Constructive and Cooperative Relationship

or Strategic Competition?

Changing Paradigms in Sino-American Relations

Xinning Song, PhD

Jean Monnet Professor

Director, Centre for European Studies

Associate Dean, School of International Studies

Renmin University of China

Draft paper for an international conference

From “strategic competition” to “constructive cooperation”?

Taking stock of Sino-American relations in 2002

Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich, Germany

July 11/12, 2002, Munich Germany


Constructive and Cooperative Relationship or Strategic Competition? Changing Paradigms in Sino-American Relations

Xinning Song

I. Chinese Perceptions of US-China Relations

Since 1994 when Bill Clinton became the US President, US-China relationship has undergone four stages of tortuous development.

Stage I, the first term of Clinton Administration. During the early period of Clinton Administration, the US government had bad reputation in China because of its tough policy towards China, especially the visit by Lee Teng-hui in 1995 and so-call corss-striate crisis in 1996.

Stage II, in 1997 when Jiang Zemin visited the US, the US and China agreed to build towards a constructive strategic partnership. The US-China relations entered into a period of honeymoon.

In January 1998, the US Secretary of Defense William Cohen's visited China. The two sides signed the Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety. When US Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited China in April, the two countries signed the Agreement on the Establishment of Direct Secure Telephone Link. On May 25, Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton had their first talk through the newly established direct secure telephone link. On June 1-2, Samuel Burger, US Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs visited China. On the next day Bill Clinton announced the extension of China's MFN trading status for another year.

Bill Clinton visited China from June 25 to July 3. Two sides agreed to make greater strides towards the goal of building a constructive strategic partnership between China and the US. The two sides also decided not to target the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control at each other, and agreed to further strengthen the strategic dialogue in economic and financial sector so as to make positive contribution to a healthy development of world economy and finance.

From April 4 to 14, 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji paid an official visit to the US, which was the first visit to the US by a Chinese Premier in 15 years. Zhu Rongji and Bill Clinton held two rounds of talks and had an extensive and in-depth discussion on China-US relations and international and regional issues of mutual interest. Zhu Rongji and Clinton issued a joint statement on the issue of China's accession to the WTO on April 10 in Washington, D.C., in which the US Government expressed its commitment to firmly support China's accession to the WTO in 1999.

On May 8, 1999, the US-led NATO brazenly fired five bombs on the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The US-China relations had big problem but still went on. In July, China and the US held two rounds of talks on resolving the US compensation for the Chinese human casualties and property losses caused by the bombing. The US agreed to promptly pay US$ 4.5 million to the Chinese Government.

On September 11, Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton held an official meeting during the APEC summit in New Zealand. The two sides stated again that China and the US should continue to build towards the constructive strategic partnership gearing towards the 21st century. On November 15, 1999, China and the US signed the Bilateral Agreement on China's Accession to the World Trade Organization.

In 2000, China-US exchanges and contacts have been increased in various fields. Governmental officials from both sides visited each other frequently. The Chinese officials visited the US included Qian Qichen, Vice Premier in charge of the foreign affairs, Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhu Lilan, Minister of Science and Technology, General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, Yang Jiechi, Vice Foreign Minister. Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton also met twice in 2000 during the UN Summit Meeting and APEC Summit.

Stage III, after George W. Bush came into power in the US, US-China relations started a new problematic period. What makes Chinese more worrisome is the US government never mentions the building towards a “constructive strategic partnership”. What Americans emphasize is “strategic competitiveness”, i.e. China is a strategic competitor of the US.

Stage IV, after the September 11th US-China relationship has been improved once again. During George W. Bush’s visits to China in October 2001 and February 2002, two sides defined the goal of the bilateral relationship as the development of a constructive and cooperative partnership between the US and China.

From 1997 to 2002, the US-China relationship undertook so-called “Constructive Strategic Partnership”, “Strategic Competitor” and “Constructive and Cooperative Partnership”.

What do the three concepts mean to Chinese perceptions of US-China relations? It seems to many Chinese, especially governmental officials and policy analysts, the changes of the three terms mean at least three things:

- Firstly, Chinese always wants good relationship with the US. The partnership means good but the competitor means bad relations. It’s the US that makes US-China relationship undergo a tortuous development. There are much less confidence by the Chinese to the American intention towards China.

- Secondly, the US policy towards China has no consistency not just because of the domestic politics but also the presidential personality, as well as the international situations. The key factor is the US national interests. But the problem for Chinese is to understand the concept of national interests.

- Thirdly, although there is difference between Clinton Administration and Bush Administration in their China policy, the basic nature is the same, i.e. Engagement plus Containment.

There is big debate among Chinese on whether or not the US changes its China policy after George W. Bush came into the power. The majority of Chinese officials and scholars believe that the Bush Administration has changed its China strategy towards the direction of more containment than engagement and cooperation, especially in its Taiwan policy. China has been in a very bad international environment due to the change of the US foreign policy.

Another group of Chinese scholars are more optimistic and realistic, although they are minority. It seems to them that there is no big change between Clinton and Bush’s China policy. In general, the basic feature of the US policy towards China is engagement with element of prevention [fang fan]. The only difference between two administrations is the behavior. Bill Clinton agreed with Chinese to building a constructive strategic partnership. At the same time there was bombing against the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. Although George W. Bush stated that the US would defense Taiwan, the independence of Taiwan will definitely not benefit the national interests of the US. What China should do is not to seek for any kind of “special” relationship but “normal” relationship between great powers. In this sense, there is no real difference among so-called “constructive strategic partnership”, “strategic competition” or “constructive cooperation partnership”.

a is if there is essential difference between Clinton Administration and Bush Administration.

II. Chinese Policy towards the US after the September 11th

The ambivalent feelings in China toward the United States, accumulated in the previous years, produced differentiated Chinese responses to the September 11th attacks on America. A candid assessment would be that a large majority of the Chinese people, including intellectuals and officials, were unsympathetic to the United States as a body politic. A typical comment was “you have bombed wantonly around the world, and now it’s your turn to suffer!” However, the Chinese leadership did not allow radical anti-American feelings to surface in Chinese media and websites. Instead, the government took a number of calculated actions to support America’s anti-terrorist endeavor:

· Jiang Zemin quickly made “hot line” phone calls to President Bush to send condolences and condemn terrorism;

· Beijing voted in favor of anti-terrorism resolutions in the U.N. Security Council;

· China coordinated with Pakistan to prevent the Taliban and Bin Laden from getting sanctuary in that area and supported the establishment of a coalition government after the downfall of the Taliban;

· The Chinese were helpful in providing intelligence and information on terrorist networks and promising to freeze their financial assets if possible;

· The Chinese government has supplied food and other relief materials to Afghan refugees;

· Beijing agreed to include an anti-terrorism statement at the APEC meeting in Shanghai in October 2001.

The main dynamics of the Chinese official reaction to September 11th may include three.

A) The Chinese saw apparent opportunities to improved their relations with the US. Many Chinese observers expressed their anticipation that the terrorist shock would remind the American people that the gravest threat to their national security did not come from China or any other single great power but from terrorist groups around the world, most of which were associated with religious extremists. According to their rationale, the Americans should reflect on their international behavior that partly caused resentment or hatred for the United States in many countries and regions. The Americans should also reconsider the planned missile defense programs and move of strategic focus away from Europe to Asia. In fighting international terrorism, the United States might be more prone to rely on multilateralism rather than unilateralism. Consequently, China would face less political as well as military pressure from the United States. Cooperation on terrorism would add more impetus to the momentum of engagement between the two countries in international affairs.

B) There were genuine concerns in China about international terrorism. It had been known to the Chinese government that some separatist groups in the Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region were trained and supported by the Taliban. These groups often resorted to terrorist acts to achieve their goals and thus posed threat to China’s security and social stability. American strikes on terrorist bases in Afghanistan might reduce the influences of the religious extremists in the region.

C) There might be other geo-strategic considerations that prompted Chinese backing of America’s action in Central Asia. As India, Pakistan, and all other neighboring states of Afghanistan except Iran were supportive of America’s campaign against the Taliban, it would have been futile and awkward for China to show any strong reservation, though the Chinese government did reiterate the hope that the military action would cause as few civilian casualties as possible and would be clearly targeted. Safeguarding raw oil supplies from West Asia might be another Chinese concern with regard the conflict in Central Asia.

On balance, it was in China’s national interest to endorse the international coalition against terrorism. The Chinese, nonetheless, conditioned their support in vague terms and refrained from rendering unequivocal support for the Afghan war per se. Most Chinese observers, like most of their counterparts in other countries, did not anticipate the war to be so successful. They later registered concerns about the increased US military presence in Central Asia and complained that China’s goodwill was not reciprocated or appreciated sufficiently by Washington. The earlier expectation of a readjustment in US foreign policy in favor of multilateralism was unfulfilled, and September 11 did not prove to be a watershed in China-US relations.

Toward the end of 2001, the Chinese leadership expressed cautious satisfaction of the international situation. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan characterized the situation as “general peace, local wars; general relaxation, local tensions; and general stability, local disturbances.” He reemphasized that peace and development continued to be “major themes of the day,” and that there were more opportunities than challenges in China’s international surroundings.

The announcement in mid-January, 2002, of President George W. Bush’s plans for visiting China, Japan, and South Korea added one more reason to Beijing’s cautious optimism. He was to arrive in Beijing on February 21, the same date when President Richard Nixon began his historic tour to China 30 years before. It was obvious, however, that Bush’s visit would not be well prepared, and that he would show more solidarity and friendship with Tokyo and Seoul than with China. Still, to get to China twice within 5 months would be unusual for a US president, especially for Bush who had previously been at best lukewarm toward China-US relations.

Yet Bush’s visit to Beijing seemed to fall short of Chinese expectations. Rather than repeating Washington’s commitment to the three US-China communiqués, the American president referred several times to the Taiwan Relations Act. There was no reference during the presidential visit to a possible resumption of the military-to-military contact, which had been suspended by the Pentagon after the EP-3 incident. Neither did Bush hide his criticism of Beijing’s policy toward religious freedom and human rights.

Only three weeks after the Bush visit, Beijing could no longer conceal its indignation at Washington’s behavior in its China relations, especially over the Taiwan issue. In an emotional statement that was unprecedented after EP-3, Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing warned the White House that the US-China relationship would go awry if the US side continued to irritate China. As the latest cases of US behavior, he referred to the visit to Florida by Taiwan’s defense minister, the possibilities of other visits by pro-independence Taiwanese politicians such as Lee Teng-hui, and the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review. Pointing to China as a possible target for American nuclear heads, the Review threatens to use nuclear weapons in a conceived warfare in the Taiwan Straits. Using the American proverb “there is no such thing as a free lunch,” Li Zhaoxing implied that China’s cooperation with the Americans in issues like trade, human rights, and anti-terrorism was not without condition and needed to be reciprocated to sustain. On the other hand, he described the recent Bush visit as “successful” and “fruitful.”

Whatever the Chinese concluded from the provocative American deeds, their reaction was still deliberate, as reflected in the reconfirmation of the visit to America by Mr. Hu Jintao, vice president of the People’s Republic of China and a likely successor to Jiang Zemin as the president in 2003.

III. Tactical Moves or Strategic Reorientation

Having experienced enough ups and downs in the China-US relationship since the end of the Cold War, Beijing’s policy toward the United States is temperate and getting increasingly mature. While the cliché of China needing a peaceful environment to sustain its economic growth and social progress still applies, Beijing has been developing a long-term strategy based on some other fundamental assumptions. These assumptions are at the same time independent variables, subject to reassessment and readjustment made by the Chinese leadership.