J.G. STOESSINGER: WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR
WORLD WAR 1
Could it have been prevented?
Most of the statesmen who made the crucial decisions behaved like fatalists. The terrible dénoucement (utgång) was foreseen, but couldn't been prevented.
Historians have been afected by this fatalistic attitude (events passing beyond men's control). Stoessingers view is that this is wrong - mortals made the decisions basing their policies on fear, not facts.
The alliance system:
The common belief is that the system of competitive alliances dividing Europe in two camps in 1914 was a principal factor that caused the war to spread. Stoessinger critizises this view as a mechanistic one.
On july 5 Germany gave her ally Austria-Hungary full support to punish Serbia. By late july however, when Austrian policy threatened a general mobilisation in Russia on Serbia's behalf, Germany attempted to restrain her ally. In this attempt she failed but had Germany succeeded historians would have had to credit the alliance system with the preventation of a war.
This is the reason why Stoessinger wants to examine the leading personalities of the time and the manner in which they perceived (uppfattade) one another.
1. THE GERMAN ASSURANCE TO AUSTRIA - "NIBELUNGENTREUE"
When the German Kaiser Wilhelm II heard about the assassination of the Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand he was deeply chocked. He liked the Austrian archduke and his wife and had just returned from visiting the couple at their castle.
Wilhelm II had a mercurial (ombytligt) temper and he believed that the assassination represented a profound threat to the monarchial principle (he also believed that the Russian Czar (his cousin) would think the same). The crowned heads of Europe (who all were relatives in some way) would have to take a common stand against the threat of regicide (kungamördare). This is why he wanted Austra to punish Serbia. On july 5 he took the fateful step of assuring Austria that she could count on Germany's faithful support even if it would bring her into conflict with Russia (blank cheque to Austria).
The incredible fact is that the German Kaiser hadn't the slightest idea what the Austrians would do. That this guarantee would entail military support never occured to Wilhelm II (or his advisors). He also believed that a common loyalty to monarchy would be a stronger bond than the links of ethnic kinship - That the czar would support Wilhelm II against his fellow slavs in Serbia.
The Kaiser used a special term for his pledge to Austria - Nibelungentreue (from the mystical German sagas - Nibelungen). The pledge of a Nibelung is a blood bond that is sacred and irrevocable - it can never be retracted. Wilhelm therefore placed the fate of his nation in hands of another power - Austria-Hungary, to take a desperate gamble.
2. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA
In 1914, the fate of Austria-Hungary was in the hands of three men; Emperor Francis Joseph, his foreign minister, Count Leopold von Berchtold, and his chief of staff, Conrad von Hötzendorff.
Francis Joseph was an exhausted and embittered old man; the wars he had waged in the past had ended in defeat, his wife had been murdered and his son died and now his nephew was murdered.
Probably he didn't want a conflict but he was manipulated by the two others - maybe he didn't grasp (fatta) the cosequenses of the policies that count Berchtold and his chief of staff were now pursuing (eftersträvade).
Conrad von Hötzendorff, A-H:s chief of staff and head of the militarist party in Vienna, believed passionately in the need to preserve his nation's status as a great power. Serbia had to be dealt a punishing blow quickly, before the situation deteriorated even further.
Count Leopold von Berchtold (foreign min.)
revealed a striking difference between his attitude towards Serbia before Wilhelm II blank check and after. He shared Hötzendorffs conviction that something had to be done to preserve Austria's great power status but the German support convinced him that this was the time to clear up Austria's Serbian problem once and for all.
Germany could thus be made to pay the price of Austria-Hungary's last and fateful effort to remain a world power. Berchtold was the mainauthor behind the Serbian ultimatum - an ultimatum he was certain Serbia would reject.
The Serbian ultimatum included demands for the dissolution of Serbian nationalist groups, the dismissal of key military officers, the arrest of leading political figures, and the right for A-H to implement (genomföra) these measures to her complete satisfaction. Serbia was given 48 h to respond.
The Serbian prince Peter and his ministers were deeply shaken. They suspected that it was a pretext to eliminate Serbia as a sovereign state. In deperation, the prince plead to the Russian Czar for help. Serbias reply was conciliatory and accepted most of the Austrian demands. Only those that would have abrogated (upphävt) Serbias sovereignity were treated somewhat evasively (undvikande). When Serbia didn't yield on every point Austria broke off diplomatic relations (july 25) and declared war 3 days later. 29. july Belgrade was under bombardment.
During these fateful days Wilhelm II was on his yacht in the North Sea but he didn't show any interest in the matter. When Austrian bombs fell on Belgrade, Kaiser Wilhelm was compelled to face the dreadful consequences of the headless pledge to Austria he had made.
3. THE ANGLO-RUSSO-GERMAN CONNECTIONS
The war that broke out on july 28 was a localized conflict and the Austrians gambled that it would remian so (The austrians thought yhat the russian czar would sympathize with A-H for the cause of monarchy). And even if this would be incorrect Count Berchtold was sure that Wilhelm's guarantee would prevent Russian intervention.
The Russian imperial court was totally out of touch with the russian people (Rasputin) and the Czar didn't control the situation. Russia's foreign policy governed also by Foreign minister Sergei Sazonov and the minister of war, Vladimir Sukhomlinov.
Sazonov was a glowing patriot embittered by Russias defeat in the Russo-Japanese war 1905.
Sukhomlinov, the man responsible for Russia's preparations for war was lazy and under the influence of both Rasputin and his subordinates. The phrase "modern war" irritated him and he took pride in not having read a military manual in 25 years.
When Serbia appealed for Russian help the people responded with heated sympathy (hostile demonstrations against A-H). Sazonov, when informed of the Austrian ultimatum, was convinced that it was a pretext (svepskäl) for Austrian aggression against Serbia (He accused the A-H:s ambassador of setting Europe on fire). He warned Austria for war with Russia. General Sukhomlinov agreed and thought that the war would spread to a war between Russia-Germany. These are the reasons why Russia mobilized its army.
With its declaration of war against Serbia, A-H had mobilized half of its army (one idea had been to frighten off Russia by this move). Sazonov viewed this as directed against Russia and decided to do the same (a quick Russian action maybe would deter(avskräcka) Austria from attacking Serbia.
When Wilhelm II was informed of the war and the partial Russian mobilization he paniced. He decided to try to mediate between Russia-Austria. In this he was encouraged by Great Britain. This mediation is called the Willy-Nicky correspondence while it was directly between the cousins Wilhelm II (signed Willy) and Nicholas II (Nicky). In the past direct personal messages had been helpful but this time it didn't. It started of well but july 30 when Nicholas response to Wilhelms appeal not to take any military actions arrived to Berlin it destroyed everything. In this cable Nicholas II told the German Kaiser that the decision on partly mobilization had been made 5 days earlier. Wilhelm paniced and thought that the czar had deceived Germany to gain time. Wilhelm II came to the conclusion Germany had to mobilize too.
By the same afternoon the Kaiser's panic took on a quality of paranoia. When the British foreign secretary (i Storbritannien termen för utr.min.) Lord Grey warned Wilhelm of the consequences he thought it meant an Anglo-Russian pact against Germany. When Lord Grey desperately attempted to avert a general war, the Kaiser saw the British at the head of a plot to attack and destroy Germany. This was the basis on which Kaiser Wilhelm made his decision to strike first.
On july 31 Wilhelm proclaimed a "state of threatening danger of war" and issued a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding demobilization. When Russia refused Germany mobilized.
4. THE ARMED "MACHINERY" TAKES CONTROL
As emperors and statesmen on all sides gradually lost control, generals and military staff began to dominate the scene. During the final period before the outbreak of general war, one appaling fact becomes terrifyingly clear: the unrelenting (obevekliga) rigidity of military schedules and timetables on all sides.
All these had been worked out in minute detail years before (f.e. The Schlieffenplan 1905), in case war should come. Now that it was imminent, each general was terrified lest his aversary (att inte hans motståndare) move first and thus capture the initiative. Everywhere the military staffs excerted mounting pressure on their chiefs of state to move schedules ahead (probably as they done in the former Yugoslavia today) so as to strike the first blow - all plans lacked flexibility - the generals were captured by the view that once a plan was started there was no going back - a mechanical process.
IN RUSSIA: When Nicholas II received Wilhelm II:s telegram in which he pleaded not to take any military actions Nicholas withdraw his order on full mobilization. The leading Russian generals thought this would give the enemy the opportunity to mobilize more quickly than Russia. Through Sazonov they succeeded in turning the Czars head.
IN AUSTRIA: The chief of staff, v. Hötzendorff had worked out a plan to convert partial to full mobilization with a minimum of delay, which he did when he receive news from Russia. This he did one day earlier than agreed upon with emperor Francis Joseph.
IN GERMANY: Wilhelm II paniced when he heard about the Russian mobilization (aug. 1). The Kaiser was thinking on a war with Russia but his general staff, in particular its chief, Helmuth von Moltke, thought differently. The German generals were commited to the Schlieffenplan (on France through Belgium due to the Franco-Russian alliance). Wilhelm hesitated in front of a two-front war. In the meantime, however, mobilization had been ordered, and the warmachine had begun to roll. Desperately the Kaiser looked for a way out from a two-front war. The idea; of giving the French province of Alsac autonomy in exchange for French neutrality which also would mean England would stay neutral. The Kaiser seized this chance for a one-front war and immediately sent for Moltke. Moltke, a general totally lacking flexibility, couldn't even think on reversing military decisions. He refused though the German general staff had an alternative plan in their files - one-front war against Russia only. Moltke convinced the Kaiser that the German military machine couldn't be stopped, let alone reversed.
IN FRANCE: p.m René Viviani feared that war would break out by accident and therefore, on july 30, ordered a 10 km withdrawal along the entire French-German border. The French commander in Chief, General J. Joffre regarded this as siucidal and pleaded to mobilise - August 1 he succeedded in having it his way.
5. CONCLUSION
The perceptions (uppfattningar) of statesmen and generals were absolutely crucial. Following dimensions of this phenomenon:
1. A LEADERS PERCEPTION OF HIMSELF
2. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARY'S CHARACTER
3. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARY'S INTENTIONS
4. HIS PERCEPTIONS OF HIS ADVERSARY'S POWER AND CAPABILITIES
5. HIS CAPACITY FOR EMPATHY WITH HIS ADVERSARY
All the participants suffered from greater or lesser distortions (förvanskningar) of themselves (honorable-pure) and their adversary's (diabolical). Most of the leaders also failed to pay any attention to the world around them (ignoring both the reactions of their allied- and potential enemycountries).
Finally, one is struck with the overwhelming mediocrity of the personalities involved. The character of each of the leaders, diplomats, or generals was badly flawed (bristfälligt) by arrogance, stupidity, carelessness or weakness. There was a pervasive (genomgripande) tendency to place the preservation of one's ego before the preservation of the peace. There was little insight and no vision whatsoever. No responsibility.
As a result of their weakness, a generation of Europe's young men was destroyed and Europe totally ruined.
THE END OF THE ARMED PEACE 1890 - 1914.
I. The breakdown of the Bismarckian system 1890-1907.
In the beginning of 1890 Bismarck resigned from his office as German Chancellor. This had far reaching consequences;
-Bismarcks resignation happened immediately before the EXPIRY OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY signed between Russia and Germany in 1887. This treaty had served the purpose to preserve friendship with Russia alongside the alliance with Austria.
There existed a considerable amount of opposition against the Russo-German treaty inside the German government and when Bismarck wasn't in office anymore these forces succeeded in changing the course of German foreign policy: Austrian hopes rose when Bismarck resigned. In Vienna he had always been regarded as incorrigibly (oförbätterligt) russian in his sympathies.
With the appointment of General Caprivi to the chancellorship, the NEUE KURS policy went into operation.
The fragile friendship with Russia was abandoned (eventhough Russia had proposed a renewal of the Treaty for 6 years). Instead the German government was hoping on a closer relation with Great Britain. Caprivi's determination to establish closer relations with Britain by the speedy conclusion, after years of haggling by Bismarck, of the Heligoland-Zanzibar agreement of july 1890. This agreement was a deliberate attempt by Caprivi to bring Germany's colonial and European policies into line, by making concessions to Britain in Africa in order to win her support in Europe (the exchange for Heligoland for Zanzibar).