THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS

Sabatier, Paul A. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Chapter 1: The Need for Better Theories by Paul Sabatier

I. Simplifying a Complex world with theories and frameworks

The policy process is enormously complex:

1) involving 100s of actors

2) sometimes spanning decades

3) involving dozens of different programs in any specific policy domain (i.e., pollution) over multiple levels of government (local, state, federal)

4) involving policy debates that are often quite technical

5) involving deeply held values and interests

A policy analyst must find a way to simplify the process if there is ever a hope to understand it. How is this done? Through a set of presuppositions (that later can be described as conceptual frameworks or theories).

These set of presuppositions help in 1) figuring out what to look for and 2) how to classify or categorize the information

For example, institutional rational choice tells us to look at institutions, individual actors and how they strategically maneuver institutional rules to pursue self-interested goals.

How do we develop these presuppositions?

1) common sense: via experience we can set up assumptions and expectations

2) science: developing a set of propositions and relationships via a public method of deata collection and analysis and clearly defining the concepts and logically connecting them.

The scientific method is considered superior because it is more open and provides a method that produces propositions that are “clear enough to be proven wrong” (note key term: empirically falsifiable) and is designed to be self-consciously, error seeking, and thus self-correcting.

Terminology:

Conceptual Framework: a set of variables and description of how they are related used to account for a phenomena.

Theory: A theory provides a “denser” and more logically coherent set of relationships.

Model: A representation of a specific situation. It is usually much more narrower in scope than a theory but more precise in its assuptions.

What is a good theory: 1) scientific (open, clear, well-defined, give rise to falsifiable hypotheses); 2) should be subject to recent use and empirical testing; 3) be a positive theory (explain something), not just normative (judging something); 4) should address a broad range of factors considered important to political scientists.

II. Theoretical Frameworks of the Policy Process

The book discusses 7 conceptual frameworks:

1. The Stages Heuristic: divides the policy process into stages (agenda setting, policy formation, legitimation, implementation, evaluation, etc.). Popular in the 1970s and early 80s, but is now considered to lack a causal theoretical bases and overly simplistic and even inaccurate.

2. Institutional Rational Choice: how institutional rules alter the behavior of rational and strategic actors pursuing self-interested goals. Arguably the most developed and most widely used in the U.S.

3. The Multiple-Streams Framework: Views the policy process as composed of three streams of actors and processes: a problem stream (consisting of problems and their proponents); a policy stream (containing a variety of policy solutions and their proponents); and a politics stream (consisting of public officials and elections). These streams often operate independently except during “windows of opportunities” when some or all of the streams may intersect (and cause substantial policy change).

4. Punctuated-Equilibrium: policy process tends to feature long periods of incremental change punctuated by brief periods of major policy change. The latter come about when opponents manage to fashion a new “policy image or images” and exploit the multiple policy venues of the U.S. (courts, legislatures, executives at the local ,state and federal level.

5. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions (each consisting of actors from a variety of institutions who share a set of policy beliefs). Policy change is a product of the competition and interaction between these coalitions.

6. Policy Diffusion Framework: developed to explain variation in the adoption of specific policy innovations, such as the lottery, across political jurisdictions.

7. The Funnel of Causality and other Frameworks in Large-N Comparative Studies: Describes a set of studies that use a variety of variables (institutional, socioeconomic, public opinion) to explain variation in policy outcomes across a large number of states.

III. Omitted Frameworks

1. Arenas of Power: Developed by Lowi (1964, 1972), describes 3 or 4 policy types (regulatory; distributive; redistributive) and describes the different political dynamics and actors that each type has. Recently there has been little interest in this framework.

2. Cultural Theory: policy outcomes influenced by four different general ideologies (individualism; hierarchicalism; egalitarianism; fatalism. Critical concepts remain ambiguous.

3. Constructivist Framework: focuses on the “social construction” of policy problems, policy belief systems, and frames of references. Tends to be more popular in Europe than in U.S. True aspects of our reality are socially constructed but they are also connected to real phenomenon (socioeconomic conditions, political institutions and rules, etc.).

4. Policy Domain Framework: a rather complex set of concepts for guiding network analysis. It argues that within a given policy domain/subsystem, organizations with an interest in a given policy area develop patterns of resource exchange and seek to influence policy events.

Chapter 2: Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework by Elinor Ostrom

I. INTRODUCTION

The author suggests that institutional rational choice is too big for one person to summarize, especially in just a small chapter in an edited book. So instead, Ostrom focuses on institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. This is a framework that began to be developed in the 1980s to help integrate a broad range of work undertaken by political scientist, economists, sociologists, lawyers, anthropologists, geographers, social psychologists and others interested in how institutions affect the incentives confronting individuals and their resultant behavior.

II. THE CHALLENGES OF STUDYING INSTITUTIONS.

Ostrom discusses 6:

1.  The term institutions refers to a broad type of entities

2.  institutions are invisible

3.  because there are many types of institutions, one needs input from a wide range of disciplines (economics, political science, sociology, psychology, etc).

4.  Multiple disciplines means multiple languages/terms/concepts

5.  rules (institutions) are created at multiple levels (global, federal, state, local, neighborhood, family) and so an analysis must be multi-level

6.  combinations of rules are configural rather than additive.

a. Multiple definitions

There are multiple definitions so one of the first tasks a framework must do is pick one.

"Rules, norms, and strategies adopted by individual operating within or across organizations."

"Referring to the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies."

b. Invisibility of Institutions

Because institutions are fundamentally shared concepts, they exist in the minds of the participants and sometimes are shared as implicit knowledge rather than in an explicit and written form.

Examples: Property-rights systems that farmers have constructed over time.

c. Multiple Disciplines—Multiple Languages

Scholars within different fields (history, political science, law, etc.) learn separate languages. One reason for developing IAD was to develop a common set of linguistic elements that can be used to analyze a wide diversity of problems.

d. Multiple Levels of Analysis

The nested structure of rules within rules, within further rules is a particularly difficulty analytical problem to solve for those interested in the study of institutions. Those who study institutions at the macro level may examine the constitutional structure. These affect collective choice decisions the micro level. Example voter turnout in Belgium and the United States, why is Belgium much higher? Constitutional factors, local political structures, individual socialization (individualism vs. communitarianism).

e. Configural relationships

Rules are not independent or additive. When rules are adopted they my interact with other rules in complex ways. Examples: Campaign finance with Constitutional protections of freedom of speech, Affirmative action with norms of fairness and equality, welfare in a capitalistic, free market system. A quorum rule requiring a high proportion of membership and a simple majority rule may be more restrictive than the pairing of a 2/3 majority combined with a quorum rule specifying a low proportion of membership attendance.

III. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS, THEORIES, AND MODELS

Research should be conducted at three levels: frameworks; theories, and models. The development and use of a framework helps identify the elements and relationships that need to be considered for institutional analysis (i.e. a general list of variables)

Theories enable the analyst to specify which elements of the framework are particularly relevant to certain kinds of questions.

A model makes precise assumptions about a smaller set of parameters and variables.

Ostrom wants one common framework that will help organize a large and diverse discipline in analyzing institutions. Within that framework there will be a family of theories and within those theories models can be tailored to particular problems at hand.

For policymakers and scholars interested in issues related to how different governance systems enable individuals to solve problems democratically, the IAD framework helps to organize diagnostic, analytical, and prescriptive capabilities. It also aids in the accumulation of knowledge from empirical studies and in the assessment of past efforts at reforms.

IV. THE IAD FRAMEWORK

One part of the framework is the identification of an action arena and the resulting patters of interactions and outcomes and the evaluation of these outcomes.

The first step in analyzing a problem is to identify a conceptual unit—called an action arena—that can be utilized to analyze, predict, and explain behavior within institutional arrangements.

An action situation can be characterized by seven clusters of variables:

1) participants; 2) positions; 3) outcomes; 4) action-outcome linkages, 5) the control that participants exercise; 6) information; 7) the cost and benefits assigned to outcomes

All of these variables define the structure of the action area. Analysis proceeds toward the prediction of the likely behavior of individuals in such a structure.

V. DIAGNOSIS & EXPLANATION WITHIN THE FRAME OF AN ACTION ARENA

a. An action situation – overharvesting from a common-pool resource

Where to start?:

1.  the participants: who and how many individuals withdraw resources from this resources system

2.  Positions: members of an irrigation association, chair of a committee, enforcement officers

3.  Set of allowable actions: what harvesting technologies exist and/or allowed

4.  Potential outcomes: what geographic region and what events in that region are affected by participants in these positions? What chain of events links actions to outcomes

5.  the level of control over choice: do appropriators take the above actions on their own initiative, or do they confer with others (permits required, etc.).

6.  the information available: how much information do uses have about the condition of the resources, about other actors costs and benefits, and about the costs of cumulative joint actions.

7.  Cost and benefits of actions and outcomes: how costly are various actions to each type of actor, what kinds of benefits can be achieved as a result of various group outcomes.

b. The Actor: Theories and Models of the Individual

The IAD approach adopts the homo economicus assumptions of human behavior.

  1. people have well-ordered preferences
  2. complete information
  3. maximize the net value of expected returns to themselves

Sid note – it also assumes

  1. Human behavior is purposive (Utility Maximizing)
  2. People’s behavior is shaped by incentives and constraints (rational)
  3. People are intelligent and creative (strategic)

These assumptions can be tweaked: i.e. fallible learners, people make mistakes but certain institutional incentives may encourage them to learn from their mistakes.

The most fully developed, explicit theories of individual choice compatible with the IAD framework are game theory and neoclassical economic theory.

These theories, and the assumptions they hold, may not always be practical in certain settings. Therefore less strict assumptions may be adopted such as the assumption of bounded rationality--that persons are intendedly rational but only limitedly so—for the assumptions of perfect information and utility maximization (frequent example in judges in criminal justice).

c. Predicting Outcomes within an Action Area

Not easy. In some cases modeling behavior have made very accurate predictions (common-pool resource use – race to consume), but changing rules, adaptations, and learning often complicate prediction

d. Evaluating outcomes

1.  Economic Efficiency (cost/benefit ratio)

2.  Fiscal Equivalence (those who benefit from a service should bear the cost)

3.  Redistributional Equity (it may be important to redistribute resources to the needy)

4.  Accountability (in a democratic polity accountability is critical)

5.  Conformance to General Morality (reduce cheating, bribes, ethical behavior being rewarded)

6.  Adaptability (ability to adapt to unique or changing circumstances)

VI EXPLANATION: VIEWING ACTION AREAS AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Underlying the way analysts conceptualize action arenas are implicit assumptions about the rules individuals use to order their relationships, about attribute of states of the world and their transformations, and about the attributes of the community

a. Rules

-  where rules originate

-  what is required, prohibited, or permitted

-  how rules are changed

-  types of rules, working rule, social habit, written rules, informal/formal

-  stability or fluctuation of a rule/

-  share mean of a rule or multiple definitions of a rule

b. Rule Configuration

What are the rules in use that help structure an action situation?

1.  Entry and Exit rules (residency, race, age, gender, etc.)

2.  Position rules (how to move from member to a higher position)

3.  Scope rules (rule that expand or limit the domain of an action)

4.  Authority rules (what actions can authorities take)

5.  Aggregation rules (Do certain actions require prior permission from, or agreement of, others?)

6.  Information rules (what information must be held secret, what must be public)

7.  Payoff rules (how big can sanctions be, how is conformance to rules monitored, who is responsible for sanctioning nonconformers, how systematic/reliable are sanctions imposed, are there positive rewards)

c. Attributes of States of the World: Physical and Material Conditions

What actions are physically possible?

What are the physical attributes of the world?:

size of the legislature

how one can address the legislature (one at a time)