmate also ensures staff and other inmates are kept as safe as possible. The inmate has not had the opportunity to build a relationship with staff, therefore his behavioral norms are not known and staff may not be able to rely on their repoure to keep the inmate under control. The second reason for operating RRAC as a Maximum Security Institution is because the inmate may not yet understand Federal Corrections, and his ignorance and fear could easily turn to violence.

The current RRAC operation within Matsqui Institution is strict. "The primary function of this unit is the safe custody and control of all offenders assigned to RRAC for assessment and placement" (7:1). RRAC inmates are separated from the general population because of their security classification (7:2). While RRAC inmates do not need protection as much as segregated offenders (8:1), they still require special treatment. Does the new RHC design provide the separation of RRAC inmates from general population inmates? How will this be accomplished?

1. Staff Opinion

-We need to understand how the new units will operate.

-Separation must be made between the low risk units and the high risk units.

-RRAC and the Psychiatric Unit should be Maximum Security areas

RHC staff and RRAC staff are concerned with the layout of the new RHC units, specifically the Psychiatric Unit and RRAC because of the nature of the inmates who will be housed here. How will RHC's new units be operated exactly? The lack of barriers and bubbles appears to jeopardize the safety of staff. Staff need to be informed and should be encouraged to ask questions pertaining to their work environment. Various CXs from across the country have been consulted on this issue of open units within a Maximum or Multilevel institution. While their responses have varied, the major consensus is that this issue must be addressed because this open layout may result in a dangerous work environment. Staff deserves to know about their future workplace and need to be assured, through facts that their safety is of utmost concern to their employer.

Conclusion

While the issue of bubbles and their presence within a Maximum Security Institution is not directly addressed in current legislation and policy, the issue of a worker's right to a safe workplace is repeatedly emphasized in various legally binding documents. The pertinent question relating to RHC's redevelopment project is whether or not the lack of barriers and bubbles constitute an unsafe working environment for its staff, and also for the general inmate population. Management is ultimately responsible for the safety of both staff and inmates.

While some experts theorize that the absence of barriers creates a more open environment that contributes to the overall rehabilitation of inmates, the other side of this issue has not been researched. These experts do not appear to have published concrete examples of when or where such barriers were utilized and the contribution these devices made to gaining control over a toxic situation. If this is a reason for the "open" unit concept for the new RHC units, it must be noted that while an inmate's rehabilitation must be encouraged, it must not be done while sacrificing the safety of staff and other inmates.

As stated earlier, all persons working in a Correctional facility understand the potential danger involved. Why, build a prison that is not equipped to react to such potential dangers? Staff and inmate interaction does not disappear with barriers and bubbles. The COI's generally operate the bubble, while the CX2's interact with offenders. Barriers are only utilized to contain and control the inmate population during a serious or potentially serious incident. Otherwise, the barriers remain hidden in the wall (although the present use of barriers at RHC extends to their use during graveyard shift routine and count times). With the redevelopment, the graveyard routine will not require the use of barriers because each cell will contain bathroom facilities, as opposed to the current communal bathroom located on each tier. Also, because it is pertinent that the routine institutional counts are correct, barriers that restrict inmate movement during this time is to be expected. The new units do not have to utilize the barriers during the count, but the unit entrance and exit doors will be locked during this time anyhow, to ensure that the count is conducted efficiently. Barriers physically restrict a person's movements, but this restriction is sometimes necessary during volatile or potentially volatile incidents. The normal operating procedures for RHC's new living units do not have to include the use of barriers on a regular basis. The use of barriers can be restricted to times of potential or current danger. While the use of barriers is normally not required, they should be an available tool for staff to use when needed. Do not build the units with the ability to add the barriers or bubbles at a later date, because such an extension would probably occur only after an incident that required this control. A proactive approach should be taken rather than a reactive approach; RHC's new living units should be built with the appropriate security systems rather than risking the health and safety of staff and inmates.