America’s Useless Attack on Colombia:
Plan Colombia and Why It Is Dangerous
Sam Gellman
Ethics in Development in a Global Environment
June 02, 2004
I. Introduction
When the Clinton Administration committed itself to a multi-billion dollar aid package to Colombia in order to fight the War on Drugs it was pretty big news. After all, as part of his “Plan Colombia,” Clinton was committing the United States to $1.3 billion dollars in aid to Colombia and its neighbors as part of “Plan Colombia.” Of the money, over half of it—$645 million would go to the Colombian military and police force, in effort to “strengthen democracy, the rule of law, economic stability, and human rights in Colombia[1].” With this package, Colombia became the third largest recipient of American aid, only behind Israel and Egypt.
Critics, however, knew that there was reason to doubt the efficacy of the plan. Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota warned “History has repeatedly shown—especially in Latin America—just think of Nicaragua and El Salvador—that the practical effect of this strategy now under effect is to militarize, to escalate the conflict, not to end it[2].” These critics recognized that the exorbitant amount of money being given to Colombia in foreign aid—well over the total amount given to every other country in Latin and Central America combined—could lead to counter-productive results, putting us in the center of conflict that has endured decades of corruption and brutality[3].
Four years after Plan Colombia was proposed, critics such as Wellstone prove to have had it right. Colombia has not ceased to produce drugs, and American objectives have not been met. In fact, many claim that fighting between two leftist guerilla groups, the right-wing paramilitary, and the government has only worsened[4]. In the year 2002, around 4,000 people were murdered and more than 350,000 people were forced from their homes. Estimates show that the conflict now claims the life of 19 civilians per day, as opposed to just 12 civilians per day in 2000[5]. Drug production has continued to accelerate and the human rights situation has continued to get worse[6]. Needless to say, the “democracy, rule of law, economic stability, and human rights” that the Clinton Administration claimed would improve have not seen much improvement.
In this report, I examine the United States’ “War on Drugs” in Colombia, and show how American involvement in Colombia has been a dangerous and counterproductive use of money. First, I look into the details of the Colombian conflict, which has been going on for decades. In doing so, I examine the multiple players who make up the conflict. I then look at how America has involved itself in the conflict and conclude by discussing where the American plan has gone wrong.
II. A Look at the Players in the Colombian Conflict
Before we delve into a discussion of the American role in the Colombian quagmire, it’s necessary to look at who the main actors are in the national civil conflict. As the US is entering a struggle that has lasted for years, it is impossible to get a full understanding of the situation at hand without discussing how the past has formed the groups that are involved today. It is an established fact that there are few “good guys” in the Colombian conflict and that all parties commit human rights abuses and other violations of international law[7]. In this section, I examine the specific groups and how they came into existence.
A. The Guerillas
a. The FARC
The FARC (Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias de Colombia – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) was an unofficial group of united Colombian peasants who were guided by Communist and Marxist doctrines long before the organization’s official formation in 1964. Prior to 1964, peasants led multiple uprisings in response to violent expulsions of from their farms at the hands of the government military and rich landowners[8]. The official formation of the FARC came after the US-sponsored Marquetalia Raid, in which 16,000 military personnel were pitted against a community of 1,000 unarmed peasants. The survivors of the raid were led my Manuel Marulanda, a peasant guerilla who had actively fought with the guerilla movement since 1948. Together, they founded the FARC shortly after the raid. The FARC’s ideology is highly nationalist and anti-capitalist, with its rhetoric rooted in early progressive ideology[9].
In the 1980s, when the government tried to end the guerilla war through peace talks, the FARC created its own political party, the Patriotic Union, which the group hoped to use as a non-violent means to negotiation. Journalist Liz Harper claims that “The UP party -- comprised of disarmed guerrillas, former Communists, and progressive Liberals -- espoused anti-corruption policies, harsh penalties against narco-traffickers and progressive land and economic reforms[10].” As the UP gained popularity, however, it became a major target of right wing paramilitaries. Over the years that followed its creation, at least 3,000 of the party’s member were assassinated or disappeared at the hands of the paramilitaries, and the FARC retreated back into the jungle as guerillas.
Still headed by Marulanda, the FARC currently has more than 17,000 members in more than 70 fronts, making it the largest guerilla group in the western hemisphere. Currently, much of the narcotics produced in Colombia are grown in areas under the control of the FARC. Though the FARC’s link to the drug trade is rather controversial, it is widely accepted that FARC members receive funds in the way of taxes placed on coca-growers in the areas it controls in exchange for protection from paramilitary and government groups[11].
The FARC further finances itself through kidnapping for ransom and extortion. Together with the ELN (see below), the FARC is responsible for a majority of the kidnappings in Colombia. According to the Center for International Policy, “The FARC and ELN are responsible for about 15 percent of killings associated with Colombia’s conflict, many of them civilian non-combatants. The FARC regularly carries out massacres, and has claimed many innocent lives through indiscriminate use of inaccurate gas-cylinder bombs[12].” Due to its reputation as a communist threat during the Cold War and its current status as the “root of the drug problem,” the FARC has been a primary target of American involvement in Colombia for decades. Currently, the US government sees the FARC as a terrorist organization, and as such has given itself a green light to mobilize against the FARC even with regards to issues unrelated to narcotics. In a rhetorical stunt, the Bush Administration often refers to FARC members as narco-terrorists. The Bush Administration’s efforts to justify attacks on the FARC as part of its War on Terror will be discussed in more detail in section III
b. The ELN
The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional -- The National Liberation Army), also founded in 1964, was created by a group of Colombian students who underwent their political and guerilla training in Cuba. Following the Cuban model of rural rebellion, the ELN attracted many radical students and priests who believed in the communist doctrine[13]. The ELN, whose mission is “to incite a Marxist revolution to oust the Colombian government, replacing the current capitalist economy with a socialist system,” currently has 3,500 members[14].
During the Cold War, the ELN depended largely on financial and military assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Attracted to the ELN’s commitment to peasant welfare, many radical priests joined the group during the 1960s as well. When the Cuban and Soviet aid declined in the 1980s, the ELN turned to kidnapping and extortion for funding.
Largely due to its religious ties, the ELN historically has not turned to drugs as a primary source of revenue. Recently, however, under new leadership, the group has loosened its prohibition on involvement in the drug trade. A primary goal of the ELN is the sabotage of the energy industry—oil pipelines, and electricity infrastructure—as it claims that the industry is dominated by foreign interests[15].
Although the ELN spoke for years of potential peace talks with the Colombian government, in early June of 2002, the Colombian government officially terminated talks that were taking place in Havana, Cuba, claiming that “the guerillas were not committed to the objectives of their peace agreement[16].” By turning the War on Drugs into a “War on Terror,” the Bush Administration has increased stepped up the efforts to shut down the ELN. As the ELN gets in the way of American oil interests, their new label as “terrorists” has allowed the American army to wage fronts against them, even though they are not very involved in the drug trade.
B. Paramilitary Groups
The guerillas, in their efforts to protect themselves and the nation’s natural resources have often targeted the wealthier land owners and oil producers. As such, ever since the guerilla groups entered the scene in Colombia, wealthy landowners, ranchers, and businessmen have banded together to protect themselves and their assets from the guerilleros[17]. In the 1950s, these land owners began commissioning militias to protect their assets and take revenge when necessary. These defense militias grew drastically during the 1980s, with the financial support of the drug cartels that had bought a majority of Colombia’s land.
Over the course of the late 20th century, multiple paramilitary groups were set up, often in response to the deaths of family members of drug cartel leaders. Because of the exorbitant wealth of the drug lords, paramilitary groups have been very wealthy and powerful. The groups threatened anyone suspected of supporting guerilla groups, ranging from unionists to religious leaders to journalists[18]. As the drug trade grew, paramilitaries such as the MAS (Death to Kidnappers) were established to protect cartel leaders’ interests in cities[19]. They used abusive tactics such as selective assassinations, forced disappearances, massacres, and forced displacements of entire communities in effort to eliminate guerilla groups.
The AUC (Autodefensas Unidades de Colombia: The United Self-Defense Force of Colombia), led by Carlos Castaño is currently the umbrella organization for these right-wing paramilitaries. In the year 2000 alone, the group was responsible for 804 assassinations, 203 kidnappings, and 57 massacres[20]. Using “extreme brutality” toward civilian populations, the group continues to weaken guerrillas and establish a terrorizing presence throughout Colombia[21]. Castaño has recently admitted that the UAC benefits largely from taxes received from coca growers who pay for protection from guerillas. The groups appear to be directly involved in processing cocaine as well[22]. Due to the immense profits as a result of drug production, the UAC has grown nine-fold since 1992, now claiming more than 8,000 members. Paramilitary groups commit around 80 percent of the murders in Colombia’s conflict.
Although it is very controversial, paramilitary groups are often involved with the military that the United States is funding. Because of their common interest in the repression of guerillas, the government and the paramilitaries have been able to unite in effort to fight the guerilla war. As such, much of the American dollars spent on the Colombian conflict are indirectly reaching the hands of the paramilitary organizations.
c. Government Military Forces
In the wake of all the civil unrest caused by paramilitary and guerilla groups, one must ask, “Where is the law enforcement during all this?” Historically, it has been either absent or contributing to the commotion. The military consists of roughly 250,000 members—145,000 military and 105,000 policy officers. Slightly less than one fifth of Colombia’s municipalities have no state security presence; this contributes largely to the paramilitaries’ ability to do as they please in various regions in Colombia.
In 1989, the Colombian Minister of Defense publicly stated that the military was to embark on a “total war” to “control the popular elements and manipulate the masses[23].” This declaration gave the military the green light to target anyone they felt was under any sort of control of the “subversive elements” of society[24]. As a result, many organizations, such as indigenous organizations, environmental organizations, peasant movements, religious groups, etc. became potential military targets[25].
As the violence of the military grew worse and American ties with Colombia strengthened, the pressure for reform increased. A revised military penal code was implemented in 1999, increasing the likelihood that those committing human rights abuses be tried and brought to justice. It also guarantees protection for militiamen who refuse to violate human rights while serving. Although this was considered by many to be a step in the right direction, there has been very little effort to enforce any of the policies set forth in this code.
The Colombia military has had very positive relations with the United States government since the beginning of the Cold War (even sending a battalion to fight with the United States in the Korean War). As part of the war on drugs, the US has provided the Colombian military with equipment through the international narcotics control program, military assistance programs, and foreign military sales. As the US trains many Colombian soldiers, the US has had opportunities to push further reforms on the Colombian military. In 2000, the Colombian government spent 3.4% of its GDP, $3 billion dollars, on its military in effort to combat the insurgency that has gone on over the past 40 years. Much of the remainder of this paper focuses on the relationship the United States government and the Colombian military have had over the past decade.
FARC | ELN | AUCZones of greatest illegal armed group activity
FIGURE 1: Guerillas, Paramilitaries, and Government illegal murder rates
d. Conclusions
After looking at the groups that are playing large roles and examining figure 1, it is certainly apparent that Colombia is not a nation of exclusively “good guys” and “bad guys.” Regardless, however, of who the victims are and who the perpetrators are, this section has clearly laid out that Colombia is a weakly governed nation with a stark history of corruption, animosity, and vengeance. As we will see, the United States’ decision to focus great amounts of money on the police and military to fight illegal drugs—what many call a symptom of other nation problems—was not a recipe for success in this incredibly complex conflict.
III. American Involvement in Colombia
a. Before “Plan Colombia”
The United States and the Colombian military have had a positive relationship for centuries. As mentioned above, Colombia was the only Latin American nation to support American efforts in the Korean War. During the Cold War, the primary motivation for American involvement in Colombia was the ideological clash with the guerillas. This pinned American forces against the guerilla movements’ communist mission. Incidentally, just as the Communist threat began fading from the American security radar screen, the American people began seeing drugs as a large international threat. A 1988 New York Times poll showed that “48 percent of the US public considered drugs to be the principal foreign policy challenge facing the United States[26].” In response, George Bush Sr. began a counter-narcotics effort, beginning in Bolivia and extending it to Peru and Colombia in 1989. His counter-narcotics effort continues today. Although the stated motives for supporting the Colombian military have changed, America has supported it for decades.
Throughout the 1990s, the Clinton Administration provided the Colombian military with more than $100 million per year, claiming that the money would only go towards counter-narcotics efforts. Although administrators admit that in some areas, the counter-narcotic efforts often crossed into counterinsurgency actions, the Clinton Administration ignored this contradiction with policy. Furthermore, the US military was often engaged in military training in Colombia, preparing Colombian soldiers who were explicitly oriented towards fighting the guerillas[27]. Clearly, thus, as early as the 1990s, the American forces were already involving themselves in far more than a Drug War, wetting their hands in a Civil War they pledged to be keeping out of.
b. Since the late 1990s
The American involvement in Colombia continues to increase rapidly. The Embassy in Bogotá has recently passed the embassy in Cairo as the largest American Embassy in the world[28]. Since Plan Colombia came into effect in 2000, the United States has appropriated $2.44 billion for Colombia, with $1.97 billion going to Colombia’s police and military forces. On average, that equals $1.35 million per day for four years. Another $688 million will go to Colombia in 2004, and there are requests that even that quantity increase[29].
The majority of American aid goes to Colombian counter-narcotics army brigades. More than half of all aid has gone to create and maintain a 2,300 man brigade in the far south of Colombia, an area fiercely contested by both the FARC and the paramilitaries. This new battalion’s original mission was to eradicate drug-processing labs, apprehend traffickers, and clear armed groups from areas of drug-cultivation[30].