Scratching a Seven Years’ War Itch

Revisiting, Revising & Re-fighting the Battle of Mulhernberg

By Chris Hahn

If the hobby of historical miniature wargaming may be likened to a kind of religion, then Wargame Tactics, by the inestimable Charles Grant, may be categorized as one of several important pieces of scripture. The comparison, not made to offend, may be continued with the confession (no pun intended) that I regularly “attend church services.” I consider myself a “follower” — not a “fanatic” — of “the gospel according to Grant.”

This cumulative chapter and verse, like any other religious, historical or archeological evidence, is subject to interpretation. As such, it is also subject to vigorous debate as well as refutation. For example, in considering the subject of scale as it relates to wargames, Mr. Grant prefers to tackle this problem from the “opposite direction.” That is to explain, instead of the traditional method of equating one metal figure to 20, 30 or even 60 actual soldiers, he starts with a “constant ground scale” (p. 14). His specific example is that of an average infantry battalion during the latter half of the 18th century. Mr. Grant refers to the drill manuals of that period, wherein the frontage of that infantry battalion is given as 120 yards. Depending of the ground scale selected (one inch equals ten yards, twenty yards and so forth), the scale frontage of the formation is filled in with an appropriate number of models (p. 15).

This approach makes a lot of sense and is rather refreshing, as it releases the interested wargamer from the figurative chains of having one metal miniature represent so many infantry, cavalry or artillery and crew. Things become slightly confusing, however, when historical evidence contradicts this particular method. In Chapter 15 of Mr. Grant’s often read and often cited work, he provides a well-crafted narrative of a fictional engagement between Prussians and Austrians, circa 1760. On page 124, he describes the size of his wargame table (one that would make any red-blooded wargamer salivate) and details the regimental organization used for infantry battalions and cavalry regiments. With regard to foot formations, an astounding 48 miniatures are used. These uniformed rankers are controlled by five officers; one of these being a colonel on what I would imagine is a splendid-looking mount. Cavalry formations number 24 troopers, and are managed by four officers. Mr. Grant believes that large units are pleasing to the eye (p. 124), and I would not disagree. Though I wonder, if one can enjoy visual splendor while adhering to historical accuracy?

In a series of articles which first appeared in Miniature Wargames magazine in 1990 (please see Issues 80 and 81), Mr. William S. Biles presents a guide to the Seven Years’ War, wherein he examines the organization of the Prussian and Austrian armies. Accepting the fact that no fighting unit -- especially cavalry --will be at its full paper-strength when on campaign, one cannot ignore the fact that the battalions of German line regiments were substantially larger than their Prussian counterparts. The wargamer interested in staging historically accurate battles set during the Seven Years’ War runs into similar problems with representing the various types of cavalry regiments and artillery batteries. This is not to find fault with the “gospel” promulgated by Mr. Grant. “The Battle of Langensalza,” his report of the action between Prussians and Austrians, makes for excellent reading. Readers will, or should, find a number of sources of inspiration in this period-specific account. As readers may have already surmised, I was moved to revisit, revise and refight a Seven Years’ War battle that was waged quite a number of years ago.

The ‘New & Improved’ Mulhernberg

In the summer of 1995, Mr. Hal Thinglum was kind enough to publish my rather poorly written report, “The Defense of Mulhernberg,” in Issue 76 of his Midwest Wargamer’s Association Newsletter (MWAN). In brief summary, the large battle was staged as a test of a cumbersome set of home rules. (Coincidentally, these rules grew out of a reading of the very same chapters of Mr. Grant’s book.)It was a traditional engagement, in that Prussians faced Austrians. The Prussian commander, Crown Prince Nottebohm, emerged as the eventual victor, due primarily to the efforts of Brigadier General Konner on the left and the sacrifice of the Grenadier Division on the right. The defensive position of General Delft was compromised on both flanks, which resulted in the dissolution of the Austrian center. It was a costly battle for both sides. In securing the field of honor, the Prussians paid a price of about 12,000 men. The failed defense cost the Austrian army approximately 16,000 from all arms. Strictly speaking, the Austrians suffered fewer casualties in dead and wounded, as some 5,000 men were captured by Prussian cavalry.

Fifteen years later, it was decided to stage a rematch.

Both the Crown Prince and General Delft are long retired from active duty. Brigadier General Konner, who was present as a divisional commander in the first engagement, is now in overall command of a refurbished Prussian army. His rank has been elevated to match the promotion. Konner’s replacement, one Brigadier General Reichenbacher, was originally a colonel of cavalry. The third and newest member of the Prussian leadership was a former infantry colonel named Wulf. For the Austrians, General Hadik was in overall command. This veteran commander was ably assisted by the young, brave and charismatic Major General Hammerstein. (It has been reported in some circles, that Hammerstein is a distant relation of Maria Teresa.)

As related above, the original rationale for the first clash at Mulhernberg was to test a set of homegrown rules. The reason behind this second engagement is not all that different. Instead of starting from scratch, however, my plan was to adapt an already published and popular set of rules. (Ironically, in the original battle, these rules were integral to the process. So I guess that at least in this specific instance, history does repeat itself.) Another reason for this rematch was to try my hand at a quasi-reconstruction of the field at Blenheim. This seemingly out-of-left-field explanation can also be traced back to Mr. Grant’s writing. On page 14 of Chapter Two, he does not mince words about the depiction of built-up areas on the wargames table. With regard to establishing concrete military reasons for this miniature battle, it might be suggested that the Prussians, by a series of well-executed maneuvers, have finally forced the enemy to give battle. The disadvantage for General Konner and his associates, however, was that the Austrian commanders were able to choose the ground.

Battlefield Design

Map 1 shows that the field selected by General Hadik for this presumed decisive clash of a long-running war very much favored the defender. Villages anchored the north and south end of the planned Austrian lines. The center of the field was “protected” by a town, a small copse, and a gentle hill. In addition to these defendable strongpoints (villages and towns are always easier to hold than take by force), there was a tremendous natural feature running along the rear of the planned Austrian position. The north end of Zietz Ridge offered an excellent observation post for anyone with a decent pair of eyes. If in possession of a field glass, his view of the countryside would be magnified several times at least. Though the slopes of both tiers of this long ridge were gradual, any attacking formation would find itself somewhat winded by the ascent, as well as wounded by the concentrated fire from the battalions and or batteries that were stationed there.

In wargamer’s parlance, the village of Mulhernberg is represented by three sectors. Each of these three-by-three-inch sectors can hold a full battalion of infantry or a battery of guns. The “garrison rule” applies to the four sectors of Oberhamlin and three sectors of Hadendorf, even though the overall dimensions of these built-up areas are different from those of Mulhernberg. The individual sectors of Oberhamlin, for example, measure four inches per side, while the sectors of Hadendorf measure just two and one-half inches per side.

Zietz Ridge, the largest natural terrain feature on the field, is four feet long and twelve inches across. The second tier on the north end measures 12 by 6 inches. Vorhst Hill occupies an area roughly 18 inches across by 12 inches deep. There is a light wood just south of Oberhamlin. Like the town, this copse of trees is composed of four sectors. As might be guessed or expected, the woods at the opposite ends of the sparse battlefield are quite dense. Movement, even for light troops, is problematic. Obviously, cavalry and artillery are not allowed passage. A road does cut through a section of the North Woods, however.

This will eventually enter “the record” as one of the largest solo actions I have attempted. The dimensions of the playing surface for this Second Battle of Mulhernberg are 12 feet by 6.5 feet.

General Konner would command 42 battalions of infantry and 11 regiments of horse. These formations would be supported by 42 cannon. On the Austrian side, General Hadik would command 33 battalions of infantry and 10 regiments of horse. Seventy-two guns would support the defensive lines.

‘Musketeers & Mustaches’

It is not an over-statement to remark that Fire and Fury took the American Civil War gaming community by storm. Neither is it an exaggeration to comment that the mechanics of these excellent rules were often adopted and adapted to other periods of conflict. I have read, for example, articles describing how Mr. Hasenauer’s rules can be molded to model engagements set in the period of Napoleon I as well as Napoleon III. For my own part, I have adopted and adapted Fire and Fury to the Boxer Rebellion, the American War of Independence, and even to ancient Rome. My imitations were titled appropriately, given the alliterative label of the original product. It is not too much of a stretch then, to adapt a set of rules created for governing miniature battles taking place in the divided United States during the 1860s, to battles taking place on the continent of Europe exactly one hundred years earlier.

It is not my intention to provide the complete text of my work-in-progress adaptation of the popular and proven Fire and Fury rules. I do think it is necessary, however, to touch briefly on a number of key points regarding the translation of the “language” of the American Civil War into Seven Years’ War “speak.”

Game Scale, Unit Strength and Quality -- In terms of game scale, “Musketeers & Mustaches” emphasizes battalion-level representation and combat instead of brigade-level. For good or ill, unit strengths reflect the information provided by Mr. Biles in his excellent, if now 20-year-old series, concerning the warring nations. Austrian units -- the German regiments -- are larger than the typical Prussian regiment. Cavalry regiments, for both Austrians and Prussians, tend to be on the large side as well. Where the Fire and Fury rules establish three levels of brigade effectiveness (Figure 3 on page 12), I have decided to double this number for the rating of each infantry battalion, cavalry regiment, and yes, artillery battery or section. Instead of “Green,” there are “Conscript” troops. Along with “Crack” and “Veteran” units, there are now “Elite,” “Regulars” and “Trained” formations.

A brief word on how unit casualties will be recorded. While units will be represented by a number of stands or trays of figures, whole stands will not be removed with each exchange of fire or melee determination. Initially, I considered the use of numbered counters or chips to keep track of losses. After thinking this over for a while, however, I changed my mind and decided that unit rosters would be prepared. As losses were taken, these rosters would be marked accordingly. Yes, this does add a certain amount of paperwork to the process. I am of the belief that this pencil and paper approach will not detract from the overall enjoyment of the planned wargame.

The Question of Artillery — Given the above shift in scale, and given the research completed by Mr. Biles, it would be historically valid to attach a three-pound or light six-pound gun to each Prussian infantry battalion. For engagements set in the year 1762, it would be as valid to attach a seven-pound howitzer to each Prussian battalion. Additional reading informs that Frederick was the first proponent of horse artillery, and that Austrian artillery crews were very well trained. Dipping back into the Grant text for a quick minute, one finds the following on pages 120-121:

“Statistics give quite tremendous ranges to which a cannon ball could be propelled, but at such ranges accuracy hardly existed -- as indeed was true on a smaller scale for the musket. Thus, as a general rule, cannon fire was opened at six to seven hundred yards’ range.”

How are these facts modeled on the miniature battlefield?

Starting with the subject of range first, let me suggest that with a ground scale of one inch representing approximately 20 yards, position batteries of both sides will have an effective range of 36 inches with round shot. The range for canister then, would be 12 inches. Turning next to the issue of battalion guns, here it seems that I’m going to decide in favor of simplicity over historical accuracy. While the effect of these light pieces might be factored in to the musketry phase of a turn, it seems to me that keeping track of these individual pieces would prove too much of a hassle. Why not just combine them into ad-hoc sections or batteries, much like the Prussians did with the grenadier companies of their musketeer battalions?