Europe’s Blues

Theoretical Soul-Searching After the Rejection of the ConstitutionTreaty

Liesbet Hooghe / Gary Marks
Department of Political Science / Department of Political Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill & Free University of Amsterdam / University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill & Free University of Amsterdam
/

Forthcoming inPS: Political Science and Politics

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The Spanish, French, Dutch and Luxembourg referenda on the ConstitutionalTreaty are the latest,but certainly not the last, flashpoints in acontentious European Union. The era in whichEU politics was determined in iron triangles of national, European, and interest-group elites ended about fifteen years ago.With the Maastricht Accord of 1991, decision making on European integration entered the contentious world of party competition, elections, and referenda.

From December 1991 through September 2005, referenda on Europe were held in 18 of the 25 member states in the EU, and that number would have climbed to 20 if Portugal and the UKhad not postponed or suspended referenda after the votes in France and the Netherlands. For Portugal, it would have been the first ever referendum on an EU issue; for the UK, the first one since its accession referendum in 1975. The only EU countries that have not (yet) held a referendum on a major EU issue are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus.

Contentious Polity

A series of fascinating studies have uncovered diverse evidence of contentiousness of European integration. Content analysis of national electoral campaigns documents a rise in salience, as do media data (Kriesi 2005). Data on interest group and social movement activity indicate an attentionshift from national to European policy, anda shift from targeting national to European authorities(Imig and Tarrow 2001). Public opinion data on European integration show that its salience and divisiveness have increased (Evans 2005; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Figure 1 displays how salience and internal dissent among political parties have intensified since 1984.[1]

How is this contestation structured? Conceptions of identityappear decisive. The underlying reason for this derives from the dual nature of governance. On one side, governance is a means to achieve collective goods by coordinating human activity; from this perspective, efficient governance should be multi-level because the externalities and scale economies vary across policies. But governance is also an expression of community. Citizens care—passionately—about who exercises authority over them. The functional need for human cooperation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. This tension is, we believe, a key to understanding the path of European integration.

The causal power of communitystruck us about five years ago when we were pouring over new data on national political parties. We expected to see a strong association between parties’ stances on European integration and their basic left/rightpositioning (arising from conflict over economic distribution and the role of the state in the economy). But this association was weaker than that between party positioning on European integration and on a non-economic dimension, measured along libertarianvs. authoritarian lines (Kitschelt 1994). The causal connection appears to run through community and identity (Hooghe and Marks 2004).[2]Parties oppose European integration because they believe it weakens national sovereignty, diffuses self-rule, and undermines community. As the scope of European integration expands to non-economic aspects of life, so Euroskepticism has become more identity-based. In 1984, two years before the single market, the main source of opposition to European integration was social-democratic (Ray 1999); by the late 1990s, the largest reservoir of opposition was among radicalnationalistparties (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002). Hence, our initial understanding of politicization as an expression of economic conflict was incomplete (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Interestingly, a stream of research has come to a similar conclusion for public opinion (Diez Medrano 2003; Hermann, Brewer, Risse 2004; McLaren 2002).

If this hypothesis is valid, it suggests that European integration is transforming conflict in Europe in the direction of pre-material, rather than post-material values, that is, values having to do with basic emotional affinities arising from group membership.

Failing theories

A theory of regional integration should tell us about the political conflicts that shape the integration process: the basic conflicts that determine not just the particular deals that are hammered out from time to time, but the fundamental direction of reform. Such a theory should tell us what the underlying patterns of conflict are that shape European decision making: who is involved, in what arenas, and what motivates them?

Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism focus almost exclusively on economic interest groups as key actors. Functionalists, like David Mitrany, and neofunctionalists, including Ernst Haas, Joseph Nye, and Philippe Schmitter, conceptualized demands for integration as arising among functional, economic interest groups, which then lobbysupranational authorities. Intergovernmentalists, like Andrew Moravcsik, conceived societal pressures as sectoral interests, usually business interests (1998). Intergovernmentalists differ from neofunctionalists in that they presume that these pressures are bottled in national arenas. But they agree in presuming that the key players are functional economic groupsvying for policy influence.[3]

The elite perspective is based on three assumptions, none of which now hold. First, that the public's attitudes towards European integration are superficial, and therefore incapable of providing a stable structure of electoral incentives for party positioning. Second, that European integration has low salience for the general public (in contrast to its high salience for business groups), and therefore has little influence on party competition. And third, that the issues raised by European integration are sui generis, and therefore unrelated to the basic conflicts that structure political competition in western democracies.

The experience of the past 15 years—and the research it generated—has dismantled each of these assumptions. Public opinion on European integration is rather well structured (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004), affects national voting (Evans 2005), and is connected to the basic dimensions that structure contestation in European societies (Hix 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). As a result, the incentives facing governments have been transformed. On issues that are salient for the public, governments, i.e. party leaders in positions of government authority, try to anticipate the effect of their decisions on domestic publics. Hence, public opinion on European integration is a field of strategic interaction among party elites in their competition for political power.

A postfunctionalist theory

How is identity mobilized for, or more usually, against European integration? How do political parties, media, social movements construct identity? How are responses to the issues raised by European integration constrained by attitudes towards other communal issues—immigration and anti-globalization in particular? If what we have suggested above is valid, researchers will have to pay detailed attention to the contested construction of identity to understand the course of European integration. Group affinities are powerful sources of political conflict (Massey 2002), and the very success of the European project has precipitated a spirited defense of national culture and sovereignty.

The theorizing we are suggesting cannot easily be assimilated in neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism. The reason for this is that an appreciation of identity compels one to be agnostic concerning whether the jurisdictions that humans create are efficient. While we share with neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism the view that regional integration is triggered by a mismatch between efficiency and the existing structure of authority, we make no presumption that the outcome will reflect functional pressures, or even that the outcome will reflect these pressures mediated by their distributional consequences. Political conflict makes all the difference, and that conflict, we argue, is rooted in communal identity. Functional pressures are one thing, regime outcomes are another. Hence the term “postfunctionalist.”

Wither European integration?

Our purpose is not to replace a theory of elite functional interests with a theory of identity, but rather to suggest that one needs to hypothesize the conditions under which one or the other is more influential. The majority of issuesare never raised at the mass level, and do not enter into referenda debates or party positioning. But fundamental issues, which have to do with the role of national governments or the scope and competencies of the European Union,have come to engage political parties and the general public in referenda and national elections.

Three developments appear to frame the future course of European integration. The first is populism. European integration has helped to transform democratic politics in the member states in a populist direction but, in the process, European integration has itself been transformed.[4]National leaders can no longer make final decisions on the course of European integration, but have come to feel that they need the formal acquiescence of their publics in referenda (Gabel and Scheve 2005; Steenbergen, Edwards, and Netjes 2005). Referenda weaken the control of party leaders, create dissension within parties, and empower single issue entrepreneurs.

The second is the growing salience of identity politics. This is a byproduct of the populist turn in EU politicsas well as the expansion of the EU agenda from economic to political integration.Conceptions of in-groups and out-groups provide cues for citizens when economic signals are weak or difficult to comprehend, as appears to be the case for constitutional issues (Hooghe and Marks 2004; van Kersbergen and Netjes 2005).

Third, the gap between elites and the public in their evaluation of the European Union has become politically potent. Elites are more alert to the functional benefits of integration than the public, both because elites have higher levels of cognitive sophistication and because they have less specific assets, and are therefore more mobile (Hiscox and Hainmueller 2005). The public is more Euro-skeptical than the elite in every EU country.

Populism, identity politics, and elite/public tensions appear to be mutually reinforcing. This leads us to expect:

  • A greater incidence of deadlock, derogations, and opting-out in intergovernmental bargaining. The tenure of national leaders, unlike that of EU leaders, is in the hands of exclusively national constituencies. Competitive electoral bidding induces short-termism and leads candidates to exaggerate their ability to win concessions in international negotiation. Grandstanding and unwillingness to compromise can pay in domestic debates that stress national leadership. At the end of the European summit following the Dutch referendum, the Spanish deputy Prime Minister Fernandez de la Vega summarized this state of mind: “It is always better to return without an agreement than with a bad one that hurts the interests of Spain” (International Herald Tribune, June 23: 3).
  • A greater incidence of non-compliance in implementation. The incentives facing party leaders shift towards non-compliance when the costs of legislation are debated in public and subject to electoral shaming.
  • Mutual distrust.One can expect the fissiparious effects described above to intensify if political elites begin to distrust each other. Trust is a vital ingredient in incomplete contracting, and the European Union is the most extensive incomplete international contract in history. Distrust creates space for disagreement about whether a particular behavior is cooperative or exploitative. Such perceptual ambiguities intensify conflict, because they extend strategic interaction to the interpretation of behavior. In game theoretic terms, distrust shrinks iterated interaction into its discrete, single-shot, components by increasing discount rates and shortening time horizons.

One possible response to the pressures we have outlined is to insulate European institutions from party competition by delegating policy to functionally specific jurisdictions. Elsewhere, we describe these as type 2 jurisdictions set up to solve particular policy problems, such as managing a public good or bad, or setting a technical standard(Hooghe and Marks 2003). There are many examples in the European Union, including independent European agenciesfor aviation, drug addiction, the environment, food safety, maritime safety, medical product evaluation, training, work safety and health, or vocational training. Elites concerned about the functional benefits of European integrationmay try to hive off a greater number of tasks to such agencies.

Type 2 jurisdictions loosen the link between identity and governance. They are flexible with respect to territorial coverage, and they generally deal with problems amenable to Pareto optimal solutions. Instead of encompassing territorial communities, type 2 jurisdictions coordinate individuals who share some geographical or functional space, for example, as machinery exporters, part-time workers, medicine consumers, or shippers. Membership in such functional communities is extrinsic; it encompasses one aspect of one’s identity, and an individual, no matter where he or she is living, can belong to several. What is more, there is no obvious limit to the number of functionally specific jurisdictions.

There is a second way in which ruling elites could lower the heat: by avoidingbehavior that ignitesEU referenda. They could do so by a) making fewer treaties or b) negotiating treaties that escape referendum treatment. If it makes sense to endogenize referenda in a theory of regional integration, why should one not also endogenize treaties? Treaties, like referenda, are instruments of purpose. If the referendum could be eliminated, not a few political leaders would breathe a sigh of relief. Could not referenda be stemmed by cutting off their source—grand treaties?[5]

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References

Diez Medrano, Juan. 2003. Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eijk, van der, Cees, and Mark Franklin. 2004. “Potential for contestation on European matters at national elections in Europe.” In European Integration and Political Conflict, edited by Gary Marks and Marco

Steenbergen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, xxx.

Evans, Geoffrey. 2005. “Principled Opposition and Self-Serving Support? Examining Heterogeneity in Orientations towards European Integration.”Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C.

Gabel, Matthew and Kenneth Scheve. 2005. “Reconsidering Party Cues and Mass Opinion toward European Integration.” Paper presented at a conference on “Euroskepticism”, Free University of Amsterdam, July 2005.

Herrmann, Richard, Marilynn Brewer and Thomas Risse. 2004. Identities in Europe and the Institutions of the European Union. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hiscox, Michael and Jens Hainmueller. 2005. “Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe.” Paper presented at a conference on “Euroskepticism”, Free University of Amsterdam, July 2005.

Hix, Simon. 1999. “Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses.” European Journal of Political Research 35: 69-106.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 1999. “Making of A Polity. The Struggle over European Integration,” in Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, edited by Herbert Kitschelt, Gary Marks, Peter Lange and John Stephens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 70-97.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2003. “Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance.” American Political Science Review 97, 2: 233-43.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2004. “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” PS: Political Science and Politics 37, 3: 415-420.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole Wilson. 2002. “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” Comparative Political Studies 35, 8: 965-89.

Imig, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow, eds. 2001. Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in the New Europe. Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield.

Kersbergen, van, Kees, and Catherine Netjes. 2005. “Interests, Identity and Political Allegiance in the European Union.” Paper presented at a conference on “Euroskepticism”, Free University of Amsterdam, July 2005.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2005. “How national political parties mobilize the political potentials linked to European integration.” Paper presented at a conference on “Euroskepticism”, Free University of Amsterdam, July 2005.

Marks, Gary and Marco Steenbergen eds. 2004. European Integration and Political Conflict, edited by Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Massey, Douglas. 2002. “Presidential Address: A Brief History of Human Society: The Origin and Role of Emotion in Social Life.” American Sociological Review 67: 1-29.

McLaren, Lauren. 2002.“Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?” The Journal of Politics 64: 551-66.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Ray, Leonard. 1999. “Measuring Party Orientation Towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey.” European Journal of Political Research 36: 283-306.

Schmitter, Philippe. 1996. “Imagining the Future of the Euro-polity with the help of new Concepts.” In Governance in the European Union, edited by Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck. London: Sage, 1-14.

Steenbergen, Marco, Erica Edwards, and Catherine Netjes. 2005. “Who is Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration.” Paper presented at a conference on “Euroskepticism”, Free University of Amsterdam, July 2005.

Steenbergen, Marco, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. 2006. “Evaluating Expert Surveys.” Forthcoming in European Journal of Political Research.

Source: Chapel Hill Party Expert Surveys (1984-2002). See

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[1] The data are from expert surveys conducted for 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2002 by a research team at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (Ray 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Steenbergen, Hooghe and Marks forthcoming.) See for details.

[2] Thus we conceptualize the new politics dimension as more encompassing than Kitschelt does. It summarizes several non-economic issues—ecological, life-style, and communal. The weighting of these issues varies across time and space: in some countries, environmental protection and sustainable growth are the core issues; in others, it is traditional values rooted in a secular/religious divide; in yet others, immigration and defense of the national community are at the core. We therefore describe the poles of this dimension with composite terms: Green/Alternative/Libertarian (or Gal) and Traditionalism/Authority/Nationalism (or Tan). But central to each of these are contrasting notions of community and identity.