1NC Solvency/Case Frontline 1/4

Northwestern University1

2011SoKo Neg

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2NC XT Japan Re-Arm Turn......

2NC XT Heg Turn [1/2]......

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2NC XT North Korean Aggression Turn......

2NC No North Korean War......

2NC No North Korean War......

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South Korean withdrawal wrecks regional security and causes North Korean aggression

Richardson 6[Corey, analyst who covered East Asian security issues as a presidential management fellow with the USDepartment of Defense, and is a co-founder of The Korea Liberator, “Korea must choose sides”, 9-9,

Rumors of a substantial drawdown or complete withdrawal of US Forces Korea (USFK) have been around for decades. After years of a South Korean administration generally hostile to US regional objectives and priorities, perhaps the rumors are finally becoming a reality. That would be a tragedy for both sides. If the US were to leave Korea, how would US influence in the region be altered? How would Korea's relationships with China and Japan change? What about the strengthening US-Japan alliance? What if North Korea collapsed? These questions have largely escaped critical consideration in the current debate. Despite President Roh Moo-hyun's stunning obliviousness to political and security realities, South Korea would be particularly vulnerable without USFK, or even with a token force left in place. For its part, the US cannot realistically expect to maintain or improve its ability to exert regional influence by leaving Korea. Like US Forces Japan (USFJ), America's Korean contingent helps prevent conflict by acting as a strong deterrent for any nation that might consider military actions or threats, at the same time moderating the responses of the host nation in tense situations. Obviously, the original purpose of the US-South Korea alliance was to counter the North Korean threat. However, as that threat has waned, a more important, diplomatically incorrect mission has evolved in addition to deterring North Korea: ensuring stability among China, Japan and Korea. The North Korean threat is nonetheless the reason for the majority of South Korea's defenses, even if Seoul won't say so in defense white papers. No conventional military calculus suggests the possibility of a North Korean victory in a second Korean War, but a weaker South Korean military could cause Pyongyang to miscalculate. South Korea's defenses must remain strong.Regional tensions, but stability Even with USFK in Korea, issues from the region's long and often confrontational history cause tensions to flare. Chinese claims that Koguryo, an ancient ethnically Korean kingdom whose territories extended into present-day China, was in fact a Chinese kingdom have raised Korean hackles on several occasions. The move is viewed as the possible groundwork for justifying a Chinese invasion of the northern half of the peninsula, perhaps to "help" a North Korea on the verge of implosion, or after collapse. China's plans to register Mount Baekdu (Changbai in Chinese) as a Chinese historical site with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Geopark list was also viewed as a possible prelude to claiming North Korean territory. The mountain, sacred to both sides, straddles the border. A 1962 agreement between the two countries split ownership of the mountain. This view is bolstered by the fact that China prefers to retain border buffer zones and would not relish having a reunified Korea, potentially with US forces just across the Yalu River. South Korea could not prevent China from sending troops into North Korea, and the US likely would not risk war with China over North Korea. Japan's colonial domination of Korea from 1910 to 1945 has left a deep and bitter resentment in both Koreas that is apt to provoke emotional and drastic responses. One high-profile manifestation of this is the decades-long dispute over the ownership of some relatively insignificant islets in the waters between the peninsula and the archipelago, the Liancourt Rocks. Known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan, South Korea has stationed a Coast Guard contingent on the island since 1954 to enforce its claim. Both nations claim the area as a part of their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). In 2005 South Korea scrambled fighters to intercept a civilian Japanese Cessna aircraft nearing Dokdo airspace. When Japan announced plans to conduct a hydrographic survey of the area, South Korea made vague threats alluding to possible military action against the research vessels. Japan backed down. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's numerous visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, dedicated to Japan's war dead including some convicted war criminals, have raised diplomatic tensions with both South Korea and China on several occasions, including a temporary recall of South Korea's ambassador in Japan. Ripe for an arms race South Korea wants to be the "hub" of something in East Asia, and it may finally have its chance, thanks to the Roh administration. The current US-South Korea situation is a case of "be careful of what you ask for because you might get it". Even so, the psychological impact on South Korea of a significant USFK departure likely would not be immediate but should not be underestimated. A massive reduction of US troop levels and capabilities could have the same effect as a complete withdrawal on Seoul's planning processes. It might begin with regretful concern, but could quickly become panic. At this point it should be noted that even if the USFK withdraws from Korea, some sort of collaborative security agreement will remain in place. However, South Korea's perception of America's commitment to security on the peninsula is the decisive factor in how it will react to real and perceived threats.What are now relatively minor disagreements with Japan and China would take on a more serious dimension. Without USFK, South Korea would need to vastly increase its defense budget to make up for functions long taken for granted. With American forces on its soil as a safety net, South Korea didn't have to be overly concerned with being attacked or invaded. Many Koreans would perceive that era over. Another factor is the closer US-Japan security partnership, which causes both China and South Korea concern. Some in the South Korean defense sector are undoubtedly jealous of the relationship Japan enjoys with the US. Japan would also need to take into consideration a South Korea without the moderating influence of USFK, although the role of USFJ in Japan would reduce much concern. In such an environment it's not unthinkable that a few minor skirmishes could occur, between South Korean and Japanese navel vessels in the vicinity of Dokdo, for example. This would be the slow start of a regional arms race, with Korea and Japan joining China's ongoing buildup. A reunified Korea could go nuclear North Korea is the wildcard. If in the next few years reunification were to occur - through a North Korean collapse, the death of Kim Jong-il, or a possible but unlikely mutual agreement - South Korea would suddenly find itself straddled with the enormous cost of integrating North Korea.These costs would dwarf the already massive increase South Korea would have been undertaking in defense spending, something it would clearly be unprepared and unable to accomplish while maintaining its defense investment. A Korea faced with an economic dilemma of such magnitude would find maintaining its conventional military forces at current levels impossible. At the same time, it would feel more vulnerable than ever, even with US security assurances. For a nation paranoid

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about the possibility of outside influence or military intervention, strapped for cash, and obsessed about its position in the international hierarchy, the obvious route might be to either incorporate North Korean nuclear devices (if they actually exist), or build their own, something South Korean technicians could easily accomplish. North Korea, after all, has set the example for economically challenged nations looking for the ultimate in deterrence. One might argue that clear and firm US security guarantees for a reunified Korea would be able to dissuade any government from choosing the nuclear option. If making decisions based purely on logic the answer would be probably yes. Unfortunately, the recent Korean leadership has established a record of being motivated more by emotional and nationalistic factors than logical or realistic ones. Antics over Dokdo and the Yasukuni Shrine and alienating the US serve as examples. But the continuation of the "Sunshine Policy" tops those. Instead of admitting they've been sold a dead horse, the Roh administration continued riding the rotting and bloated beast known as the Sunshine Policy, until all that are left today are a pile of bones, a bit of dried skin, and a few tufts of dirty hair. Roh, however, is still in the saddle, if not as firmly after North Korea's recent missile tests. Japan must then consider its options in countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea without USFK. Already building momentum to change its constitution to clarify its military, it's not inconceivable that Japan would ultimately consider going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea, there is no technological barrier preventing Japan from building nuclear weapons. While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable, that an arms race would occur is probable. Only the perception of threat and vulnerability need be present for this to occur. East Asia could become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus dispute between China and Japan, or the Koguryo dispute between Korea and China.The arms race need not occur One could argue that the US would be able to step in and moderate things before such an escalation could occur. Considering the recent US record on influencing either North or South Korea, it is perhaps unwise to count on it being able to do so at some crucial point in the future.One could also argue that the US need not be involved in a future East Asian war. Like assuming there is no need for USFK since North Korea is considered less of a threat to Seoul, that is wishful thinking. The US has too many political and diplomatic ties, aside from alliance obligations, to ignore such a war. For American policymakers, the notion that a withdrawal is a deserved payback for the rampant anti-Americanism in South Korea, or that the few billion we spend on defense there is a catastrophic waste, need to be discarded. The potential cost of a war would be far greater in both American lives and in dollars, the benefits of continued peace immeasurable. Vastly reducing or withdrawing USFK can only harm US security, it cannot help it. USFK has helped maintain peace and allowed the US to project influence in the region for the past six decades; removing that presence would be foolish and difficult to replicate once done. It is also important to keep in mind that the next presidential election will likely result in a less anti-American administration. South Korean policymakers and citizens alike need to come to terms with the fact that Korea will probably never be a powerful nation, but because of its location it will always be important in the geopolitical sense. Because of this, Korea can never take the middle ground or play a "balancing" role; Korea must choose sides. Finally, the reality that both American and South Korean policymakers need to come to terms with is that USFK deterring a second North Korean invasion has become a secondary mission to maintaining regional stability, even in a reunified Korea.

Turn—Japanese nuclearization

Dao 3 [1/5/03, James, NY Times, “Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?”

Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia."In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond." In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about theUnited States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much theUnited States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term." "Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."

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Extinction

Circione 2K[Director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/22/00 (Foreign Policy)]

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses.Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence.Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

Turn—heg

Kang & Cha 3– *associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND **associate professor of government Georgetown’s school of Foreign Service (May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, “Think Again: The Korea Crisis,”

“The United States Should Pull Its Troops Out of an Ungrateful South Korea” Not yet. Massive demonstrations, Molotov cocktails hurled into U.S. bases, and American soldiers stabbed on the streets of Seoul have stoked anger in Congress and on the op-ed pages of major newspapers about South Korea. As North Korea appears on the nuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by the groundswell of anti-Americanism. They cringe at a younger generation of Koreans who tell cbs television’s investigative program 60 Minutes that Bush is more threatening than Kim, and they worry about reports that South Korea’s new president, Roh Moo-hyun, was avowedly anti-American in his younger days. Most Koreans have complicated feelings about the United States. Some of them are anti-American, to be sure, but many are grateful. South Korea has historically been one of the strongest allies of the United States. Yet it would be naive to dismiss the concerns of South Koreans about U.S. policy and the continued presence of U.S. forces as merely emotional. Imagine, for example, how Washingtonians might feel about the concrete economic impact of thousands of foreign soldiers monopolizing prime real estate downtown in the nation’s capital, as U.S. forces do in Seoul. But hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces is hardly the answer to such trans-Pacific anxiety, particularly as the U.S.–South Korean alliance enters uncharted territory. The North Koreans would claim victory, and the United States would lose influence in one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world—an outcome it neither wants nor can afford. In the long term, such a withdrawal would also pave the way for Chinese regional dominance. Some South Koreans might welcome a larger role for China—a romantic and uninformed notion at best. Betting on China, after all, did not make South Korea the 12th largest economy and one of the most vibrant liberal democracies in the world. The alternatives to the alliance are not appealing to either South Koreans or Americans. Seoul would have to boost its relatively low level of defense spending (which, at roughly 3 percent of gross domestic product, is less than that of Israel and Saudi Arabia, for example). Washington would run the risk of jeopardizing its military presence across East Asia, as a U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula raised questions about the raison d’être for keeping its troops in Japan. A revision in the U.S. military presence in Korea is likely within the next five years, but withdrawal of that presence and abrogation of its alliance are not.