NORTH CAROLINA CAPITAL LITIGATION
THE PENALTY PHASE – GENERALLY
NARLEY L. CASHWELL
RESIDENT SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
WAKE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH CAROLINA CAPITAL LITIGATION
THE PENALTY PHASE – GENERALLY
NARLEY L. CASHWELL
RESIDENT SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
WAKE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA
INTRODUCTION
This is not intended to be, nor is it in any respect, a learned research paper upon the topic of the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case tried in accordance with the General Statutes of the State of North Carolina. Consider it, rather, as a tool of practical advice and suggestions to apply in addressing legal procedures and resolving issues which either will or may arise during sentencing. The author is neither a scholar nor a teacher but rather a trial attorney/trial judge with some small experience with capital cases. Statutes and case authorities are offered merely to support opinions and positions taken herein.
In the preparation of this paper the author has relied upon and drawn heavily from the papers, documents, and writings of others to whom the author is indebted and grateful. Some of those sources are cited within the body of this writing and all sources are cited at its conclusion.
OPENING STATEMENTS
The jury has returned verdict(s) finding the defendant(s) guilty of first degree murder under one or more of the legal theories set out in N.C.G.S. 14-17 and the State has given notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. The prerequisites having been met, future proceedings in the sentencing phase are now to be conducted in accordance with the mandates of North Carolina General Statutes 15A-2000 et seq., Article 100, Capital Punishment.
Once the guilty verdict(s) has been returned and all jurors, including alternates, have returned to the jury box and the alternate jurors have been informed of the verdict(s); the first issue you, the trial judge, will most likely have to consider is not included within the procedure set out in G.S. 15A-2000. The first request from counsel will be one seeking permission to make an opening statement.
Unlike G.S. 15A-1221(a)(4) which provides:
“Each party must be given the opportunity to make a brief opening statement,
but the defendant may reserve his opening statement.”
G.S. 15A-2000 is silent as to an opening statement. Moreover, G.S. 15A-1334(d) states “Sentencing in capital cases is governed by Article 100 of this chapter.” In State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 190-194 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the limited common law right to allocate allowed by G.S. 15A-1334(b) does not apply in capital sentencing hearings in part because of the language of G.S. 15A-1334(d). In State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 396 (1998), a capital case where Judge Rousseau limited opening statements at the guilt phase to five minutes and denied any opening statements whatsoever at the sentencing phase, the Supreme Court held that control over opening statements was discretionary, that no abuse of discretion was shown and that “…we do not find any authority that (the defendant) is entitled to an additional opening statement during the sentencing phase.”
Therefore, we know: (1) that G.S. 15A-2000 does not provide procedurally for a sentencing phase opening statement; (2) that the opening statement provision in G.S. 15A-1221(a)(4) does not apply to the sentencing phase; (3) that it is within the judge’s discretion to allow or deny a request to give a sentencing phase opening statement; and (4) that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny such a request.
In deciding whether to exercise your discretion and allow opening statements at the sentencing phase, what do you take into consideration? Certainly an opening statement would be appropriate if there had been no guilt phase, i.e. either the defendant pleads guilty to first degree murder or the case has been remanded to the Superior Court to conduct only a sentencing hearing. Logically, the need for an opening statement would be greater in these instances because a jury totally unfamiliar with the evidence offered at a guilt phase will have been chosen.
An opening statement might also be appropriate when the State will be offering evidence to support one or more aggravating circumstances of which evidence was not offered at the guilt phase. Likewise, if the defendant’s evidence of mitigating circumstances would be unusually extensive or complex, an opening statement may be appropriate.
However, in those instances where the sentencing hearing will immediately follow the guilt phase, where the jury has been allowed to take notes, where the State is going to rely on the evidence it has already offered without more, and where the defendant’s evidence is limited to family members and perhaps one or two experts, opening statements would not normally be necessary.
The decision regarding opening statements should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the factors suggested as well as any other consideration you think of, and should be based on your sound discretion. Do not forget to say for the record, “In my discretion, the motion/request to give an opening statement prior to the offering of evidence at this sentencing hearing is (denied/granted).”
If you allow sentencing phase opening statements, remember to give the definition of an opening statement modified to fit a sentencing hearing. In doing so consider using the following language:
“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, prior to offering evidence at this sentencing hearing, the attorneys have the opportunity to make an opening statement. [In the event the State will waive its opening statement, you might add, “However, neither attorney is required to make an opening statement and may choose to forego or waive their opening.] The purpose of an opening statement at this sentencing hearing is narrow and limited. An opening statement is an outline or general forecast of what that attorney believes the competent and admissible evidence will be. An opening statement is not a time to argue the case nor to attempt to persuade you as to the sentence to be recommended by you. Furthermore, what an attorney says in an opening statement is not evidence and may not be considered by you as evidence. [The evidence will come in the form of the testimony of the witnesses, admission of the parties, stipulations of counsel, or any physical objects or exhibits that may be offered by the parties.]”
Finally, if you choose to allow opening statements, remember that you have the discretion to set a time limit for them. Consider advising the attorneys that, in your discretion, you are limiting opening statements to no more than five or ten minutes, unless they can explain to you why more time is needed. Remember that the more time the attorney has, the more likely the opening statement will become either an argument or an attempt to persuade the jury to a particular sentence or violate one of the purposes of opening statements discussed in State v. Mash, 328 N.C. 61 (1991), and State v. Allred, 131 N.C.App. 11 (1998).
THE STATE’S EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING
N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(a)(3) defines and governs the presentation of evidence and provides as follows:
In the proceeding there shall not be any requirement to resubmit
evidence presented during the guilt determination phase of the
case, unless a new jury is impaneled, but all such evidence is
competent for the jury’s consideration in passing on punishment.
Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to sentence, and may include matters relating to any of
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in
subsections (e) and (f) of this section. Any evidence which the
court deems to have probative value may be received.
After you have denied, in your discretion, the request to make opening statements or after the opening statements have been completed, you are then going to turn to the State’s attorney and inquire as to whether the State is going to offer evidence and if it is ready to proceed. Unless the proceeding is a resentencing, the defendant has pleaded guilty, or the State is going to offer evidence of an aggravating circumstance in support of which no evidence was offered at the guilt phase, you are likely to hear the district attorney say that the State is tendering all evidence offered in the guilt phase and that the State rests. G.S. 15A-2000 (a)(3) allows for this approach and it is not an uncommon one.
However, if the proceeding is one wherein the defendant has pleaded guilty to first degree murder and the State has given notice of its intent to seek the death penalty, G.S. 15A-2001(c) provides that “…the presiding judge shall impanel a jury for the limited purpose of hearing evidence and determining a sentence recommendation as to the appropriate sentence…” and “…(t)he jury’s sentence recommendation…(in such cases)…shall be determined under the same procedure of G.S. 15A-2000 applicable to defendants who have been tried and found guilty by a jury.”
If the proceeding is a resentencing and the State does not agree to accept a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to G.S. 15A-2004(d), then the sentencing hearing is conducted under the procedures of G.S. 15A-2000.
Our premise, for the purposes of this paper, is that the State will be resubmitting all evidence presented during the guilt phase and also offering additional evidence in order to carry its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in G.S. 15A-2000(e)(1) through (11).
Professor Farb will discuss in detail both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in his presentation. Therefore, they will be addressed here only in very general terms for the purposes of establishing a frame of reference.
Victim Impact Evidence
Rule 1101(b)(3) of the Rules of Evidence provides: “The rules other than those with respect to privileges do not apply in the following situations: (3) Miscellaneous Proceedings ---- …sentencing…”
One could reasonably assume in light of this language and especially since the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing proceedings and that any evidence the court “deems relevant to sentence” may be introduced even if the evidence was inadmissible at the guilt phase, State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 517 (1995); that the offering of evidence at sentencing is a “no-holds-barred” affair.
In fact, evidence offered at sentencing, even though the evidence may have been inadmissible at the guilt phase, is admissible at sentencing if the evidence is relevant to issues therein. State v. Stephens, 347 N.C. 352 (1997); State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114 (1994); State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172 (1994).
Logically, it would seem that, as G.S. 15A-2000(e) limits the State to the eleven listed aggravating circumstances, the State’s only evidence which would be relevant at sentencing is evidence offered to support one or more of those circumstances. However, evidence about the victim and of the impact of the murder on the victim’s family (i.e. victim impact evidence) although not strictly relevant to an aggravating circumstance may be offered by the State.
In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the United States Supreme Court permitted such evidence in the form of testimony by the victim’s mother and ruled it did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
However, there are two instances when this type of evidence should not be allowed:
1. Where the victim impact evidence is so unduly prejudicial as to render the sentencing fundamentally unfair and thereby violate due process, (as noted in the Payne opinion), and
2. Where the victim impact evidence consists of opinions or characterizations by the family about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700 (1994), addressed the issue of victim impact evidence in the form of testimony about the victim and her character. The Court cited Payne and found the evidence admissible. The stated purpose of this ruling was to give the State some latitude in fleshing out the humanity of the victim, as long as the State did not go too far.
Cases subsequent to Reeves, addressing the issue of victim impact evidence are noted by Professor Farb in his North Carolina Capital Case Law Handbook (2nd ed. 2004) on pages 158 and 159, in the form of synopses of the testimony or evidence offered.
In the event a trial judge is presented with victim impact evidence, the judge should consult the Capital Case Law Handbook as well as review G.S. 15A-833, evidence of victim impact, as this statute is cited in several of the North Carolina Supreme Court opinions.
Finally, because victim impact evidence can be particularly disturbing when considered in conjunction with concepts of due process and fairness, because in determining whether the death penalty should be recommended the lives of all murder victims should be weighed equally, and because the defendant’s counsel may hesitate to object to this testimony in the presence of the jury, the trial judge should consider hearing the proffered testimony of victim impact witnesses in the absence of the jury. The inherent power of the court should allow you the authority to conduct such a hearing on your own motion even if defense counsel does not so move.
A voir dire hearing will allow you to assess the extent of the testimony, whether it violates Payne or Booth, whether objections should be allowed, and whether limiting instructions should be given to the witnesses. It will also defuse any potential emotional outbursts.