SK Prostitution Neg DDI 2010

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South Korea Prostitution Neg

Strat Page 2

Counter Plan 3

Re-arm DA 4

North Korea DA 6

Ext. North Korea DA 8

ADV Frontline: Commodities 13

Ext- Essentialisn bad 14

DA Turns Case 15

ADV Frontline: Patriarchy/Militarism/Intersectionality 16

Butler EXT. 18

Utilitarianism 19

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SK Prostitution Neg DDI 2010

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Strat Page

HEY DERRRR. Okay, let’s start with the counter plan. The only disad that the counterplan doesn’t work really well with is politics. I mean, it can be done, but you want to change U.S. policy towards prostitution and KEEP THE TROOPS THERE.

North Korea is the best disad to use against this case. It’s specific and probably true.

You can access the Aff’s solvency for the counter plan or cut solvency yourself.


Counter Plan

Text: The United States federal government should ban all military personnel from leaving military bases while stationed in South Korea.

Lawmakers want to heavily charge soldiers for their presence at bars that should be off limits

Donald Macintyre/Tongduchon, Staff writer, Monday, Aug. 05, 2002, Times, “Base Instincts”, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,333899,00.html#ixzz0vHLZb392

But now a U.S. Senator and 12 members of Congress are demanding action. Alarmed by a Fox Television news report casing brothels where trafficked women were allegedly forced to prostitute themselves to G.I.s, the lawmakers sent a letter to the Pentagon in May, asking for an investigation. "If U.S. soldiers are patrolling or frequenting these establishments, the military is in effect helping to line the pockets of human traffickers," the legislators told U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In June, the Pentagon pledged to investigate the trafficking allegations in Korea and check other U.S. military installations around the world. (A Pentagon spokesman could not confirm whether such an investigation had started. In a written statement, the U.S. military in Korea says it has nearly completed an inquiry into the allegations.) In Korea, concern over the behavior of U.S. troops comes at a particularly sensitive time. Many younger Koreans resent the U.S. military presence on their soil. Sex crimes involving G.I.s prompt periodic outbursts of anti-Americanism. And last Wednesday, 3,000 angry demonstrators staged a noisy protest in downtown Seoul over the death of two young teenage girls who were crushed by a military vehicle during a June training exercise on a public highway not far from Tongduchon. Numerous apologies from the U.S. military have failed to cool growing public anger over the incident. The military has refused to relinquish jurisdiction over the soldiers. For their part, the U.S. lawmakers are particularly concerned about the charge that soldiers are paying to have sex with women who have been forced into prostitution. In 2000, Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, putting Washington at the forefront of efforts to combat the growing worldwide trade in women. Republican Congressman Christopher Smith, the chief sponsor of the law and one of the lawmakers pushing the Pentagon to clean up its act, says he was shocked to learn that it's business as usual up in Tongduchon: "There needs to be a very aggressive ending of this outrage," he told TIME. "We need to lead by example." A good place to start the campaign might be Club Y, a sleazy haunt that Filipinas working on the strip call "a bad bar." Rosie Danan found out just how bad the week she started working there in late 1999, at the age of 16. Back home in Manila, a recruiting agency had promised Danan the job would require her merely to serve drinks and chat with customers. After she arrived in Korea�on a false passport�Club Y's mama-san took her papers away and told her the rules: she would be serving up her body as well as booze. She would get no days off for the first three months. And later, she could earn days off only if she sold enough drink and sex. She would live in a room above the club and, unless she was with the mama-san, would not be allowed outside except for three minutes a day to make a phone call. The penalty for coming back late: $8 a minute. At least 16 Filipinas have escaped from bars near Tongduchon since June, bringing with them similar horror stories. Official statistics show 5,000 women have been trafficked in Korea since the mid-'90s, but human-rights groups says the real figure is much higher. More than 8,500 foreign women entered Korea last year on "entertainment" visas, mostly Filipinas and Russians. These visas are a tool for international trafficking, says Goh Hyun Ung, a spokesman for the International Organization for Migration: "The women don't know they are going to be locked up as soon as they get to clubs and forced into prostitution." Goh says U.S. soldiers sometimes help Filipinas escape from clubs, but most are ignorant of the trafficking. He blames commanders for not educating the troops: "The U.S. military in Korea has always pretended the problem didn't exist." Danan had to dance on stage every night, eight times a night�and, the mama-san warned, all her clothes had better be off before the song ended. It was the most humiliating thing she had ever done. But a few days later, it got worse�a G.I. came in and paid to take her to one of Club Y's squalid VIP rooms, where sex costs $60 for 10 minutes and about $160 for half an hour. The mama-san gave her tissues and a condom, and hit her when she resisted. "Every time I am crying," says Danan. "The mama-san said, 'If you cry like that in the business, the business is going down.'" In June, U.S. Secretary of the Army Thomas White wrote Congressman Smith to assure him that military brass in Korea "in no way encourage, support or condone any aspect of prostitution or human trafficking." Colonel Sam Taylor, a spokesman at the main U.S. installation in Seoul, says the military is aware of the worldwide problem of human trafficking. "If presented with evidence of illegal activity, we'll start the process in motion to make those establishments off-limits."

Re-arm DA

1. U.S military presence means South Korea won’t militarize now.

Bruce Bennett 2010, Senior Policy Analyst – RAND Corporation, “S. Korea’s Military Capability ‘Inadequate’”, Chosun Ilbo, 1-29, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/01/29/2010012900705.html, 7/1/2010)

An American academic says South Korea's military capabilities are inadequate to handle a North Korean invasion or other North Korean military action or regime collapse there. In an article entitled "Managing Catastrophic North Korea Risks," Bruce Bennett, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, said South Korea could face a crisis if it fails to enhance its military capabilities through modernization of equipment and personnel capable of using and maintaining it. He cited South Korea's outdated weapons, inadequate military budget, and reduced conscription period as the rationale for his claim. Many major South Korean weapon systems "are very old, such as M48 tanks and F-5 aircraft originally designed and produced three decades or more ago," he said. By contrast, "the U.S. military spends some 16 times as much as the [South Korean] military on equipment acquisition each year despite the U.S. forces having only twice as many personnel. U.S. military research and development spending is some 50 times" South Korean spending each year.

2. US pull out causes South Korean prolif

Patrick J. Buchanan, senior advisor to three Presidents, columnist, political analyst for MSNBC, chairman of The American Cause foundation and an editor of The American Conservative, Patrick J. Buchanan; right from the beginning(blog), 10/10/2006, http://buchanan.org/blog/pjb-an-asian-nuclear-arms-race-134

For over a decade, this writer has argued for a withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Korea — because the Cold War was over, the Soviet Union had broken up and there was no longer any vital U.S. interest on the peninsula. And because South Korea, with twice the population of the North, an economy 40 times as large and access to U.S. weapons generations ahead of North Korea’s 1950s arsenal, should defend herself. If we leave now, however, Seoul will take it as a signal that we are abandoning her to face a nuclear-armed North. South Korea will have little choice but to begin a crash program to build her own nuclear arsenal.

3. That leads into a East Asian arms race

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Analyst in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division AND Sharon Squassoni. Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 10/24/06, CRS Report for Congress, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33709.pdf

Many regional experts fear that the nuclear test will stimulate an arms race in the region. Geopolitical instability could prompt Northeast Asian states with the ability to develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly to move forward, creating a cascading effect on other powers in the region. One scenario envisioned would start with a Japanese decision to develop a nuclear weapons program in the face of a clear and present danger from North Korea. South Korea, still wary of Tokyo’s intentions based on Japan’s imperial past, could follow suit and develop its own nuclear weapons program. If neighboring states appear to be developing nuclear weapons without drawing punishment from the international community, Taiwan may choose to do the same to counter the threat from mainland China. In turn, this could prompt China to increase its own arsenal, which could have impact on further development of programs in South Asia. Alternatively, South Korea could “go nuclear” first, stimulating a similar chain of reactions. Most nonproliferation experts believe that Japan, using existing but safeguarded stocks of plutonium, could quickly manufacture a nuclear arsenal. South Korea and Taiwan would take longer, although there is evidence of past experiments with plutonium processing for both countries.24

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Rearm DA

4. East Asian arms race will cause extinction.

Ogura & Oh ’97 [Toshimaru Ogura and Ingyu Oh are professors of economics, April, “Nuclear clouds over the Korean peninsula and Japan,” 1997Accessed July 10, 2008 via Lexis-Nexis (Monthly Review)]

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.


North Korea DA

1. US military presence is the only thing keeping stability on the Korean Penninsula now.

Jacquelyn S. Porth, USINFO, Staff Writer, U.S. Pacific Command’s Directorate for Strategic Planning and Policy, ’07, “U.S. Military Bases Provide Stability, Training, Quick Reaction”, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/February/20070227132836sjhtrop0.6571466.html

Washington -- The United States long has pursued its national security interests in cooperative efforts with friends and allies around the world, sometimes through military bases and smaller defense installations.U.S. military facilities are established only after a country invites the United States to do so and the host nation signs a status of forces or access rights agreement. Such agreements have a broad range of tangible benefits, the most obvious being valuable military-to-military contacts and a presence that offers regional stability or deterrence. The U.S. military presence in South Korea, for example, authorized as part of the 1954 U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, is a deterrent to neighboring North Korea and has had a stabilizing effect on the Korean Peninsula.

2. U.S. pull out means North Korean proliferation

Robert H. Scales, Jr. and Larry M. Wortzel, ‘99 “The Future Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and the Geostrategy of American Commitment”, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00072.pdf

American nuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcome in Northeast Asia for its contribution to security and stability in the region. China’s military strategists may complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China; but they acknowledge in private discussion that without extended deterrence, as provided for in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit.23 China’s leaders even realize that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons. Japanese military strategists express their own concerns about South Korea.24 Threatened by the probability that North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, without the protection of U.S. extended deterrence, the South would probably respond in kind by developing its own weapons. Certainly South Korea has the requisite technological level to develop nuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, because the North already has a nuclear capability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed peninsula. Tokyo might then reexamine its own commitment to defense relying on conventional weapons with the support of the Japanese populace. Strategic thinkers in China and Japan acknowledge that the continuation of extended deterrence might inhibit Japan from going nuclear in such a case.

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SK Prostitution Neg DDI 2010

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North Korea DA

3. North Korean proliferation causes arms races throughout Asia—the impact is nuclear war due to conflict, immature systems, and miscalculation

Stephen J. Cimbala, Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, ‘9 [Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8]

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy. As George H. Quester has noted: If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well, therefore, the world will not see its nuclear weapons being used against Japan or South Korea or anyone else, but will rather see this new nuclear arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held in reserve), as a deterrent against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract the economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar approach to social engineering. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.