8
A study of the INTERFET operation using DIAMOND
Stephen Bocquet
Defence Systems Analysis Division, DSTO Australia
Attached to Dstl Policy and Capability Studies
The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) peace enforcement operation ran from 20 September 1999 when the first troops were deployed to Dili, until 28 February 2000, when command was transferred to the UNTAET peacekeeping force. In terms of the speed of deployment, achievement of the mandate and lack of casualties, INTERFET set a benchmark for this type of operation. DIAMOND is a relatively new simulation model, developed for analysis of peace support operations. An East Timor scenario has been developed for DIAMOND, centred on the INTERFET operation. The aim this work is firstly to contribute to the validation of DIAMOND by examining how well key aspects of the operation can be represented in the model, and secondly to assess the suitability of DIAMOND for analysis of peace support operations.
The INTERFET operation[1],[2],[3]
East Timor is a former Portuguese colony, which was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 following the departure of the colonial authorities. Indonesia claimed the territory as a province. Australia recognised the Indonesian claim in 1979, but few other countries did so. The UN adopted several resolutions between 1976 and 1982 calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces and the right of self-determination for the East Timorese. Estimates for the number of East Timorese killed by military action, famine and disease in the first few years of Indonesian occupation range from 100,000 to 230,000 out of a population of 630,000.
In January 1999 President Habibie of Indonesia offered the East Timorese a referendum to decide between autonomy within Indonesia and independence. Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement in May 1999 entrusting the UN with holding the referendum. Indonesia agreed to take responsibility for maintaining peace and security in East Timor during the referendum. However, the Indonesian armed forces continued to provide arms and support to pro-integration militias in the lead-up to the referendum. The referendum was held on 30 August 1999, with a 98% turn out of registered voters, and a 78.5% vote for independence. Following the announcement of the ballot, militia violence in the territory escalated rapidly, with the Indonesian forces doing very little to prevent it. Most UN staff were evacuated by 8 September. About 500,000 people were displaced from their homes, either within East Timor or to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia, some of them forcibly deported from East Timor.
Following significant international pressure, on 12 September 1999 Indonesia agreed to the deployment of an international force in East Timor. Australia formally agreed to lead the force on 14 September. On the 15th the UN Security Council unanimously agreed to Resolution 1264 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This resolution authorised the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.
On 19 September Major General Peter Cosgrove was appointed commander of INTERFET, and flew to Dili for discussions with Major General Kiki Syahnakri, the senior Indonesian officer in East Timor. At dawn the following day INTERFET forces began arriving by C-130 Hercules at Dili’s Comoro airport. After the airport was secured by Australian, New Zealand and British special forces troops, the Second Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR) was flown in and began to deploy around Dili. On 21 September the Third Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) arrived at Dili port on board the fast catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay, and 22 light armoured vehicles from C Squadron 2nd Cavalry Regiment were landed from HMAS Tobruk. The same day twelve Black Hawk helicopters self-deployed from Darwin to Dili Heliport to provide air mobility.
Dili was secured in the first few days of the operation, with militia being rounded up and disarmed by Australian, New Zealand and British (Ghurka) forces. On 27 September an airmobile operation was conducted in Liquica, a town 30km west of Dili. Liquica was the scene of some of the worst militia violence before and after the referendum, including a massacre in the Catholic church in April 1999. In early October the main towns near the border with West Timor were secured in airmobile operations supported by amphibious landings of armoured vehicles and other equipment. This was the key phase in the operation: once the border with West Timor was secure, militia entering East Timor could be intercepted, denying them the freedom to operate from sanctuaries in West Timor. Operations in and around Suai, on the south coast, met with significant militia activity. In one incident a militia truck convoy attempted to break through a roadblock. Australian troops opened fire, wounding six militia. Later the same day, a patrol escorting detainees from this incident was ambushed, and two militia were killed in the ensuing fire fight. On 22 October a further airmobile operation commenced, to secure the Oecussi enclave. Militia violence in this district, isolated from the rest of East Timor, had continued right up to the arrival of INTERFET. Almost the entire population of 50,000 had been displaced from their homes.
In general the militias were poorly equipped and trained, with little resolve to fight. In part their lack of resolve was due to the rapid and effective INTERFET response to their actions. Lack of support from Indonesia was also a major factor, the result of international pressure, especially from the US.
The main points of entry for INTERFET were Comoro airport, Dili port and Baucau airfield, which was secured by an airmobile operation on 22 September. Comoro airport is able to handle C-130 Hercules aircraft, but not larger airlifters; Baucau airfield is able to handle the largest aircraft. Dili port can only handle two ships at a time. These limitations placed some constraints on the rate of build up of INTERFET forces. Outside of Dili, personnel and equipment arriving by sea had to be landed on beaches[4].
The INTERFET operation concluded on 23 February 2000, when authority was transferred to UNTAET. Initially the UNTAET peacekeeping force was mostly made up of units which had participated in INTERFET.
East Timor scenario in DIAMOND
The DIAMOND scenario begins with the initial deployment of INTERFET to East Timor, and covers approximately the first 6 weeks of the operation. Included in the scenario are the deployment of INTERFET, the withdrawal of Indonesian forces, militia activity and civilian response to this, and the operations of INTERFET within East Timor.
One of the distinctive features of DIAMOND is the facility to represent multiple parties, with relationships between them ranging from friendly through to hostile. The parties and their relationships are shown in Table 1. These relationships do not change during the scenario. A simple stochastic model is used for negotiation between parties, which occurs when one party requests support from another, or requests passage through a roadblock.
Table 1. Relationships between parties
INTERFET / INTERFET B / UN / TNI / Militias / FALINTIL / CiviliansINTERFET / Friendly / Friendly / Friendly / Neutral / Hostile / Neutral / Friendly
INTERFET B / Cooperative / Friendly / Friendly / Neutral / Uncooperative / Neutral / Friendly
UN / Cooperative / Cooperative / Friendly / Neutral / Uncooperative / Neutral / Friendly
TNI / Neutral / Neutral / Neutral / Friendly / Cooperative / Hostile / Neutral
Militias / Hostile / Hostile / Uncooperative / Friendly / Friendly / Hostile / Hostile
FALINTIL / Cooperative / Cooperative / Cooperative / Hostile / Hostile / Friendly / Friendly
Civilians / Cooperative / Cooperative / Cooperative / Neutral / Hostile / Cooperative / Friendly
INTERFET is represented as two separate parties in DIAMOND. One (INTERFET) comprises the Australian, New Zealand and UK forces which undertook the majority of combat operations. The second (INTERFET B) comprises the other national contingents, which generally had more restrictive rules of engagement.
There were approximately 7,600 Indonesian troops remaining in East Timor when INTERFET deployed. Only four battalions have been identified: Bn 143 in Liquica, Bn 401 in Baucau, Bn 744 in Dili, and Bn 745 in the Los Palos area. In the scenario one battalion of 600 men is assigned to each of the 13 districts, for a total of 7,800 men. There were also approximately 7000 Indonesian police in the territory when the INTERFET operation began, but they are not represented as they had no effect in restraining militia violence.
The pro-integration militias are represented as a single party, although in fact there were a dozen or more separate militias. Each militia operated in its own locality, with the consent and in some cases support of the Indonesian army. Table 2 lists militia groups identified in May 1999, several months before the INTERFET mission.
FALINTIL (Forcas Armadas de Libertaçao Nacional de Timor Leste) is the armed wing of FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionana de Timor-Leste Independente), the East Timor independence movement. Although the independence movement had wide support in East Timor, as shown by the result of the August 1999 referendum, FALINTIL had been reduced to 500-1200 men by 1999. Only the FALINTIL commander Taur Martin Ruak and two small militia units are included in the scenario.
Table 2 The main known pro-integration Militia groups
Name / Location / Estimated StrengthAitarak ('The Thorn') / Dili / 5000
Gadapaksi ('Youth guard for upholding integration') / Dili / N/A
Darah Merah ('Red blood right wing militia') / Dili / N/A
Besi Merah Putih ('Red and White Iron') / Liquica / 2000
Naga Merah / Ermera / N/A
Mahidi / Ainaro / 2000
Laksaur / Suai / 500
AHI ('I will uphold integration') / Ailiu / N/A
Halilintar ('Thunderbolt') / Bobanaro / 800
ABLAI ('I will fight to Preserve the Mandate for Integration') / Manatuto / 100
Saka / Baucau / 970
Tim Alfa / Lautem / 300
Makikit / Viqueque / 200
Source: Bruce Woodley 'Red and White Terror', The Weekend Australian, 1-2 May 1999
Six basic types of ground combat unit are used in the scenario: Infantry company, mechanised infantry company, infantry battalion, ASLAV squadron, APC squadron and a militia unit. INTERFET is represented at company level, TNI at battalion level, and the militia unit is used for the pro-integration militias and FALINTIL. Transport ships are represented individually, and air transport is represented in flights of four C-130 aircraft.
In DIAMOND each party has a ‘Joint Theatre Commander’ who holds that party’s plans. Each plan contains one or more objectives, each assigned to a ‘Component Commander’ from that party. The objectives are composed of one or more missions, such as move, transport, defend, secure etc. The ‘Component Commander’ allocates forces amongst the various missions in his objectives. Each mission takes place in a defined mission area, comprising one or more nodes. The mission areas in the East Timor scenario correspond to districts, individual towns, or specific transport routes such as Darwin to Baucau Airfield.
DIAMOND uses a node and arc network to represent the scenario geography. In the East Timor scenario the nodes correspond to cities, towns, villages, road junctions and sea waypoints, and the arcs represent roads and the main sea and air routes. The terrain for the nodes and arcs is chosen to represent the surrounding area, except in the case of larger towns such as Dili and Baucau which are designated ‘suburban’. Most terrain is designated Open (flat), Open (rolling) or Open (mountainous), although many nodes and arcs could equally well be designated scrub, lightly wooded or densely wooded. There are no designations such as “hilly, wooded” available in DIAMOND, which would be more appropriate for much of the terrain in East Timor.
Figure1 is an example of the DIAMOND screen display for the East Timor scenario, showing the node and arc network and some of the military units and other entities in the scenario, superimposed on a topographic map.
Figure1. DIAMOND East Timor screen display.
There are three main climatic zones in Timor: North, Mountains and South. The mountains comprise areas above 600m (2000’) elevation, and the other two zones consist of lower lying areas between the mountains and the north or south coast of the island. The climate in Timor is defined by two seasons, Dry and Wet, with transitional periods between them. The seasons and transitional periods are different in each zone, as shown in the following table:
Jan / Feb / Mar / Apr / May / June / July / Aug / Sept / Oct / Nov / DecNorth
Mtns /
Wet
/ Trans / Dry / Trans /Wet
SouthDIAMOND represents ‘weather’ rather than ‘climate’, but the period represented in the scenario (late September up to the end of October) falls in the dry season for all three climatic zones, so weather effects were not included in the scenario. However, each node was assigned to one of the three climatic zones (‘areas of interest’ in DIAMOND) to facilitate analysis of weather effects in an expanded scenario.
Population data for East Timor is hard to come by. District populations before and after the crisis are listed in a FAO/WFP report[5], but no information on individual town populations was found. One civilian entity comprising the entire district population was located in each district centre. Militia activity causes these entities to break up and disperse during the scenario. In two districts (Ambeno and Cova Lima), a civilian entity has been placed in each town. The district population is equally divided amongst the towns, except that the district centre has double the population of the other towns. It was hoped to extend this more realistic distribution to other districts, but the additional civilian entities caused DIAMOND to crash with ‘access violation’ or ‘stack overflow’ errors. The population of West Timor is not represented in the scenario.