A Review of Chinese Development, 1978 1992: Examining the Role of the Developmental Coalition
Virginia Review of Asian Studies
A REVIEW OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT, 1978-1992: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL COALITION IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT
PATRICK HOU
NATIONAL QUEMOY UNIVERSITY
Abstract
This paper follows a traditional method of historical sociology to construct an analytical narrative about the politics of Chinese development between 1978 and 1992. Data derived from pre-eminent scholarly works are employed, while essential concepts such as development, coalitions, and institutions are defined and utilised as guidelines for the analysis. In effect, viewing development as a political process, this paper suggests that the experience of Chinese development after 1978 sustains the proposition that the developmental coalition is a necessary factor of successful development, especially in the context in which pre-existing pro-development institutions and policy frameworks agreed by the concerned power actors are absent. Demonstrating its consistency with the Chinese context, this proposition, in turn, can be a theoretical foundation for further research on the natures and attributions of other developmental coalitions in modern China.
Keywords: Chinese development, Deng Xiaoping, economic growth, political stability, developmental coalitions, the politics of development
1. INTRODUCTION
Following the tradition of historical sociology and utilising outstanding secondary sources of data, this paper has a humble goal. Itsets out to examine the role played by the pro-development coalition of elites (or developmental coalition; Leftwich 2010) led by Deng Xiaoping in the process of Chinese development between 1978 and 1992. With this evaluation, this paper is expected to reach the conclusion that developmental coalitions are critical and essential for the emergence, maintenance, revival, and reformulation of developmental institutions (which are conducive and amicable to development). In other words, this paper helps illustrate the above proposition with the successful Chinese experience of development. In effect, a theoretical basis for future investigations into the natures and characteristics of other developmental coalitions (both at the national and local levels) in modern China can be established.
The next section of this paper elaborates the key concepts employed to construct the analytical narrative (Bates et al. 1998), which demonstrates the importance of the developmental coalition. The third section identifies the emergence of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and analyses some crucial policies and institutions of Chinese development. The fourth section discusses the political struggles between the reformists and conservatives over the economic reforms, and development. And the fifth section explicates the factional struggles before the Tiananmen Incident and points out two political events that critically influenced the power struggles at the political centre. The economic policies and international environment that China confronted after the Tiananmen Incident are elaborated in the sixth and seventh sections, which also provide a historical background for understanding the discussion of the role played by the Chinese military leaders in the revival and reformulation of the Dengist developmental coalition and economic reforms in the penultimate section. But the critical concepts need to be addressed first.
2. The Critical Concepts
Although the goal of this paper is to demonstrate the idea that institutions conducive and beneficial to development require the work of developmental coalitions, this paper, in effect, is a result of my initial study aiming to employ the research framework of Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) to evaluate various cases of development (both successful and failed ones at national and local levels) in modern Chinese history.[1] The idea that this paper tries to illustrate is a major theoretical argument of the DLP. Conducting a pilot research, it is sensible to make sure that the argument fits into the Chinese context. As I shall show, not only does this paper follow the useful definitions of the critical concepts provided by the DLP, but also successfully demonstrates that the propositions and agenda of the DLP are consistent with and can be utilised to understand the political experiences of numerous case of development in modern China. Nevertheless, to avoid sidetracking out attention, this paper only elaborates the important concepts employed to review the politics of Chinese development between 1978 and 1992.
I start from the term, development.As Leftwich (2011: 3) rightfully defines,
development is understood as the processes which shape and reform locally appropriate and legitimate institutions that promote sustainable economic growth, foster political stability, enhance progress on key issues areas (such as gender, service delivery or emissions reduction) and facilitate inclusive social development, at national and sub-national levels.
In this definition of development, institutions are understood in terms of neo-institutionalism and need to be defined as well. The institution refers to a relatively enduring collection of both formal and informal rules and practices that structureactions (March and Olsen 2006; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). As Peters (1999) has pointed out, an institution can be seen as a structural feature of society, both formal (such as the voting procedure in a national assembly) and informal (such as a set of shared norms). ‘As such, an institution transcends individuals to involve groups of individuals in some sort of patterned interactions’ (ibid:18; added emphasis).
To elaborate more, the definition of the institution can also be succinctly summarised as the rules of the game (North 1990).‘They are pervasive in all human societies, shaping social, economic, and political behaviour, from marriage and most aspects of etiquette, to rules of the road, patterns of property rights, ownership and exchange, and modes of representation and action in politics’(Leftwich 2009a:7).Moreover, it is important and necessary to distinguish the concept of the organisation from the concept of the institution. According to Leftwich (ibid), the organisation is a subtype of the institution. If institutions are the rules of the game, then organisations are the players of the game. Leftwich (ibid) also identifies three characteristics of the organisation. First, organisations ‘have their own internal rules which apply only to their members’ (ibid:7). The second characteristic is that organisations ‘have relative autonomy from each other’ (ibid:8). And the last one is that each organisation ‘has its own internal structure of power and authority’ (ibid:8). Examples of the organisation include a military division, a university, a commercial company, and a governmental ministry within a state.
The paradigm of neo-institutionalism is not a unified school.[2] In this paper, historical institutionalism is adopted. For historical institutionalism, institutional analyses aim to ‘examine the relationship between political actors as objects and as agents of history’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 10). That is to say, a historical institutional analysis not only emphasises that institutions critically shape and constrain actions and strategies, but also acknowledges that institutions themselves are also the outcome of intentional or unintentional actions and strategies. This paper attempts to strike a balance between the discussion of agency (actors) and that of structure (institutions). Historical institutionalism pays due respect to the impact of human actions, so the explication of structural factors in this paper follows naturally this paradigm.
But why is this paper so keen on the exploration of the role played by agency in the process of development? This question takes us back to the definition of development mentioned earlier. In this useful definition, development is understood as a process, a political process. This process shapes and reforms institutions that promote political stability, economic growth and other progress in society. It is straightforward for us to understand that the promotion of political stability is political. But to point out the political nature of economic growth and other progress in society demands more elaboration.
As Leftwich (2011) identifies, both technology (scientific and administrative) and politics are important factors for the promotion of development. Again, it is not difficult to understand that road planning and building, which can be essential for modernisation requires technical, administrative, and other practical knowledge. But why on earth is politics part of the necessity? Why is politics intrinsic to the definition of development? Why development is political by nature?
Let us first grasp what politics is. For this paper, it is more analytically useful if politics is broadly defined. It needs to be defined much wider than it is conventionally understood. Politics should be comprehended as a process.
Politics comprises all the activities of co-operation, negotiation and conflict, within and between societies, whereby people go about organizing the use, production or distribution of human, natural and other resources in the course of the production and reproduction of their biological and social life(Leftwich 2004: 103).
Politics, thus defined, exists in all spheres of social life (Leftwich and Wheeler 2011). It consists of the pervasive, inevitable, and even necessary activities of co-operation, compromise, negotiation, and conflict ‘involved wherever and whenever human beings in groups have to take decisions about how resources are to be used, produced, and distributed’ (Leftwich 2011: 3).
Bearing the above definition of politics in mind, it should be easy to understand that the process of development is political by nature. Development necessarily and
always involve the organization, mobilization, combination, use and distribution of resources in new ways… And because resources are to be used and distributed in new ways, there will inevitably be disputes amongst individuals and groups about how such resources are to be used as they calculate who will win and who will lose as a result of different configurations (Leftwich 2000: 5; original emphasis).
Land reform can be a good example (ibid). It has been widely acknowledged by economists, and even by World Bank (1991), that in many cases land redistribution, which eradicates unbearable inequality of land holding, is a key condition for the promotion of agriculturalproductivity and rural development, which in turn can contribute to urban industrial growth. This is because small farmers tend to be more productive than large ones (Leftwich 2000; Todaro 1997). However, in many developing countries, such as Brazil, India, and Nationalist China (1926 – 1949), whether the question of the unequal landholding can be dealt properly or not is a question of power struggles between the state and the landed interests, for land distribution inevitably affects and damages the interests, resources, and power of the politically strong landlords (Leftwich 2000). Nevertheless, this example of land reform illustrates the idea that development is political by nature.
Now it is time that I should explain why it is important to examine coalitions in a study of development. Every developmental process is political. However, in current academic fashion, the understanding of the political nature of development has only resulted in numerous studies urging the building of democratic and transparent administrative institutions. And the construction of these institutions tends to be transplantation of structures and institutions of the advanced Western countries (Leftwich and Wheeler 2011).
It is for certain that institutions matter for development. ‘But what is often ignored is that the institutional and policy environment is negotiated, shaped, maintained, undermined or changed by people and organisations through political processes’ (Leftwich and Wheeler 2011: 4; original emphasis). Especially, in many developing countries, institutions and systems of governance that are congenial to development do not exist, or exist merely in very weak, informal, conditional, and unstable patterns. Furthermore, in these countries, very often autonomous local authorities (for example, chiefs, landlords, and other types of local strongmen) co-exist with, and challenge, the central state (Leftwich and Hogg 2007). Under these circumstances, to build, shape, and reform institutions that promote economic growth, foster political stability, and enhance other societal progress enjoy no formal (or even informal) procedures, appropriate precedents, and pre-existing policy frameworks agreed by all (or at least sufficient) concerned actors (ibid). What underlies this argument is that institutions (the rules of the game) are created by people (the players of the game).
In such kind of context, the challenge of development becomes ‘how to achieve cooperation, trust and “synergy” between different interests, groups and organizations … for transformative developmental purposes’ (ibid: 5). That is to form a coalition for developmental purposes. Notably, coalitions can be loosely defined as ‘[f]ormal or informal groups which come together to achieve goals which they could not achieve on their own’ (Leftwich 2009b: 14).
Furthermore, to launch and sustain development, developmental leaders (who promote development and modernisation enthusiastically) must be able to mobilise the persons who benefited from this process into an effective force, or a coalition. This coalition needs to be powerful enough to overcome the opposition imposed by the persons whose interests may be damaged by the development (Shirk 1993). Above all, a coalition established by developmental leaders and allied with the concerned actors critically matters in the process of development.
However, as Marx (1996:32) convincingly identifies, ‘[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances, given and inherited’.Although leaders and other types of actors (individual and collective) build and shape institutions and development policies, but they also work within structural and institutional context (Leftwich 2011). Thus, this paper pays equal attention to structural factors influencing development during the Dengist era (1978 – 1992) as well.
It is worth noting that Mann’s (1993) social theory provides a solution for scholars who believe the appropriateness of examining the mutual relations and interplay between institutions (structure) and actors (agency) in social change and development. His theory identifies that state elites and leaders do not make decisions in a vacuum isolated from other power holders. Each of these power holders and actors make decisions and take actions that influence all others in an unintentional way.
Remarkably, Mann (ibid) does not exclude the possibility that actors attempt to make rational choices, calculate interests, and select the most efficient and effective means to achieve their goals. However, he points out that rational actions combined with the complex and ‘unintended consequences of the interaction of overlapping, intersecting power networks’ can result in unpredictable and devastating consequences’ (ibid: 796), as illustrated by the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.
The overlapping, intersecting power networks refer to social structures, which can be examined through the lens of historical institutionalism. But it is important to note that the above viewpoint on the structure-agency relations suggested by Mann (ibid) has helpful implication for the analysis of this paper. Chinese state leaders, elites, and their coalitions in the Dengist era made critical decisions against the backdrop of complex contextual incentives and constraints generated by various institutions and social structures, and their decisions often had profound but unintentional, unexpected consequences on Chinese development.
To sum up, in this section, I have pointed out the definition of development. Development viewed as a process is political by nature. This is because, in the process of development, new institutions that promote economic growth, political stability, and other societal progress need to be formed. And the establishment of new institutions inevitably involves the redistribution of power and interests among the concerned actors. This is political, and developmental coalitions are required to be founded and led by developmental leaders to overcome the oppositions of those whose interests can be harmed in the process of development. Furthermore, I have also cited Marx (1996) and referred to Mann (1993) to pinpoint the importance of paying equal attention to both structural and agential factors in the evaluation of Chinese development in the Dengist era.
Nevertheless, the concepts and the proposition about the relations between coalitions and development discussed above are the guidelines for constructing the analytical narrative below. The construction of the following narrative is to demonstrate that the case of development in the Dengist era follows the logic provided by the concepts and proposition. This is the modest objective that this paper aims to accomplish.
3. The Emergence of the Dengist Development
In order to demonstrate that the Chinese experience of economic reforms and development during the Dengist era fits the proposition elaborated in the previous section, it is imperative to examine the establishment and persistence of development initiated by Deg Xiaoping (or as a shorthand, the Dengist development) and to explore how it revivedin the early 1990s after the conservatives’ political onslaughts. This section deals with the first two themes.
(1) The Origins of the Dengist Development
After Mao Zedong’s death, Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor, did make efforts to alleviate the condition of economic stagnation that had existed since the late-Maoist era (1972 – 1976; White 1993). The implementation of Hua’s overambitious economic plans, which intended to import numerous large industrial plants and technology, resulted in an immediate fiscal crisis and his political downfall (White 1993; Naughton 1996).
Hua’s economic plan generated more problems than it resolved. Rural peasants’ evasion of taxes and levies became pervasive and reflected their discontent with the stagnant living conditions and unfavourable terms of trade between cities and villages (White 1993). Spontaneous economic activities outside state planning and against state prohibitions were common although the data revealing how widespread such activities were is not available (Yang 1996). These activities included the clandestine implementation of household responsibility system and establishment of collective rural factories in the Lower Yangzi Delta. Moreover, the rural factories in this area from the early 1970s started to take raw materials away from urban state industrial enterprises and began to push the central state’s budget into deficit (White 1998).The party-state’s control over the pace and scope of industrialisation also eroded. Individual ministries were competing to formulate mega-projects beyond state planning, while foreign exchange requirement soared to three times more than the original plan, from approximately 1.8 billion US dollars to 5.7 billion (Naughton 1996: 70 – 71).In 1979, a one-year budget deficit of 17.1 billion Chinese yuan was registered (Baum 1994:56).