Faye Donnelly, University of St Andrews, Redefining the Rules of the Game?: A Critical Analysis of the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Discourse
Introduction:
This paper analyses how President George W. Bush and his team attempted to redefine the international order after September 11, 2001. Particularly examined is how their justifications for the 2003 Iraq war were constructed against this backdrop. Highlighting the importance of change, specific consideration is on how the language employed by the Bush administration at this ‘defining moment’ affected their agency in subsequent spheres of engagement. Hence, I explore how words not only cause but also constitute international codes of conduct. Keeping with this theme I address the legitimisation of democracy as an unquestioned reality. Using Abu Ghraib as another ‘defining moment’ in the Bush administration’s foreign policy, I argue that the same concept actually weakened rather than strengthened America’s defence when this scandal broke. Needless to say these unexpected paradoxes severely challenge conventional wisdoms circulating in the vernacular of mainstream IR literature and US foreign policy.
Redefining the world after September 11, 2001
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked a monumental turning point for the conceptualisation of world affairs. Or so the Bush administration asserted. Proof of the latter is the repetitive references to enormous transformations omnipresent in their foreign policy discourses thereafter[1].
Responding to what were labeled “acts of war”[2], security became America’s top priority. Once again change was advocated as being instrumental for succeeding in this mission. According to the President, “the mind-set of war must change. It is a different type of battle. It's a different type of battlefield. It's a different type of war” (Bush, 2001: b).
Such grandiose designs are unsurprising given the shock and suffering America encountered[3]. Nor are they revolutionary in US foreign policy terms[4]. Significantly distinctive, I argue, are the vast yet vague purviews articulated within the Bush administration’s foreign policy[5].
A distinctive narrowness quickly enveloped this overarching strategy, however. Tellingly the US ‘war on terrorism’ was portrayed by its leading proponents as a black and white matter. For them the decision was crystal clear, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001: c).
As shown, while such dualisms were imperative in formulating the Bush administration’s foreign policy they became more limiting as events evolved. Ultimately they proved insufficient for enabling it to adapt during the wars[6] they created. On the contrary, when faced with unintended crises the rigid line drawn between good and evil came to entrap their creators. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Iraq. Declaring this to be the case, of course, necessitates closely analysing the broader language games constructed to justify this war.
Justifying the Iraq War:
Manifestly security was certainly a, if not the, major selling point for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Admittedly the battle fits neatly into the Bush administrations promise to undertake offensive measure overseas as part if its “two front” war on terrorism[7]. A closer inspection reveals, however, that these larger “war on terror” discursive frameworks had to be specifically tailored to justify the invasion of Iraq[8].
The principle of state sovereignty[9] was one immediate hurdle necessitating such re-definitions. Aware of the inherent rules associated with this principle and the implication these had on determining what constituted a legal war in the international arena, powerful cases for pre-emptive self-defense were subsequently constructed.
Descriptions of looming dangers posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and links to al Qaeda were advanced to substantiate such claims[10]. Employing oppositional, ‘us versus them’, categorisations also helped convince the world about the near and present dangers this country posed. Measured by such discursive yardsticks, Iraq is conveyed as having made the case against itself[11]. Noticeably as the charges leveled against Saddam Hussein grew within the Bush administration discourse, inaction turned from being being highly dangerous to non-debatable. Simply, “we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in a form of a mushroom cloud” (Bush, 2002: a)[12].
There is no need to rehearse the causes of the Iraq war here. For as Hakan Tun? (2005: 335) correctly notes, “the least understood aspect of the ongoing war in Iraq is what caused the United States to invade the country in the first place”. Instead this paper contends that this invalidation marks another defining moment after which exporting democracy was increasingly entered the foreground of the Bush administration’s foreign policy proclamations.
Once the chief weapons inspectors submitted their finding on January, 2003, for instance, Colin Powell noted, “We in the world community desire to help Iraqis move their country toward democracy and prosperity. We want to help the Iraqi people establish a government that accepts principles of justice, observes the rule of law and respects the rights of all citizens” (Powell, 2003: b). Concurring President Bush noted, “The nation of Iraq -- with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people -- is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom” just as “the world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder” (Bush, 2003: a)[13]. His second Inaugural Address was more explicit, declaring, “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands […]. So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Bush, 2005)[14].
Inevitably this shifting focus represents an astonishing alteration the Bush administrations foreign policy, especially given their avid rebuttal of nation-building as a US objective. Quoting the President directly, “in this administration we’re not into nation building, we’re focused on justice and we are going to get justice” (2001: j). Today this dramatic transformative u-turn is simply taken for granted. More consequentially, the Bush administration was able to claim that this apparent contradiction was no contradiction at all. Conversely, they made a convincing case that the spreading democracy to initiate regional and global change had always been on the agenda. In the process, I claim that they actively redefined the rules of the game.
To clarify, I am not asserting this government never spoke about democracy post-September 11, 2001, or throughout its global ‘war on terror’ campaign. Evidently this word was presented intermittently or seriously implied in the Bush administrations remarks on both matters[15]. Indeed Jonathan Moten (2005:112) claims, “the promotion of democracy is central to the George W. Bush administration’s prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall grand strategy, in which it is assumed that U.S. political and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values abroad”. While this observation is correct I approach the issue from a different angle. Rather than assuming the immediate continuation of democracy promotion, as Monten does, I aim to outline how democratic references in US foreign policy discourse grew exponentially once the President and his team began to distance themselves from their original agendas of preventive force and WMD.
Importantly Monten does address variations in the current Bush administrations democracy promotion strategy, examining, “the long-term shift from exemplarism to vindicationism” (2005:115). However, his conclusion omits the crucial fact that neither scheme took precedence in legitimising this government’s goals after September 11, 2001. Actually, apart from his address the very next day[16], President Bush made only scant and fleeting references to democracy in his public speeches or press statements in the immediate aftermath of this event. Freedom instead was predominant heading used to define America’s global foreign policy objectives. In a nutshell, ‘freedom and fear’ were war[17].
Furthermore, where the concept of democracy was explicitly mention in the early stages of the ‘war on terror’, it was not in a promotional capacity but rather as something to be defended[18]. Noticeably, at the outset, democracy was also viewed as a short term solution rather than a long term investment from the US perspective. Consequently it was presented in their foreign policy discourse, as well as on the ground in Iraq, in a largely institutionalised capacity. Expressing this dimension early on Bush declared, “The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another”. Undercutting any permanent US involvement, however, he upheld that, “rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.” (Bush, 2003: b).[19]
These limited and pluralist visions are a far cry from the universal promise to promote global democracy explicitly advanced by the Bush from 2005 onwards.
Exposing such miniscule or what some would perceive as purely grammatical distinctions may seem awfully petty. Nevertheless, I contend that paying closer attention to the language employed by the Bush administration affords greater insight into the grand-strategic adjustments they instigated to the contours of US foreign policy. Honing in on their discourse reveals this government advocated a very particular iteration of democracy. Ultimately I proclaim that it served as a legitimising device when their central justification for launching the Iraq war became nullified.
Observing the Bush administrations shift to democracy as the epicentre of it foreign policy also showcases how the same discursive frame became problematic later. Essentially I maintain this defining moment opened up the space for inconsistencies between their words and deeds and, consequently, alternative interpretations of their stated objectives. In light of the Abu Ghraib scandal[20] this language was severely contested. No longer was democracy seen as the idealistic standard or the moral enterprise espoused by Bush and his cohort but rather, for many, as a disguise for US torture. Neither did this word succeed in dispelling tough criticisms which potentially implicated this government in human rights abuses. Instead, as highlighted below, after this defining moment the Bush administration clearly became trapped in their own language.
Before outlining how this unexpected transformation occurred I will provide a more robust theoretical overview of what I mean by defining moments. Situating the latter within wider constructivist and discourse analysis scholarship also draws comprehensive insights for examining and explaining these profound turning points within the Bush administrations foreign policy.
Defining Moments and Theoretical Developments:
Demonstrably the Bush administrations foreign policy altered in the run up to the war. Indeed this paper has already mentioned three central ‘defining moments’ in relation to the Iraq war. Respectively these are:
1) Framing the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as acts of war and synchronically inferring that preemptive self-defence as the best way to protect America and the world thereafter
2) The shifting focus away from disarming Saddam Hussein of his WMD stockpiles to promoting democracy as the central justification for the 2003 Iraq war.
3) The erosion of democracy as the keystone of US foreign policy following the Abu Ghraib scandal.
Plainly these particular shifts represent moments of acute crisis for the US[21]. Discursively, the latter two showcases how the Bush administration constructed its response to the same in democratic terms. Deciphering these linguistic modifications also lends credence to my argument that the Bush administration chose among a series of viable and alternative options rather than simply acting unilaterally or friviously. What become apparent on closer investigation is that they were keenly aware of both the relevant contexts and audiences necessary to address so as to turn their ideas into action. In sum, I argue that the Bush administration actively set out to define and redefine existing structures to justify their foreign policy during these turbulent times.
These empirical junctures have been labelled ‘defining moments’ rather than tipping points[22] since this heading better captures the ideas and language underscoring my overall arguments. Furthermore, this terminology is more appropriate since it illuminates the subtle alterations underlying the Bush administrations foreign policy discourse rather than merely focusing on the great instances of change associated with tipping points. While empirical snippets of the US foreign policy analysed in this paper share an affinity with the transformational dynamics associated with the latter, it offers a more thorough investigation into the role that language plays in initially framing and operationalising these dynamics of change. Additionally captured is how the Bush administration actively set out to redefine existing rules and structures to pursue their own foreign policy objectives. Indeed I examine how the discourse employed by the Bush administration helped constitute the boundaries of what was permissible in and possible at different stages of its foreign policy. Speaking of defining moments literally also helps to express the importance these two had incidents in constructing, reconstructing and deconstructing the different language games present in US foreign policy during this epoch[23].
Taking all this on board I now apply it to show how the foreign policy discourse of the Bush administration attempted to craft an appropriate response to the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal in democratic terms.
‘Defining’ Abu Ghraib
The Abu Ghraib incident is the final defining moment under investigation in this paper. Mainly it has been selected to examine how the concept of democracy was undermined in and by emerging evidence that American’s conducted torture there. Scathing comparisons made between the morality promised in the first and the immorality proven by the latter were clearly problematic for the Bush administration to confront or defend. For as Alberto Mora, and John Shattuck (2007) stress, “the promotion of democracy and human rights is a key element of U.S. foreign policy and fosters a rules-based international system anchored in the protection of human dignity. But our ability to achieve this goal -- indeed, even our adherence to this strategic objective -- is severely compromised when our own conduct is widely perceived to violate human rights”. A serious tension arises in this respect since, as I illustrate, the Bush administration itself did not abandon the concept. On the contrary they strongly reinforced it.