Foreign Policy
In Return to Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, edited by Stephen Wegren. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, the 5th edition, 2013, pp. 235-256.
1. Introduction
Around the Fall of 2009, Russia’s foreign policy began to depart from the assertive course that had culminated in the war with Georgia in August 2008. Russia’s assertiveness had generally solved the key tasks the Kremlin had articulated around 2005. The country revived its status as great power and defended its international prestige using available economic, military, and diplomatic means. Russia exploited its energy clout to expand its relations abroad and cemented its military presence in the strategic area of the Southern Caucasus by defeating Georgia and recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence. Under the presidency of Dmitri Medvedev, the country gradually adopted a more nuanced approach to the outside world – one which was dictated by need to modernize the domestic economy. Having established itself as a major power, Russia was now turning to domestic modernization and inviting the outside world to contribute to it.
The new approach did not mean that Russia was returning to its pro-Western course of the early 1990s or attempting to build special ties with the United States in the manner that followed 9/11. Not only did Russia become stronger, but the international context in which Russia had to defend its interests changed dramatically. The world was no longer West-centered. The global financial crisis revealed the United States and Europe’ economic vulnerability; the Russia-Georgia war undermined the West’s monopoly for the use of force in world politics. In the meantime, China and India kept growing during the crisis by consolidating new regional centers of power and establishing politico-economic interdependence outside the West.[1] Under these new conditions, Russia has worked to broaden its existing ties with countries across the world, from Europe and the United States to Asia and Afghanistan. The Kremlin has also mobilized its soft power to reverse the colored revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine and strengthen Russia’s influence in the former Soviet region. Finally, Russia remained critical of the United States’ proposal to develop the Missile Defense System (MDS) jointly with Europeans but separately from Russia.
This chapter documents the new policy shift away from the Kremlin’s assertive foreign policy explaining it by Russia’s revealed economic vulnerabilities and new international opportunities. Contrary to some common views that attribute Russia’s foreign policy to the nation’s traditionally imperialist and anti-Western political culture, the primary drivers in the Kremlin’s foreign policy have remained contemporary and domestic. They include new opportunities for economic growth and stability, as well as the need to address increasing security threats. Being seriously hit by the global financial crisis, Russia remains keenly interested in developing economic and technological ties with the Western nations. At the same time, the Kremlin’s priorities have begun to shift. Initially the country’s leadership was hoping to develop a grand strategy by engaging Western nations, in particular the United States, into projects of common significance, such as counter-terrorism and energy security. However, as Russia grew stronger and the West began to decline relative to the rising powers in Asia and Latin America, the Kremlin made important adjustments to its policy.The concluding section offers a preliminary assessment of Russia’s contemporary foreign policy and analyzes the challenges ahead.
2. Changed Conditions and Russia’s Worldview
International Conditions
Three factors – the global financial crisis, new relations United States, and revolutions in the Middle East served as global conditions that shaped Russia’s foreign policy perspective.
During 2008, Russia’s economy was hit by the global financial crisis. The crisis ended an era of unprecedented growth which lasted nine years (1999-2008) and during which the economy not only caught up with 1990 levels,but continued to grow at an annual pace of about 7%. The global economic crisis revealed the tenuous nature of Russia’s recovery and the remaining weaknesses of its power base. During the crisis, Russia, which is heavily dependent on energy, including exports, was hit particularly hard and its GDP fell by around 9 percent in 2009, while China and India continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace. Russia had to spend a considerable portion of its reserves to bail out domestic enterprises, including non-competitive ones, and to scale down its activist foreign policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus.[2]The crisis revealed that Russia has met some of its economic and security challenges, but it has also perpetuated an insufficiently diversified economic structure and has failed to address some serious gaps in its social infrastructure.
Another important factor that affected Russia’s foreign policy was the United States’ decision to improve relations with the country. Despite Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008, the newly elected president Barak Obama quickly moved to “reset” relations with Russia and establish strong ties with Russia’s president Dmitri Medvedev. The “reset” diplomacy alleviated the Kremlin’s fear of NATO expansion and the region’s destabilization in response to Washington’s strategy of global regime change. For several reasons, Russia had previously condemned both policies. First, it viewed the liberalizing and democratizing instincts coming from the United States as directed against the Kremlin’s power and security. Second, the so-called colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during 2003-2005 failed to bring greater stability and prosperity, but greatly politicized the international environment in the region. Georgia and Ukraine expressed their desire to join NATO, which added to Russia’s sense of strategic insecurity. In the aftermath of the NATO summit in April 2008, president Putin stated, “We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders … as a direct threat to the security of our country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice. National security is not based on promises.”[3]Third, Russia felt vulnerable to the radicalization of Islam in response to the U.S. methods of fighting a war on terror. Although some of Russia’s problems with Islamic terrorism could be attributed to its own errors, such as attempts by some of its authorities to close local Mosques, other aspects were related to U.S. policies that tended to isolate moderate Muslims and give the cards to radicals. In a global world, this translated into a greater support for Islamic radicals inside Russia.
Finally, Russia was affected by transformations in the Middle East from regime changes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Lybia to rising instability in Syria. From Russia’s perspective, the Middle Eastern changes had the potential to destabilize the region and contribute to growing terrorist violence including inside Russia. Russia's domestic ties with 20 million to 25 million Muslims were far from balanced, constantly testing the relationships between ethnic Russians and residents from the Islamic republics of the Northern Caucasus.
Russia’s Worldview
It took Russia’s leadership some time to adjust its foreign policy perspective to the new global conditions. Until the Fall of 2009, the country’s officials refused to fully acknowledge the debilitating effects of the global financial crisis and continued to issue generally optimistic assessments. For example, the new National Security Strategy to the year 2020 provided a long list of potential threats to the country’s security, but stated in its preamble confidence in the country’s ability "to reliably prevent internal and external threats to national security and to dynamically develop the Russian Federation and to turn it into a leading power in terms of technological progress, people's quality of life and influence on global processes."[4]
As time was passing, Russia had begun to draw fundamental lessons from the crisis. In September 2009, Medvedev published the article “Go, Russia!” with a highly critical assessment of the country’s domestic conditions. By pointing to “a primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption”, “semi-Soviet social sphere, fragile democracy, harmful demographic trends, and unstable Caucasus”, the new president posed a rhetorical question “if Russia cannot relieve itself from these burdens, can it really find its own path for the future?"[5]His proposed solutions included the modernization of the economic and the political system, technological changes, and strengthening the judiciary to fight corruption. In his address to the Federation Council in November 2009, Medvedev further insisted that the effectiveness of foreign policy must be "judged by a simple criterion: Does it improve living standards in our country?"[6]Finally, in his meeting with Russia’s ambassadors in July 2010, he further highlighted the need to establish “modernization alliances” with the United States and other Western nations.[7]Official documents too began to reflect the new vision. The Foreign Ministry document prepared for the President in February 2010 sought to strengthen Russia’s economic position. By reflecting the realities of the global financial crisis, the document builds on Medvedev’s notion of “modernization alliances” and provides detailed recommendations for attracting Western investments and creating favorable conditions for Russia’s technological modernization.[8]
The new vision responded to the new realities without undermining the established foreign policy consensus in Russia. Such consensus assumes that the currently “unipolar” structure of the international system diminishes Russia’s global influence and that its leadership must work to revive the country’s status and remain tough in defending its national interests.[9] In addition, both Putin and Medvedev advocated essentially economic means for achieving Russia’s international objectives. Both sought to position their country for successful competition in the world economy, including by capitalizing on Russia’s rich energy reserves. Both were pragmatically focused on exploiting opportunities outside the West and building flexible coalitions with members of BRICS, SCO, and other non-Western countries to promote Russia’s global interests. Finally, both were concerned that political changes in the Middle East and elsewhere may further complicate the already painful global economic recovery.
The Domestic Reception
Medvedev’s foreign policy vision was met with a mixed reaction at home. The initially skeptical members of the business community became increasingly supportive of the president’s priorities, which included new incentives for investments from the private sector.[10] Critical of what they viewed as an excessively centralized and energy-oriented model of development, members of the business class supported Medvedev’s emphasis on modernization as essential for the country’s integration with the world economy and Western institutions. In particular, the Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR), led by the head of Russia’s Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Igor’ Yurgens, published a number of reports and statements supportive of Medvedev’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. One such report described Russia’sfuture aspirations in the 21st century,presenting the country as bound to the European Union by shared values, security interests, visions of world order, and a system of treaties on strategic partnerships in military, energy, political, and cultural areas.[11] Foreign policy analysts with ties to the West also supported Medvedev and encouraged him to go further in developing Russia’s pro-Western orientation. For example, Director of the Moscow Carnegie Center Dmitri Trenin argued that “Russia is not a distinct civilization or a world unto itself”, and therefore “Russia's non-inclusion into the European security architecture is a problem, while China's absence from the U.S.-led system of security arrangements in Asia is not.”[12]
More critical was the reaction from those groups within the political class who read Medvedev’s policies as excessively pro-Western and detrimental to the nation’s sovereignty. Those with strong ties to the defense and security establishment demonstrated that their foreign policy priorities differed from those with commercial and political relations to the West. By highlighting Russia’s obligations to preserve global strategic balance and influence in Europe, Eurasia and other regions, these groups defended a more muscular and assertive foreign policy, and not the one "judged by a simple criterion: Does it improve living standards in our country?". These groups’ modernization priorities also differed from those of Medvedev. Thosesupported by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin prioritized the development of the energy and military sectors, as opposed to the diversification highlighted by Medvedev. Importantly, Putin too was often sympathetic to the group’s ideas.[13]The Middle Eastern changes had the effect of deepening fears that similar developments could take place inside Russia and destabilize the existing political structure. As the presidential election was approaching, foreign investors too were divided with some showing signs of nervousness about political stability and leaving the country’s markets.[14] Outside the Kremlin, the divide widened between successful professionals in large cities and those dependent on additional state assistance for surival during the economic crisis.
In September 2011, Putin responded to the growing divide by making public his decision to run for presidency. Quite possibly, the decision reflected Putin’s skepticism regarding his protégé’s vision and ability to act on his perspectives on the country’s future. On March 4, 2012, after running an aggressive and populist campaign, Putin was elected in the first round with the impressive 64% of the vote.The Medvedev project therefore remained half completed. The system was again stabilized on Putin’s terms. However, the cities-based middle class,which was critical of Putin’s system, grew restless and increasingly ready for political protest. The elections to Duma on December 4, 2011 amply demonstrated the public fatigue with the system, which worked to promote the ruling party, United Russia (UR), at the expense of other parties and movements. Even the official count recognized that UR gained 49% of the vote by loosing 15% of the what it obtained in 2007. In addition, the vote was widely contested across the country, especially in large cities.The new power structure assumed the need to incorporate Medvedev’s supporters, to which Putin responded by appointing Medvedev Prime Minister.
3. Relations with the West
“Reset” with the United States
Russia’s ties with the United States began to improve soon after Washington’s proclaimed desire to “reset” relations with Moscow and president Obama’s trip to Russia in July 2009. The two sides were now cooperating in several areas. They signed and ultimately ratified the new START by replacing the old treaty of 1991. Signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, the new agreement further limited the number of strategic nuclear missiles to the level of 1,500, renewed a verification mechanism and banned the deployment of strategic weapons outside the national territories. Russia also cooperated with the Western nations on Iran. The United States had earlier supported Russia’s proposal to reprocess spent nuclear fuel outside Iran as a way for the country to continue with its nuclear program for peaceful purposes. However, Teheran refused to go along with the Russian proposal, and Moscow opted to support the United Nations’ resolution on Iran. In addition, U.S.-Russia relations notably improved in the area of stabilizing Afghanistan. Russia agreed to U.S. military over-flights and over-land transportation of non-military cargos. The two countries jointly raided several opium laboratories in Afghanistan, destroying more than 2,000 pounds of heroin.[15] In March 2012, the Kremlin went as far as approving NATO use of an airport in Ulyanovsk as a transit point for moving soldiers and cargo to and from Afghanistan.[16] Finally, Russia renewed a strong interest in developing economic relations with the United States. Medvedev stressed the importance of investments to the information technology sector. Russia also completed negotiations over its membership in the World Trade Organization – the end of the road that begun in 1993. In addition, Russia’s state oil company Rosneft concluded an agreement with ExxonMobil to explore and develop Russia’s Arctic Basin.[17] The deal’s success depends on Moscow’s commitment and approval by the U.S. Congress.
The progress in relations with the United States did not overshadow a number of unresolved issues between the two countries. The Kremlin remained critical of the U.S. proposal to develop the MDS jointly with the Europeans. Russia was worried about being isolated from Western security developments and viewed as potentially threatening the expansion of American military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders, which had been taking place within and outside NATO. Even after Obama’s election, the United States remained rhetorically supportive of the former Soviet states’ bid for NATO membership.[18] Russia maintained its right to protect its interests in Georgia and elsewhere in the former Soviet region, whereas the United States continued to demand that the Kremlin withdraw its military from Northern Ossetia, Abkhazia and Moldova. The two sides also competed, rather than cooperated, on energy transportation issues. As Russia worked to increase the exports of Central Asian energy via Russia’s pipelines, the United States tried to persuade potential investors and former Soviet nations to build alternative transportation routes, such as the Trans-Caspian route under the Caspian Sea. Outside Europe and Eurasia, Russia remained concerned about the United States’ foreign policy interventions, which became evident from Moscow’s decision to abstain in the United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC) resolution that authorized airstrikes against Libya.[19] The list of unresolved issues between the two countries also included Russia’s arms sales to non-Western countriesthe Soviet era Jackson-Vanik amendment that blocked development of bilateral economic ties, and human rights. In particular, against objections from the Russian government, the U.S. Congress considered the bill that would impose visa bans and asset freezes on human rights violators in Russia. The bill was named after Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky who was defending a foreign firm, but was arrested and died while in detention.[20]